Volume 1 — Federal Cases

<p>Case No. 1.</p> <p>Damages to Person — Right op Action —Stevedore.</p> <p>1. In an action in rem to recover of the ship damages sustained by a stevedore, engaged in discharging cargo, who was thrown down and seriously injured by the breaking of the span- 1 rope that sustained the tackle of slings he had I rigged, which rope the master of the bark had ! rigged expecting to discharge the cargo himself: ! Meld, that the putting up an imperfect span-rope was not such a failure of duty on the part of the master in the furnishing of the ship as would give a right of action against her.</p> <p>[2. Cited in The Rheola, 7 Fed. Rep. 783, to the point that the owner of a defective article is not liable for an injury caused thereby to a mere stranger, unless the article was imminently dangerous.]</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[Li bankruptcy. Warren C. Abbe filed a petition that the late copartnership of which he was a member be declared bankrupt; that the petitioner be declared bankrupt, and discharged from all his debts, partnership as well as individual. The register was of the opinion that the first request should be denied and the other granted. Hoard on the certification of the register. Opinion of the register concurred in.]

[In equity. Bill by Horatio H. Abbe and others, trading as the Gong Bell Manufacturing Company, against Jonathan C. Clark and others to restrain the infringement of patent No. 150,933. Decree for an injunction and an account.]

<p>Case No. 6.</p> <p>Principal and Agent — Ratification—Witnesses —Credibility.</p> <p>1. When an agent exceeds his powers in the adjustment of a controversy, his principals, in a reasonable time, after a knowledge of it, should repudiate it. If this be not done, the principals may become bound.</p> <p>[Cited In Foild v. Farrington, 10 Wall. (77 U. S.) 148.]</p> <p>2. If an agent entered into an arrangement notifying the debtor that he would submit it to the creditor for his ratification, unless he shall ratify it, there is no binding obligation.</p> <p>3. When witnesses contradict each other in a material fact, a jury will consider which of the witnesses, from the circumstances connected with the transaction, would be most likely to know and recollect the facts.</p> <p>4. A witness who swears that a certain thing was said or done, is entitled to greater weight than a witness who said he did not hear the remark or witness the act. The one is positive, the other negative; and both may be true, on the supposition that the first witness swears truly.</p>

<p>Case No. 7.</p> <p>Patents por Inventions — License—Conditional Assignment — Breach of Condition — Caveat Emptor.</p> <p>T. An assignment of certain patents having been granted with a condition therein that, if default were made in payment of any of the instalments of the consideration money therefor, thereupon the assignment should become null and void, and default having been made, and a re-assignment taken, (previous to which, however, the assignee had granted a license to a third party to use the patents,) held, that a license granted under such circumstances was no defence to a charge of infringement by the use of the patents, because the assignee could give no better title than he himself had and the licensee ought to have inquired into the as-signee’s right to grant such license.</p> <p>2. The maxim “caveat emptor” applied, under the facts in this case.</p>

[In equity. Bill by Gorham D. Abbot against The American Hard Rubber Company for an injunction.] This was a demurrer to a bill in equity.

In bankruptcy. Motion to dissolve an injunction, granted, pending involuntary proceedings, restraining the debtor and Roscoe L. Bowers from conveying or disposing of certain property claimed to have been conveyed and disposed of by the debtor in fraud of the bankrupt act. The petitioning creditors objected, and the cause was submitted upon affidavits filed by both parties. The opinion is not printed in full.

<p>[At law. Real action, by James A. Abbott and Hannah K. Abbott, his wife, demand-ants, against the Essex Company, tenants, to recover a parcel of land.] Both parties claimed under the will of John Kittredge. The demandants claimed that the will of John Kittredge created estates tail in equal moieties in each of his two sons John and Jacob, with cross remainders in fee-simple. The tenants claimed under Jacob Kittredge, to whom in his lifetime his brother had conveyed all his title; and they maintained that each of the two sons took a fee-simple, and that by way of executory devise, the share of that son, ■ who should first die without issue, was devised over to the other. The will was as follows:</p> <p>“In the name of God, amen. I, John Kit-tredge, of Andover, in the county of Essex and province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England, surgeon, being, through Divine goodness, favored with the due exercise of my understanding, have great cause, and accordingly I return thanks to Almighty God therefor; but being exercised with such bodily indisposition as gives me reason to think that my continuance in life is but short, I have, therefore, thought proper to discharge my mind of all worldly concerns, as far as possible, to the end that I may spend the remainder of my days in preparation for futurity; for which purpose I make this my last will and testament, whereby I dispose of my worldly goods and estate as followeth, namely:—</p> <p>“Imp’s. I give to Sarah, my well-beloved wife, the one third of all my lands and buildings in Andover aforesaid, and the one third of all my household goods and furniture, to be for her use and improvement, so long as she remains my widow.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my son, Benjamin Kit-tredge, of Tewksbury, in the county of Middle-sex, the sum of twenty shillings, lawful money, and the reason I give him no more is, that I have given him his portion out of my estate some time before.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my son, Thomas Kit-tredge, all the land I own lying in a place known by the name of Ox Common, in said Andover, which, with what I have given him, my said son Thomas, completes his full proportion of my estate.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my two sons, namely, John and Jacob Kittredge, all my lands and buildings in Andover aforesaid (excepting the land I gave to my son Thomas aforesaid), which buildings consist of dwelling-houses, barns, corn-house, grist-mill, and cider-mill, all of every denomination; also, all my livestock of cattle, horses, sheep, and swine, and all my husbandry utensils of every denomination, and all my tools that may be useful for tending the mills aforesaid, and also all my bonds and notes of hand and book accounts, together with what money I may leave at my decease; and my wearing apparel, I give the same to my said sons, John and Jacob Kittredge, to be equally divided between them; and in consideration of .what I have given my said sons John and Jacob Kittredge, the executor of this testament (hereinafter named) is hereby ordered to see that all my just debts and funeral charges, together with all the legacies in this will mentioned, be paid out of that part of my estate I have given to my two-sons, John and Jacob Kittredge, to whom I give each one bed and bedding.</p> <p>“Item. It is my will, that if either of my said sons, namely, John and Jacob Kittredge, should happen to die without any lawful heirs of their own, then the share of him who may first decease shall accrue to the other survivor and his heirs.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my granddaughter, Molly White (daughter of Aaron White, of Medway, in the county of Suffolk), the sum of fourteen pounds five shillings and two pence, lawful money; and the reason I give her no more is, I gave my daughter (mother of the said Molly White) at her marriage, as much as would make her, the said grandchild, with what I have now bequeathed, equal to my other daughters, which sum is to be paid her at the age of twenty-one years; but if she should see fit to marry before she arrives to that age, the same to he paid her at her marriage.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my granddaughter, Sarah Dwinnel, the sum of sixty pounds, lawful money, to be paid in the following manner, namely, twenty pounds to be paid her as soon as she arrives to the age of twenty-one years; but if she should see ñt to marry before the age of twenty-one years, the same sum of twenty pounds to be paid her and the remainder to be paid in three years after she arrives to the age of twenty-one, with lawful interest for the same till paid; and I also order her, the said Sarah Dwinnel, to be maintained out of that part of my estate I give to my sons, John and Jacob Kittredge, until she arrives to the age of eighteen years.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my daughter, Elizabeth Kittredge, the sum of fifty-three pounds, six shillings and eight pence, lawful money, of which sum thirteen pounds, six shillings and eight pence is to be paid her at my decease, and the remainder to be paid her in four years after, with lawful interest for the same till paid.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my daughter, Hannah Kittredge, the sum of sixty pounds, lawful money, twenty pounds to be paid her when she arrives to the age of twenty-two years (except she should marry before she arrives to the age of twenty-two years), then the said twenty pounds to be paid her, and the remainder to be paid in three years after, with interest for the same till paid. 'I also give her my best bed and furniture.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my daughter, Susanna Kittredge, the sum of sixty pounds, lawful money, twenty pounds to be paid her when she arrives to the age of eighteen years, and the remainder in five years after, with interest for the same till paid.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my three daughters, namely, Elizabeth, Hannah, and Susanna Kittredge, the remainder of my household goods and furniture (excepting wet and dry cash), and also the one third which I gave Sarah, my aforesaid wife, or what of the same may remain at her decease or marriage; all of which is to be equally divided amongst them, my abovesaid daughters. I also give to them, my said daughters, the privilege of living in my house for so long as they shall live a single life, and the liberty of keeping a cow and one swine on the produce of my land I have given to my two sons, John and Jacob Kittredge.</p> <p>“Item. It is my will, that if either of my daughters or granddaughters aforenamed should die and leave no lawful issue, then, what I have given to either of them, should be equally divided amongst my surviving daughters or their heirs.</p> <p>“Item. I give to my said sons, John and Jacob Kittredge, my wet and dry cash, and also my pew in the North Meetinghouse in Andover, aforesaid, to be equally divided between them, they to allow my aforesaid wife and daughters to sit in said pew as= long as they live unmarried. And if there-is any of my estate that I have not disposed óf in this will, either real, personal, or mixed, of what name or nature soever, I give the same to my aforesaid sons John and Jacob Kittredge. '</p> <p>“Lastly. I do hereby constitute and appoint my aforesaid son, John Kittredge, the sole executor of this my last will and testament, allowing this and no other to be so.</p> <p>“In witness whereof, I, the said John 0Klttredge, have hereunto set my hand and ¿seal, this twentieth day of September,. Anno Domini one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, and the fifteenth year of His Majesty’s reign. John Kittredge.”</p> <p>It was admitted by the parties, that said testator died in the year 1775; that his will was duly proved August 5, 1776; that his two sons, John Kittredge and Jacob Kittredge, survived him; that said John Kittredge died in the year 1826, never having been married; that said Jacob Kittredge died in the lifetime of his brother John, on July 15, 1807, leaving the following children, namely, John Kittredge, his oldest child, who died without ever having had issue, on the tenth of January, 1823; Jacob Kittredge, his next oldest child, who died December 18, 1831, having had issue one child, who is the demandant, Hannah Kittredge Abbott; Thomas W. Kittredge, his next child, who is now alive; Hannah Kittredge, his next child, who died, intestate, on the 28th October, 1815, never having had issue; George W. Kittredge, his next child, who died July 4, 1836, intestate, having had issue one child, Jacob Kittredge, who is now alive, and William H. Kittredge, his last child, who died, intestate, on the 1st of October, 1849, never having had issue. The marriage of the demandants was also admitted, and that the surviving son of Jacob Kittredge, the-devisee named in said will, and also his surviving grandchild, had before the commencement of the suit, released and conveyed to-demandants all their interest and title in the-demanded premises. [Judgment for defendant. Affirmed, by supreme court, 18 How-(59 U. S.) 202.]</p>

<p>Case No. 12.</p> <p>Judicial Sals — Hiving Credit — Conversión.</p> <p>A wagon and other articles, the property of ■ an express company, then in possession of a i stable-keeper, attached on mesne process in a suit against the company, were bought at sheriff’s sale made under statute of Massachusetts, by the attaching creditors, under an agreement with the sheriff that credit should be given for-the articles they might purchase at the sale until the decision of the suit in which the attachment was made. After the sale, the officer and the auctioneer instructed the stable-keeper not to deliver any articles sold, except on production of a receipt for the purchase-money, signed' by the auctioneer. Before payment for the wagon, and while it was still in the stable-keeper’s possession, and without the knowledge-of the purchasers, it was distrained and sold by a United States collector of internal revenue, after notice to the express company, for nonpayment of taxes due from the company. Hrld. that the right of property in the wagon vested I by the sale in the purchasers, and that they I could maintain trespass de bonis asportatis-against the collector for its conversion.</p> <p>LSee Corfield v. Coryell, Case No. 3,230.]</p>

<p>Case No. 13.</p> <p>Juxioa Moutgagee — Homestead.</p> <p>Where a mortgage was made on two pieces of real estate, and a subsequent mortgage was made on one of them, and thereafter a homestead was declared in respect of the land not embraced in the second mortgage, held, that the equitable right of the junior mortgagee to compel the first mortgagee to resort, in the first instance, to the property on which he had exclusive claim, could not bo taken away or impaired by a declaration of homestead, by either husband or wife, on the property exclusively mortgaged to the first mortgagee.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by C. F. Gardiner and others against the Abby Whitman, J. H. Pearson, and others, and George Cannon, assignee, claimants for materials furnished. Dismissed.] This was a libel against the Abby Whitman, for materials alleged to have been used in her construction, under the Massachusetts statute, entitled an “Act establishing a lien upon ships and vessels in certain cases,” St. 1848, c. 200.

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, by Peter McDonald, prosecuting for himself and on behalf of his wife and minor children, against the ship Aberfoyle, to recover damages for breach of a contract for the passage •of libellant and his family. [The decree ren-dered herein was affirmed by the circuit court in The Aberfoyle, Case No. 17.] Samuel R. Graves, owner of the vessel, | filed a claim and answer.

In admiralty. Peter McDonald and others filed a libel in rom, in the district court, against the ship Aberfoyle, alleging that they were not furnished with provisions and water on their passage from Liverpool to New York in that vessel, as they should have been according to the terms of a contract entered into by them with the agent of the owner.

In admiralty. Information or libel of seizure for importing into Boston, from the province of New Brunswick, certain coal, which was not truly goods or merchandise of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the said province, contrary to the act of 15 May, 1820, c. 122, § 3, [3 Stat. 604.] At the trial, the principal inquiry was, whether the coal was the produce of the province of New Brunswick; and the evidence on both sides was so contradictory, that the question, on whom…

[At law. Action- of trover and conversion by Robert W. Aborn and others against John W. Mason, assignee in bankruptcy of ■ Louis H. Oberhofer. Heard on motion for i new trial. Motion denied.]

[At law. On motion to set aside the judgment. Denied.] This was an action against the collector of the port of New York. It was originally commenced in the superior court of the city of New York.

<p>Case No. 20.</p> <p>BANKituPTcr — Fhesentation of Petition— Pkactice.</p> <p>[The fact that a petition in bankruptcy was attested “nine days before presented” affords no bar to its presentation; and the decree dates back to the application, and property acquired after verification, and before presentation, passes as assets to the assignee.]</p>

<p>Case No. 23.</p> <p>Marshal's Costs — Bonding Vessel.</p> <p>A vessel was seized by the marshal under a monition, and thereafter was released on a stipulation for her appraised value. Held, that the marshal was not entitled to a commission on such appraised value under section 829 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. In The Norma, Case No. 1,626, the district court for Louisiana held that, where a settlement is made before a final or interlocutory decree is rendered, the marshal is not entitled to his commissions. This case was, however, denied by the same court in The Clintonia, 11 Fed. Rep. 740, by holding that the marshal is entitled to his commissions, although the property was released on stipulation, the claim compromised, and suit withdrawn, before a final decree was rendered. See, also, to the same point. Robinson v. Bags of Sugar, 35 Fed. Rep. 603; The Vernon, 36 Fed. Rep.</p>

In admiralty. Exceptions to a libel for services rendered in towing the Acadia from Detroit to Lake Huron, in June, 1S57. [Overruled.] The libel alleged that the service ' was. maritime, and that the libellants had also a lien by virtue of the laws of Michigan when. the services were rendered. The warrant oí arrest was issued and placed in the hands of the late Marshal Fitch, after his term of office had expired.

<p>Case No. 26.</p> <p>Shipping — Affkeightment—Principal and Agent.</p> <p>1. Where a broker, in fact as agent of the owner of lumber, but in his own name, contracted to have it shipped at a specified freight, ■but, when the time came for shipping it, refused to ship it in his own name, or to be responsible for the freight: Meld, that the owner of the vessel had a right to refuse to receive the lumber, and that no action would lie against him, to recover any increased freight which was paid on shipping the lumber by another vessel.</p> <p>2. Nor could the broker, if he acted simply as agent, in making the contract, maintain such action in his own name.</p>

In admiralty. This was originally an •ordinary suit in rem, brought to recover of the bark Acme the amount of certain advances made by the firm of M. A. Herrera -& Co., of Havana. In the first instance, the libellants filed their libel against the vessel, upon which process was issued, under which the vessel was taken into custody by the marshal.

<p>Case No. 26.</p> <p>Collision- — Between Steameb and Vessel at Axcnon — Speed of Steameb— Lookout — Narrow Passage.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel in rem to recover the amount of advances made by M. A. Herrera & Co. to the master of the bark Acme; George H. Millington, a mortgagee thereof, appearing as claimant. The mortgagee’s claim was rejected by the district court, and a decree entered for the libel-ants. (Case No. 27.) The claimant appeals. Decree sustaining the lien of both libelants and claimant.]

[In bankruptcy. Certificate to district judge by register of question arising in proceedings.] [Statement by Charles Hamlin, Register:] Upon the examination of said bankrupt in behalf of said creditors, the assignee being present, the following question was proposed to said bankrupt, viz.: “Referring to the conveyance requested by the assignee, please state whether you are now willing to execute them.” The bankrupt answered: “Upon consulting with my counsel, present, I…

In admiralty. Hearing on a libel of information. This was a libel of information and seizure for forfeiture for alleged violation of the registry laws. The libel alleged as cause for forfeiture, that the oath taken by David Muir, the claimant, to obtain enrollment and license of the bark, was false in the following particulars: 1. That at the time of taking the oath ihe said David Muir was not a citizen of the United States, as in said oath alleged. 2.

<p>Case No. 30.</p> <p>Salvage — Conusiox—Exertion or Chew to Avoid.</p> <p>Successful exertions by the crew of one vessel to avoid an impending collision with another cannot bo considered salvage services rendered to the latter.</p>

<p>Case No. 31.</p> <p>Salvage — Sevekal Salvoes — Pkiokity of Ah-kival.</p> <p>[Under wrecking rule 4 in salvage cases prescribed by the district court of Florida, requiring that licensed wrecking vessels shall be admitted to assist at the wreck in the order in which they arrive, a vessel is deemed to have "arrived” when she is in reasonable hailing ■distance, ready to receive and obey orders: and a subsequent change in the position, by standing oti and on, although she might be further from tlie wreck than another vessel just arriving, will not forfeit her right.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Manuel Acosta and others against the barlt Halcyon and cargo for salvage. Decree for libelants.]

<p>[In admiralty. Libel to enforce forfeiture of vessel. Dismissed.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 34.</p> <p>Mabitime Liems — ¡Supples—Waives—Pbomisi-sokv Note.</p> <p>1.The mere giving of a promissory note by the debtor for supplies furnished a ship, is no satisfaction of the debt, nor is accepting it a waiver of the lien the creditor may have had therefor.</p> <p>[Cited in The Bird of Paradise v. Heyne-man, 5 Wall. (72 U. S.l 561; The Eclipse, Case No. 4,268; The Napoleon, Id. 10,011. Questioned in Harris v. The Kensington, Id. 6,122.]</p> <p>[See Sutton v. The Albatross, Case No,-13,645; Moore v. Newbury, Id. 9,772.]</p> <p>2. Nor will the principle be varied, although the credit was given to the agent, or his note taken for the debt, unless it be proved that the principal had settled with the agent, and his rights would thereby be prejudiced.</p> <p>[Cited in The Napoleon, Case No. 10,011.]</p> <p>3. A ship built in the United States for alien residents abroad, becomes their property without any documentary title. It passes like any other chattel.</p> <p>4. The right of lien for supplies against a foreign vessel rests on the maritime law, and is not affected by local legislation.</p> <p>5. Tito departure of such vessel from the state before her arrest does not bar the lien or remedy upon it in admiralty.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Waiver of the lien must be by express agreement, otherwise libel in rem can be maintained, on the surrender of the note. The Eclipse. Case No. 4,268; The Nestor, Id. 10,-126; The Gate City, Id. 5,267. But not where the note is outstanding, and it does not appear that it has not been negotiated. Ramsay v. Allegre, 12 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 611.]</p>

[In admiralty. On appeal from district court. Libel to enforce a forfeiture for violation of the act of January 9, 1808, entitled An act supplementary to the act entitled •An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States,’” (2 Stat. 453;) and also for violating section 32 of the act of February 18, 1793, for enrolling and licensing vessels, (1 Stat. 316.) The district court condemned both vessel and cargo. Affirmed.

<p>Case No. 36.</p> <p>Pbizb — Examination- of Master and Chew as Witnesses — Secondabv Evidence.</p> <p>1..The rule of the prize law is, that the master and some of the crew of the prize vessel must be brought in to be examined as witnesses to the facts attending the seizure.</p> <p>2. The rule will be dispensed with in a case-where there is no physical means of complying with it on the part of the captors.</p> <p>3. Where the personal production of the ship’s company is satisfactorily excused, the court will suspend proceedings in the cause,- or admit secondary evidence.</p> <p>4. In this case none of the ship’s company being produced as witnesses, and there not be-, ing sufficient evidence to condemn the vessel’ under the practice of the English prize court, the court allowed the libellants time, not exceeding a year and a day from the institution of the suit, to produce proof that the vessel was arrested in fact and was lawful prize of war, and that the more direct testimony usually produced to that end was not legally at. command of the libellants.</p>

Lin admiralty. Libel by William Reynolds and others against the ship Ada for wages. Decree for libelants.] This was a libel for wages, and was heard on the following statement of facts, agreed by the parties: •The libellants shipped on board the barque at Liverpool, according to the shipping articles, which are to be exhibited to the judge at the hearing. From Liverpool the ship came to the port of Savannah, where she arrived about the 20th of May.

<p>Case No. 37.</p> <p>PitizE — Violation op Blockade.</p> <p>Cargo condemned, on further proof, for a violation of blockade by the vessel.</p>

In admiralty. Information of seizure against the sloop Abby. 1st. For being engaged in a trade other than that for which she was licensed (i. e. the coasting trade> against the 32d section of the coasting act of the 18th of February, 1793, c. 8. [1 Stat. 316.] 2dly.

Appeal [by James Adams] from the decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant him letters patent for his improvement in hydrometers. [Reversed.]

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

La bankruptcy. In this case an examination of the bankrupt, [Julius L. Adams,] at the instance of one creditor, under the 26th section of the bankruptcy act, had been concluded. Another creditor obtained an order for a similar examination, on the return of which order the bankrupt objected to being examined, claiming that, after one examination had been concluded, the other creditors were estopped from examining him further. The register held that they were not so es-topped.

In bankruptcy. On the application of the assignee in bankruptcy in this case, a summons was issued to an attorney to appear as a witness. He appeared before the register on. the 10th of March, 1872, and was sworn in. these words: “I do solemnly swear that I will make true answer to all such questions as may be proposed to me respecting all the property of the said James M.

[At law. Action of assumpsit by Charles F. Adams and others against George Bancroft, collector of the port of Boston and Charlestown, for money had and received.] The parties agreed upon the following statement of facts: — “The plaintiffs, in November last, imported a quantity of silk gloves from France.

At law. This was an action of assumpsit ' [by Franklin Adams and others] against [Jo- ' seph F.] Blodgett, the principal, for $945.75, ; money had and on an… Held: and several others not present agreed to follow the course which those present should agree on. They Anally and mutually contracted, that J. Blodgett should give up to-his creditors all his property and credit; and what of his debts these did not pay, he stipulated in writing to discharge at some future time.

In bankruptcy. Motion to dismiss a petition in bankruptcy filed against the Boston, Hartford, and Erie Railroad Company, for want of jurisdiction. [Overruled.] [Enoch G. Sweatt, another creditor, after-wards presented a petition for review to-the circuit court, which petition was denied. Sweatt v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co., Case No. 13.6S4.]

[At law. Action to recover possession of land, tried by the court upon submission of facts agreed on.

<p>At law. Action to recover land, tried by the court without a jury. [Judgment for plaintiff.]</p>

<p>In equity.</p> <p>Bill in equity [by James Adams against Alpheus Burks] for an injunction to restrain alleged infringement of letters-patent [No. 38,713] for an improvement in coffin lids granted James S. Merrill and George W. Homer, May 26, 1863, and for an account. The defendant filed a plea to the whole bilL The pleadings and facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

At law. This was an action of ejectment. The plaintiff having closed, the defendant offered as the foundation of his title a document purporting to be the will of Eliab Grimes, who died on the 7th day of November, 1848, and proffered to prove the execution of the same.

[In equity. Bills by Phineas Adams to enjoin the ccunty commissioners of Douglas county from issuing certain bonds, and Me-lancthon S. Beach, the county treasurer, and other county officers, from levying a tax to pay the coupons first due. On motions to dissolve temporary injunctions. Granted.]

In equity. This was an action on the case, [Adams & Hammond against Edwards & Holman,] tried before Mr. Justice Woodbury and a jury, for the infringement of letters patent [No. 3,117,] granted to Daniel Fitzgerald, June 1, 1843, and conveyed by mesne assignments, to plaintiffs. The nature of the invention consisted in interposing plaster of Paris between the inner and outer chests of fire-proof iron safes, after the manner described in the specification.

[In admiralty. Libel for salvage. Decree for libelants.] This was a suit in admiralty, in a cause of contract civil and maritime, and of extra services rendered by the steamer It. B. Forbes to the barlt Island City and her crew; and was removed Into this court pursuant to the act of the 3d of March, 1S21, on the certificate of the district judge that he was so concerned in interest as to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to hear the cause.

In equity. [Bill by J. McGregor Adams against the Illinois Manufacturing Company for an accounting, and an injunction restraining the further infringement of patent No. 50,591. Decree for complainant.]

<p>Case No. 56.</p> <p>Patents foh Inventions — Reveksixg Motion to Produce Different Result — Slight Change in Combination to' Produce Same Result — Technical Defect in Description.</p> <p>1. The complainant’s invention consisted in reversing the motion of the beater-bars for regulating the feed in a corn-sheller, and by this change produced a result which had not before been attained: Held, that the invention was patentable.</p> <p>2. The courts should not defeat a patent for a mere technical defect in description, if it clearly appears what the inventor has described and claimed as his invention.</p> <p>3. A change of location of a part, in combination, where there is no new function performed by the changed member in its new location, will not evade a patent. Nor will the fact that the part changed works better in the location where the defendant puts it, than where complainant put it, if it does the same work, but only in degree better, make any difference. The result is the same.</p> <p>[Cited in Knox v. Great Western Q. M. Co., Case No. 7.907: Consolidated Roller-Mill Co. v. Coombs, 39 Fed. Rep. 34: Schlicht & Field Co. v. Chicago Sewing-Mach. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 587.]</p> <p>4. Letters patent No. 132.128. granted _ to Henry A. Adams, October 15th, 1872, for improvement in corn-shellers, held valid.</p>

In equity. This was a bill in equity [by Calvin Adams against J. Hervey Jones, .Alexander M. Wallingford, and another] for an injunction and account, founded upon the alleged violation and infringement of letters patent [No. 16.676,] for an “improved keeper for right and left-hand door-lcek,” granted to complainant February 24, 1857.

<p>Case No. 59.</p> <p>Railroad Companies — Municipal Aid — County Bonds — Bona Fide Holders— Construction of Statute.</p> <p>1. The act of assembly of 9th July, 1853. section 7, authorizing certain counties to subscribe to the capital stock of the North-Western Railway Company, which provides that the counties may “make payments on such terms and in such manner as may be agreed upon by said company and the proper county,” confers, by such provision, full authority upon the county to issue coupon bonds in payment of such subscription.</p> <p>2. All doubts as to this being the proper construction of the .said section dispelled by the following considerations: 1st, Because the legislature themselves have so construed it, the proviso to the said section being “that whenever bonds of the respective counties are given in payment of subscriptions, the same shall not be sold by said railroad company at less than par value,” &c., which shows that the legislature took it for granted that the issue of bonds was intended to be included in the brief but comprehensive expression of the “manner in which payment may be made.” 2d, All parties concerned have treated this as the true construction, and have acted under it accordingly, 3d, The matter has been before the supreme court of the state, (8 Casey, [32 Pa. St.] 144,) and it does not there appear that the county ought to have the bonds enjoined as made without authority. The decree there is based on the doctrine that these bonds are binding on the county in the hands of bona fide holders.</p> <p>3. The said bonds, so issued, in the hands of bona fide holders, who have obtained them at their market value, are not affected by the proviso of the act, “that whenever bonds of the respective counties are given in payment of subscriptions, the same shall not be sold by said railroad company at less than par value.</p>

<p>Case No. 61.</p> <p>Patents fok Inventions — Novelty—Old Con-tkivances — New Objects.</p> <p>1. Letters patent No. 111.798, granted to Thomas Adams, February 14th, 1871, for an improvement in chewing gum, held void for want of novelty.</p> <p>2. The question of what constitutes sufficient novelty, discussed.</p>

<p>Case No. 62.</p> <p>Baxkiícptcv — Ton nous Acts of Assignee — Cox-fusio.v of Goons.</p> <p>1. The estate of a bankrupt is not answerable for the tortious acts of the assignee.</p> <p>2. When the wheat of two parties is intermixed and confused, by mutual consent, they become owners in common of the grain so mixed in proportion to their respective shares of the bulk or quantity.</p> <p>[Cited in Rahilly v. Wilson, Case No. 11,532; The Pietro G., 38 Fed. Rep. 150.]</p> <p>3. When the good;, of two parties are mixed by one without the consent of the other, if they be grain or other articles, of equal value, the other party is only entitled to his proportionate share of the common quantity.</p> <p>[Cited in The Pietro G., 38 Fed. Rep. 150.]</p> <p>[See Rahilly v. Wilson, Case No. 11,531; Norris v. U. S., M Fed. Rep. 735; Harrington v. U. S.. 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 356.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Should the warehouseman sell a portion of the wheat, each original owner is entitled to claim his pro rata share; and should he buy other wheat, and mix it with the remaining portion, the title to such additional wheat would pass to the original owners. Rahilly v. Wilson, Case No. 11,531.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Samuel Adams, Asa Combs, Kennedy Andrews, James Howard, Edward Gillespier, John Antonio, and William Martin against the brig Sophia, Charles A. ICalberg, master, for wages. Decree for Samuel Adams, but dismissing the libel of the other libelants.]

<p>Case No. 66.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — State and National Laws —Constitutionality — Construction — Lex Loci Contractus.</p> <p>1. The act of the state of New-York of the 3d of April, 1811, is an insolvent and not a bankrupt law.</p> <p>2. Distinction between insolvent and bankrupt laws. — Derived from England, where it has been long established. Those laws defined.</p> <p>3. If the act in question, however, had been a bankrupt law, it would not have been void as repugnant to the constitution of the United States.</p> <p>4. Presumption in favor of the constitutionality of state laws.</p> <p>5. The existence of a power in the states to pass bankrupt laws, not incompatible with the powers delegated to congress for that purpose. The exercise of the powers of the latter would, however, suspend the powers of the former.</p> <p>6. Importance of bankrupt laws to the larger commercial states, and probability that they intended to retain the right of making their own until congress could adopt an uniform system. Difficulties attending the adoption of such system.</p> <p>7. Whether a general bankrupt law, including any classes besides traders, would be within the powers granted by the constitution to congress? Quere.</p> <p>8. The constitutional provision that “no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts,” does not apply to insolvent laws.</p> <p>9. Difficulty attending the application of this provision.</p> <p>10. Rules of constitutional construction.</p> <p>11. History of the evils which led to the adoption of this and the like restraining provisions. Insolvent laws were not among those evils: on the contrary, they were esteemed beneficial.</p> <p>12. Inference from the uninterrupted practice of some of the states in favor of the constitutionality of such laws.</p> <p>13. Presumption that contracting parties, being aware of this practice, make their contracts with reference to it.</p> <p>14. The retrospective operation of insolvent laws does not bring them within the constitutional provision.</p> <p>15. Chronological account of the insolvent laws of New-York. No distinction in any of them between existing and future contracts.</p> <p>16. The rule lex loci contractus does not apply to cases of discharge under insolvent laws.</p> <p>[Cited in Cook v. Moffat, 46 U: S. (5 How.) 316.]</p> <p>17. Meaning of this rule. Mischievous tendency of some dicta and decisions arising out of it, proceeding on a mistake in applying it as well to the remedy as to the construction and validity of the contract. . Remarks on Smith v. Buchanan, [1 East, 11,] and other cases</p> <p>18. Expediency and justice of insolvent laws.</p> <p>19. The defendant made to the plaintiffs at Boston, Massachusetts, while they all resided there, several promissory notes, and afterwards removed to New-Tork, where he was discharged under the insolvent law of that state, of the 3d of April, 1811, which was passed after the making of the notes. Held that his discharge was a good bar to the action.</p> <p>[20. Cited in Cooper Manuf’g Co. v. Ferguson, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741, 113 U. S. 727. to the point that contemporary interpretation of a constitutional provision by a legislative enactment is entitled to great weight.]</p> <p>NOTE, [from original report.] Since the question of the constitutionality of the state insolvent laws has been raised, the supreme court of the U. S. has settled the following principles., which are, of course, the law of the land. . In Sturges v. Crowninshield, which was decided at the February term, 1819, 4 Wheat. [17 U. S.] 122, the court held, that until the power to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies be exercised by congress, the states are not forbidden to pass a bankrupt law, provided it contains no principle which violates the- 10th section of the first article of the constitution of the United States — That insolvent laws which discharge the person of the debtor, but leave his obligation to pay in full force, are not repugnant to the 10th section — And that a discharge of a debtor under the act of the state of New-York, of the 3d of April, 1811, from a contract made in New-York before the passage of the law, the creditor then residing in Massachusetts, and not having proceeded to’ execution against the body of his debtor in New-York, was void by the 10th section. In M’Millan v. M’Neill, Id. 209, the debt was contracted in 1813, in South Carolina, the debtor and creditor both residing there, and the discharge was obtained in Louisiana, whither the debtor had removed, in 1815, under a law of the state, passed in lS08. The court held, that “this case was not distinguishable from that of Sturges v. Crowninshield; and that the circumstance of the state law, under which the debt was attempted to be discharged, having been passed before the debt was contracted, made no difference in the application of the grinciple.” It will be observed, that the court o not notice the circumstance that the contract was made in South Carolina, where the parties then resided. In Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Bank of Pennsylvania v. Smith, 6 Wheat. [19 U. S.] 131, the court held, that a discharge obtained in Pennsylvania in September, 1812, under an act of that state, passed the 13th of March of the same year, from a contract made in ■ Pennsylvania in 1811, the contracting parties at all those times being residents of that state, was void. The case of a discharge under the law of a state, where the contract was made within the state, between residents of the state, and after the passage of the law, has not yet been decided. Such a case is, however, pending, and has been argued, and is held under advisement and for a further argument at the next term.</p>

At law. Action of tort, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in the service of the defendant town, from the unaccountable discharge of an explosive furnished for use in blasting. The case was tried upon the general issue and the defendant had a verdict in its favor, whereupon the plaintiff moved for a new trial for misdirection of the court. [Motion overruled.]

