937 F.2d 611
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Sylvia Jean BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 90-15087.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 27, 1991.*
Decided July 1, 1991.
Before SCHROEDER, FLETCHER and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM**
Sylvia Jean Brown, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 motion to vacate her sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2255 and 1291. We review de novo, United States v. Popoola, 881 F.2d 811, 812 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam), and affirm.
District courts have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain section 2255 motions only from persons who are " 'in custody' in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(3) (1982). The movant must be "in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed." Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) (citation omitted); Feldman v. Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir.1990). Once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual "in custody" for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492; Feldman, 902 F.2d at 1448. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968).
Here, Brown is challenging a federal sentence imposed in 1975, which sentence she served in its entirety by April 1983. Brown remained in federal custody after the expiration of her 1975 sentence, however, because she also was serving a concurrent twenty year sentence imposed in Oklahoma in 1978 for an unrelated crime. Brown filed this section 2255 motion in November 1989, and is not challenging her 1978 conviction or sentence. Her only contention is that her 1975 sentence was improper. Thus, because Brown's 1975 expired well before she filed this section 2255 motion, Brown fails to satisfy the "in custody" requirement to challenge her 1975 sentence. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491-92; Feldman, 902 F.2d at 1448. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed Brown's section 2255 motion.
AFFIRMED.