Case: 20-40332 Document: 00515896409 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/11/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-40332 June 11, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Arnoldo Antonio Vasquez,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:17-CV-101
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Jolly and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Arnoldo Antonio Vasquez, a former Salvadorian military officer, is
now a naturalized American citizen. Based on his role in extrajudicial killings
and a subsequent cover-up occurring during armed conflict in El Salvador,
the government seeks to revoke his citizenship, that is, to denaturalize him.
The district court conducted a three-day bench trial and declined to cancel
Vasquez’s American citizenship. The district court erred. Although he may
have refused to actually shoot civilians, we find that the former officer
“assisted” and “participated in the commission of” extrajudicial killings
during the Salvadorian Civil War, rendering him statutorily ineligible to
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No. 20-40332
assume the “high privilege” of American citizenship. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(E)(iii); Chaunt v. United States,
364 U.S. 350, 357 (1960) (Clark,
J., dissenting). We therefore REVERSE and REMAND.
I.
Arnoldo Antonio Vasquez served as an officer in the Salvadorian
military during the brutal civil war that took place in El Salvador between
1980 and 1991.1 On September 20, 1988, Vasquez’s superiors gave Vasquez
the names and addresses of alleged members of a rebel group to capture near
the town of San Sebastian. Armed and ready, Vasquez and his soldiers
traveled to the town and did as they were told.
After the alleged rebels had been captured, a major who was secondin-command of the entire battalion ordered one of the detainees to be killed.
Two of Vasquez’s superiors refused to comply with the order and requested
it in writing because they believed it to be illegal. The major then skipped
over these intermediate officers and contacted Vasquez directly, repeating
his order and stating he would come to San Sebastian to “conduct an
investigation.” Vasquez testified that at this point, he knew the major
planned to kill all of the detainees and had no intention of conducting an
investigation. This understanding was further confirmed by the fact that the
major had also ordered one of the detainees to be dressed in black clothing so
that he would appear to be a member of a rebel group.
Knowing that the major was coming and planned to execute the
detainees, Vasquez nevertheless had his soldiers dress one of the detainees
in black clothes. The major arrived, ordered the capture of additional
individuals, and then ordered all of the detainees to be executed—ten
1
For the most part, the facts of this case are not in dispute, and we fully rely on the
district court’s findings.
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innocent civilians in total. Vasquez’s soldiers proceeded to kill the detainees
by staging a fake ambush: they lined up the detainees in a road, set off
explosives and fired their weapons to make battle noises (and seriously
wound the detainees), and then finished off the detainees at point-blank
range.
Vasquez, without corroborating evidence, claims that he refused to
comply with the major’s order to participate in the staged ambush. But
Vasquez admits that he saw his soldiers preparing for the staged ambush,
knew it was happening, and was relatively close by as the detainees were
murdered.
After the killings, the major instructed Vasquez to say that the
detainees had been killed during a skirmish following an ambush, which was
a lie. Vasquez repeated this lie to his soldiers to make sure that they knew
the cover-up story. He repeated this lie again to a Salvadorian military
commission charged with investigating the incident, which had come to be
known as the San Sebastian Massacre. Eventually, when Vasquez found out
that he was to be blamed for the massacre, he told the commission the truth.
Investigative proceedings continued for several years before the
military commission and in Salvadorian courts. Vasquez was first identified
as having potentially carried out the killings alongside his men but was later
acquitted by a court of the crime of intentional homicide. An appellate court
upheld his acquittal. During this time, however, the Salvadorian military
continued to threaten and murder potential witnesses, and even judges, to
prevent civilian courts from holding the military accountable. After the civil
war ended, the United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador
specifically found that Vasquez transmitted the major’s order to “designate
some soldiers to finish off the victims” of the massacre. It further found that
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he “provided the necessary materials to activate” the explosives that were
used in the fake ambush.
Over a decade after the massacre, Vasquez applied and was approved
for a visa to come to this country. Several years after that, in 2004, he sought
to become a naturalized American citizen. His application was approved, and
in January 2005, Vasquez took the oath of allegiance and became a United
States citizen. But in 2017, the government brought this denaturalization suit
against Vasquez, alleging that he failed to meet statutory requirements for
citizenship at the time of his naturalization and that he procured his
citizenship illegally. After a three-day bench trial, the district court found
that the government had not met its burden of proof. The government
appeals.
II.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to “establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. That power bestows the
ability to create rules regarding both the requirements for citizenship and the
potential consequences for failing to meet those requirements—even if
discovered after citizenship has already been conferred. See United States v.
Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951, 956 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J.). These consequences
include denaturalization.
Congress has stated that “[n]o person” may become a citizen “unless
such applicant . . . has been and still is a person of good moral character.” 8
U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3). A person cannot “be regarded as, or found to be, a
person of good moral character” if that person “at any time” has
“committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
commission of . . . any extrajudicial killing.”
