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← 1 F.1d 768 - Bartlett, Reid & Co. v. Teah

Bartlett, Reid & Co. v. Teah’s Empirical Analysis

1 F. 768 · 1880

Citation profile

13
cited by 13 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
March 2002
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 2 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2002

5 federal appellate · 2 district ·

301880189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Britton v. . Lorenz · 5 Ohio St. 124 - Hoffman, Burneston & Co. v. Mackall · Turner v. Watkins · Juliand v. . Rathbone · Pettit v. Johnson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““A mortgage does not invest the mortgagee with an absolute and indefeasible title. The equitable title, called the ’equity of redemption,’ remains in the mortgagor. The mortgage is a security for the debt, and creates a lien upon the property in favor of the creditor. There is no difference in legal effect between a mortgage with a power of sale and a deed of trust executed to secure a debt, where the power of sale is placed in a third person. Both are securities for a debt. Both create specific liens on tlie property; and in both the equitable title or right of redemption remains in the debtor, and is an estate or interest in the property that the debtor may sell, or that may be seized and sold under judicial process l>y his other creditors, subject to tlie lien created by the mortgage or deed of trust. * * * An assignment for the benefit of creditors is well defined to be ‘a transfer by a debtor of some or all of his property to an assignee in trust, to apply tho'same, or the proceeds thereof, to ihe payment of some or all of his debts, and to return the surplus, if any, to the debtor.’ Burrill on Assignment, § 2. The terms of the instrument in this case bring it exactly within this definition, and stamp it as an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and not a mortgage, or deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage. Unlike a mortgage or deed of trust, it was not given by way of security. There is no defeasance clause giving the grantor the right of redemption. It does ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.