[At law. Action by Samuel Adams against A. M. White on a promissory note.] The facts of this case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. It came up on a plea to the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States, and on a rule to show cause why judgment should not be entered for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.

At law. Ejectment for lands in Newport, Rhode Island. [Judgment for plaintiffs.] The parties agreed to a special statement of facts, as follows: Silas G. Huddy being seized of the demanded premises in fee by his last will and testament, dated, made and duly executed on the seventh day of December, A. D. 1801, and after his decease duly proved, and approved by the court of probate, devised the same premises in fee to his wife, Elizabeth Huddy, he, the said testator, then…

[In admiralty. Libel in rem for wages by Adams against the steamer Wyoming, (H. B. Crosset, claimant.) Counter petition by mortgagee. Libel dismissed. Decree for mortgagee.]

In equity. This bill was brought to restrain the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 106,597, dated August 23d, 1870, for improvement in' sieves, and letters patent No*. 4.037, dated February 7th, 1871, for design for sieves, both granted to Robert J. Mann.

<p>[In' equity. Bill by the Adams Express Company against Joseph Davison, the Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Railroad Company, Oscar A. Stevens, and W. Jackson Phelps.]</p>

<p>Case No. 74.</p> <p>Patents fob Inventions — Validity.</p> <p>Patent of Charles H. Dedrick, “Improvement in the Manufacture of Soles and Heels of Boots and Shoes from Hides,” adjudged invalid.</p>

In admiralty. This action was instituted on the 31st October, 1846. The plaintiff was a British subject, residing at Nassau, the owner of the brig Victoria; and he brought this action against the American Mutual Insurance Company of Baltimore, upon a policy of insurance effected on said vessel, which was lost on the voyage insured for.

In bankruptcy. The case as shown by the record is as follows: John Addison, Jr., the present bankrupt, by the partition of his father’s real estate, became the owner of a tract of land situated in Northampton county, Virginia.

In admiralty. Several libels were filed by material men claiming liens against the ship Adele. The vessel was sold without opposition, and the proceeds paid into court, and the several libellants, having had the reports of the commissioner as to their several amounts confirmed by the court, applied to the court to decree payment out of the funds.

[In equity.] Injunction. Motion to dissolve. It was objected that the answer does not appear to be sworn, &c., there being no certificate but that of the justice himself, that he was a justice of the peace for Prince George’s county, in Maryland, at the time he administered the oath. This court has never gone so far as to admit an answer sworn and certified in this manner. In England, the answer is taken by commission.

In admiralty. Libel in rem for damages sustained fro-m negligent and improper tow-age service. Defense that the injury resulted from inevitable accident. The cause was heard on libel, claim, answer and proof. [Decree for libellants.]

<p>In equity.</p> <p>[Bill by the Adjustable Window-Screen Company against John W. Boughton for 1he infringement of the reissue of patent No. 52,726. Bill dismissed.]</p>

<p>Case No. 80.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Services—Seamen—Agency.</p> <p>[Note. Nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible.]</p>

In bankruptcy. Petition of review under soo. 2, bankrupt act.2 [Dismissed.] Lehman Durr & Co. and other creditors of the bankrupt estate of Isaac Adler &■ Brothers, on the 17th of August, 1S74, filed their petition in the district court, praying for the removal of P. H. Pitts and C. C. Carr, assignees of the bankrupt estate.

At law. Plaintiff sued Carman A. New-comb, United States marshal for the eastern district of Missouri, and the sureties upon his official bond. The alleged breach of the bond was, that plaintiff being the legal owner and possessor of two cases of merchandise of the value of $1,000, the defendant Newcomb, acting as United States marshal, and under color of that office, seized and took possession of said cases wrongfully and without leave.

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by the Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company against the Admiral (the Eastern Steamboat Company, claimants) for damages sustained in a' collision. Libel dismissed, with costs.]

In admiralty. This was a libel in prize, filed by the United States against the ship “Admiral,” her tackle, apparel and furniture, and the goods, wares and merchandise laden thereon; and came here on appeal of her claimants, British suhjeets, from the district court condemning her. The facts appearing from the evidence in preparatorio, and the ship’s papers, were as follows: 1. That the said vessel was of English ownership, and the property of the claimants. 2.

In admiralty. A suit for the salvage of the said vessel and cargo having come into this court by appeal, salvage was decreed to the libellants, at the November term, 1839, and the residue of the proceeds of the saved property, after payment of the salvage, was, by the decree, directed to be retained in the registry of the court, to be paid to the owners of the property saved, or their lawful representatives.

In admiralty. A libel in rem was filed, in the district court, by Charles L. Gager, owner and master of the steamboat Albany, against the steamboat A. D. Patchin, to recover for salvage services rendered to that vessel by the Albany, under the following circumstances.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Adrian and Story against the vessel Live Yankee on a contract of affreightment. Libel dismissed.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by the owners of the Harvest Queen against the Adriatic. Libel dismissed; also dismissed up.on appeal to the circuit court. The Adriatic, Case No. 01. Decree of circuit court affirmed, upon appeal to the supreme court in Marshall v. The Adriatic, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 855, 107 U. S. 512.]

In admiralty. Tills was an appeal by the libellants from a decree of the district court, in a suit in rein, in admiralty, dismissing the libel. The following facts were found by this court: “On the 20th of October, 1S75, two hundred and fifty bales of coir yam were shipped on the steamship Adriatic, consigned to the libellants, in New York. Coir yarn is the fibre of the cocoanut husk, madé into strands of yarn, and put up in hanks.

This was a libel in rem, in admiralty, filed in the district court, to recover damages for a collision. That court dismissed the libel, [The Adriatic, Case No. 89] and the claimant appealed to this court. [Libel dismissed. Decree of circuit court subsequently affirmed by supreme court in Marshall v. The Adriatic, 2 Sup. Ot.

<p>Case No. 92.</p> <p>Phize — Violation of Blockade — Condemnation.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for a violation of the blockade.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel for salvage. Claim -of forfeiture on behalf of United States. Decree of forfeiture by district court (decree nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible) reversed, and ship and cargo adjudged to libelants. Decree of circuit court for libelants reversed, on a different ground, by supreme court in The Adventure, 8 Cranch, (12 U. S.) 221.] Appeal from the district court of Norfolk.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel for wages. Dismissed.]</p>

<p>Case No. 94.</p> <p>Prize — Violation or Blockade — Appraisement by Naval Survey — Appropriation to Government-Prize Proceedings.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel captured as prize is appraised by a naval survey, and appropriated to the use of the United States, and her papers and crew are, with the appraisal, sent to this court, proceedings against her in prize are regular, although she is .lot brought before the court.</p> <p>2. Vessel condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

[At law. On demurrer to petition. Demurrer sustained.] The plaintiff insured the personal property of one Myron H. Balcom, situate adjoining the defendant’s railway, for $1,900. Within the lifetime of the policy, property covered by it to the value of $2,214 was destroyed by the carelessness of the defendant’s servants in the use of its locomotive engine.

<p>[At law. On demurrer to declaration. Demurrer sustained as to three counts, and overruled as to the fourth.]</p>

[In admiralty. Cross libels for collision. Decree for libelants, and cross libel dismissed.] Cross libels for damage done on the first day of August, 1868, in the harbor of Boston, at about four o’clock in the afternoon. The weather was fine, with a five or six knot breeze. The brig Alice was sailing down the harbor on her voyage to Surinam, and the schooner A. G. Brooks was coming up on a coasting voyage from a port in Maine to Boston.

<p>Case No. 99.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade — Enemy Frop-euty.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 100.</p> <p>Appeal — Jurisdictional Amount — Amendment op Pleadings.</p> <p>1.A libel was filed in the district court, by a seaman, against the. master of a vessel, to recover a balance of $30.95, claimed to be due for wages; and also damages for an assault committed upon the libellant by the master, without claiming any particular amount of damages: the libel was dismissed by the district court, and in the circuit court, to which the case was taken by appeal, a motion was made to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the record did not show that the sum in controversy amounted to $50: a motion was thereupon made by the appellant, to amend his libel, by inserting that he had sustained damages, I by the assault, to the amount of $300: one of the witnesses had proved that he would not have run the risk of the blow given to the libellant for $100: Held, that the amendment asked for could not be made; that the circuit court had no authority to review the decree of the district court, unless 'the sum in controversy amounted to $50; and that the court could not permit an amendment to be made, the object of which was to change the record so as to give the court jurisdiction, in a case where, according to the record before them, they had none.</p> <p>2. If the case showed that the appeal was legally before the court, then, having jurisdiction over it, the court could permit the pleadings to be so amended as to enable it to do justice between the parties; but it cannot acquire jurisdiction, by altering the record which has come to it from the district court.</p> <p>3. The deposition of the witness does not show the amount of damages claimed by the libellant; and it is the claim of the libellant, and the answer of the respondent, denying the claim, that make the controversy, and ascertain the amount in dispute.</p> <p>4. Where . property is in dispute, and the value of it is not averred, and does not appear in the record, parol testimony has been received in the supreme court, upon appeal, to show its value, and to show the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>5. And so too, as to the value of an office, where the right to the office is the matter in controversy.</p> <p>6. But where the controversy relates merely to the amount of money which one party is entitled to recover from the other, the record must show the amount in dispute, in order to give jurisdiction to the appellate court.</p> <p>7. In all cases in the supreme court, where the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the court gives no costs; and that being the rule in the supreme court, it is proper that the circuit court should adopt the same rule in analogous cases.</p>

This cause was brought into this court by certiorari, from the supreme court of New York. It was an action [by Peter A. Aguirre and others] against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duty. The plaintiffs, in November, 1851, exported, to Cuba a cargo of domestic produce, in a Spanish brig, of 147 63-05 tons burthen.

<p>Case No. 102.</p> <p>Police Power — Exclusion op Foreigners — Treaty with China of July 38, 1868 — Fourteenth Amendment — Conflict of State Statute with Act of Congress.</p> <p>1. The police power of the state may be exercised by precautionary measures against the increase of crime or pauperism, or the spread of infectious diseases from persons coming from other countries. The state may entirely exclude convicts, lepers and persons afflicted with incurable disease; may refuse admission to paupers, idiots and lunatics and others, who from physical causes are likely to become a charge upon the public until security is afforded that they will not become such a charge; and may isolate the temporarily diseased until the danger of contagion is gone.</p> <p>2. The extent of the power of the state to exclude a foreigner from its territory is limited by the right of self-defense. Whatever outside of the legitimate exercise of this right affects the intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration to this country and residence therein, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the general government, and is not subject to state control or interference.</p> <p>3. The sixth article of the treaty between the United States and China, adopted on the twenty-eighth of July, 1868, provides that Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the LTnited States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by citizens or subjects of (be most favored nation, and as the general government has not seen fit to attach any limitation to the ingress into the United States of subjects of those nations, none can be applied [by a state] to the subjects of China.</p> <p>[See Chae Chan Ping v. U. S., 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623, 130 U. S. 581.]</p> <p>4. The fourteenth amendment to the constitution declares that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws: Held, that this equality of protection implies not only equal accessibility to the courts for the prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement- of rights, but equal exemption with others of the same class from all charges and burdens of every kind. Within these limits the power of the state exists, as it did previously to the adoption of the amendment, over all matters of internal police.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 Fed. Rep. 5X1; The Railroad Tax Case, 13 Fed. Rep. 773; In re Lee Sing, 43 Fed. Rep. 362.]</p> <p>5. On the thirty-first of May, 1870, congress passed an act declaring that “no tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any state upon any person immigrating thereto from a foreign country which is not equally imposed or enforced upon every person immigrating to such state from any foreign country, and any law of any state in conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and void;” Held, 1. That the term charge, as here used, means any onerous condition, and includes a condition which makes the right of an immigrant, arriving in the ports of the state, to land within the state depend upon the execution of a bond by a third party, not under his control, and whom he cannot constrain by any legal proceedings; and, 2. That the statute of California, which prohibits foreign immigrants of certain classes, arriving in' the state of California by vessel, from landing until a bond shall have been given by the master, owner or consignee of the vessel that they will not become a public charge, and imposes no condition upon immigrants of the same class entering the state in any other way, is in conflict with the act of congress.</p> <p>NOTE, [from original report.] The only point involved and decided in the case of City of New York v. Miln. 11 Pet. [36 U. S.] 102. was the constitutional power of the state of New York to compel the master of a vessel-with passengers, arriving at her ports, from any country out of the United States, or from any other state of the United States, to report in writing, on oath, to the state authorities, under a prescribed penalty, the name, place of birth, and last legal settlement, age and occupation of every person brought as a passenger in the vessel. This the supreme court held that the state, in virtue of her general' police powers, had the constitutional right to do. In the course of the opinions of Mr. Justice Barbour and Mr. Justice Thompson, general language is used indicating a power in the state to exclude persons from her limits whom she might deem dangerous to the material or moral welfare of the state, but the language was wholly unnecessary to the decision of the only point then in judgment before the court. The facts of the two cases known as The Passenger Oases, 7 How. [48 U. S.] 283, were briefly these: One of the cases (Smith v. Turner) went to the supreme court on a writ of error from the court of errors of New York. The other case (Norris v. City of Boston) went to the supreme court of the United States from the supreme court of Massachusetts. The New York case arose substantially upon these facts: A statute of that state authorized the health commissioner to demand and receive, and in case of neglect or refusal to pay, to sue for and recover of and from the master of every vessel arriving in the port of New York from a foreign port, for himself and each cabin passenger, one dollar and fifty cents, and from the master of each coasting vessel for each person on board twenty-five •cents; but coasting vessels from New Jersey, Connecticut and Rhode Island, were only required to pay for one voyage in each month. The moneys thus collected were denominated in the statute hospital moneys, and the master was authorized to sue and recover from each .passenger the amount paid on his account. To the failure on the part of the master to pay within twenty-four hours after arrival of the vessel, was attached a penalty of one hundred dollars. All moneys collected from this source, in excess of the amount necessary to defray the hospital expenses, were to be paid over to the treasurer of the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, in the city of New York. Upon this statute, Smith, the master ■of the British ship Henry Bliss, was sued for $295. He demurred to the complaint, on the ground that so much of the statute as authorized a recovery was repugnant to the constitution of the United States. The demurrer was overruled in the state courts, and electing to stand upon his demurrer, the case was taken to the supreme court of the United ■States where the point was thus sharply presented to the court for decision. That tribunal. after the most exhaustive and elaborate arguments upon the question, decided that the act of the legislature of New York, in the ■particular case under consideration, was repugnant' to the constitution of the United States, and void, and accordingly reversed the judgment of the court of errors of New York.</p> <p>In the case of Norris v. City of Boston, the facts were substantially as follows: Norris, an inhabitant of St. Johns, in the province of New Brunswick, Kingdom of Great Britain, was master of a vessel belonging to the port of St. Johns: he arrived with nineteen alien passengers at the port of Boston. Prior to landing,.he was compelled to pay, under a law of Massachusetts, to the city of Boston, two •dollars for each passenger. The statute of Massachusetts authorized the municipal authorities to appoint examiners, whose duty it was to examine the condition of all passengers ■on board of any' vessel arriving in port. If, upon such examination, there were found among said passengers “any lunatic, idiot, maimed, aged or infirm person,” incompetent, in the opinion of the examining officer, to maintain himself, or who had been a pauper in another country, the passenger was not permitted to land, until the master, owner, consignee or agent of the vessel gave to the city a bond In the sum of one thousand dollars, with sufficient sureties, that such lunatic or indigent passenger would not become a city, town or state charge within ten years from the date of the bond, and for all alien passengers, other than those already specified, the master was required to pay two dollars for each passenger before they could land. Appropriate penalties were contained in the statute to secure compliance with its terms. Norris paid the two •dollars for each passenger, as prescribed by the statute, under protest, landed his passengers, and thereupon instituted suit for the recovery of the money he had thus been compelled to pay. In the- state courts judgment passed in favor of the defendant, when the case was taken to the supreme court of the United States upon a writ of error, where the judgment was reversed; that court holding the statute of Massachusetts, under which payment of the money was compelled, was unconstitutional and void. In the opinions of the justices in these celebrated cases, language is also used as in the case in 11 Pet. [36 U. S.] expressive of the right of the state, in exercise of its police power, to exclude persons from her limits; but from the statement of the cases, it is obvious that no such question was before the court.</p> <p>Mr. Justice Wayne, one of the judges composing the majority of the court which decided the Passenger Cases, sums up the conclusions of the court, as follows (7 How. [48 U. S.] 412):</p> <p>1. That the acts of New York and Massachusetts imposing a tax upon passengers, either _ foreigners or citizens, coming into the ports in those states, either in foreign vessels or vessels of the United States, from foreign nations or from ports in the United States, are unconstitutional and void, being in their nature regulations of commerce contrary to the grant in the constitution to congress of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several Stales.</p> <p>2. That the states of this Union cannot constitutionally tax the commerce of the United States for the purpose of paying any expense incident to the execution of their police laws; and that the commerce of the United States includes an intercourse of persons, as well as the importation of merchandise.</p> <p>3. That the acts of Massachusetts and New York in question in these cases, conflict with treaty stipulations existing between the United States and Great Britain, permitting the inhabitants of the two countries “freely and securely to come, with their ships and cargoes, to all places, ports, and rivers in the territories of each country to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of said territories, respectively; also, to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce, and generally the merchants and traders of each nation, respectively, shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject, always, to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively:” and that said laws are therefore unconstitutional and void.</p> <p>4. That the congress of the United States having ’by sundry acts, passed at different times, admitted foreigners into the United States with their personal luggage and tools of trade, free from all duty or imposts, the acts of. Massachusetts and New York imposing any tax upon foreigners oi immigrants for any purpose whatever, whilst the vessel is in transitu to her port of destination, though said vessel may have arrived within the jurisdictional limits of either of the states of Massachusetts or New York, and before the passengers have been landed, are in violation of said acts of congress, and therefore unconstitutional and void.</p> <p>5. That the acts of Massachusetts and New York, so far as they impose any obligation upon the owners or consignees of vessels, or upon the captains of vessels or freighters of the same, arriving in the ports of the United States within the said states, to pay any tax or duty of any kind whatever, or to be in any way responsible for the same, for passengers arriving in the United States or coming from a port in the United States, are unconstitutional and void: being contrary to the constitutional grant to congress of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and to the legislation of congress under the said power, by which the United States hare been laid off into collection districts, and ports of entry established within the same, and commercial regulations prescribed, under which vessels, their cargoes and passengers, are to be admitted into the p.orts of the United States, as ■well from abroad as from other ports of the United States. That the act of New York now in question, so far as it imposes a tax upon passengers arriving in vessels from other ports in the United States, is properly in this case before this court for construction; and that the said tax is unconstitutional and void. That the ninth section of the first article of the constitution includes within it the migration of other persons, as well as the importation of slaves, and in terms recognizes that other persons as well as slaves may be the subjects of importation and commerce.</p> <p>6. That the fifth clause of the ninth section of the first article of the constitution, which declares that “no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another state; nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another,” is a limitation upon the power of congress to regulate commerce for the purpose of producing entire commercial equality within the United States, and also a prohibition upon the states to destroy such equality by any legislation prescribing a condition upon which vessels bound from one state shall enter the ports of another state.</p> <p>7. That the acts of Massachusetts and New York, so far as they impose a tax upon passengers, are unconstitutional and void, because each of them so far conflicts with the first clause of the eighth section of the first article of the constitution, which enjoins that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; because the) constitutional uniformity enjoined in respect to duties and imposts is as real and obligatory upon the states, in the absence of all legislation by congress, as if the uniformity had been made by the legislation of congress; and that such constitutional uniformity is interfered with and destroyed by any state imposing any tax upon the intercourse of persons from state to state, or from foreign countries to the United States.</p> <p>S. That the power in congress to regqlate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states includes navigation upon the high seas, and in the bays, harbors, lakes, and navigable waters within the United States, and that any tax by a state in any way affecting the right of navigation, or subjecting the exercise of the right to a condition, is‘contrary to the aforesaid grant.</p> <p>9. That the states of this Union may, in the exercise of their police powers, pass quarantine and health laws, interdicting vessels coming from foreign ports, or ports within the United States, from landing passengers and goods, prescribe the places an,d time for vessels to quarantine, and impose penalties upon persons for violating the same: and that such laws, though affecting commerce in its transit, are not regulations of commerce prescribing terms upon which merchandise and persons shall be admitted into the ports of the United States, but precautionary regulations to prevent vessels engaged in commerce from introducing disease into the ports to which they are bound, and that the states may, in the exercise of such police power, without any violation of the power in congress to regulate commerce, exact from the owner or consignee of a quarantined vessel, and from, the passengers on board of her, such fees as will pay to the state the cost of their detention and of the purification oi the vessel, cargo, and apparel of the persons on board.</p>

[In bankruptcy. Petition by Daniel Ail, Jr., and • Alexander Buchman, assignees of Sugarman & Frank, against Samuel Thomer, to recover money paid in fraud of the bankrupt act. Decree for plaintiffs.]

<p>Case Mo. 104.</p> <p>Natchai.ization — Guísese—Ac T 1875.</p> <p>1. A native of China, of the Mongolian race,’ is not entitled to become a citizen of the United States under the Revised Statutes as amended in 1S75. Rev. St. § 2169; Amend. Rev. St. p. 1435.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Ah Chong, 2 Fed. Rep. 739.]</p> <p>2. A Mongolian is not a “white person” within the meaning of the term as used in the naturalization laws of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Camille, 6 Fed. Rep. 256.]</p>

<p>(Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

In admiralty. [Appeal from decree of condemnation. The Sarah Starr Case No. 12,-352. Affirmed. For opinion on question of marshal’s fees after bonding for appeal, see The Aigburth, Case No. 105.]

<p>At law. This was an action on the case [Herrick Aiken against S. C. Bemis] for violating a patent of the plaintiff. The letters were averred to have been obtained May 24th, 1830, for “a new and useful improvement' on the saw-set,” and the infringement to have been made in A- 11. 1837 and 1838. At the trial here, at the last May term, before Sprague, J., the patent was given in evidence and described as consisting of a hammer, a shank, a regulating screw and spiral spring. It is not necessary to describe either of them, except that the hammer was to be of iron with a steel point. Much testimony was put in tending to prove that saw-sets similar to this had been known and used a few years before the date of these letters, and other testimony by the plaintiff to raise a presumption that some of the saw-set machines, which, by some of the witnesses of the defendant, were sworn to have been used earlier, were probably made by the plaintiff, after his invention and the maturing of his saw-set, which happened about two years previous to the taking out of his patent The evidence, showing an infringement by the defendant proved that the hammers in his saw-sets were all made of steel, and not in part of wrought iron, and that the plaintiff, in experiments made before completing his saw-set found that steel hammers broke frequently, and wrought iron ones enduring longer, his specification was confined to the last with steel points. The defendant therefore moved for a nonsuit on this ground, which the court refused. The plaintiff then offered further proof that the manufacture by the defendant extended to six or seven hundred dozen, and that the profit on the sale of them was $2.00 per dozen. In the course of this testimony a witness swore that one Call, who made some of these saw-sets, was a foreman for Bemis, and that Call said he had made a certain number or them in all, specifying it, and gave to the witness an order on Bemis for the wages for his work. The admission of this testimony to that statement about the number was objected to, but it was allowed to go to the jury. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff for $2000 damages.</p> <p>A motion was made for a new trial by the defendant, assigning the following causes. 1. The refusal to nonsuit the plaintiff for the variance in the hammer described in the specification, from that hammer made by Bemis. 2. The admission of Call’s declarations as to the number of saw-sets made by Bemis. 3. The damages being excessive. 4. The verdict being against the weight of evidence. 5 Newly discovered evidence since the trial.</p> <p>The affidavits as to the newly discovered evidence were numerous. The oath of the defendant showed that this new evidence not known before the trial, though one of the witnesses was named in the notice of -the defense, thinking that as a mechanic, h'e was likely to know something of the subject. But he was not talked with nor summoned. A portion of the other witnesses resided at distances not very remote from the defendant. The substance of the newly discovered evidence was in depositions taken under an order requiring notice to be given to the opposite party. Their use was objected to by the plaintiff, because the notice was so short, that his counsel were unable to see him or confer together before the time arrived, and to reach the place of taking them seasonably. But the court, on being satisfied no unfairness was intended by the defendant in the notice, stated that the depositions would be admitted conditionally, as they came within the order. In this class of inquiries they might, without a special order, always be ex parte. But the court said, that, if admitted, time would be allowed to the plaintiff, under the circumstances, to take the depositions over again, and cross-examine the witnesses, if he desired it. The plaintiff concluded to proceed without doing this. Among the new witnesses was Ealim Stebbins, who testified to seeing a saw-set like this, except brass for iron in the guards, as early as 1820, at Good-now’s, and another, belonging to D. B. Perkins, afterwards. Another witness was D. B. Perkins, who swore to seeing one like this as early as 1816, in Waterville, Me., one in Lancaster, N. H., in 1826, and one bought in Connecticut in 1828. The next new witness was Jethro Latham, who testified to buying another saw-set, like this in principle, between 1824 and 1826, in Rhode Island. Another new witness, O. Dickerson, testified to seeing in 1828 a different, but in some respects similar saw-set. Another, A. Blanchard, swore to the making, by himself and brother, in Palmer, Mass., of a like saw-set in 1826. It was constructed from a description given by his brother. He swore to another made in Springfield, by two machinists, in 1823 or 1825. Eli Parsons testified that he bought another similar one at Springfield in 1827. Horace Lee swore to another still in 1820, in Hartford, Conn., and Dyer White to another, less like the plaintiff’s in form, but with some such principles, made by him in 1819.</p> <p>The motion was argued at an adjourned session in September, 1847, by Bates and B. R. Curtis in its favor, and Hayes and J. P. Hale against it.</p>

In equity. This was a bill in equity filed to retrain the defendant from infringing letters patent [No. 6,025] for an “improvement in knitting needles,” granted to James Hibbert, January 9,-1849, extended to Peleg Hull, administrator of James Hibbert, deceased, for seven years from January 9, 1863, and on April 22, 1863, assigned to complainant. Two preliminary questions arose upon two papers executed during the original term of the patent.

<p>Case No. 111.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Rights op Strangers — Equal Equities —Assignee as Agent por Creditors-—Pleading.</p> <p>[1. E., Sr., desiring to screen his property from creditors, advanced money to pay off certain mortgages, the mortgagee, by procurement of E., Sr., transferred the mortgage debts and security to E.. Jr., who was adjudicated a bankrupt on the petition of his creditors, and' tne assignee in bankruptcy foreclosed the mortgages and received the proceeds. Complainant,, an assignee of a judgment creditor of E.. Sr., claimed such proceeds as the property of E.,. Sr. Eeld, that the bill was not demurrable in failing to allege that complainant was the owner of his demand at the time of the fraudulent transfer, he being entitled to all the rights of his assignor in the premises.]</p> <p>[2. In such case the creditors of E., Jr., could not be affected by any secret trust on his part for the benefit of E„ Sr.; and their equities with respect to the fund in the hands of the as-signee being equal to those of the creditors off E., Sr., and the mere fact that such fund was in the hands of the assignee amounting to an appropriation thereof to the use of the creditors of the bankrupt, E., Jr., they could not be compelled to surrender the same in favor off complainant.]</p> <p>- [3. An assignee in bankruptcy, in all else than in setting aside property exempt to the-bankrupt, is the agent of the law for the benefit of creditors; and a fund in his hands realized from the assignment is to be deemed appropriated to the use of the creditors, as between such creditors and others having equal equities with respect to such fund, before it passed to the assignee.]</p>

Lin equity. Bill by James Aiken against James D. Ferry for injunction. Heard on bill, answer, replication, exhibits, and proofs. Decree for plaintiff.]

[At law. Action by Walter Aiken against the Manchester Print Works for infringement of patent No. 6,025. Judgment for plaintiff.] Trespass on the case for the alleged infringement of a patent on knitting-machine needles. The action was in the name of the assignee of the patent. The inventor was James Hibbert; and the original patent was issued to him on the 9th of January, 1S49.

[In. admiralty. Libel by Richard R. Airey against the brig Ann C. Pratt and Leonard B. Pratt, master and claimant, for seaman’s wages. Decree for libelant. Affirmed on subsequent appeal to the circuit court. Airey v. The Ann C. Pratt, Case No. 114.]

[Appeal from the district- court of the United States for the district of Maine.] -, This was a libel in the admiralty [by Richard R. Airey against the brig Ann C. Pratt, (Leonard B. Pratt, master and claimant.)] The case is stated in the opinion of the court [Decree ■“or libelant. Claimant appeals. Modified and affirmed.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] [In admiralty. Libel by Chandler R. Merrill against James Airey and others for breach of a covenant in a charter party. Decree for libelant. Merrill v. Ajey, Case No. 9,468. Respondents appeal.]

<p>Case No. 118.</p> <p>Prize — Violation of Blockade — Enemy Property.</p> <p>Cargo and appraised valuation of vessel condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

This was a motion by the plaintiff, a citizen of the state of New York, for an order allowing him to file in this court copies of the process, pleadings, depositions, testimony and other proceedings in this cause, the clerk of the state court from which removal was sought having refused to make and certify such copies.

In equity. This was an action commenced in the circuit court of Dane county, in the state of Wisconsin, in 1860, to foreclose a mortgage given by the defendant to plaintiff and one Mrs. Lord, she having assigned her interest to plaintiff.

[At law. Action by C. C. Akin against the Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Company on a contract of fire insurance. Trial by the court. Judgment for plaintiff. [C. C. Akin, the holder of a fire insurance policy on an hotel and furniture, had mortgaged the property to Wassel & Moore, and, with the consent of the company, assigned his policy to them to the .extent of their interest.

[In admiralty. Libel for collision. Decree for libelant. Modified on appeal by circuit court, iñ The Alabama, Case No. 123, but afterwards affirmed by supreme court, (92 U. S. 695.)] This was a libel for a collision brought by Nicholas de las Casas, the owner of the Spanish bark Ninfa de los Mares against the steamer Alabama and the steam tug Gamecock, both of them American vessels.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. In this case, a sailing ship, the Ninfa de los Mares, in tow of-a steam-tug, the Gamecock, was collided with by a steamer, the Alabama, and sunk. The owner of the ship libelled both of the other vessels, in rem, in the district court.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[Review of proceedings in. tie district court of tlie United States for the.middle district of Alabama.] [In bankruptcy. Petition by the Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company for review ■ of a decree of the district court adjudicating the company bankrupt, on petition of William A C. Jones. Decree reversed.]

Tin equity. Motion for appointment of receiver of property of the Alabama & Chata-nooga Railroad Company, and for an injunction to restrain a sale of said property in proceedings in bankruptcy against said company in the district court of the United States for the middle district of Alabama. Heard on reargument of said motion, and also on petition of Sylvester Stephens, for review of the decree of the district court adjudicating the company bankrupt, argued at the same time.

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by William F. English and others against the ship Alabamian and cargo for salvage. Decree for libel-ants as to a part of the cargo.]

In admiralty. This was an action to enforce an alleged lien upon the American bark called the “Alaska,” for pilotage. The 11-beUaut, who was a New Jersey pilot, boarded the bark when some thirty miles south southeast from Barnegat, bound to New York. He did not, however, take charge until Sandy Hook light was just in sight, from which place he acted as pilot until the vessel was moored in the port of New York, which was her home port.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the- district of Minnesota.] In admiralty. A libel in rem was filed in the United States district court for Minnesota, in August, 1875, to enforce a maritime lien for necessary material and supplies furnished by the libellant to the Albany, at the request of the master. These were so furnished by- libellant in 1873, at La Crosse, in the state of Wisconsin, where the libellant resided and did business.

[Tn admiralty:. Libel in rem for collision by Elijah Brainerd and James G. Ketcham, copartners, trading as the Albany Dredging Company, and owners of the dredge Star-buck, against the tug Gladiolus and the bark Concordia. The case was referred to assessors, whose report is now submitted. Decree for libelants.

In bankruptcy. This was a petition by the Albany Exchange Bank that Ralph Johnson and Benjamin P. Watrous be decreed bankrupts. The petition alleged that the debtors were merchants, doing business as such in the city of Albany, and composing the firm of Johnson & Watrous, and contained the usual allegations as to their indebtedness.

At law. This was an action [by Albee and Bundy against May] to recover under the statute of the state passed November 15th, 1S20, the value of betterments or improvements made on land. [Judgment for plaintiffs.] The defendant had recovered the lands in ejectment of the plaintiffs.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] [In admiralty. Libel for collision. Decree finding both vessels in fault.]

[At law. Action by Albers & Co. against William Frick, collector of the port of Baltimore, to recover customs duties alleged to have, been illegally exacted. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff.]

