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1 Conn. 387

Phelps v. Foot

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Decided November 15, 1815

Supreme Court of Connecticut · decided 1815-11-15

IN ERROR. This was an action of assumpsit against Foot as indorser of a promissory note.

Cited in Bouvier (1914)’s definition of “Hearsay Evidence”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1815-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently January 1981

3 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Swift, Ch. J.

¶1In this case sundry questions arise upon the bill of exceptions.

¶2It was contended, that the defendant should not prove a certain agreement at the time of the indorsement of the note, that a writ special should be issued, and the debt secured, if possible. But the plaintiff has acknowledged such agreement ; and it does not appear but that it was reduced to writing at the time of the indorsement, and it must now be presumed to be legal and valid. It was therefore admissible evidence.

¶3As to the admission of the copy of the deed ; though by law a sworn copy ought to be produced, and a certified copy from a town clerk is not admissible, yet no objection was made on that account j and it does not appear that there was not proper evidence of the copy. The objection apparent on the record is, that the original ought to have been produced, and not a copy ; but the original was not in the power of the party ; of course, a copy was the best evidence, and was admissible.

¶4The deed was relevant evidence ; for by the above agreement the plaintiff was bound to secure the debt, if possible ; *391he was bound to secure it by taking land, if in bis power. It was pertinent, therefore, to prove the maker of the note was the owner of land so that it could be taken ; and as it appears the deed was recorded while the execution was in force, so that the plaintiff might have levied upon it, this evidence was material.

¶5The court refused to admit, the officer, who served the writ of attachment issued on the indorsed note, to testify to the answers that were given to his enquiries when he was making search after the maker of the note. It was a material point on the trial whether the officer made due search and enquiry upon the attachment. It was his duty to make enquiry at all proper places, and to make search wherever it was probable he might be found. To shew that he had done this, it was necessary that he should state the enquiries and the answers made, and that he had made search accordingly.

¶6Such answers are a part of the transaction ; they are facts, and do not stand on the footing of hearsay evidence. On this ground, I am of opinion that the judgment complained of is erroneous.

¶7In this opinion the other Judges severally concurred.

¶8Judgment reversed.

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