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(9);
8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(E)(iii). Lest the meaning of “extrajudicial killing” be unclear,
Congress defined the term as “a deliberated killing not authorized by a
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previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.” Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256,
§ 3(a),
106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992).
For over a century, the Supreme Court has recognized that “no alien
has the slightest right to naturalization unless all statutory requirements are
complied with.” United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917). If a
person manages to become a citizen despite not meeting Congress’s
requirements, his citizenship is “illegally procured.”
Id. And since “every
certificate of citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the
government may challenge it,” the government may “demand [the]
cancellation” of illegally procured citizenship that was not “issued in
accordance with [Congress’s] requirements.”
Id.
The authorization and procedures for revoking a naturalized
American’s citizenship who failed to comply with congressionally imposed
conditions for acquiring that citizenship are found in 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). This
statute empowers the government to initiate a civil suit to “revok[e] and set[]
aside” any order admitting a person as a citizen and “cancel [his] certificate
of naturalization” if proven that his citizenship was “illegally procured.”
8
U.S.C. § 1451(a); Fedorenko v. United States,
449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981). As
described above, “a naturalized citizen’s failure to comply with the statutory
prerequisites for naturalization renders his certificate of citizenship revocable
as ‘illegally procured’ under
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).”
Id. at 514.
A denaturalization suit, however, is not “an ordinary civil action since
it involves an important adjudication of status.” Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 160 (1943). To take away a person’s American
citizenship is an “extraordinarily severe” penalty: “[d]enaturalization
consequences may be more grave than consequences that flow from
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conviction for crimes.” Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611–12
(1949). Because “[r]ights once conferred should not be lightly revoked,” the
government must meet an “exacting standard” to denaturalize a citizen,
proving its charges by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.”
Id. at
612; Schneiderman,
320 U.S. at 125. This burden is “substantially identical
with that required in criminal cases” because the “objective sought” and the
“gravity of the consequences” are not “so different as to justify adoption of
a different standard.” Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1988);
Klapprott,
335 U.S. at 612. The facts and the law should be construed “as far
as is reasonably possible” in favor of the citizen. Schneiderman,
320 U.S. at
122.
III.
We thus come to the central question: whether Vasquez, in
connection with the San Sabastian Massacre, “committed, ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of” an extrajudicial
killing? If the government has satisfied this standard by “clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence,” then Vasquez cannot be, as statutorily defined, a
“person of good moral character” who has met congressionally prescribed
requirements for citizenship. His citizenship was therefore “illegally
procured” and can be revoked.
We agree with the district court that the San Sebastian Massacre
constitutes an extrajudicial killing as defined in the statute. But the question
we focus on is whether Vasquez “assisted” or “otherwise participated” in
the massacre.
We begin, of course, with the text. Construing the facts “as far as
reasonably possible” in favor of Vasquez, it does not appear that he
“committed,” “ordered,” or “incited” the killings in San Sebastian. 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(iii). The statute, however, goes further to encompass
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actors who “assisted” or “otherwise participated” in extrajudicial killings.
Id. Looking to the meaning of these terms at the time of the statute’s
enactment, “assist” was defined “to give support or aid” or “to give usually
supplementary support or aid to”; the definition of “participate” was “to
take part” or “to have a part or share in something.” Assist, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2001); Participate,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2001). These
broad terms implicate a wide range of conduct beyond actually committing
the crime, especially since “participate” is modified by “otherwise”—“in a
different way or manner,” “in different circumstances,” or “in other
respects.” Otherwise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2001).
Caselaw supports this understanding. Although the Supreme Court
has not yet addressed this language in the context of this statute, “laws
dealing with the same subject . . . should if possible be interpreted
harmoniously.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 252 (2012). In a key
denaturalization case, the Court addressed the meaning of “assist[ing]” in
the persecution of civilians, another statutory bar to naturalization:
[A]n individual who did no more than cut the hair of female
inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have
assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand,
there can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform
and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and
was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit
a nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping
inmates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits
within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the
persecution of civilians.
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Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514 n.33. Circuit courts have often if not uniformly
turned to this descriptive language as a starting point to elucidate the term
“assistance” as used in other immigration statutes: for example, when
considering asylum or denaturalization for former persecutors. The
“persecutor bar” to asylum prohibits those who “ordered, incited, assisted,
or otherwise participated” in the persecution of others “on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion” from being granted asylum. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i); Chen
v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,
513 F.3d 1255, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases).
Applying the language in Fedorenko, these courts have held that determining
whether a person “assisted” or “participated” is a “particularized, factspecific inquiry into whether the applicant’s personal conduct was merely
indirect, peripheral, and inconsequential association or was active, direct and
integral.” Chen, 513 F.3d at 1258–59.
