1 F3d 1232 Canty v. City of Winston-Salem
1 F.3d 1232
Charles Larry CANTY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM; Martha Wood, Mayor, City of
Winston-Salem; Lynn Harper, Alderman, City of Winston-Salem;
Nancy Pleasants, Alderman, City of Winston-Salem; Virginia
Newell, Alderman, City of Winston-Salem; Nelson Malloy,
Alderman, City of Winston-Salem; Robert Northerton,
Alderman, City of Winston-Salem; Larry Wayne Womble,
Alderman, City of Winston-Salem; Vivian Burke, Alderman,
City of Winston-Salem; Hugh Wright, Alderman, City of
Winston-Salem; Bill Stuart, City Manager, City of
Winston-Salem, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 93-1564.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: July 16, 1993.
Decided: August 2, 1993.
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CA-92-642-6)
Charles Larry Canty, Appellant Pro Se.
Richard Lee Rainey, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellees.
M.D.N.C.
DISMISSED.
Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Charles Larry Canty appeals the magistrate judge's order denying his motion for appointment of counsel. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This Court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1988), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292 (1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903 (1987).
We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED