Volume 1 — Barbour's New York Chancery Reports

This case, came, before the chancellor upon bill and answer, and upon a master’s report of the facts in relation to the rights of such of the defendants as were infants. The object of the suit was to establish a will of the complainant’s deceased wife, as a valid disposition of her separate estate held in trust; such will having been lost by accident, or fraudulently and feloniously taken and destroyed.

This case came- before the chancellor upon appeal by C. Schwab, one of the defendants,- from an order of the vice chancellor of the' first circuit.

The bill in this case stated that J. Holmes, of Albany, died in 1832, leaving his daughter, one of the complainants, and eight other children surviving him, who were entitled to the real estate of which he died seized; that at the time of his death he owned in fee certain lots in the city of Albany, described in the bill, which were then subject to a mortgage to the commissioners of loans of the county of Albany; that the mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the premises…

This was an application on the part of the complainant to dismiss an appeal, by the defendant, from a decree of the assistant vice chancellor.

This was an appeal from an order of a vice chancellor, setting aside an order, for an attachment, which had been made by such vice chancellor, and all subsequent proceedings thereon, for irregularity; with costs.

This was an application, by the complainant, for a retaxation of the defendant’s costs, upon a decree for the dismissal of the complainant’s bill. The principal items objected to were, the costs upon a motion made by the defendant, to dissolve an injunction which had been granted in the cause; and nothing was said in the order in relation to the costs of the application.

The bill in this cause was filed to charge the separate estate of a feme covert, in the hands of her trustee, with the amount of an order drawn upon the trustee, by- her' husband, in her name. The bill was taken as confessed against all of the defendants, and the case was submitted by the complainant for a decree.

This case came before the chancellor upon an inquisition finding P. Russell to be a lunatic, and upon the petition of one of his sons, on whose application the commission was issued, to have a committee of his person and estate appointed. A counter application was made on the part of Russell to have the inquisition set aside for irregularity, or for leave to traverse, or for a feigned issue to try the question of lunacy.

This was a itiotion to dissolve an injunction upon bill and answer. The object of the injunction was to stay the defendant from proceeding at law to foreclose a mortgage under the statute, upon the ground of alleged usury in the mortgage. The bill charged that a part of the consideration of the mortgage was an usurious negotiable note given by the complainant to T. Ells, and endorsed by the latter and sold to the defendant.

An application was made in this case for the appointment of a committee of the person and estate of an habitual drunkard; and the order as proposed by the solicitor for the petitioner directed the bond of the committee and his sureties to be made payable to the drunkard, and to be- filed with the register.

This was ah appeal from a decision of the' surrogate of the city and county of New-York, appointing the respondent administrator of' the estate of his deceased father. The intestate left three children surviving him, one daughter, the wife of the appellant, and two sons; the respondent, and a younger son who was admitted to he incompetent. The appellant applied for letters of administration, on the estate, in rightof his wife.

This was an application, on the part of the complainant, for an injunction or order restraining the defendant from proceeding at law to foreclose a mortgage, according to the statute, under the following circumstances. In 1839, R, H. Nicholas was the committee of the estate of R. Nicholas, his father, who had, been found an habitual drunkard; upon a commission granted by the vice chancellor of the fifth, circuit.

This was an application to dissolve an injunction upon bill and answer.

This was an application, oh the part of the complainants, to open an order entered by tlie defendant to close the proofs, and to allow farther timé for the complainants to take testimony in this cause. And a second application was made, for leave to amend the complainants’ bill, by striking out the name of Murray as one of the complainants therein.

This was an application, on the part of the defendants, to dissolve, or modify, or set aside, the injunction which had been issued in this cause; on the ground of the insufficiency of the bond which had been taken by the injunction master, upon allowing such injunction.

This was an appeal from an order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, ordering the defendant’s exceptions, to the master’s amended report in this case, to be taken off the files of the court.

' A motion was made, founded upon a service on the former assistant register, as guardian ad litem of some of the defendants, in a partition cause, who were infants.