<p>Case No. 137.</p> <p>Judgments — Amendment—Time for Names of Parties.</p> <p>1. The judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, § 32, [1 Stat. 91,] gives no authority to the courts of the United States to make any amendments in judgments, except as to defects and want of form.</p> <p>LCited in The Illinois, Case No. 7,003; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall- (88 U. S.) 532.]</p> <p>[See Bank of U. S. v. Moss, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 31.]</p> <p>2. The doctrine of the English courts in all cases of ordinary suits, (excluding fines and recoveries,) is, that judgments and records, are amendable only, (1st.) where the case is within the reach of some statute; and (2d.) where there is something to amend by.</p> <p>[Cited in Jenkins v. Eldredge, Case No. 7,-269.]</p> <p>3. At common law, no judgment was amendable after the term at which it was entered.</p> <p>[Cited in Jenkins v. Eldredge, Case No. 7,-269.] -</p> <p>4. Where the name of a party was erroneously stated in the writ to be .Tames H. Alvers, instead of John H. Albers, which was the true name; It was held, that, as the misnomer,was a mistake of fact, not apparent upon the" record. and not to be amended by any matter apparent in any part of the record, the court were not authorized to make the amendment.</p> <p>[Cited in Jenkins v. Eldredge, Case No. 7,-269; The Illinois. Id. 7,003: Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. (88 U. SO 532.]</p>

<p>In admiralty. This decree was affirmed by the circuit court. See Blatchf. Pr. Cas. 663, [The Albert, Case No. 139.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. [Decree of condemnation, affirming The Albert, Case No. 138.]

<p>Case No. 140.</p> <p>Salvage — Ship Burning at Anchorage — Amount of Award.</p> <p>[Cited in Bowers v. The European, 44 Fed. Rep. 491.]</p>

In admiralty. This was an appeal from the district court of the southern district of New York, from a decree dismissing a libel for want of jurisdiction. [Affirmed.] The libel set forth that Charles Willey, the owner of the brig Virginia, Bethell, master, on the 14th day of March, 1840, chartered said brig to the libellants. ' This charter party was in the following words: — ‘'This charter party made and entered into, this fourteenth day of March, 1840, by and between…

<p>Case No. 142.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade — Enemv Property.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel for salvage. Decree for libelants.] Salvage. On Wednesday, January IS, 1865, the bark Albion Lincoln, bound from some port in the West Indies for Portland, with a cargo of molasses, got on shore at Nasha-wena, an island at the entrance of Vineyard sound, lying about fifteen miles from New Bedford on one side and Holmes Hole on the other.

<p>Case No. 143.</p> <p>Prize — Examination op Prisoners — Custody of Snip.</p> <p>[1. When a prize is sent into port, without the prisoners taken in her, whose examination is important, the prize commissioner will be ordered to give the ship and cargo into the custody of the marshal, to be held until the prize master shall have returned to the flag officer, in order that the prisoners, or an affidavit giving the reasons for their detention, may be brought into court.]</p> <p>[2. Where the prize master was present at the capture, the prize commisisoner will be ordered to examine-him.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. Petition of the assignee in bankruptcy of William Albrecht for an injunction to restrain proceedings in a suit against the bankrupt in a state court.

[At law. Action of assumpsit by George Albree and another against Maria E. Johnson. Motion by defendant to stay execution and set aside judgment, with application for writ of error coram nobis. Motion granted.]

<p>Case No. 147.</p> <p>Patents for Inventions — Reissue —Anticipation — Infringement—Experimental User.</p> <p>1. It is not necessary that a reissue should embrace everything found in the original, since the prohibition of the act is limited to the adding of new matter to the specifications.</p> <p>2. There is no obligation upon the patentee to claim all things in the reissue which were claimed in the original invention.</p> <p>3. On the question of originality, mere experiments never put to practical use, are not anticipations.</p> <p>[See Aiken v. Dolan. Case No. 110.]</p> <p>4. He is the first inventor and entitled to the patent, who, being an original discoverer, has first perfected and adapted the invention to actual use.</p> <p>5. An experimental making and user of a patented article is a technical infringement.</p> <p>6. Reissued letters patent No. 5,155, granted to complainant, November 26th, 1872, for improvement in dies for finishing rubber-coated harness mountings, held valid.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by Simeon Shaw and others against the ship Albus and cargo for salvage. Decree for libelants.]

<p>In equity. [Suit by Charles W. Alcott and Catherine C. Magee against Joseph Young to enjoin infringement of letters patent No. 93,775. Patent declared void.]</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Exceptions to answer overruled.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. Petition by Edward Alden for a confirmation by the court of a sale to him by the assignee in bankruptcy of Hiram O. Alden of certain real estate in Illinois, in order to perfect his title according to the laws of that state.

<p>In bankruptcy. This was a motion filed to expunge the proof of Leonard Alden, on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. A preliminary objection was taken to the filing of the' motion, upon the ground that the application was too late. It appeared, by the affidavits in the cause, that Francis Alden filed his petition to be declared a bankrupt December 30, 1842, and was decreed bankrupt February 21, 1843. The proof of Leonard Alden was filed August 1, 1S43. A dividend was ordered upon his estate September 26th, of which due notice was given; and the motion to expunge the proof was made January 30, 1844, a dividend having been allowed and paid on the respondent’s claim.</p> <p>It further appeared, that before filing the motion to expunge, the counsel for the creditors, objecting to Francis Alden’s discharge, at whose request the present motion was made by the assignee, examined the records to ascertain whether a majority in numbers and value of the creditors, who had proved their claims, joined in the objections; and on that examination it appeared that the amount of Leonard Alden's claim was incorrectly entered on the book, though the proof itself and the dividend sheet correctly stated it. The bankrupt, in his original schedule, had stated Leonard Alden’s claim to be upon notes, but the claim moved to be expunged was on account. It was not denied that the debt was originally a just and valid claim, but it was contended that it was barred by the statute of limitations, and that, under the circumstances, the motion was not too late.</p> <p>On the other hand, it was contended, on behalf of Mr. Alden, that the statute of limitations was a technical defence, and that a party who seeks to set it up should be held to comply strictly with the principles under which it was admissible as a bar; that a decree had been rendered allowing this claim, upon due notice, to all parties, which ought not to be reopened, even if the court could, consistently with established principles, reverse the decree; and that it was never known that a judgment was reversed in order to give a party an opportunity to set up the statute of limitations.</p>

[In bankruptcy. Petition by receivers, appointed by several state courts, of the property of the Boston, Hartford & Erie Railroad Company, against which a petition in bankruptcy had been filed by James Alden, for a modification of the injunction issued in the bankruptcy proceedings. Injunction modified.]

At law. This was an action for an infringement of a patent right for an improvement in scythe snathes. The original pat-entee was Dexter Peirce, who took out letters patent, March 11th, 1837, (No. 144.) He afterwards assigned his right and interest under these letters patent to several persons, who again assigned to the plaintiffs in the present case.

In equity. This bill is brought on the chancery side of this court [by Alderdice, as-signee, against the State Bank of Virginia and D. O. Mayo, bankrupt] to set aside a deed of preference, made by said bankrupt to said bank within four months of bankruptcy, as void under the 35th section of the bankrupt act [Decree for complainant]

<p>[At law.] This was assumpsit [by William L. Aldrich and another against the Equitable Safety Insurance Company] on a policy of insurance, made December 17th, 1841, on the cargo of the ship Neponset, to the extent of $15,000, on one half thereof, from Bremen to the coast of Sumatra, and thence to a port of discharge in Europe, with this provision, viz.: “The balance óf this policy to attach to freight after covering property.” The insurance was made to Mark Healy “on account óf whom it concerns,” “loss payable to the order of M. Healy.” The plaintiffs claimed, as possessing an insurable interest in the cargo and freight under the following circumstances, and that the insurance was made with a view to cover it. Thus, on the 17th of November, 1841, Mark Healy, being owner of the above ship, and she being at Bremen to obtain employment, in charge of her captain, one Joseph Powell, a contract was entered into between him and the plaintiffs, that the latter should furnish $23,000 in specie, and four boxes of opium for the vessel to proceed to Sumatra for the purchase of pepper, and to return with it to Europe, the adventure to be on the joint account of Healy and the plaintiffs. It was further stipulated, that the port charges should be defrayed out of this money furnished by the defendants, and the bills of lading of the cargo be consigned to them for sale, they paying for freight of half thereof, one cent and a half per pound, and that the plaintiffs should remain in advance to Healy for half the specie on the same terms as in the last voyage on their joint account. Healy was left to make insurance, and in the event of making it, the policy for the vessel and Healy’s half of the cargo, was to be deposited in the hands of Messrs. N. & P., who were agents of the plaintiffs. A loss of the vessel took place about March, 1843, at the Island of Mauritius, but the cargo was not injured over five per cent., and was obliged to be reshipped and carried to Europe in another vessel, and 'the freight therefor was paid by the plaintiffs; the Neponset losing her freight by the loss of the vessel before reaching Europe. Though the arrangement in the original agreement was for an insurance on the cargo and vessel, Healy made it on the cargo and freight, and lodged it with Messrs. N. & P. for the plaintiffs, and it was accepted by them. The whole loss for which the defendants are liable, exceeds, it is admitted, $3000, being about $1680 and interest, since April, 1843, for general average chargeable to the cargo, and about $1681 on account of freight. But it is contended by them, that Healy in this, insured only his own property; and the plaintiffs had no insurable interest therein; or if they had, that the policy was assigned to them by Healy without the consent of the office, and hence could not be recovered on by them, under an express provision in the following words: “It is also agreed that this policy shall be void in case of its being assigned, transferred, or pledged, without' the previous consent in wrriting of the insurers.” It was further agreed in the policy as follows: “And in case of loss, to be paid in sixty days after proof of loss and proof of interest in the said property, the amount of the note given for the premium, if unpaid, and all sums coming due being first paid or secured to the satisfaction of the said company, they discounting interest for anticipating payment.” The defendants claimed under this, to set off not only the premium note of $526, which remained unpaid, but other large sums, due from said Healy to the insurance office, amounting in all to $5476. Healy had failed, since the insurance, and had taken the benefit of the bankrupt act; but neither party now claiming proved their debts under the bankruptcy. The amount due to the plaintiffs as the balance of their account with Healy, after selling the cargo, was, in August, 1843, at the time the business closed, $1727; for which, and interest since they commenced this action, April 9th, .1844, they seek to be indemnified. The case was tried here in April, 1S46. at an adjourned term, and a verdict taken by agreement for the plaintiff in blank, to be filled up with such sum as the court, on examination, should deem proper, if the plaintiff was in law entitled to recover. Otherwise, the verdict was to be set aside, and a general verdict to be entered for the defendants.</p>

At law. The plaintiff’s counsel was absent, but a bond for money was filed as the cause of action. Mr. Law, for the defendant, offered to appear without bail.

<p>Case No. 157.</p> <p>Collision at Sea — Steamer and Bahk — Fog— Speed — Wrong Manceutre.</p> <p>1. The bark M. was sunk by a collision with the steamer A., on the 20th of April, 1871, off Boston harbor, in a thick fog. The steamer was bound from Boston to Liverpool, heading about east by south, and going at a speed of at least seven or eight miles an hour. The fog was so dense that objects could not be seen more than fifty yards, and the steamer was blowing her fog whistle at short intervals, and had a lookout stationed on each bow. They reported the bark right ahead, whereupon the steamer’s engine was at once reversed, and her helm ported, till she headed southeast half east, when she struck the bark on the port side, cutting in to her main hatch. No sound from the bark was heard on the steamer till after the bark was reported, when the sound of a horn was heard. The bark was heading northeast half east. There was very little, if any, wind. The whistle of the steamer approaching was heard on the bark some fifteen' minutes before the collision, and from that time two or three blasts of a fog horn were blown by the bark in response to each blast of the steamer’s whistle. Her master, when he saw the steamer, called to her to starboard her helm, and the steamer’s lookout also called out “Starboard:” Held, that the bark was blowing a proper fog signal, and that the speed of the steamer was the cause of its not being heard till the collision could not be avoided.</p> <p>[For instances of collision and the precautions necessary to be taken in foggy weather, see The Monticello, Case No. 9,739; The Blackstone, Id. 1,473; The Matteawan, Id. 9,2S3: The Hammonia, Id. 6,005; The Hansa. Id. 6,037.]</p> <p>2. That the steamer's speed was too great, and was a fault causing the collision. That, if the steamer had starboarded her helm instead of porting, and swung in the opposite direction as much as she did under her port helm, her •direction would have been east northeast, nearly parallel with that of the bark. And that, therefore, the order to port was a wrong one, and contributed to the collision.</p>

<p>Case No. 158.</p> <p>Collision' — Rule op Damage — Cost op Cargo at Place op Shipment — Interest.</p> <p>1. The barque M., bound from Montevideo to Boston, was sunk in a collision with the steamer A. about twenty miles from Boston harbor. The steamer was held liable for the loss. The commissioner, to whom it was referred to compute the damages, having made his report, both parties filed exceptions to it, bringing up the question, what was the true rule of damages for the loss of the cargo, and as to the allowance of interest: Held, that the true rule of damages in such a case, is to allow the cost of the cargo at its place of shipment. with expenses and charges, and insurance and' interest.</p> <p>[Cited in Guiliert v. The George Bell, 8 Fed. Rep. 585; The City of New York. 23 Fed. Rep. 619; The Umbria, 46 Fed. Rep. 927.]</p> <p>[See The Mary J. Yaughan, Case No. 9,217; Dyer v. National Steam Nav. Co., Id. 4,225, modifying Id. 4,226. Contra: The Russia. Id. 12,169; Swift v. Brownell, Id. 13,695.]</p> <p>2. That, where the contract price at which cargo was purchased included the expenses of putting it alongside the vessel, charges for brokerage and commissions and counsel’s certificates in purchasing and shipping, if paid, and usual and necessary, are to be allowed, as part of the cost.</p> <p>[Cited in The City of New York. 23 Fed. Rep. 619; The Umbria, 46 Fed. Rep. 927.]</p> <p>[See- The Ocean Queen, Case No. 10,410.]</p> <p>3. On cargo bought generally, charges for putting the cargo alongside are allowable also. Charges for putting money at the purchase place to pay for the cargo are not allowable. Interest on the purchase price paid, from the time it was paid, is allowable, and also interest on all other allowable items. But the rate of interest allowed is six per cent.</p> <p>[Cited in The Mary Eveline, Case No. 9.212; Dyer v. Nat. Steam Nav. Co., Id. 4,225.]</p> <p>4. The allowance of interest in cases of tort is a matter of discretion.</p>

<p>Case No. 159.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition—Power op Attorney.</p> <p>Creditors of a bankrupt, who offered terms of composition, gave a power of attorney to T„ which stated that the composition was not to-be accepted if made for less than 20 per cent., 10 per cent, to be paid in six months, and 1(> per cent, in twelve months, from February 16th, 1875. T. signed a composition which provided for the payment of 20 per cent, in six and twelve months from March 16th, 1875: ffeld, that this difference in time was fatal to the proceedings.</p>

In bankruptcy. John D. Alexander was duly adjudicated a bankrupt on his own petition, and filed the usual schedules of his debts and assets.

In bankruptcy. These petitions for involuntary bankruptcy against the several defendants were tried together by consent of the parties.

Habeas corpus. The district attorney applied for a warrant to send the defendant [J. H. Alexander] to the district of Louisiana for trial on a criminal charge. The defendant was 'brought before a commissioner on a complaint, and the only evidence of probable cause was the certified copy of an indictment returned to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Louisiana. No evidence was offered by the defendant.

[In bankruptcy. Certificate 1o district judge by register of questions arising in the taxation of fees of c-lerk, register, and mar-shnl in the bankruptcy of Alexander Alexander, upon exceptions by the bankrupt’s counsel to certain items of fees charged.]

