1 Dudley Rep.
Volume 1 — Dudley's Reports (Ga.)
106 opinions
- 1 Dudley Rep. 1Janes v. Robinson (1831)
<p> Motion against Sheriff to pay over money collected on a Mortgage fi. fa. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 2Daniel v. Justices of the Inferior Court of Talliaferro County (1831)
<p>shSi*b«*a»fhAr-¿zed to levy on an? nesro estate, unless ther^ia p?.r* be found ¡mffi-¡h™' d°btSa&f (Prin.Dig! 249.) ofp*® vision,tfecourt* comtabies^bí fore levying up™al “■*§[",? °l enter on the ex-phonal Pertv■ to be 'Chen such entry not8traversabte.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 4M'Dowell v. Hunter (1831)
<p>in an action broaeh°ofnwárí i-aniy tho plain-íf^noTon ovfction, at. least abandoned *o possession of the bhlnfound^sub-jeet to the eXe-íhe° d had virtue of°tho by ecuUon%nd°tha"t ^rived *ofn ids possession thereof: otherwise U° demurrable) "Ti1 m oa''aKU ■</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 5Executors of Flournoy v. Coxe (1831)
<p>in a case which turned e"tire¡J. fact, where the contradictor™*3 and the special S^herí^vert’ no suspicions of tion^oaiim'X jury, the court</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 6Gilmer v. Blackwell (1831)
<p>no?sira "en-ercci upon a recogni-securities'11!™™ been required by show caiSr^hv judgment shouili against them"'1</p> <p>And if judgment and execution^sues, it may be offb" affidaril^of illegality.</p> <p>For the English practice on thin subject, nee 2 gomyn^mg.by s„qy’ »ñ<i° ’tii« A"*0”118*ther*</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 7Heirs of Early v. Sherwood (1831)
<p>When a man marries a woman holding property in her own right, he is entitled to that property, if he reduce it to possession in the life time of the woman: But if he does not, and dies, the property survives to the wife and does not vest in his executor or administrator.</p> <p>And if property be given to the wife during co-verture, it vests absolutely in the husband, and need not be bv him reduced to possession in the life time of the</p> <p>Tayl. 44. Í Hayw. 275 and 278, 2 Conn. Rep, 564. 2 Conn. Rep, 143, 2 Day’s Comyn, 209. 1 liac, Abr. 290.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 8Pool v. Barnett (1831)
<p> Right of Appeal in Equity Causes. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 15State v. Pemberton (1831)
<p> Tax Ji. /as. and rule against the Sheriff to pay over money. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 16Martin v. Administrator of Fyffe (1831)
<p> Attachment. Verdict for plaintiffand motion for new trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 18Roll v. Black (1831)
<p> Trover, Verdict for Defendant and motion for new trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 20Picquet ex rel. Reed v. Administrator of Cormick (1831)
<p>In ft court whose jurisdiction is nmuel to a particular amount, a set-off* cannot te pleaiied widen exoep.is tha' a-mourT : and_ if str*n a set-ofi be plea ie ! iff an I .- f¡r¡or Court o li.nuel jinsiic-t '>n, an 1 allowed, and ihfjre be an appeal although the cause corner up in its totali y, it comes up subject to the same nr.iba’rm and where a verdict had been given f>r the bah a^e of a se:-ofí on appeal under such circumstances, the court ordered it to be set aside and granted a new trial.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 22Justices of the Inferior Court of Columbia ex rel. Edmondson v. Administrators of Wynn (1831)
<p>When the statute prescribing a bond declares alt bonds not taken pursuant to it void, the statute must be strictly pursued as bonds which do not conform to it are void by express enactment.</p> <p>When the statute contains no such provision, the conditions of bonds taken under it, which are contrary to the statute, are alone void; as also are onerous conditions beyond the statute.</p> <p>The obligor can in no case be permitted to take advantage of the omission of conditions when the omission is beneficial to himself.</p> <p>When the conditions omitted are onerous to the obligor, they shall not be permitted to charge him j but if a statute prescribing the condition of a bond to be given by an officer, agent, trustee or other person, enumerate particular duties, and also contain general words which include his whole duty, an obligor in a bond taken under such statute, is not discharged from his general obligation by an omission of such particular enumeration.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 27State v. Simons (1831)
<p>Though juries be constituted judges both of law and fact in criminal cases, and courts should be cautious about interíéring with their verdicts m such cases, yet if juries mistake law and fact, or draw improper legal conclusions from given facts, to prevent injustice, and allow them an opportunity to correct errors, the court will sometimes grant a new trial even when there has been no corrupt or improper conduct on the part of the jury.</p> <p>Prin. Dig. STS*</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 28State v. Sherbourne (1831)
<p>. If a jury bo guilty of gross misconduct,, the court will not hesitate to grant a new trial,.</p> <p>Prtn. Dig. 588.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 28Beers v. Crowell (1831)
<p> Verdict for plaintiffs, and motion for new trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 30Dubois v. City Council of Augusta (1831)
<p>The city council of Augusta have the power to establish and enforce such bylaws, rules and ordinances respecting the harbor and wharves and every regulation that shail appear to them requisite for the security, welfare and convenience of the city ; provided they be,not repugnantlo the Constitution and laws of the land.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 32Inferior Court of Richmond County v. Barr (1831)
<p>on*”constable’s bond, the breach MurTto advertise his levy and ceedSgs'o/an attachment, ^ac-bywhehmeam the attachment was dismissed ; the court charged the jury, if they believed the plaintiff faded in his attachment on account of the neglect of the constable, they ought to find against the constable ; but if they believed that plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his atiach-inent on account of the supposed irregularity, that such dismissal effectually discharged defendant and his securities. The jury found for the constable, and the court refused to grant a new</p> <p>If defendant in attachment appear and put in special bail, he dissolves the attachment, relieves his goods from its lien and it becomes thenceforth a proceeding in ■personam.</p> <p>Attachment may also be dissolved by defendants giving bond with good security to appear, abide by, and perform the order or judgment of the court; and after attachment is dissolved, the proceeding need not be advertís--</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 37State ex rel. Forsyth v. Justices of the Inferior Court of Richmond County (1831)
<p>The Mandamus is an established remedy to oblige Inferior Courts and magistrates to do that justice which without such writ, they are in duty ana by virtue of their offices bound to do.</p> <p>To sustain an application for mandamus, it is not only necessary that the relator should have a legal right to the thing commanded ; but he must also be without a legal remedy.</p> <p>The Inferior Court is not a corporation, and cannot be sued as such.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 42State v. Fraser (1831)
<p>On s wnt of Habeas Corpus, the court will ?á,Cba!¡g°ordre-mand,according stancet CófCtthJ case; but it will ofpruperiynltnd if the writ be to thTcourtj'though bound, ex debito {h*m from anil-legat restraint, to deliver them over to any bo-tlimany privt kge.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 46State v. Philpot (1831)
<p> Habeas Corpus, Attachment, and Motion to be discharged. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 59Taylor v. Thomas (1831)
<p>The sth see, ?L„the of act to regulate the Pllota8° of from the several a°|jwh\hch vests’the «un-power to decide, |aafeUanydamfge, dispute, com- or arising against or be-pTiotforplfotlg?, or any otiTer “att*heer buS'e"! of a pii#t,^docs SultitXT'court °f juri^a°¿ f0vrer apu0tage, where lhoe thinydolkrs.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 62Bank of South Carolina v. Brown (1831)
<p> Case, and Motion for New Trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 66Central Bank v. Kendrick (1831)
<p>Where th« stn-tms required >ond with secu- \ t i bt ta en jr tne rent of a i In i igo, ir ! m cm ssG-v note was taken-suit was u i i led u*> n n n 3 t, mJ ihe n fit i pic t Ld tnat the note was ' i h < dcv-e, the st v v 1 K h rc-i uJ t bond nad not been ( npbed with, Tne plea was overruled.-A motion was then made for a new trial on the ground that the court erred in overruling the p!ea, which motion was refused.</p> <p>Where there has been a substantial compliance with the law, the want of a rigid comfor-i dty with the mere letter of a statute requiring a bond to be token, is not a tVal objection to the bond:</p> <p>But if the statute prescribes the form and ■ undition of the bond, and declares ail bonds taken in any omer form void, the bund prescribed should be strictly pur<* sued.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 72Irwin v. Morell (1831)