<p>Exceptions to a master’s report.</p>

This was a partition suit, and was heard on the report of the commissioners who had been appointed to make partition. The report was signed by only a part of the commissioners; and no reason was given for the omission of the others to join in signing and acknowledging it. Nor did it appear from the report that all the commissioners met together and consulted upon the matter of the partition.

<p>Rights of a purchaser from a defendant in a foreclosure suit, who purchases after decree confesso.</p> <p>Effect of amending bill after the original bill is taken as confessed.</p>

This was a motion for the appointment of a receiver in a creditor’s suit. C. P. Collier, for the defendant, resisted the application, on the grounds that motions were pending before the chancellor for leave to amend the bill, and to dissolve the injunction; and that a motion to set aside the judgment on which the bill was founded was pending in the supreme court.

This was a motion for a decree of divorce in an adultery case. No report of a master having been obtained as to the amount of alimony proper to be allowed to the wife, who was the complainant;

This was an appeal by one of the six residuary legatees of J. Burtis, deceased, from the sentence or decree of a surrogate, upon the final settlement of the account of the acting executor. The principal ground of complaint, stated in the petition of appeal, was that the executor had not been charged with interest upon the balance in his hands, belonging to the appellant.

This was an appeal from a decretal order of a vice chancellor, overruling a demurrer to the complainant’s bill.

This was an appeal from an order of the vice chancellor of the seventh circuit, granting an injunction. The. complainant brought an action of trover against the defendant, in the supreme court, and recovered a verdict for about $1100.

This case came before the chancellor upon an appeal from a decree of the late vice chancellor of the sixth circuit. In June, 1833, the complainant procured a loan, from the defendant Bishop and T. Hance deceased, for which he gave to them his bond and warrant for $2500; upon which they caused a judgment to be entered up in the supreme court. Hance subsequently died, and Bishop, together with the defendant E. Hance administered upon his estate.

This case came before the chancellor upon an order for the receiver of the property and effects of the Canajoharie and.

<p>This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the eighth circuit, dismissing the complainant’s bill. The com-» plainant, in November, 1839, was the owner of a farm in Le Roy, whieh farm was subject to three mortgages thereon, amounting together to the sum of $1350. And the defendant owned a lot of 220 acres of land in Illinois, which he had once visited, but which the complainant had never seen. A negotiation was entered into by the parties, for the sale of the Le Roy farm to the defendant, the complainant to receive the Illinois lot in part payment. This negotiation resulted in a written contract between them for a sale to the defendant of the Le Roy farm, together with certain farming utensils and other property, for the price or sum of $4000, to be paid for by a conveyance from him to the complainant of the Illinois lot, at the rate or price of five dollars an acre, and the assumption, by the defendant, of the payment of the three mortgages upon the Le Roy farm. And the rest of the $4000 was to be paid in cash at a future day, and to be secured to the complainant by a bond and mortgage upon the Le Roy farm. This agreement was carried into effect in April, 1840; at which time the complainant conveyed the Le Roy farm to. the defendant, subject to the payment by the latter of the three mortgages which were liens thereon. And the defendant gave the complainant a deed of the Illinois lot, and paid him a part of the balance of the $4000 in cash, and gave him a bond and mortgage for the residue. That bond and mortgage the complainant subsequently sold and assigned to a third person. The defendant went into possession of the Le Roy farm, and after-wards paid off one of the mortgages upon the premises, which he had assumed to pay by his contract with the complainant. During the negotiation between the parties, the defendant made certain representations to the complainant, which, as the bill alleged, turned out to be false, in relation to the quality of the Illinois land, the situation and quantity of timber thereon, and the character of the soil, &c. In May, 1841, the complainant</p> <p>went to Illinois for the purpose of settling upon the lot conveyed to him by the defendant. But finding the lands different from what he expected to find them, from the representations of the defendant, he returned in the latter part of June of that year; and tendered to the defendant a reconveyance of the Illinois lot, and demanded to be paid the $1100 at which the lot had been estimated in the contract for the sale of the Le Roy farm. This demand not being acceded to, the complainant filed his bill in this cause, in which he charged, among other things, that the Illinois land was worthless and wholly unfit for farming purposes, and destitute of timber; and that the representations made to him by the defendant, before and at the time of the sale of the Le Roy farm, as to the situation, quality, and value of the Illinois land, in the several particulars mentioned in the bill, were falsely and fraudulently made. And he prayed that the defendant might be decreed to pay him the $1100 with interest thereon from the date of the conveyances under the contract, together with the expenses and damages which, he had sustained by his removal to Illinois to settle upon the lands, &c.; that the deed of the Illinois lot might be declared to be inoperative, upon a reconveyance of the lot by him to the defendant; and that the amount decreed to be paid by the defendant might be declared to be a lien upon the Le Roy farm; or that he might have such other relief as he was entitled to upon the case made by his bill. The defendant, in his answer, denied all fraud and false representations by him in relation to the situation, quality or value of the Illinois lands. The cause was heard upon pleadings and proofs. The vice chancellor decided that the complainant had no right to have the contract rescinded in part; and that the court would not entertain jurisdiction of the case for the mere purpose of decreeing a compensation in damages for a false and. fraudulent representation in relation to the situation of the Illinois lot. He therefore declined examining the question whether the proofs in this case were sufficient to support the allegations in the bill on that subject.</p> <p>The following opinion was delivered by the vice chancellor:</p>

<p>A surrogate has no jurisdiction, to prohibit an executor from contesting the paymen of promissory notes, given by the testator, in an action at law brought thereon; 01 to restrain him from prosecuting a bill of discovery, filed in the court of chancery, for the purpose of ascertaining the consideration of such notes.</p>

This was an appeal from, a decretal order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, allowing the demurrer of the defendants, Bright & Palmer; and dismissing the complainant’s bill, as to them, with costs.

This was an application, on the part of the defendants, to set aside an injunction, which had been issued in this cause, for irregularity ; or for such other relief as they were entitled to in the premises.

This was an appeal, by the complainants, from an order of the vice chancellor of the second circuit. The bill was filed to compel the specific performance of an award of arbitrators, for the partition of land.

This was an appeal from an order of the vice chancellor of ' the seventh circuit, suppressing the deposition of W. H. Cooper, one of the defendants. , The bill was filed to foreclose' a bond and mortgage given by Cooper; and the defendant Deming, was made a party as a subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged premises. Cooper and Deming put in separate answers, setting up the defence that the bond and mortgage were void for usury.

This was an appeal from a decretal order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, allowing the demurrer of three of the defendants in this suit, J. C. Brown, M. B. Ives and R. H. Ives; and… Held: all the property, rights, credits, stocks, and other choses in action, and money to which he was entitled, or in which he was interested as a partner in each of the said firms.

This was a creditor’s suit. The bill was in the usual form of a creditor’s bill, and purported to have been sworn to by the complainants in the usual manner, except that the statement in the jurat was in this form: “ State of New-York,-county, ss.” And the oath was signed “O. 0., comm’r of deeds,” without specifying the county or city for which the person signing it was a commissioner. It appeared, however, that he was in fact a commissioner of deeds for the city of Albany.

This was an. appeal by the defendant, H. M. Western, from a decree of the late assistant vice chancellor of the first circuit, setting aside a conveyance from I. G. Collins, deceased, to E. Iv. Collins, in trust, for Mary Collins, of certain lands upon Staten Island, which were subsequently sold and conveyed by her to the defendant Western.

This case came before the chancellor, the office of vice chancellor of the sixth circuit, where the suit was pending, being vacant; upon an application by the defendant for an allowance, to enable her to defend the suit, and for the support of herself and child during the litigation. The bill was filed by the husband to annul his marriage, with the defendant, upon the alleged ground that she had another husband living at the time of such marriage.

This was an application, on the part of the complainants, for leave to proceed in this suit against the surviving defendants, notwithstanding the death of McNeil, one of the original defendants.

The bill ill this cause was filed to foreclose, and obtain satisfaction of, a bond and mortgage for $3000, and interest, given by the defendant Stienbergh, to his co-defendants J. G. Fellers and George Fellers, and subsequently assigned by the mortgagees to the complainant, for the consideration of $2800 only; with a covenant, on the part of the assignors, that the whole $3000 and interest, secured by the bond and mortgage, should he paid to the assignee, when it became…

This was a demurrer by Herrick, one of the defendants, to the complainant’s bill. The object of the bill was to foreclose and obtain satisfaction of a bond and mortgage, given by Herrick to T. D. Christie, on the 14th of November, 1840, conditioned for the payment of $2759, with'interest from the date of such bond and mortgage; of which sum $759, with the interest thereon, was to be paid in one year, and the residue in four equal, annual payments from that time.

<p>When a notice of motion must specify the grounds of the motion.</p> <p>Admissions of an assignor, made subsequently to the assignment, are not binding upon the assignees.</p>

This was an appeal from, a decision of the circuit judge ot the first circuit, affirming a sentence and decree of the surrogate of New-York, refusing to admit to probate, as a will of personal estate, an instrument in writing propounded by the proctor of the appellant, as the will of Isabella Leo Wolf, deceased. The following opinion was delivered by the circuit judge:

This was an application, by the defendants in this cause, to the chancellor for relief, under the following circumstances; the office of vice chancellor of the sixth circuit being vacant at the time of such application. In January, 1833, the complainant filed his bill in this cause before the chancellor, against Vanderkemp, Evans and Schermerhom.

This was an application, on the part of the complainants, to open an order entered by the defendants to close the proofs in this cause; and also for an order extending the time to produce witnesses for forty days. The bill was filed by the complainants to foreclose a mortgage upon 100 acres of land in Onondaga county, given by G. Quackenbush to J. L. Voorhees, in October 1823, and assigned by Voorhees to John Quackenbush, ■the father of the mortgagor, in January, 1844.

This was an appeal, by the defendant J. Harden, from a decree of the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit, denying the appellants application for' costs, upon a bill of discovery.

This was an appeal by the administratrix and administrator of Amos Proctor deceased, from an order of the surrogate, of the city and county of New-York, denying the application of the appellants to set aside the letters of administration granted to the public administrator; and also revoking and setting aside the letters of administration which had been granted to the appellants.

This was an appeal from the decision of the vice chancellor of the fourth circuit, denying the application of the complainants for a further examination of the defendant before the master, on a reference upon a judgment creditor’s bill.

<p>This case coming on to be heard, upon an appeal from a decree of a vice chancellor,</p>

This case came before the court upon an exception to the teport of a master, as to t.he sufficiency of the defendant’s third answer. The complainant took five exceptions to the original answer of the defendant; all of which exceptions were submitted to, or allowed. The defendant thereupon put in a further answer; which answer was reported insufficient in the matter of all the exceptions except the first.

This was an application for the re-taxation of the costs in a foreclosure suit. The bill was filed against the mortgagor and his wife, and fifteen other persons who were made parties as having some interest in, or lien upon, -the mortgaged premises, subsequent to the giving of the mortgage.

This case came before the chancellor upon the separate appeals of J. R Brady and J. T. Brady, two of the defendants in this suit, from a decretal order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, overruling their several demurrers to the complainant’s bill.

This was an appeal from an order of the vice chancellor of the eighth circuit. The hill in this cause was filed to foreclose a mortgage; and the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged premises being insufficient to pay the debt and costs, the complainants obtained the usual decree, for the payment of the deficiency, against Avery and Patterson, two of the defendants, who were personally liable for the debt secured by the mortgage.

This was an application on the.part of S. Grant, one of the defendants in this cause, for a rehearing, or for a modification of the decree of sale of the mortgaged premises,-or fora review and correction of the decision of the inaster charged with the sale, as to the order in which the several parcels of the mortgaged premises should be sold under the decree.

This was an application, by the defendant in a creditor’s suit, for an order that the master review his decision as' to the person to be appointed the receiver in this cause, and also that he review his decision as to thé form of the assignment which the defendant was required to execute, under the decree.