<p>Case No. 164.</p> <p>Prize — Trading with Enemy after Declaration of War — Confiscation of Vessel — Evidence of Capture.</p> <p>1. If, after a knowledge of the- war, an American vessel go to an enemy port, and take in a cargo there, the vessel and cargo are liable to confiscation for a trading with the enemy. See The Mercurios, 1 C. Rob. [Adm.] 80; The Columbia. Id. 154; The Neptunus, 3 C. Rob. [Adm.] 173; The Alexander, 4 C. Rob. [Adm.] 93; The Exchange, 1 Edw. [Adm.] 39.</p> <p>[See Caldwell v. Southern Exp. Co., Case No. 2,303.]</p> <p>2. What constitutes a capture. If there be an animus capiendi, and a submission on one side, and a possession on the other, it constitutes a capture, although no prize crew be put on board.</p> <p>3. A prize crew not necessary to navigate a captured ship, so as to preserve the possession of the captors, if the captured crew agree to navigate her.</p> <p>4. But the captured crew are not by law compelled to navigate her.</p> <p>5. Where, on the original preparatory evidence, the fact of capture is admitted, further proof ought not to be admitted, to create doubts, as to the fact of capture.</p> <p>6. Further proof is never allowed to a party, who shows himself in delicto.</p> <p>[Cited in The Cuba, Case No. 3,457; The Lilia, Id. 8,348.]</p> <p>7. The-president’s instruction of the 28 th of August, 1812, did not protect from capture vessels coming from British ports with cargoes put on board long after a full knowledge of the war.</p> <p>[8. Cited in The Revere, Case No. 11,716, as authority for dismissing a claim, and even for condemnation, where a ship sailed with false papers, as to her destination, and put in a false claim, supported by false testimony.]</p> <p>[See The Joseph, 8 Cranch, (12 U. S.) 451; The Rapid. Id. 155; Jecker v. Montgomery, 18 How. (59 U. S.) 114: The Diana. Case No. 3.S76; Caldwell v. Southern Exp. Co., Id. 2,303.]</p> <p>[NOTE. This decree was affirmed by the supreme court. 8 Cranch, (12 U. S.) 160. The decree of the district court is not accessible.]</p>

<p>Case Mo. 165.</p> <p>Sr,AVE Trade — Forfeiture OF VeS:EI..</p> <p>The first section of the slave trade act of 1800, c. 51, [2 Stat. 70, § 1.] prohibits not merely the transportation of slaves, but the being employed in the business of the slave trade; and therefore a vessel caught in such trade, though before she has taken slaves on board, is liable to forfeiture.</p> <p>[Cited in The Porpoise, Case No. 11,2S4.]</p>

[In equity. Suit by Charles Aexander and others against the Central Railroad of Iowa and another for foreclosure of mortgage. On demurrer to bill. Demurrer overruled.] This is a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage made by the defendant on its railroad and property. The bill is filed by the plaintiffs as bondholders, who allege that they bring it -for themselves and all other bondholders who are similarly situated. It charges default in the company to pay interest.

[In admiralty. Libel for wages. Dismissed.] This was a libel in personam, by William Alexander against Joseph Galloway, master of the ship Columbia, to recover seamen's wages.

[At law.] Replevin of goods distrained for rent; avowry of rent arrear, concluding with a prayer for judgment for double rent, according to the act of assembly. moved for judgment for double rent, under the statute of Virginia. Old Rev. Code, p. 165,. § 15. contended that no instance has occurred in .which judgment has been given for double rent. The jury have not found that the whole amount of rent distrained for, namely, $141.67; was due.

In equity. L. E. Alexander, as receiver of the Columbia Life Insurance Company, and the company, are named as plaintiffs [and Homer and Homer and A. M. Britton as defendants] in the bill, which alleges that the company is a Missouri corporation; that on the eighteenth of October, 187J, it was, by decree of the circuit court of St. Louis county, adjudged to be insolvent and enjoined from doing further business, and the plaintiff, Alexander, appointed receiver of its property…

At law. This action is brought by the plaintiff, [Robert Alexander,] a citizen of California, against the defendant, a citizen of Oregon, to recover the possession of a half section of land situate in Lane county, the same being the donation claim of Robert Alexander and Sarah, his wife, numbered 70, and lying in sections 35 and 36, in township 20 south, of range 3 west, of the Wallamet meridian.

<p>Case No. 172.</p> <p>Moktoaoes — Deed Absolute ox Its Face — Pa-nol Evidence — Tkusts.</p> <p>11. Where a deed, absolute upon its face, is given to secure a debt, equity will enforce the debtor’s right to redeem, irrespective of any agreement or of the intentions of the parties; and parol evidence is admissible to show whether the conveyance was in fact made as such security.]</p> <p>[2. To establish the fact that a conveyance, absolute upon its face, was intended to secure debt, and should therefore be subject to redemption, parol evidence of an agreement to that effect is insufficient; facts and circumstances must be shown dehors the instrument such as to give rise to an equity paramount to the intention of the parties, or by exhibiting the real nature of the transaction to expose the attempted fraud, and for these purposes parol evidence as to the consideration, the conversation and correspondence between the parties, and every other circumstances, is admissible.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>|3. A conveyance made in satisfaction of a precedent debt, so that there is no personal remedy left to the creditor against the debtor, cannot take effect as a mortgage, although it contains a clause providing for redemption. Oonway v. Alexander, 7 Granch, (11 U. S.) 218, followed.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[4. A widow and her children conveyed to her brother in fee simple a ranch as a satisfaction for and extinguishment of a precedent debt, but under the expectation founded on the brother’s assurance that any surplus of the price at which it might thereafter be sold over and above the amount necessary to reimburse him would be appropriated by him to the benefit of the widow and her children. Meld, that whatever trust was created referred .to the proceeds of such subsequent sale, and didl not attach itself to tfie land, nor in any way impair the brother’s right to dispose of it.]</p> <p>[NOTE. This decree was reversed by the supreme court in Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 323. Mr. Justice Swayne, in delivering the opinion, said: “The lessees and their assignees insist that they are bona fide purchasers without notice. This proposition cannot be maintained. * * * The doctrine invoked has no application where the rights of the vendee ¡ lie in an executory contract. It applies only where the legal title has been conveyed and the purchase money fully paid. * * * To give validity to such a sale by a mortgagor, it must | be shown that the conduct of the mortgagee was, in all things, fair and frank, and that he paid for the property what it was worth. He must hold out no delusive hopes; he must exercise no undue influence; he must take no advantage of the fears or poverty of the other party. Any indirection or obliquity of conduct is fatal to his title. Every doubt will be resolved against him. Where confidential relations and the means of oppression exist, the scrutiny is severer than in cases of a different character. The form of the instruments employed is immaterial. That the mortgagor knowingly surrendered and never intended to reclaim is of no consequence. If there is vice in the transaction, the law, while it will secure to the mortgagee his debt, with interest, will compel him to give back that which he has taken with unclean hands. * * * The terms exacted for the loan by Rodriguez were harsh and oppressive. The condition of the widow and orphans might well have touched his kindred heart with sympathy. It seems only to have whetted his avarice. Two per cent, a month — and this, if not paid as stipulated, to be compounded — was a devouring rate of interest. It was stipulated that the further advances should bear interest at the same rate. He demanded an adjustment when, from the failure of the crops and other causes, the property was greatly depressed, and he knew the widow and her children had no means of payment. The alternatives presented were an absolute conveyance of the property or a foreclosure and sale under the mortgage. He was anxious to procure the deed, and exulted when he got it. The.debt and advances, with the interest superadded, were much less than the value of the property. * * * The testimony of Rodriguez alone is sufficient to turn the scale against him. He cannot repudiate the assurances upon which his grantors were drawn in to convey. To permit him to do so would give triumph to iniquity. The facts indisputably established bring the case clearly within those principles by the light of which, in determining the rights of the parties, the judgment of this court must be made up. The complainant stands in the place of those from whom he derives title. _ He is clothed with their rights, and is entitled to redeem six-sevenths of the premises upon paying that proportion of the mortgage debt and interest. The former must be held to include the amount advanced, as well as that represented by the note, and the latter be settled by the terms of the contract and the law of California.”!</p>

[At law. Application for continuance. Denied.] The plaintiff died since the last term, and the administrator appears at this term. The issue was made up at the last term. Mr. Youngs, for defendant, contended that he was of right entitled to a continuance. By the act of assembly of Virginia, (P. P. [1 Rev. Code 1803,] p. 110, § 20,) all suits abate by the death of a party, unless there has been a verdict or interlocutory judgment.

<p>[In equity. Suit by Robert J. Alexander against Martin L. Todd and Alfred W. Woods to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent. Decree for plaintiff.]</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by William B. Byrnes and others, owners of the barkentine C. L. Pearson, against the steamship Alexandria, for damages sustained by collision. Decree for libelants. An appeal was taken to the circuit court, and there affirmed.]</p>

[In admiralty. -Libel by William B. Bymes and others, owners of the barkentine C. L. Pearson, against the steamship Alexandria, for damages sustained by collision. Decree for libelants, reported in The Alexandria, Case No. 178. Claimants appeal.

At law. Debt for the penalty of a by-law of the corporation of Alexandria, against burning oyster-shells on a brickkiln, without a license. Mr. E. J. Lee, for defendant, objected to the jurors, because they were citizens of Alexandria, and the penalty enured to the benefit of the corporation; and cited Hanson v. Peircy, 1 Morgan, Essays, 280; Rex v. Carpenter, 2 Show. 47; City of London v. Un-free Merchants, Id. 146; 3 Bac.

This was a motion by Mr. Taylor, attorney for the common council of Alexandria, for judgment against Joseph Mandeville, for his proportion of the expense of paving Pitt street, between Cameron and Queen streets, th; recovery of which, by motion, is authorized by the amended charter of the 25th of February, 1804, § 11, (2 Stat. 255.) By the by-law of the 7th of September, 1802, the proprietor of a lot is liable to a tax of $1.32, on every front foot of his lot on a street…

At law. Debt for the penalty of two hundred dóllars under a by-law against burning oyster-shells in Alexandria. The defendant pleaded that the penalty of the by-law was not a reasonable penalty, upon which the plaintiff took issue.

At law. Debt, against the surety of one Talbot, an inspector of fish, upon his official bond faithfully to execute the duties of the office. Mr. Mason, for defendant, prayed the court to instruct the jury that the defendant was not liable upon this bond, for honest error in judgment, or want of skill; and cited [President, etc., of Union Bank v. Clossey,] 10 Johns. 271.

This was a motion for judgment for taxes on a range of lots lying on tbe west side of West street, in Aexandria. Tbe question was whether tbe jurisdiction of the corporation extended over those lots.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] [At law. Libel of seizure for forfeiture of certain sugar, (Gonzalo Alfonso, claimant.) Judgment of forfeiture to United States. Claimant appeals.] Writ of error to a judgment rendered in the district court.

<p>Case No. 189.</p> <p>Salvage — Amount op Awakd.</p>

In admiralty. In March, 1873, the canal-boat Mohawk was towed from Passaic, N. J., to Port Johnson, the master of the canal-boat knowing that the ice in the channel was strong and the passage dangerous. The owners of the tug were unwilling to have her undertake the work, because of the danger, and because they did not tow for hire; and had refused to take any pay for the service, or to be responsible for damage. The trip was made safely, and the boat got a load of coal.

In admiralty. This was a libel filed to recover damages for a collision, which took place between two and three o’clock A. M. on the 26th of June, 1865, about fifty miles to the northward of Cape Hatteras, between the steamship Alhambra and the schooner Wonder, by which the schooner was sunk and totany lost. .The schooner was owned by Kinney and Smith. Smith was her master. He lost his life in the collision.

<p>Case No. 193.</p> <p>Priority op Liens — Maritime or State Liens to be Paid before Mortoage Liens, Where by General Maritime or Local Law a Lien is Given.</p> <p>A mortgage lien upon a vessel has no priority over maritime claims of any class for which either the state or maritime law gives a lien, but is postponed to those liens.</p> <p>[Cited in The Theodore Perry, Case No. 13,-879; The Bradich Johnson, Id. 1,770; The General Burnside, 3 Fed. Rep. 230; The City of Tawas. Id. 174. Followed in The Illinois, Case No. 7,005: The J. E. Rum-bell, 13 Sup. Gt. Rep. 502, 148 U. S. 1.]</p>

■ [In admiralty. Libel in rem by James E. Chase against the bark Alice Tainter for supplies. Libel dismissed with costs. Affirmed by the circuit court in The Alice Tainter, Case No. 195.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] [In admiralty. Libel in rem by James E. Chase against the bark Alice Tainter for supplies. Decree for claimant dismissing the libel in the Alice Tainter, Case No. 194. Li-belant appeals. Affirmed.]

<p>Case No. 196.</p> <p>Admiralty — Costs—Fees of Clerk.</p> <p>1. Where a note of issue, on an appeal in admiralty, is delivered to the clerk, under rule 55 of this court, with a view to his putting the cause on the calendar of causes to be tried, for a particular term, a fee of $1 to the clerk for the service is a lawful and proper fee, and, if paid by a successful party, can be taxed against his adversary, as costs in the cause.</p> <p>[Cited in The Siren, Case No. 12,910; The P. Merwin, Id. 4,893.]</p> <p>2. It is proper for the clerk to charge for including the evidence, in a suit in admiralty, in the final record, .on final decree, notwithstanding the provision of section 1 of the act of February 16th, 1875, (18 Stat. 315,) in regard to. appeals in admiralty to the supreme court.</p>

In. equity. The complainant, Alice, was a mulatto woman, who was claimed by the defendant Peter Morte, as his slave, and who was about to be carried away into the southern states, when she claimed her freedom, and complained to Mr. Hoffman, a justice of the peace, who, under a statute of Virginia, in force in the county of Alexandria, detained her, and committed her to the marshal for safe keeping, until her complaint could be heard by the court; the defendant, Morte, having…

[In admiralty.] This was libel In rem, by James O. Haight against the steamboat Alida, to recover for repairs made upon that boat. [Libel dismissed.] The facts out of which this action arose were as follows: During the navigation season of 1847, the steamboat Alida, being then wholly owned in this state, was employed in running between New York ■ and Albany, making regular passenger trips •daily, Sundays excepted.

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, by the president, managers, and company of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, against the steamboat Alida, to recover.for ■supplies .of coal furnished that boat. [Decree for libelants.] The action arose out of the following facts: —The libellants’ corporation were the' owners of the Lackawanna coal beds, and were •engaged in supplying coal extensively to .steamboats.

<p>Case No. 201.</p> <p>Collision in New Yoke Harbor — Tow-Boat— Vessel at Anchor — Sudden Gale.</p> <p>A tow-boat, with thirty canal-boats, four barges, and a sloop in tow, was bound down the North river, with an ebb tide. In passing a large steamer, which lay at anchor, the hawser tier struck the steamer, and two of the canal-boats were sunk. The defence set up was, that a sudden squall of wind struck the steamer, as the tow was passing at a proper distance, and drove her into the tow: Held, That the defence had not been made out, but that the collision was occasioned by lack of precaution on the part of the pilot of the tow-boat.</p>

<p>Case No. 201a.</p> <p>Naturalization — Residence—Acts or 1802,1813, and 1824 — Minors.</p> <p>[1. The naturalization ;:ct of April 14, 1S02. § 1, (2 Stat. 153, c. 28.) required five years’ residence in the United States. Act March 3, 1813, § 12, (2 Stat. 809, c. 42,) provided that an alien must have a residence of five years, without being for any part of that time out of the territory of the United States, in order to become entitled to naturalization. Held that, under the act of 1802, “residence” meant domicile, and that said act did not require that the alien remain constantly in this country for five years.]</p> <p>[2. Act May 26, 1824, (4 Stat. 69, c. 186.) provided that any free white alien, under 21 years of age, who shall have resided in the United States three years nest preceding his arriving at the age of 21 years, and who shall have continued to reside therein until the time of making application to be admitted as a citizen, may be naturalized after arriving at the age of 21 years, and after he shall have resided in the United States five years, including the three years of his minority. Held that, so far as concerns minors, this repealed the act of 1813, and required merely a domicile in the United States under the prescribed conditions.]</p> <p>13. A person who serves an apprenticeship in the United States, and thereafter is in constant service as a sailor, and spends the short intervals between his voyages with his mother, who resides in the United States, is himself a resident of the United States, within the meaning of the act of May 26, 1824. (4 Stat. 69, c. 186,) and is entitled to naturalization.]</p>

In equity. [Heard on motion to dissolve a temporary injunction that had been granted at the time of the filing of complainants’ bill.

<p>Case No. 203.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Maritime Liens.</p> <p>[A contract by a plumber and coppersmith for materials and labor expended upon the construction of a ship is not a maritime one. and a lien therefor given by local law is not enforceable in admiralty. Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. (61 U. S.) 393, 402, followed.]</p> <p>[Cited in The Norway, Case No. 10,359.]</p> <p>[See Roach v. Chapman. 22 How. (63 U. S.) 129Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. (88 TJ. S.) 532; The Lottawanna, Id. 558; The Belfast, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 624; The Edith, Case No. 4,283.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel for collision. Decree for libelant, affirmed by circuit court in The Alleghany, Case No. 205, and that decree affirmed by supreme court, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 522.] The libellant, Bernard Goldsmith, shipped on board the schooner Henry C. Winslow a cargo of oats, at Milwaukee, to be carried to the port of Buffalo. On the 7th of May, 1864, the schooner left her dock in-the Milwaukee river, in tow of the steam tug W. K. Muir.

[Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin.] [In admiralty. Libel for collision. Decree in district court for libellants. Respondent appeals.