<p> Motion for New Trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 81Allen v. Lacy (1832)
<p> Assumpsit, and Motion for New Trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 83Marine & Fire Insurance Bank of the State of Georgia v. Megar (1832)
<p>fa an action against an administrator for money had and received by his intestate, (which money was won at cards) it was held necessary to prove that tho intestate actually received the money in question ; and the proof that he was in partnership with others who gambled, won, and received it, was held insufficient.</p> <p>The courts will not recognize a copartnership in</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 85Glover v. Woolsey (1832)
<p> Assumpsit, and Motion for JSew Trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 91Banks v. Cater (1832)
<p>An express contract of sale cannot be recovered, under a general indebi-tatus assump-sit count; it must be specially declared upon:</p> <p>And where there was a sale of 1500 bushels of salt to be paid for at’90 days, it was held that action fcould not. be brought on the contract until the expiration of the time.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 92Lamar v. Mahony (1832)
<p>dssvmpsit, and Motion for New. Triad..</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 94Mackay v. Moore (1832)
<p>«liF'tht *2 of its becoming w'nf.arf’ 'the same in effect “¡f %tll>become become — if a should cteari^mdicaie &c°'tandnnot>a ¡Imitation. ”° a</p> <p>if the condition • precedent WeC<evenmb°the act of Go/ the no/e/aris/0"1'1</p> <p>limit6th^°extent of power con-anded prescribe the particular cutinl^ií,an/the agent is as little manner, as to mtrforln either casé he would ■b'/0<ínsteadUrof executingautho-r,y-</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 97Pennington v. Watson (1832)
<p>A. indorsee of a note given by B. placed the same in the hands of her attorney for collection : B. went at once to the attorney and placed in his hands a number of notes and other evidences of debt, of a larger amount on third persons as collateral security for the payment of his own note: In the receipt which the attorney gave B. for those evidences oi’debl he agrees as soon as he has collected enough of them to pay B.’s note to deliver it over to him, together with whatever balance there might be over.</p> <p>The court held that the evi :en-ces of debt were not taken as satisfaction of B.’s note, nor did the language of the receipt amount to an agreement not to sue B. mi the securities mentioned m the receipt could be collected.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 99Colvard v. Coxe (1832)
<p> Bill for Discovery and Relief. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 100Fellows v. Guimarin (1832)
<p>The except»on m favor of.. merchants’ accounts in the the statute oi lTOT^'snot re* pealed by the ofti809HMta<Ion</p> <p>tioifof copan-nership, and u»shall havlatat-tached to the partner has the hlsco tonbind promises1 whkfi íatutev0,d lh°</p> <p>to'be* sufficient must be express be alTaduTowi ledgment so MtoTecqmva-lent toa lse‘</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 102Wilson v. Wright (1832)
<p> Trover, and Motion for New Trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 105Hale v. Burton (1832)
<p>belonging to pᣠt.os m cases of ¿cb^as*regard the mode of trial, to d¿Stress-war-'ants, for rent, pIsCVy° ¡3 ma¿e. appeal \o aspe-Clal W-</p> <p>a garbled or ‘“r'nofbeC?e-ceived in evi-by the</p> <p>Distress for rent is a rem* edy whifh but a landlord can have, and “a’o0°nnof!|a^e lord’and tenant ceases, the remedy ceases with it.</p> <p>A distress warrant maybe '¿™^!Son prb! peny, wherever fncatnhobeCoun'tv and the author-„ot confined to the demised pre-mlses-</p> <p>Acts giving edy™u7 of'Bth¡ ««Unary course mustSe°constru-strictly, and dearly contem-Plate° bJthem-</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 107Redmond v. Glover (1832)
<p> Motion for rule Absolute for Foreclosure of Mortgage. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 108Casnard v. Eve (1832)