Upon a motion to dissolve an injunction, on bill, answer and affidavits, where an answer on oath was waived, and the charges in the bill were supported by the affidavits of disinterested witnesses, as authorized by the 37th rule;

The bill in this case was filed by the husband to obtain a divo rce from his wife, upon the ground of her adultery. It appeared from the bill that the defendant had two children; who, as the complainant charged, were illegitimate. And from the proofs it appeared that she had another child born a short time after the filing of the complainant’s bill.

This was an appeal, by the defendant, from a decree of the late vice chancellor of the third circuit. Matthew Van Hoesen died in 1817, seised of a farm in Columbia county worth nine or ten thousand dollars, and possessed of personal property, exclusive of farming utensils, furniture, and stock on the farm, of the value of about $5000.

This was an appeal from an order purporting to have been made by the vice chancellor of the first circuit, but which was made by the consent of the counsel for both parties. The consent to the order also contained an express stipulation, that such consent was to be without prejudice to the right of either party to appeal from such order.

The complainant recovered a judgment, and upon the return of an execution issued thereon unsatisfied, he filed a creditors bill against the defendant. The defendant thereupon procured the other defendant in the present suit to sign a note with him as collateral security for the debt and costs, or a part thereof, and the complainant agreed to stay the proceedings upon the creditor’s bill until such note became due.

This was an appeal from a decretal order of the assistant vice chancellor, overruling a demurrer to the complainant’s bill. The facts of the case, and the opinion of the assistant vice chancellor, will be found in the report of the case before him. (1 Sand. Ch. Rep. 188.)

This was an application for a reference to a master to take proof of the facts stated in the bill, as against an absent defendant who had not appeared in the suit.

This was an appeal by the defendants from a decree of the late vice chancellor of the second circuit. In May, 1828, the defendant, N. V. Knickerbacker, conveyed to his father, J. Knickerbacker, the other defendant in this suit, all his real and personal estate, consisting of lands in various counties, and about $15,000 in money then in the hands of the grantee.

This was an appeal, by the defendants, from a decretal order of the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit, overruling a demurrer to the complainants’ bill. The complainants were an incorporated manufacturing company, located in the town of New-Hartford, in the county of Oneida; and their bill was filed against the collector of the town, and the board of supervisors of the county, to restrain them from collecting a tax imposed upon the real estate of the complainants.

This was an appeal from a decision of the surrogate of the county of Washington. The appellants, as legatees under the will of Anna Hastings, deceased, cited the appellant, as her executor, to account. The executor, wishing for a final account, obtained the usual citation for all persons interested to attend the settlement of his account; and the proceedings were adjourned to the 25th of August.

This was an appeal, by R. McCartee, the administrator of the estate of Sarah Brown deceased, from a decree of the surrogate of the city and county of New-York, directing the appellant to pay. to Catharine Camel, the respondent, her distributive share of the estate of the decedent. S. Brown died in New-York in 1832, and letters of administration upon the estate were granted in August of that year.

This was an application by creditors of P. Cassidy, who died in 1835, for the payment of their several debts, out of moneys in court; which moneys arose from the sale of real estate in a partition suit, between the heirs of the decedent, in 1839. Four of the adult heirs had received their several shares of the proceeds of the sale.

This case came before the chancellor upon an appeal by the acting executor of H. Westervelt, deceased, from two decisions and orders of the surrogate of the city and county of New-York.

This was an appeal by the defendant E. C. Durkee, from a decree of the late assistant vice chancellor of the first circuit. S. O.-Durkee, one of the defendants, previous to the 2d of April, 1839, was in business in Schenectady as a grocer, and then had goods on hand to the amount or value of $975. The capital with which the business had been carried on, with the exception of $50, had been advanced in property or loaned to him in money by his brother E. C. Durkee.

This was an appeal from a decretal order of the surrogate of the city and county of New-York.

