OpenJurist

919 F2d 145 McSwine v. L Callahan G

919 F.2d 145

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Frederick Earl McSWINE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
William L. CALLAHAN, Kurt Peterson, Superintendent, Chase
Riveland, Curt Snyder, Rannie G. Vickers,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90-35139.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 6, 1990.*
Decided Nov. 26, 1990.

Before TANG, O'SCANNLAIN and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM**

2

Frederick Earl McSwine, a Nebraska state prisoner, appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees Washington state prison officials in his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. McSwine, a former Washington state prisoner, contends his due process right to a speedy trial and right to equal protection were violated when appellees failed to comply with certain provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"), see Wash.Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 9.100.010 (1990), and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ("UCEA"), see Wash.Rev.Code Ann. Secs. 10.88.200 et seq. (1990). We affirm.

DISCUSSION

I. McSwine's Claims Under the IAD

3

McSwine raises two claims under the IAD. First, McSwine contends appellees denied him his rights to a speedy trial and equal protection by frustrating and ultimately thwarting his attempts under Article III of the IAD to request final disposition of two pending charges against him in Nebraska. Second, McSwine claims appellees violated those same rights by not transferring him temporarily to Nebraska after that state had sought his temporary custody after properly invoking Article IV of the IAD based on the two pending charges.

4

These claims are without merit. McSwine's rights under the IAD related to the pending charges against him in Nebraska for burglary and forgery. These charges were dismissed. The charges upon which McSwine eventually was convicted in Nebraska, two counts of willful failure to appear, were brought after McSwine was extradited to that state on June 17, 1987. Accordingly, we conclude that any rights McSwine may have had under the IAD terminated with the dismissal of the pending burglary and forgery charges in Nebraska. See State v. McSwine, 231 Neb. 886, 889, 438 N.W.2d 778, 780 (1989) (reaching same conclusion). Summary judgment was appropriate as to these issues.

II. McSwine's Claims Under the UCEA

5

McSwine also contends appellees violated his civil rights by not affording him a hearing before he was extradited to Nebraska. We reject this claim. McSwine admitted he signed a waiver of extradition on June 30, 1986. He was extradited to Nebraska on June 17, 1987, pursuant to this waiver. McSwine's waiver of extradition relieved both Washington and Nebraska from any further duty to meet the formal requirements of the UCEA. See Wash.Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 10.88.430 (1990). Accordingly, summary judgment as to this issue was appropriate.

6

AFFIRMED.

*

The panel unanimously finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 34(a) and 9th Cir.R. 34-4

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3