<p>Neither the judiciary act of 1799, nor any act amendatory thereof, the common law, nor the English Statute of Jeofails, will authorize the courts ;o permit a change of parties, an i the introduction of a new cause of action, by way of amend-mendment in the pleading.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 110Bomgaux v. Bevan (1831)
<p>The excep-ttons m favor of judgments, mongages and executions con-tamed in the act of >79\ ,,re' scribing the priority to be observed by exec-nistratorsin the Ketykts-tates of their tates'appiyoniy to such execu-rirents and mold-gages as exist t¿ieinof'the tator or intestate alien^pontheir estates.</p> <p>if there be bond-debts, and sued upon a stmpie contract neither pay it, píainUtr^To recover in his ac-do"aLuie have no’t assets be-thedebts due upon bonds, he mucíi out'o?ids own estate as he sufferedbe recovered from of™ an°r 'action forth these debts upon specialtiesf and to say that he hath no more than what is sufficient to satisfy them, and thereby he shall bar the plaintiff in his action.</p> <p>The nature of the debts at the time of the testator's or intestate's death is to regulate the priority of their payment, by the executor and administrator, and no preference can be created either by greater diligence on the part of the creditor or by the acts of the executor or administrator himself.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 117Slaughter v. Thompkins (1832)
<p> Motion in Arrest of Judgment. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 119Miller v. Hale (1832)
<p> Assumpsit, on appeal from Court of Common Pleas and motion for JSew Trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 120Harden v. Miller (1832)
<p>On sale of landed estate the gurchase-monev ecomes a debt on the personal, estate, and the equitable lien ought, to be extended to only so much of the purchased estate as the personal estate is insufficient to pay: *The purchase-money is not an original charge-upon the landed estate, but only an equity to resort to it, in case the personal estate should prove deficient:</p> <p>But notwithstanding the admission of these principles, there )« no authority for requiring the vendor, first to obtain judgment at Saw and a return on his execution as preliminary to his application to a Court of Equity to obtain an account of the personal estate, and a decree of payment, if it may be so, otherwise that the lien be declared and the land</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 123Wakeman v. Roache (1832)
<p>'p'r s.,alul6 neC^nlTbM na"oraPP*'2“ sigmncnt of dower-</p> <p>The husband cLnof^NeTt the estate which “jj-“ nor oan >l ho sal"6 under*1 «- ecution-</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 127M'Lellan v. Wallace (1832)
<p>The equity the court affords a person entitled to real estate by devise, to have the in-cumbrances upon it discharged as a debt out of the personal estate, goes no farther than as between the heir or devisee oftha estate, and the residuary lega» tee- it cannot inte’rfere with of hr th c r Spar t s! as specific or gene-much lesífwitfí the interest of ere .1 ms.</p> <p>two^fundThaMe to his claim, a LT^imerest'm one only, has a nght to compel the former to resort to the neces^ary^'^for the satisfaction this rule 'hus^no appiication in a between °frtwo different sets of deT’from^íhe real osiate by bu”mterestedTn the personal, pursuing his lien upon the real tsac'</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 130Bank of Georgia v. Mayor of Savannah (1832)
<p>by No special power of luxu :• banks in then corporate capacity has he us g'ven to iho Mayor and A’-dermen of Savannah by the act of 1625, and no such po\w r can be implied from the general taxing powers conferred that act.</p> <p>The city may handset in’6 fmhTci1'" íofit'!spersonii propeny and u-the act ab..,c referred to.</p> <p>The geneiat Cfe"ed'° towns and cUi-s Bocunsnued to subject tin corporation*" .j be twice tax. J: píesí words' a statute omc-cessary imndca-tton.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 138Brewster v. Hardeman (1830)
<p>Assumpsit, and plea of Statute of Limitations (a).</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 153Rives v. Boulware (1832)
<p>a corporation “"^uncuPíh!» statute of 1822, ^ment.6 ga(ñ certain cases, ^j*remment,on-</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 155State v. Dozier (1832)
<p>On indictment ^,re proofndwal| that defendant riuaiitm/m-duced the pro-cimsíand w fur a tract ¿f fendínt had at-rcadJ' ,01<1 and another1- Mo-li°QSt0{er°dercct of™0<,f;r prose-?utor it? by action of ^ Tlh™en^otion was overruled,</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 155Spratlin v. Hudspeth (1832)