'The bill in this cause was filed to foreclose a mortgage on which there was about $55 due, and also to obtain payment of a judgment of about $80, which was a lien upon the mortgaged premises. The bill alleged that the defendant in the judgment had no real or personal estate, other than the mortgaged premises, out of which the judgment, or any part of it, could be collected.

This was an application by J. L. Bevans, one of the defendants, for the relaxation of costs in a foreclosure suit. The complainant was the assignee of the mortgage; and Bevans, who was made a defendant as having an interest in some part of the mortgaged premises as a subsequent purchaser, or incumbrancer, put in an answer which rendered it necessary to file a replication and to prove the execution of the assignment.

This was an appeal from an order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, setting aside an order to take the bill as confessed against the defendant E. D. Foote. The answer was completed and sworn to, and copied, on the last day to which the time for answering had been extended; but too late to file and serve it on that day.

This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the fourth circuit, dismissing the complainants’ bill, with costs. In 1831, G. T. Getman was the owner of a farm in the Stone Arabia patent in the county of Montgomery; and on the 26th of June in that year, he and his wife mortgaged the premises to S. Cogswell, to secure the payment of about $400 in two years, with annual interest.

This cause came before the court upon exceptions to a master’s report, allowing forty-three exceptions to the complainant’s bill, for impertinence. The bill was filed by the husband, •against his wife, for a separation from bed and board, under the provisions of the twelfth section of the act of the 10th of April, 1824.

This was an appeal from an order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, allowing an injunction. The complainants, the master and wardens of the port of New-York and their clerk, filed their bill in this cause to restrain the defendants from interfering with their duties and franchises, as wardens of the port of New-York.

The bill in this case was filed to foreclose a mortgage; and the defendant Packard had a lien upon the premises as a purchaser at a tax sale, the time for redemption not having yet expired ; which lien overreached, and was entitled to priority over, the complainant’s mortgage.

This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit, dismissing the complainants’ bill with costs. The object of the bill was to restrain the commissioners appointed by the act of April, 1838, to build a free bridge across the Oswego river, between the falls and the north line of the village of Fulton, from proceeding to erect such bridge. The following opinion was delivered by the vice chancellor:

This was an appeal, by the defendant, from a decree of the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit. In April, 1829, J. Whaley, the father-in-law of the defendant, owned a state certificate which entitled him to a patent for lot No-. 213, in East Oswego village, upon the payment of $30, which remained due to the state for the balance of the purchase money.

This was an application by tine of the three executors named in the will and codicils of J. Van Wyck, deceased, to be discharged from his trust, and tb leave the trust to be executed by the remaining executors. The testator gave certain portions of his real estate to some of his children, at specified prices, as a part of their shares of his estate.

This was an appeal from a decision of the vice chancellor of the fourth circuit, refusing to dissolve the usual injunction upon a creditor’s bill, against P. Cornelius the judgment debtor.

This was an application on the part of the defendant, Gary Y. Sackett, for an order to examine (he defendants, S. S. & W. M. Bayard, as witnesses in behalf of Sackett, and for a commission,, and to extend the time to take testimony until the return of such commission.

This was an application on the part of the defendant to set aside an order for the appointment of a receiver, upon a creditor’s bill, and to dissolve the injunction and take the amended bill of Complaint off the files of the court, for irregularity. The original bill was in the usual form of creditor’s bills, and was founded upon two judgments in the supreme court, against the defendant and in favor of the complainants, which were recovered in 1839.

<p>This was an appeal, by the complainant, from a decision of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, refusing to overrule a plea in a foreclosure suit as frivolous, and denying the usual decree as upon a bill taken as confessed for want of an answer.</p> <p>The complainant was the assignee of a bond and mortgage given by the defendant D. Wilson, who was still the owner of the equity of redemption; and .the defendant Nowal was made a defendant as a subsequent incumbrancer having a judgment which was a lien upon the mortgaged premises. Previous to the commencement of this suit, the defendant Nowal had filed a creditor’s bill upon his judgment against D. Wilson, the mortgagor, m which suit, subsequent to the filing of the bill of'foreclosure in the present cause, Nowal obtained the usual order for the appointment of a receiver. Under that order a receiver was afterwards appointed; and the defendant D. Wilson thereupon assigned all his property, including his equity of redemption in the mortgaged premises, to such receiver, under the order of the court. The defendant Nowal pleaded these facts in bar of the suit generally ; insisting that the receiver was a necessary party.</p>

This was an appeal from an order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, denying the application of three of the defendants to vacate the decree entered in this canse, and to allow those defendants to put in an answer to the bill of the complainants. The answer proposed to be put in was not served upon the complainant’s solicitor with notice of the application, and therefore could not be read upon the motion.