In equity. The complainants, a Boston company, are the manufacturers of a fertilizer to which they have given the name of “Eureka Ammoniated Bone Superphos-phate of Lime.” The defendants manufacture a fertilizer which they call the “Baltimore ’Eureka’ Ammoniated Bone Superphos-phate of Lime.” At a former hearing the court had refused the complainants’ application for a preliminary injunction, because the defendants, in their answer, denied that the appropriation of the name…

<p>Case No. 207.</p> <p>■Salvor, Undertaking of — Duty of Tow — Salvage by Steam Tug — Com pens atioh.</p> <p>1. A salvor does not undertake to succeed in saving the property in peril, but only that he will exercise ordinary skill and diligence in the use of the means or machinery with which he undertakes the salvage service.</p> <p>2. It is the duty of the vessel in tow to keep In proper trim and tack, to follow the tug, and steer accordingly; and, if injuiy results to the tow from negligence or mistake in these respects, the tug is not responsible.</p> <p>H. Owing to its comparative independence of the winds and currents, a steam tug may perform a salvage service with comparative safety to herself, and therefore the matter of risk to herself and crew is to be estimated accordingly, in fixing the value of such service.</p> <p>4. A steam tug of three hundred and four horse-power left Baker’s bay, and overtook an iron ship of one thousand two hundred and thirty-five tons, worth forty-seven thousand dollars, drawing twelve feet of water, in ballast, drifting onto the west end of Chinook spit in seventeen feet of water at flood tide, near two hours before high water, with the wind blowing about eight from the south-east, and took her hawser and towed her under the lee of the east of Sand island, where, owing to the strength of the wind, which had increased to ten and veered to south-east by south, she was compelled to let her go in comparatively safe anchorage in twenty-three feet of water; but the ship, only letting go one anchor, dragged on to the spit, where she lay until next morning in about four or five feet of water at low tide, when the tug, ana three others of near the same power, and working under the same management, returned to her, and- pulled her off about two hours before high water, with a light breeze from the east by south, and the ship heading south and west, without any serious risk to the tugs or actual injury thereto. Held,, that the service was a salvage service, and the compensation therefor fixed at five thousand dollars.</p>

Appeal [by A. B. Allen] from the decision of the commissioner of patents for refusing to grant letters-patent to him for his improvement in mowing machines. [Affirmed.]

. [In admiralty. Libel in rem by Vicenzo Allegro against the steamboat Niagara (Thomas C. Durant and others, claimants') for collision. Decree for respondents.]

<p>Case No. 208.</p> <p>Contempt — Refusal to Obey Ordebs of Register in Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction — Habeas Corpus — Arrest in Another State.</p> <p>1. An uncontested order, made by a register in bankruptcy, in Vermont, that a bankrupt produce certain books and papers relating to his business, was disobeyed by him. On proof thereof, and on service of notice on the bankrupt, the district court for Vermont adjudged him to have been guilty of a contempt, and ordered that he deliver up the books and papers to the marshal, and pay the costs, and that, in default thereof, he be arrested by the marshal, or his deputy, and committed to jail to be safely kept until discharged by order of said court. The deputy of the marshal demanded the books and papers and costs from the bankrupt, in New Hampshire, which he refused to deliver or pay, and then the deputy arrested him in New Hampshire, and committed him to jail in Vermont. On a habeas corpus sued out by the bankrupt: Held, (1.) The order of the register was the order of the court, and, when it was disobeyed, it was proper to institute proceedings for contempt directly on such disobedience.</p> <p>[Cited in Eischer v. Hayes, 6 Fed. Hep. 71; U. S. v. Anon., 21 Fed. Rep. 770.]</p> <p>2. That it was proper to direct that the bankrupt be committed until discharged by order of the district court.</p> <p>[Cited in Fischer v. Hayes, 6 Fed. Rep. 74.]</p> <p>3. That the arrest in New Hampshire was illegal, and the imprisonment in Vermont, in pursuance of such arrest, was, therefore,, illegal, although the warrant of arrest was valid.</p>

<p>Case NTo. 209,</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition — Confirmation by Court.</p> <p>[The court must confirm a composition agreed upon by the requisite majority of the creditors where they are not shown to have some other motive than the desire to promote their own interests, as well as those of the other creditors, and where the composition will actually benefit ail, though the bankrupt has made an assignment to a favored creditor, procured the petition in bankruptcy to be filed against himself, and taken proceedings to effect the composition solely in his own interest.]</p>

In equity. This -was a suit in equity at Pittsburgh, Allegheny county, in which the complainants set forth by their bill that one Allen, of that county, the testator of the defendants, being owner of a large real and personal estate, died, having made by his last will certain annuities, bequests and devises, seme out and out, and several in trust.

<p>Case No. 210.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition — Confirmation — Fraud of Bankrupts.</p> <p>[Where the requisite number of creditors consent to a composition in bankruptcy, and it appears that the composition is advantageous to the creditors, it must be confirmed, though the proceeding in bankruptcy was fraudulently brought about by the bankrupts, and though they will profit by the composition.]</p> <p>[Cited in Re Jacobs, Case No. 7,159.]</p>

[On appeal from the commissioner of patents.] [Application by E. G. Allen, assignee of F. W. Willard, for letters patent for a process of distilling the liquid products from ccal. An interference was declared with letters patent issued April 27, 1S88, to David Alter and Samuel A. Hill, and Allen’s application was rejected by the commissioner. Applicant appeals. Affirmed.]

At law. Debt [by John Allen against E. T. Arguelles] upon the judgment of the county court of Philadelphia county, in Pennsylvania. Plea nul tiel record, and issue. The plaintiff produced a certificate, under the seal of the county court, that a transcript of a judgment and proceedings before a justice of the peace was filed and entered of record in that court.

At law. This was an action of debt, brought [by Ethan Allen] upon a final decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, made in j a suit in equity in that court founded upon j letters patent granted to the plaintiff on the i 3d of August, 1844, [No. 461,] for an im- j provement in the method of constructing j locks for fire-arms.” The bill was filed on ; the 24th of June, 1840, against Orison Blunt ¡ and one William I. Syms, for an…

<p>Case No. 214.</p> <p>Lease — Condition against Assignment — Breach —Bankrupcty.</p> <p>This was a bill in equity brought by an as-signee in bankruptcy to enjoin one who had leased a store to the bankrupt from disturbing the petitioner’s possession. The lease stated that the store was to be used by the bankrupt as a dry goods store, and provided for a forfeiture in case of an assignment without the written consent of the lessor.</p>

[At law. Action on the case by Ethan Allen against Orisson Blunt and others] for infringing patent [No. 461] for “an improvement in the method of constructing locks for fire arms.” Plea the general issue, with a special statement of matters of defence.

At law. This was an action on the case [by Ethan Allen against Orson Blunt and others] for a violation of a patent right lor a self-eocking pistol. The suit was instituted September 2, 1844, and counted on a patent [No. 461] issued for the last time on the 3d of August, 1844, but which had originally issued, November 11, 1837, and been surrendered and cancelled for a defective specification, January 15, 1844, as well as again August 3,. 1844.

<p>[In equity. Bill by Aaron H. Allen against the city of Brooklyn to enjoin infringement of letters patent No. 12,017. Injunction refused.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel for compensation for services. Decree for libelants.] From the pleadings and evidence it appeared that the Canada, [John] Sewall, master, on a voyage from Jamaica to England, having lost her rudder, and sprung her foremast in a storm, was obliged to bear away for the first port. She came to anchor off the bar of Charleston; when the captain came ashore for assistance, and returned with a new rudder, six fresh hands, and a pilot.

[In equity. Suit by Thomas Allen and George H. Nettleton against the Dallas & Wichita Railroad (Jompany for foreclosure of mortgage.] Heard at chambers, on motion of defendants to vacate order for appointment of receiver. [Motion overruled.] On May 24, 1878, the complainants filed their bill, and moved at chambers, before the circuit judge, for the appointment of a receiver of the property and effects of the . defendant railroad company.

<p>In admiralty. This was a libel in per-sonam filed by James Allen against Franklin Hallet, master, and George Gibson, first mate of the packet-ship Queen of the West, to recover damages for ill usage inflicted on the libellant, on board that vessel. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. [Decree for libellant.]</p>

<p>Case No. 224.</p> <p>Admiralty — Appeals—Seamen’s Wages.</p> <p>1. If the libellant does not appeal, he cannot ask to have the damages increased here, except by an allowance for the delay of payment.</p> <p>[Cited in The Stephen Morgan v. Good, 94 U. S. 604; The Maggie P.. 25 Fed. Rep. 206; Bush v. The Alonzo, Case No. 2,223; Shaw v. Folsom, 40 Fed. Rep. 512.]</p> <p>[See Airey v. Merrill, Case No. 115; The Peytona, Id. 11,058; The Quickstep, Id. 11,-509.]</p> <p>2. In fixing a quantum meruit for wages on a whaling voyage, it is competent for the court to take into view the unusual protraction of the voyage, and the condition of the vessel and the crew, though not specially alleged or relied on in the libel.</p>

[At law. Action by John Allen against TVilliam M. Hunter for damages for infringement of letters patent No. 8,621, granted to J Allen, December 23, 1851. Tried by jury. Verdict for defendant.]

<p>[At law. On motion for new trial. Motion overruled.]</p>

[At law. Action of ejectment. Tried by jury. Verdict for plaintiff.] The plaintiff, in tracing bis title, began with a deed from one R. to William Carter, dated April 1733, granting a rent charge out of this ground, being a lot in Philadelphia;' a deed from R. to Benjamin Clark, of tbe fee simple of the lot, charged with the rent,, in 1738: the will of Clark, devising this lot to his wife for life, and to his seven children; deed from the widow and five children to Thomas…

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by Walter Allen and others, owners of the barque Hin-doo, against R. C. Mackey and others, respondents, and owners of the ship John Quincy Adams. Decree for libellants.] This was a cause of collision. The libel-lants were the owners of the barque Hindoo, of Newcastle-on-Tyne, which sailed from Liverpool, in January, 1851, on a voyage to Aden, in the Red Sea, with a cargo of coal.

[At law. Action of assumpsit by William Allen against Joseph McKean. Verdict for defendant, taken subject to opinion of the court, set aside, and verdict for plaintiff entered.] This was an action of assumpsit for money had and received, brought by the plaintiff, who claimed to be president of Bowdoin College, against the defendant, who was treasurer of the college, for the recovery of the salary and perquisites of the office of president of the college.

In bankruptcy. This is an appeal from the district court of the United States for the. eastern district of Missouri.

At law. Debt on a prison-bounds bond. Breach, that the defendant departed, &c. Plea, payment. Replication, non-payment, and issue. R. S. Coxe, for defendant, objected to the bond, because he said that there was no such judgment as that recited in the bond.

In equity. This was a suit in equity [by Aaron H. Alien against the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York and the board of education of the city of New York for infringement of] re-issued letters patent [No. 1,126 of patent No. 12,017,] granted to the plaintiff for “improvements in seats for public buildings.” IDecree for complainant]

<p>Case No. 233.</p> <p>Principad and Agent — Powers op Agent — Conversion — Tender—Liens.</p> <p>1. Where a power to an agent is general, he may do any thing to bind his principal, which is within the scope of his authority.</p> <p>2. If' the agency be special, every thing is void, which may be done, unless in strict conformity with the authority.</p> <p>3. If, upon demand, the defendant said he would retain the goods demanded, and that he knew a suit would be brought; this is evidence of a conversion.</p> <p>4. When a party, holding goods in his possession adversely, has paid rent for the premises in which they are stored; it is not necessary to tender the rent, in order to enable the owner of the goods to recover them in an action of trover.</p> <p>5. Liens depend upon contracts, express or implied; and none can be implied, jvhere the defendant acts adversely to the right's of the person for whom he has paid the money.</p> <p>[Cited in Gunton v. Nock, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 382.]</p> <p>NOTE, [from original report.] He who has an absolute or general property, may bring trover, though he never had the actual possession; for property, in personal things, draws to it the possession, to enable him to bring trover or trespass against a stranger who takes it away: but, he must have a right of possession. Yet, if a person having a special property as a bailee, sells and delivers the goods to another as his own, bona fide, and without notice; the general owner cannot bring trover, or any other action, against the vendee; for, by the sale, his property is altered. So, possession, with an assertion of title, or even possession alone, gives such a property, as will enable a man to bring this action against a wrong doer; for possession is prima facie evidence of property, sufficient to put the defendant upon proof of property. So, the finder of a tiling, may bring trover against a stranger, who converts it. If the goods come to the defendant by delivery or finding, the plaintiff must demand them; and refusal is evidence of a conversion. But, it is not evidence of a conversion, where it is obvious that the defendant has made no conversion; as if he has cut down trees, and left them lying there; nor in the case of a carrier, &c. where the goods were lost through negligence, or were stolen: but action on the case is the remedy: but, if it does not appear that they were lost, or if the carrier had them, when he denied to deliver them, it is a conversion. Bull. N. P. 44. Nor where that carrier has a lien on the goods for a debt due him, which is not paid, nor tendered; but trover will lie. if the carrier breaks open the box containing the goods, or sells them, or has them in possession when the demand is made. Not only claiming the property as one’s own, but asserting the right of another over it, is, upon demand and refusal, evidence of a conversion. Denial to one who has a right to demand goods, is an actual conversion, and not merely evidence of it; for the assuming upon one’s self the property in, and right of disposing of. another’s goods, is a conversion. So, where one intrusted •with the goods of another, puts them into the hands of a third person, without orders, it is a conversion. Making up of a thing found, or delivered, is a conversion; so is a misuse of it. So, taking and carrying away is a conversion, without demand or refusal. Wilbraham v. Snow, 2 Saund. 47, note 1; [Doe v. Richards.] 3 Term R. 357: [Baldwin v. Cole.] 6 Mod. 212; 6 Bac. Abr. 679. In [Green v. Farmer,] 4 Burrows, 2218, Lord Mansfield lays it down, that courts are disposed to maintain liens: 1. Where there is an express contract. 2. Where it is implied from the usage of trade. 3. Where it may be implied from the manner of dealing between the parties, in the particular case. 4. Where the factor claims it, for the balance of his general accounts.</p>

[At law. Suit by executors of M. A. English to recover a deposit in a savings bank.' Judgment for plaintiff.] Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.

On motion by plaintiff to remand the cause to the state court. The material facts are as follows: The plaintiff, B. E. Allen, is a citizen of Iowa. The defendant, Joseph T. Ryerson, is a citizen of Illinois. The other defendant is the sheriff of Polk county, Iowa. The plaintiff brought this suit in one of the state courts of Iowa.

At law. [Action by Phillip Allen and others against P. Sehuchardt and others for damages for breach of warranty. Judgment for plaintiffs.] The sample of a quantity of madder was put into the hands of a broker in the city of New York, by the defendants, to make sale of it for them. A sale was made accordingly to the plaintiffs, in the state of Rhode Island, upon an inspection of the sample bottle, which the broker refused to open on account of instructions from his principals.

<p>In equity. The opinion of the court contains a full statement of the case.</p>

In equity. This was a suit in equity [by Ethan Allen] for the infrihgement of letters patent. [No. 401. See note at end of case.] The bill prayed for an injunction, an account, &c. The patent was for an “improvement in the method of constructing locks for firearms,” and was originally granted to the plaintiff on the 11th of November, 1837. It was re-issued on an amended specification on the 3d of August, 1844. The plaintiff now moved for a provisional injunction.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] [At law. Action of debt by the United States against Robert W. Allen, John Henderson, and James Swedge on a bond. Judgment in district court for plaintiff. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.]

In equity. Allen, by Ms will, ordered that “first and foremost there be secured to my dear wife” on my real and personal estate, an annuity “of $1,200 a year, to be punctually paid semiannually during her lifetime, and that my executors pay all taxes on the premises occupied by my wife during her lifetime.” Then followed numerous legacies to individuals, to corporations, and for pious uses, exceeding in amount the whole personal estate, but not charged, like the annuity, on…

[In bankruptcy. Action by Alonzo W. Allen against A. G. Whittemore, assignee, to enforce the collection of a promissory note secured by a conditional bill of sale.]

[At law. Action by H. M. Allen against the town of Cameron. Judgment for plaintiff.] Action on negotiable coupons originally attached to bonds issued by the town of Cameron under the corporate seal thereof to the CMcago •& Southwestern Railroad Co. or bearer, upon a vote of the people of the town. It appeared on the trial that the town of Cameron was platted on part of section 23, and the plat was so recorded.

<p>[In admiralty. Heard on motion for an order to sell the cargo, pending a hearing on the merits. Motion denied.]</p>

<p>Case No. 245.</p> <p>Prize — Violation of Blockade — Contraband Goods — Military Equipments.</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo seized in the harbor of Beaufort, N. C., on its capture; condemned for these reasons: 1. For violating the blockade in entering Beaufort. 2. For taking .on board there an enemy clearance and a cargó, with intent to evade the blockade in coming out, and attempting to come out. 3. For carrying into Beaufort a large supply of military equipments.</p> <p>[Cited in The Gondar, Case No. 5,520.]</p> <p>2. The illegality of sailing under an enemy license is legal cause for the forfeiture of a neutral vessel.</p>

<p>Case No. 346.</p> <p>Prize — Crew as Witnesses — Neutral Property.</p> <p>1. The examination of witnesses in a prize case should be confined to persons on board of the captured vessel at the time of the capture, unless upon special permission of the court first obtained.</p> <p>2. In this case none of the crew on board at the time of the capture, eleven in number, were examined; but, instead, two seamen who had been discharged from the vessel before her capture were examined; and no explanation of the reason for this was given. This was a great irregularity, which cannot be overlooked or disregarded in a consideration of the proofs.</p> <p>3. Vessel and cargo acquitted of a violation of, or of an attempt to violate, the blockade. ></p> <p>4. Vessel held, to be neutral property. Further proof ordered as to the neutral ownership of the cargo; and further proof allowed as to the proprietary interests in the vessel, the vessel and cargo being claimed by the same party.</p>

Pin admiralty. Libel in rem by the Alliance Insurance Company against the brig Morning light to recover damages suffered by the schooner Jerry Fowler in collision, and paid by libelant as insurer. Libelant’s motion to set aside an appraisement was granted, (Case No. 246a;) and the libel was thereafter dismissed, (Alliance Ins.' Co. v. The Morning Light, Case No. 246b.) Libel-ant appeals. Affirmed.]