<p>oi*ft 'I1’08® benef-m&y either or both obligors at his election.</p> <p>In an action on a bond to save harmless a security on another bond, it is sufficient that the record shows the security to have been dam-nified, and the evidence upon which he became damnified need not be produced.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 157Daniel v. Andrews (1832)
<p>The legista-inrmaking°pr<Í mis30ry «otes given*for" money or other ¡¡2 them^ex-¡^“m proving Jcormd-eratlon-</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 158Mills v. Mercer (1832)
<p>te for a valuable consideration,^is transfer of the “t,®r®1st twfveíy and considera-prove™"81 be</p> <p>An alteration of aVai of sale, footthereofífrom an*1 absolute one iimitsThe inter-éft in the pro-perfy, conveyed to a mere estate for life, although by consent of parties, ought ta he upon valuable consideration or the courts will not enlorc© it.</p> <p>The execution of a promissory is evidence m law of a full settlement of all accounts up to the date thereof, except such as are specially accepted at the</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 161Slack v. Moss (1832)
<p>Sanotegíveá ln consideration °Q sue, ¡avoid* ,nr,''a‘,to< con' when the causa boraacct¡°nclpf°|r' ¡i!egai and vofij anot<r slv.en "l consideration of forbearance is cause of action, The court re-</p> <p>The payee of a promissory p“[entls w¡t°i to prove its con-sfme^circum-stances,</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 165Slack v. Slack (1832)
<p>The court refused to order an allowance by way of temporary alimony for a married woman, out of her husband’s estate, during the pendency of a libel for divorce, and a bill of “we ex-eat’1 when it appeared by his answer that the husband was willing to take her to his bed and board and treat her well.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 166Stone v. Head (1832)
<p>on the1 sc* of "aw ^rtoa^dor* mantjudgments, is, that when havT elapsed Wntrvl'on the^ fa. showing vi-^arTofthe^pia^n-uftr0r owner,the judgmenttsvoid.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 167Semmes v. Porter (1832)
<p>Although a son under his father’s Will, may hare an interest in the erop growing upon land devised, for the support of himself, his mother and other children ; if his mother die, and he seizes upon the crop without being appointed executor or administrator of his mother, his interest in the crop- will not shield him from liability as executor de son</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 168Roe v. Doe ex dem. Neal (1832)
<p>Though it is for the benefit of society that claims to property levied on, should be interposed and settled before the same is subjected to sale by the sheriff, yet the law regulating claims is merely permissive, not mandatory.</p> <p>See Irwin v. Morel!, ante, 72.</p> <p>In cases of claim to land, the courts have always required proof of the possession of the defendant in execution at the date of the judgment, or subsequent to it, and though possession is the . weakest evidence of title, it is held sufficient to put the claimant to the production of his title.</p> <p>Upon proof ^ that the clerk of the court of Ordinary had been ordered by that court never to permit an original paper to be taken out of his office, a certified copy was allowed in evidence: and the court said there was no law requiring the copy to be under seal.</p> <p>See acts of 1830, Pamph. p. 121.</p> <p>The recording or not recording a deed concerns no one, except those who derive title from th® samo feoffor by a deed ofsubse-quent date.</p> <p>Deeds more than 30 years old need not b® proved when possession accompanied the deed from its execution, and that the act of 1785 did not innovate upon the English law respecting ancient deeds.</p> <p>Glib. Law of Evidence, 94,</p> <p>Hearsay evidence is not admissible to prove</p> <p>See 3 Term Reports, 707, where hearsay evidence is fully discussed.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 170Jordan v. Heirs & Distributees of Bradley (1830)
- 1 Dudley Rep. 172Morris v. McClain (1832)
<p>, note cannot be SdOTscT'OTt^of his county.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 172Birch v. Roberts (1832)
<p>writ is taken at the amendment is not made at cannoT b^a-wardítuhout a new order.°Ut a When an order to amend a</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 173Carmichael v. Pendleton (1832)