This was an application for the sale of the real estate of infants, in which certain adult parties interested in the premises, consented to join in tiie sale, upon receiving their several proportions of the proceeds thereof, and to pay their respective proportions of the costs of the proceedings.

This was an appeal from an order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, grunting a new trial upon a feigned issue. The complainant filed a bill against her husband, for a divorce, on the ground of his alleged adultery. The bill charged that the defendant had committed adultery with S. M. D., and one issue was framed upon that charge.

This was an appeal by Joseph Hewlett, the purchaser at the master’s sale under a decree of foreclosure in this suit, from an order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, allowing a resale. The facts in the case were substantially as follows: The defendant, S. Mount, was the owner of a house and lot in the city of New-York, as heir at law of his deceased son, on which the complainant held a mortgage, given by the decedent, for $1000.

This was an appeal by the complainant from an order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit. The bill was filed by the wife, against her husband, to obtain a divorce on the ground of adultery. The defendant put in an answer admitting the adultery, and the usual reference was made to a master to take the proof of the complainant’s allegations, and to report his opinion thereon.

This case came before the chancellor on exceptions to the master’s report upon a reference to ascertain the amount of damages sustained by the defendant by reason of an injunction. The defendant held a bond and mortgage upon a farm in the possession of the complainant, and advertised the mortgaged premises for sale under a statute foreclosure; which sale was to have taken place on the 5th of June. 1845.

This was an appeal from a decretal order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, overruling a demurrer to the complainant’s bill. The bill was filed by two of the children and legatees of T. Goodyear, deceased, and by the surviving husband of the other child, who was also the trustee of the estate of his deceased wife under an ante-nuptial contract, and who, as such trustee., was entitled to her share of the estate of her deceased father.

This was an application by the complainant to dismiss an appeal, brought by the defendant Ellsworth, from the final decree in this cause, for irregularity. The bill was filed by the complainant to foreclose a bond and mortgage given, by the defendant Ellsworth, to J. McGregor, and assigned by the latter to the wife of the complainant, during coverture.

The bill in this cause was filed by the executors of D. Collin, deceased, to obtain a judicial construction of his will, and for directions for the distribution of his estate among his residuary legatees, under the following clause of his will: “ Eighthly: I give and bequeath all the rest and residue of my personal estate to all my grandchildren, to be distributed among and paid to them, share and share alike, by my executors, in manner and form following; to be vested in…

This, was- an. appeal by the- defendant from an order of the-vice chancellor of the-seventh circuit, giving to the mother the; custody of one of the infant childrens of the parties. The complainant-filed her bill for a.divorce, on the gr.oundofi the adultery of the-defendant.

This was an application, on the part of the defendants, to dismiss an appeal, by the complainant, from a decree of the vice chancellor of the seventh circuit. The decision of the vice chancellor which was appealed from was made previous to the 18th of July, 1844. And the complainant, supposing that the decree had been entered in conformity with that decision, appealed from the decision on the last mentioned day, and gave the proper appeal .bond, and a notice of the appeal.

<p>This was an application to set aside an order taking the bill as confessed.</p>

The decree of the chancellor in this case, as reported in 8th Paige’s Reports, 633, having been reversed by the court for the correction of errors, that court made a decree permitting the complainant to redeem the premises on paying the amount which should be reported due to Hooker, by the master, within thirty days after the confirmation of the report; but the decree, as modified and entered, omitted to declare what should be the effect of the omission of the complainant to…