Lingner v. Lingner’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The idea underlying all these cases is that a reconciliation between the parties may be accomplished by separating them for a limited time and permitting their passions to subside. In the case before us, however, the parties are mature. The chancellor, who had these people before him, together with their kinsfolk, has found that their mutual feelings have reached such a degree of hostility as to make a reconciliation impossible; that a limited divorce would only prolong a bad situation that society had no interest in preserving. We agree with the chancellor. This is not a doubtful case such as Rutledge v. Rutledge, supra, [ 37 Tenn. 554 ] and those that follow it. The wishes of neither party in a divorce case control the actions of the court. The court, of course, gravely considers the desires of the party wronged, but the court reserves the right to determine for itself what is best for that party. We can see no good that would accrue to either party herein by decreeing a limited divorce since no rapprochement can be expected. “As pointed out by another court, we must take into consideration ‘ the mischiefs arising from turning out into the world, in enforced celibacy, persons who are neither married nor unmarried.’ Burlage v. Burlage, 65 Mich. 624 , 32 N. W. 866, 867 . Society is not interested in perpetuating a status out of which no good can come and from which harm may result. ””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Abney v. Abney · 28 Tenn. App. 696 - Herchenroeder v. Herchenroeder

2. ““I have seen the complaint on the stand. I have seen the defendant on the stand. I have observed their manner and demeanor as only a trial court can. I have seen the children of the complainant on the stand. I have seen the sisters of the defendant, worthy and good women, and these good children on the stand. It is perfectly apparent to me that no reconciliation can, and will ever, take place between these people. ... It must be apparent to everybody that observed the demeanor of these people on the stand that wounds have been opened and that it would not be in the interest of society and the marital relation, but a travesty, to grant the kind of divorce prayed in this bill. It would only prolong the situation that now ought to be stopped, and I have concluded that under the authority of Séctions 4202', 4205 and 4220 of the Code (Shannon’s) as construed in the case of Hackney v. Hackney, 9 Humph. [450, 452, 453] 28 Tenn., [450] on pages 452, 453, to end this marital relation. It oug’ht to be ended and I am going to grant an absolute divorce on the ground of abandonment and failure to provide to this woman under this bill under her prayer for general relief. ’ ’”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 28 Tenn. App. 696 - Herchenroeder v. Herchenroeder

3. “Although a divorce suit is in the nature of a suit in equity * * * nevertheless a divorce suit is sui generis. The procedure is largely controlled by statute. Pleading and practice in divorce cases, as governed by statute, differ in many particulars from pleading and practice in equity cases generally. * * * `such cases stand upon grounds peculiar to themselves, and do not fall within the ordinary rules governing chancery proceedings.' Hackney v. Hackney, 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 450.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Elizabeth Harris v. James B. Turner