<p>wl^nins*ltu°t™e][ K„¡t for a client ^™eg out^rf the county Asides i« liable for an ^"entoftbe suits being dis-cas¡>rhOr'if he recover and |ef|™up and «- ecutfon issue, retum^thereon of no property, f0er the'costs?1’ *</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 175Barnett v. Justices (1832)
<p>A certiorari was granted and sustained upon the ground that the Justices’ Court had mis-? interpreted the legal effect of certain articles of agreement introduced m evidence before it.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 176Stapp v. Partlow (1832)
<p> Malicious Prosecution. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 177Doe ex dem. Hammond v. Roe (1832)
<p>Recording gives no preference to deeds, unless it is done within the time prescribed by the statute. Between deeds standing upon the same footing in other respects, the oldest is to be ¡ referred.</p> <p>Where two ps Ties claim title from the same grantee, the identity of the grantee is matter of fact, to be tried by a jury.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 178Roberts v. Carr (1832)
<p> Bill for Discovery, Account and Legacy. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 180Newsom v. Harris (1832)
<p>insufficient8d»-mages, it is sometimes a flood ground for granting a new trial*</p> <p>In an action tíes^the^easure of damages is kñ/auhftime •f the breach,</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 181Jordan v. Administrators of Jordan (1832)
<p>To an action upon a note, the defendant will not be allowed to prove, a partial failure of consideration.</p> <p>A sale of a special interest in land does not amount to a warranty of title ; and if the relinquishment to the purchaser simply recites the promise of a third person to make title, this will not constitute a warranty,</p> <p>A purchaser of a special interest in land, who gives his note for the purchase money, and is in quiet possession of the land, shall not be protected from the payment of the note, from a mere apprehension of being disturbed at some future</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 182Cumming v. Fryer (1832)
<p> Fi. Fa. and Claim. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 182Jordan v. Administrator of Jordan (1832)
<p>compute Ca"the enT^ion h'Sfrom support the Statute1 of ¡imitations. An adminis-</p> <p>The enerai rule that when attaches°wm continue to run, statutory inhibition against P“’s "ght</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 185Hogg v. Odom (1832)
<p>A deed conveying property to the “ children of Nancy Jones” is not void for uncertainty, if it can be shown who were intended bv these words, and that they v ‘ip m Ufa and capable of taking at the time the deed was ex-</p> <p>But such a deed cannot be</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 188State v. Ashley (1833)
<p>The prisoner was indicted and convicted under a law to which tío penalty was annexed by the legislature: On motion in arrest of judgment, the court discharged him, and arrested all further proceedings.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 189Caruthers v. Wardlaw (1833)
<p>a rontraTwh™ the>- express or ™Jr'by plrdOT under seat, or of brought™Tthe name of the par-fes'ai7nierest^in such contract, is ves e '</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 190Smith v. Oliver (1833)
<p>Letters of dis-aiiT'ie"’anyaob-cinat fo™ th° ry, as o«ecmai'y toiv wi aSn" Jstrators fr.im ail flirt-uNi “‘i”/ ere», ” or“ the ctM-i'rouiiWin'11'</p> <p>¿ t tionaiitv of ihe pin Di» 'íés affitmodJ'</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 192Nunnelly v. Road Commissioners (1831)
<p> Fi.fa. and Illegality. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 193Evans v. Lampkin (1831)
<p>Testimony ta-former claim b<¡m to the same fweeiT&e same parties and upon ti“en waTheliTto be admissible,</p> <p> Aee™ettnfra' </p> <p>held p®”®^ bm gíLuí had* a «ght to interfere and interests of ‡? m</p> <p>And that the j^groeTfoíiowed the condition of the motber-</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 195Ginnis v. Bacon (1831)
<p>„ Aa affidavit wh¡ch states mHhouTthelt ¶? deponent doth positive under theact of 18ie-</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 196Selleck v. Twesdall (1831)
