927 F2d 610 Plunkett v. United States Parole Commission

927 F.2d 610

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Noel Edward PLUNKETT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-35812.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Mar. 1, 1991.*
Decided March 5, 1991.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, No. CV-88-278-AAM; Alan A. McDonald, District Judge, Presiding.

E.D.Wash.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

Before FLETCHER, PREGERSON and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM**

2

Noel Edward Plunkett, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his civil rights action for damages and injunctive relief. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we review de novo, Tucker v. Carlson, No. 88-15568, slip op. 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 1991). We affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.

3

On May 25, 1988, Plunkett filed a civil rights action against the U.S. Parole Commission ("USPC"), USPC Hearing Examiner James Kelley, U.S. Probation and Parole Officer Paul Turner, and Federal Bureau of Prisons Officials John Sugrue and Sam Shoquist. Plunkett later amended his complaint to add the United States as a defendant. Plunkett's complaint, brought pursuant to various civil rights statutes and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleged that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of due process during a parole recission hearing held on July 22, 1986. Plunkett alleged that after this hearing, the USPC rescinded his presumptive parole date of August 25, 1986, ordered him to remain in prison until the expiration of his federal sentence in May of 1992, and imposed a special mental health aftercare condition. Plunkett's complaint further alleged that the conspiracy among the defendants was racially motivated and undertaken in retaliation for his litigation activities. Plunkett sought both monetary damages and an injunction ordering his immediate release on parole, restoration of good time credits, and expunction of certain prison disciplinary infractions from his record.

4

Initially, the district court stayed the civil rights action pending disposition of a habeas petition Plunkett previously had filed, which was based on substantially the same facts. On August 10, 1989, an unpublished order partially granting Plunkett's habeas petition was filed. Plunkett v. Kincheloe, No. C-87-736-JLQ (E.D.Wash. Aug. 10, 1989). On August 29, 1989, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in this action based on the findings of the order in the habeas action.

5

On September 1, 1989, the district court considered Plunkett's civil rights complaint and denied his claims for injunctive relief, stating:

6

Although Plunkett may maintain this action seeking money damages for his alleged illegal incarceration, he cannot obtain an earlier or speedier release. To do so he must utilize the remedy provided by habeas corpus.

7

On September 6, 1989, Plunkett filed a motion to amend his complaint to include claims for habeas relief in addition to his claims for monetary damages. The district court did not rule on either Plunkett's motion for habeas relief or on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Instead, on November 6, 1989, the court dismissed the action, finding in part that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute immunity from damages.1

8

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Plunkett's claims for damages because parole officials are entitled to absolute immunity from damages, based on their quasi-judicial status, for actions taken when processing parole applications. See Fendler v. United States Parole Comm'n, 774 F.2d 975, 980 (9th Cir.1985); Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir.1983) (parole board members are absolutely immune when they act to grant, deny, or revoke parole).

9

The district court erred, however, in denying Plunkett's claims for injunctive relief. To the extent that Plunkett challenged the fact or duration of his confinement, the district court should have construed the complaint as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241. See Tucker, slip op. at 1345. Moreover, the district court should have considered and ruled on Plunkett's motion to amend his complaint to include habeas claims. Accordingly, we remand for the district court to consider Plunkett's habeas claims.2

10

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.3

*

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4. Accordingly, Plunkett's request for oral argument is denied

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

1

In his briefs on appeal, Plunkett does not challenge the other rulings made by the district court in its order dismissing the action. Accordingly, Plunkett has waived these issues. See Wilcox v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 n. 2 (9th Cir.1988)

2

It is not clear from the record whether the habeas claims Plunkett raised in this action are different than the claims he raised in his previous habeas petition, or whether he has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to any new claims. These issues can be considered by the district court on remand

3

Plunkett's requests for appointment of counsel and for transfer of this action to another district court judge are denied