Thus, in other asylum and denaturalization cases, detaining,
searching, and interviewing two Jews escaping from the Nazis was deemed
“assisting” in persecution, as was serving as an editor of an anti-Semitic
periodical. United States v. Dailide, 227 F.3d 385, 392, 398 (6th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Koreh,
59 F.3d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1995) (denaturalization
cases). Of particular similarity to the case at hand, being armed and present
when civilians were thrown into a pit and murdered also was considered
“assistance.” United States v. Reimer,
356 F.3d 456, 459 (2d Cir. 2004)
(Sotomayor, J.) (denaturalization case). Taking custody of and transporting
innocent civilians to places where it was known they would be beaten and
abused—or serving as a translator during interrogation marked by torture—
also qualified as “assistance or participation in” persecution. Miranda
Alvarado v. Gonzales,
449 F.3d 915, 928–29 (9th Cir. 2006); Singh v.
Gonzales,
417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005) (asylum cases). In short, caselaw
is uniform in its assessment that this standard “does not require actual
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‘trigger-pulling’”; the defendant need not engage “in the commission of
physical atrocities” to be found to have “assisted” or “participated” in
them. Miranda Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 927; Koreh,
59 F.3d at 442.
Here, Vasquez is more similar to Fedorenko’s hypothetical guard than
the hypothetical barber. His undisputed conduct—capturing those who were
killed, continuing to detain them knowing their deaths were imminent,
waiting nearby while they were executed, and taking action to hide what truly
happened—was not “merely indirect, peripheral, and inconsequential
association” with the killings, but was “active, direct, and integral” to the
civilians’ deaths. Although, on his version of the facts, he did not engage in
“trigger-pulling,” he was involved enough to be considered one who assisted
or otherwise participated in the killings.
Nor does Vasquez’s refusal to actually pull the trigger on those
murdered absolve him. In Xie v. I.N.S., the Second Circuit was confronted
with a similar issue in the context of the asylum persecutor bar. Xie v. I.N.S.,
434 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 2006) (asylum case). Before coming to America,
Xie had driven captive women to forced abortions carried out by the Chinese
government.
Id. But on one occasion, because no guard was present, he
released a woman who pled for her freedom.
Id. at 143. The court held that
“nothing in the governing statutes or case law” allows “redemptive
behavior” to “serve as a basis for us to conclude” that the persecutor “was
thereby relieved . . . of the consequences of his having previously assisted in”
persecution.
Id. at 143–44. Similarly, the fact that Vasquez refused to shoot
the prisoners does not relieve him of the fact that he assisted and participated
in their deaths in other ways.
Finally—and although not by any means dispositive—the statute’s
legislative history also provides another data point indicating a broad reading
of the terms at issue. The language interpreted here was added as part of the
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Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act, which was “intended to close
loopholes in U.S. immigration laws that have allowed aliens who have
committed serious forms of human rights abuses abroad to enter and remain
in the country”; its purpose was to “expand the grounds for inadmissibility
and removability to cover aliens who have engaged abroad in acts of . . .
extrajudicial killing.” S. REP. NO. 108-209, at 1–2 (2003). In discussing
§ 1182(a)(3)(E)(iii), the legislative history makes clear that “[t]he statutory
language—‘committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated
in’—is intended to reach the behavior of persons directly or personally
associated with the covered acts. . . . Attempts and conspiracies to commit
these crimes are encompassed in the ‘otherwise participated in’ language.”
Id. at 10. While the legislative history is not part of the statute and is most
certainly not the law, Vasquez was “personally associated” with the murders
at San Sebastian. And he was part of the conspiracy that undertook the
killings and sought to cover them up.
In sum, dictionary definitions, caselaw, and legislative history point to
an inescapable conclusion regarding the terms “assisted” and “participated
in”: they cover a broad range of conduct—including Vasquez’s actions.
Vasquez captured the innocent civilians who were killed. He had his men
dress one of them in black to facilitate the ruse the major attempted to use to
blame the killings on the rebels. He kept them detained knowing their
unlawful deaths were imminent. And he thoroughly helped with the cover-up and coached others to do the same. These actions—undisputed by the
parties—show that Vasquez assisted and participated in the extrajudicial
killing of ten Salvadorians at San Sebastian. He therefore was not a person of
good moral character, was not eligible to become a citizen, and illegally
procured his citizenship. And because the government has proved this by
“clear, unequivocal, convincing evidence”—again, we rely only on facts
undisputed in the record—Vasquez’s certificate of naturalization must be
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canceled, and the order admitting him as a citizen must be revoked and set
aside. The judgment is REVERSED and VACATED, and the case is
REMANDED for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED for entry of judgment.
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