<p>In the same affidavit for attachment, plaintiff may set forth notes due— notes that are not due — and that he is in-dorser on certain other notes of defendant, which are not yet due, without subjecting himself to the consequences of a misjoinder of actions; the acts of 1799— 1816 and 1820, being in effect but one act, so far as this point is concerned.</p> <p>If plaintiff in his affidavit use the words a has absconded” they are sufficientun-der the act of 1799< though |he word in that act pre”eñt u'nse'.1'6</p> <p>he not entitle h?m-^f0lf ¡gis and ¡820, vif that thede-j^ant To“^ ¡,dn the benefit of‘!ies®’.h*mi?t debtor ¡s «moo-“taw the limits of this and that the y! aeuiafiy*»!-moving or about ^ remr°emoved without the iim-°ounty,Sac-cordin» to that of 1820‘</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 199Harris v. Williams (1831)
<p>The records and judicial proceedings of the courts of South Carolina, when legally authenticated, are entitled to the same faith and credit in Georgia as they have By iaw or usage in Carolina.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 200Barney v. Doyle (1831)
<p>®y f*« 6* dtóary act Jof ri^’courfs^as courts of law !«IstabiLi>>0iost papers, notes, &c. and when it may be sued on the same manner as the original, and that without resort to a Court of Equity. andrecorered i</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 202Brodnax v. Brown (1831)
<p>where defen-fn'aseumpsiras executors de pleaded non as-sumpsit, ne un- and that they 3-ver intermed-would'not Sow *f'.ch^katr'al ° e '</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 203Martin v. Byrom (1831)
<p>A subsequent promise to avoid the plea of infancy, must be. express, and deliberately made,</p> <p>A mere acknowledgment is not sufficient.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 204Crawford v. Beal (1831)
<p>A transfer^of theybecomedue th mákerofaiT d«fence towhS he ™oul^nt|1t^'de had they contin-of the a ee "ds e payee'</p> <p>a dettCwUhaB! as the adminis-isasucdffor’the same, he cannot off aa debt due to him from c. the intestate,</p> <p>See also the nei case.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 205Crawford v. Vaughn (1831)
- 1 Dudley Rep. 206Crawford v. Grubbs (1831)
<p>sesImmediately preceding, it is •Of Í!contmItI a debt with b. trator o* c! and issued for the pS’asTm-1 ofTa^ebt^dueKi testate:"</p> <p>a differenT* " whereTh” debt sued on was ule'infestate^n-stead of his ad-mimstrator ; for then the debts are mutual and ot course may be set-off.</p> <p>There is n0-thing in the 5th 1799^1,16whlcí ought to operate ofthe1"subject! nothing which sírucSon deprive anj- one fence, acquired andsute\sün"a’ the death of ghts í>rd*ieo i Pr'n’ lg‘ ’ '</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 207Atwell's Executors v. Barney (1831)
<p>An executory devise, to vest on a dying without issue gene-fR^y, that is on RR indefinite failure of issue, is not good because it tends to create a perpetuity.</p> <p>? dyins T issue jivi; But courts favoring the intention of the testator, particularly in devises of personal property, take hold of any circumstance or words of the will which limit the general expression of dying without issue and afford ground for construing ..... limitation to be without - living at the death of the party, in order to support the devise over; so die word^'a/ier lawful1 ’issue" were construed lawful issue at deceased °fand to constituida pood limitation devi8e!xecutory</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 209Stewart v. Grimes (1831)
<p>In a« action conditioned™» Pay a debt by lo*pay rent, the simi,Ia F0^110: on"tile' pkri° of uré defendant p™.of formalíce of the c«dmon: And cipie is appii-condit¡onedb°to deliver, on a fioTnnd muni-ments of title,</p> <p>ls a defendant has his testimo-rJfúses°tT!ntr¿ duce it at a pro-EhícáTeorTm™? ter of law, and concluding argument, an^ after beenarguedafor plaintiff, he nan-mitted to change i,is position and introduce his testimony.</p> <p>xhediscov. cry of new and ¡¡¡^"after diet, is a good ^w"trisd.ra</p> <p>lrial is granted on the verdict of !l.PSütsiíown"lo ¡-1® “urt, thfl LíePÍo'7appeal" ho ca”* tv, ti»com-Twili oh payment of costs, direct ihe case to be transferred to the appeal docker, and allow it to be tried before a special jury.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 212Hobby v. Pemberton (1831)
<p> Judgment on Foreclosure of Mortgage and rule nisi against Sheriff. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 213State v. Sims (1831)
<p>sec^t'dR. p!?. nal Code cf are declared”1!» be judges both fact ^l.nidyetw ther were *" rerdici^grossiy and would’ unques-n^v^af-^but where thevWdict “¡[{j of the case, and ¡s at Pth"'discr"-t™> of the court, disturbed.''1 bs</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 214Woodruff v. Dean (1831)
<p>By 2d see. of act of 10th December 1803, the justices of the Inferior Court have power to discharge persons imprisoned for debt under circumstances therein named, but they must do it as a court, and an order for discharge submitted to them in-dividualiy for their respective signatures out of court is insufficient and void.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 216Anderson v. Primrose (1831)
<p>A. sued B. as executor de son tort of C. and offered Gj..#sswifu l.o prove the in-termeddling ; she being an heir and distri-butee of C., and the effect of her testimony being to increase tha residuum for distribution in exact proportion to the debt sued on and recovered, was held to bo clearly incompetent as a witness.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 218Hicks v. Thomas (1831)
<p>i to set aside Verdict and order Nonsuit. Rule</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 219Anderson v. Musgrove (1831)
<p> Fi.fa. and Claim by Burton and Host wick ; Verdict for Flaird iff and Mot ionfor 'sew Trial. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 221Mealing v. City Council of Augusta (1831)
<p>,.ity CHUncil of Augusta cun-[irthé^amiTs'tf *He charter to “athíií'^ñdfr >*s <»™ ordi-b^consMereda court ^subject to While ¡ho</p> <p>"'i”“^,|be„nIeg, fhenparty ¡* in danger of being mimed by some suit actually depending.-. >» ¡hat he merely f''ars H’*1 a s,m meúcedin which [j!jn™feht su<fer</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 224Hunter v. Shaffer (1831)
<p>Where thede-negroXd íon-traded marriage personfre®nWh‘a neighboring lile'r'iT'Snd'p-o-perty for a long mU*éd™hemnto thecourtefn*"*'8’ statepresumed »rtofrTveSeffect to a d?ed made some one should assert and main-her*as^hís^slave* '</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 227Administrators of Magruder v. Administrators of Offutt (1831)
<p> Rule nisi for Foreclosure. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 229State v. Tassels (1830)
<p> Indictment for Murder. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 239Daniel v. Daniel (1832)
- 1 Dudley Rep. 240Dardin v. Ogletree (1832)
<p> Assumpsit. . </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 241Upshaw v. Oliver (1832)
<p> False Imprisonment. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 243Scott v. Walker (1832)
<p>ti0n“f¡howord¡ “or bearer” in Materia?'aitera-non, and wilt vi-“enVimie’raUfc proven to travo ij“mak« or by his consent,</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 244Excellency the Governor v. Williams (1833)
<p> Scire Facias. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 245Hinton v. Scott (1833)
<p>In, *n **>*°» °f debt upon votoe given in pur-defendant ^ili not be permiied resentí»™? Tr the^vaiiw and £nd'tymade '!!v wmíhT'Ta of partiai fadure of avadhim1'0" aval im.</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 247Cooper v. Perry (1833)
<p>Words, which are doubtful or even innocent in themselves, if they be proven to have a criminal signification according to the common understanding of them will support an action of slan-</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 249Poe v. Justices of the Peace (1833)
<p>A note given in compromise of a suit by set. fa. to condemn land under the lottery law of 132o, is in violation of that statute, contrary to public policy,and void as between maker and payee ; and its consideration may be inquired into in a suit between the original parties :</p> <p>But if indorsed before due, and without notice, in a suit by such innocent indorsee against the maker, the courts will not permit the consideration to be gone</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 251Wright v. Wright (1833)
<p>imeresUn f0d™yrsenraa¿¿ brought, into hot^-pot^ but her "husband’s estate at the death,</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 252Williams v. Abercrombie (1833)
<p>An account dencé, oughfTó show the daily the party: other■wise it will bo rejec ° '</p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 253Thompson v. Arthur (1833)
<p> Motion to dismiss Attachment. </p>
- 1 Dudley Rep. 254Crockett v. Routon (1833)
<p>Parol evidence which denies or varies a record, is inadmissible.</p> <p>To determine whether a former recovery is a bar to a subsequent action, a good test is, whether the same evidence will support both actions.</p> <p>If the parties, the subject-matter of the stiit, and the evidence, be the same, the former recovery is a bar.</p>