[In admiralty- Libel for forfeiture against the brig Alligator, (Anthony Langford and others, claimants.) Decree in district court for condemnation. Claimants appeal. Decree affirmed, and judgment on bond given by claimants ordered for appraised value and costs.]

<p>Case No. 249.</p> <p>Removal or Suits — Act or July 27,1866, Construed.</p> <p>1. Where the plaintiff, being a citizen of the states, brought ejectment in the usual form, in the state court, against the defendant, also a citizen of the state, who pleaded to the merits, and a third person, a citizen of another state, was, on his own application, made a co-defendant, but filed no plea; and both joined in a petition for the removal of the cause to the federal court, stating no facts in relation to the ownership of the land, or their relation to each other, and the court ordered the removal: Held. that the cause was improperly transferred; and the same was remanded.</p> <p>[Cited in Case v. Douglas, Case No. 2,491.]</p> <p>2. Whether the non-resident landlord may, in such case, where the title is in dispute, and the resident defendant is a mere tenant, have the cause removed on proper petition under the act of July 27, 1S66, quere.</p>

[At law. Action by B. F. Allison on a policy of fire insurance against the Phoenix Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff.] This is an action on a fire .policy to recover $2,000, the amount insured by the defendant upon the plaintiff’s stock of goods.

<p>Case No. 253.</p> <p>Prize — Relocation of Blockade — Hostile Vessels.</p> <p>1. The president’s proclamation of 14 May, 1S62, ’‘relaxing the blockade” of Beaufort, N. C., and opening it to trade under regulations of the treasury department, the port being in our military possession, must be construed, so far as neutrals are concerned, as having entirely raised the blockade; and neutral vessels bound there, in violation of the regulations of the treasury department, are not guilty of an attempt to break the blockade.</p> <p>2. Vessel and cargo condemned for breach of blockade, the evidence showing an actual hostile destination.</p>

<p>Case No. 354.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Forfeiture foe Misconduct— Shipping Articles in Derogation op Legal Eights.</p> <p>1. A justifiable discharge of a seaman by the master, for bad conduct, will work a forfeiture of the wages previously earned.</p> <p>[See The Magnet. Case No. 8,955; The John Martin, Id. 7,358; Eelf v. The Maria, Id. 11,692.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. Courts of admiralty will not [wholly] forfeit a seaman’s wages for a single act of disobedience, however [if] trivial or provoked.</p> <p>3. A stipulation in shipping articles in derogation of the general rights of seamen, as established by the maritime law, is void, unless it was fully and fairly explained to them, and additional compensation allowed them, adequate to the restrictions and risks imposed thereby.</p> <p>[See The Australia, Case No. 667.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Wages of seamen will not be forfeited for slight faults; the disobedience must be of a very gross nature, involving serious danger, or it must be malignant or habitual, such as goes to the very essence of the contract. The Mentor, Case No. 9,427; The Maria, Id. 9.074; The Pioneer, Id. 11,176. For cases in which a partial forfeiture of wages was decreed because of disobedience, see The William Cummings, Id. 17,600; The Elizabeth Frith, Id. 4,361; The Jefferson Borden, 6 Fed. 301; The Antioch, 11 Fed. 165; The Moslem. Case No. 9,875. In the following cases it was held that the particular misconduct-complained of was not sufficient to warrant a forfeiture or deduction of wages: Smith v. The J. C. King, 3 Fed. 302; The Paul Revere, 10 Fed. 156; Marsland v. The Yosemite, 18 Fed. 331: Macomber v. Thompson, Case No. 8,919; Sprague v. Kain, Id. 13,250: The Magnet, Id. 8.955; The John Martin, Id. 7,358; Hayes v. The J. J. Wickwire, Id. 6,262; Snell v. The Independence, Id. 13,139; Lang v. Holbrook, Id. 8,057; The Mary Ann. Id. 9,194; The Olive Chamberlain, Id. 10,491.]</p>

In equity. The first case was a hill in equity, [by Samson Almy against Peleg Wilbur,] filed, and notice served on the respondent, 17th October, 1842.

In admiralty. Libel in personam by the owner of the vessel [the Alonzo] against [the Montreal -Ocean Steamship Company,] shipper of the cargo, to recover freight and de-murrage. The respondent by answer disputed the amount of freight demanded, and denied all liability for demurrage.

[In admiralty. Libel by William Bush against the schooner Alonzo, (Thomas Hag-get, claimant.) for wages. Decree for libel-ant. This cause was afterwards taken to the circuit court by the claimant, and the judgment was affirmed, under title of Bush v. The Alonzo, Case No. 2,223.]

[Petition by Martin Alsberg, a bankrupt, for writ of habeas corpus. Denied on January 6, 1877. Bankrupt petitioned for a re-bearing on May 8, 1877. Denied on June 15, 1877. Petition of the bankrupt to set aside orders of district court denied by circuit court on June 29, 1877. [The bankrupt, who bad failed as a dry-goods merchant in 1873, settled with. his creditors, and resumed business in September, 1875, when he purchased about $9,000 worth of goods.

At law. Action upon a policy of insurance, underwritten by the defendants, dated the 19th of August, 1S31, whereby the plaintiff by his agent, Zebedee Cook, Jr., was insured- “ten thousand dollars on profits on merchandise on board the brig Leonora, at and from Callao to Baltimore, free of average and salvage, and the policy to be the only proof of interest required,” at a premium of one and a half per cent., the profits being valued at $20,000.

At law. This was an action [by Joseph W. Alsop, Jr., and Henry Chauncey] against [Hugh Maxwell,] collector of the port of New York, to recover back an alleged excess of duties paid him. A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

At law. This was an action [by Joseph W. Alsop, Jr., and another] against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties paid by the plaintiffs on a quantity of copper imported by them from Chili, in January, 1851.

<p>In equity- Submitted on demurrer to the-bill for want of equity.</p>

Under the laws, of South Carolina prior to 1861, the juries in the state courts were required to be white persons owning a certain amount of property. The circuit court of the district of South CaroHna made a rule regulating the summoning of juries in conformity with that law.

In equity. George Alston and others, of the state of North Carolina, executors of Thomas Mutter, late of the said state, exhibited their bill in this court, against William Munford, heir at law, and devisee of Robert Munford, deceased, Anne Munford, his widow, and Anne Byrd, widow of Ot-way Byrd, and Richard Kennon, and Elizabeth, his wife, which Anne Byrd and Elizabeth Kennon were children of the said Robert Munford, and all of the state of Virginia.

<p>Case No. 369.</p> <p>Bond — New Bond — Presumption of Innocence —Release of Surety.</p> <p>A. was surety for one S., as postmaster, on his official bond. On the 14th of September, 1861, a new bond, with other sureties, was accepted, whereby A. was. by statute, released from responsibility for all acts or defaults of S. committed subsequently. S. was afterwards removed from office, and at that time was a debtor to the United States. In a suit brought against A. on his bond, to recover such debt, it was not shown by the United States that S. had not in his hands, on the 14th of September, 1861, ready to be paid or applied, all the moneys of the United States with which he was justly chargeable: Eeld, that it must be presumed he had such moneys in his hands when the new bond was given; and that A. was not liable therefor.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by the Amazon Insurance Company against the steamboat Iron Mountain and the barge Ironsides. Heard on exceptions to the libel. Exceptions overruled.] The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Case No. 273.</p> <p>Bonds — Forthcoming Bond — Marshal’s Fees.</p> <p>1. It is not necessary that a forthcoming bond should recite the return of the execution, nor the certificate of the service, nor the name of the-person by whom it was served; but it must state that the execution was served.</p> <p>2. A mistake in calculating the marshal’s fees, may be cured by a release; and judgment maybe rendered for the true sum.</p>

In admiralty. Affreightment. — Libel by A. S. Lewis and others, composing the mercantile firm of A. S. & W. G. Lewis & Co., against the schooner A. M. Bliss, alleging that they hired the vessel of Patton, Ginn, & Folger, of Boston, agents and owners, for six voyages to Hayti or other parts of the West Indies, or the Salt Islands, at $1,-200 for each voyage, and that the vessel had performed only two of the voyages, and that her master and said agents refused to send her on…

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Abraham Hill to recover possession of the yacht Amelia from J. N. Towns. Libel dismissed, with costs. Reported as Hill v. The Amelia, Case No. 6,487. Decree affirmed.]</p>

In admiralty. The following proceeding was had in the case of the Amelia: Eastern District of Penn’a. In the U. S. District Court. To the Hon. John Cadwalader, Judge of said Court: The undersigned begs leave to report, that about one o’clock, P.

This cause was submitted to the decision of the court by Mr. Key, for the petitioner, and Mr. Jones, for the defendant, upon the following case ^agreed: “In this case it is admitted that the petitioner was bom in the state of Maryland, and became, by marriage, the property of one Henry O. Middleton, who resided in Washington county, in this district, until May, 1820, there keeping the said petitioner in his possession, as his slave.

In admiralty. This was a libel for a collision which occurred about 6 o’clock P. H., on the 25th of October, 1S65, after dark, on the Hudson river, about seven miles below Albany, between the lake boat or barge Contest and a boat in tow of the steamboat America, whereby the Contest was badly damaged. The amount of damages claimed was $10,000.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by the Camden & Amboy Railroad Transportation Company, owners of the steam tug Fairfield, against the steam ferry boat America, owned by the Union Ferry Company. Libel dismissed. This decree was reversed by the circuit court in The America, Case No. 284. The decree of the circuit court was reversed by the supreme court. 92 U. S. 432. See note to The America, Case No. 284. For the decree of the circuit court on the question of damages, see The America, Case No. 285.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by James McKeag, owner of the canal-boat A. W. Humphreys, against the steamer America, for damages suffered by the A W. Humphreys while in the America’s tow. Libel dismissed.]

<p>Case No. 283.</p> <p>Damage to Cargo — Bill or Lading — Inherent Deterioration — Bad Storage.</p> <p>1. Oranges and lemons were shipped on a steamship at Valencia to be brought to New York under a bill of lading exempting the vessel from losses by perils of the seas or from inherent deterioration. On the discharge of the cargo at New York the fruit was found to be mostly decayed, and a libel was filed against the steamer to recover for its loss: Held, that on the evidence the cargo had not been so-stowed as to permit proper ventilation.</p> <p>[Cited in The Portuense, 35 Fed. 671.]</p> <p>2. That it was not incumbent on the libellants to prove that there was no inherent deterioration in the fruit.</p> <p>3. That the rotting of this fruit was undoubtedly unduly hastened by the manner in which it was stowed; and that the libellants were entitled to recover.</p> <p>[Cited in The Portuense, 35 Fed. 671.] [See The Star of Hope, 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 651.1</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York. [In admiralty. Libel by the Camden & Amboy Railroad Transportation Company, owner of the steam tug Fairfield, against the steam ferryboat America, owned by the Union Ferry Company. In the district court the libel was dismissed, with costs. The America, Case No. 281. Libelants appeal. Reversed. This decree was reversed by the supreme court on appeal. 92 U. S. 432.

[In admiralty. Libel for collision by the ■Camden & Amboy Railroad Transportation Company, owner of the steam tug Fairfield, against the steam ferryboat America, (the Union Ferry Company, claimant) The district court dismissed the libel, with costs, (Case No. 281,) but on appeal the decree was reversed by this court, and a reference •ordered, (The America, Case No. 284.)2 Heard ■on exceptions to the commissioner’s report.

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem for wages. The defence was desertion and forfeiture of wages. It appeared that the libel-lant shipped for a voyage from Savannah to Liverpool, and thence to New -York. At Liverpool he left the vessel, and the claim was for wages out and home. It was proved that the libellant, who was the carpenter, was severely and unjustifiably beaten by the mates, and that he left the vessel in consequence.

<p>[On appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.]</p> <p>In admiralty. This was an information claiming the schooner America, as forfeited, 1st because certain goods, to wit, 120 tons of plaister of paris, were imported in said vessel into the United States from some port in Nova Scotia, and being of more than $400 in value, were unladen in the night time without a permit, contrary to the collection act of 2 March, 1799, c. 128; 2d. because the same goods were, at some port ! of Nova Scotia, laden and put on board of said schooner, with the knowledge of the owner and master, with intention to import the same into the United States, contrary to , ¡ the act of March 1, 1809, c. 91; 3d. because the said vessel, being a vessel duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and having on board foreign merchandize of a value exceeding $800, did arrive at the port and district of Boston from the district of Penobscot, without being provided with, or exhibiting a manifest of the cargo then on board of said vessel, or any manifest including said plaister, contrary to the coasting act 18 February, 1793, c. 8.</p> <p>for the United States, in support of the first count, cited sections 27 and 28 of the act regulating the collection of duties; the first of which provides, that any foreign goods brought in from a foreign port, and unladen without a permit, unless in case of accident or distress, shall be forfeited; and the last, that the vessel which receives them shall also be forfeited, He also relied on the 59th section, providing that no goods brought from any foreign port or place shall be unladen but between sunrise and sunset, without a permit or license; and if so unladen, to be forfeited. And if the value at the highest market price be $400, then the vessel, &c. are to be forfeited. He contended that no disünction was here made, as to goods not liable to duties. In support of the second count, he referred to the 4th, 5th, and 6th sections of the non-intercourse act 1 March, 1809. In support of the third count, he relied on the 46th and 50th sections of the coasting act, requiring the exhibition of a manifest.</p> <p>contended as to the first count, 1st. that no goods, but such as were liable to duties, were intended by the act. The plaister, which composed this vessel’s cargo, was not liable to duties. He referred to the act regulating the collection of duties, and also to the 4th and 51st sections of the coasting act; 2dly, that the facts must show it to be imported from a foreign port in the same vessel, unladen in the night time, and of more than $400 in value. Without the papers, the evidence proves nothing of the quantity, nor whence it came. It, only shows circumstances of suspicion. • If the papers are resorted to, they must be taken for what they purport to be. They prove the schooner a coasting vessel, regularly enrolled, and the cargo cleared from Eastport. So also the depositions. The same facts form an answer to the second count. As to the third count. he contended that coasting vessels were not obliged to enter, or exhibit a manifest, unless required, and that the requisition was complied with in this case.</p>

<p>Case No. 388.</p> <p>Collision — Liens on Vessels — Order or Payment.</p> <p>1._ In a case of collision, the owner of a vessel injured has a maritime lien upon the offending vessel for the amount of the damages to which such owner is entitled in consequence of the collision; and this lien is of equal rank with those of material-men, bottomry-bond holders, and others, whose claims rest upon the necessities of the ship or the hazards of navigation.</p> <p>[Cited in Beane v. The Mayurka, Case No. 1,175; The China, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 68; The Avon, Case No. 680. Disapproved in Force v. The Pride of the Ocean. 3 Fed. Í66; The F. H. Stanwood, 1 C. C. A. 385, 49 Fed. 580.]</p> <p>2. A creditor holding a maritime lien, who proceeds in rem in a court of admiralty, and obtains a final decree in his favor, before another creditor, having a co-ordinate or equal claim, has instituted proceeding or intervened in the prior suit to enforce his lien, is entitled to be paid his debt in preference to the creditor who has asserted no right until after the entry of such final decree.</p> <p>[Cited in The Lady Boone, 21 Fed. 732. Distinguished in The City of Tawas. 3 Fed. 173. Disapproved in The E. A. Barnard, 2 Fed. 719.]</p> <p>3. Such final decree may, however, be opened on the application of the apparently dilatory creditor, if such application be made within a reasonable time, while the fund still remains in court, and under circumstances which would excuse a default, and induce the court to open a decree for the purpose of enabling a proper claimant to set up a meritorious defence to the demand on which the decree was made.</p> <p>4. If no preference has been obtained by the actual making of a decree, as above mentioned, the maritime liens, of the same class, or rank of privilege, upon a ship sold under th« order of a court of admiralty, should, as a general rule, be paid out of the proceeds in the inverse order of the dates of the creation of such liens.</p> <p>[Cited in The Fanny, Case No. 4,638; The E. A. Barnard, 2 Fed. 719; The Frank G-. Fowler. 8 Fed. 333; The Lady Boone, 21 Fed. 732. Disapproved in The Minnie R. Childs, Case No. 9,640; Force v. The Pride of the Ocean, 3 Fed. 166; The Frank G. Fowler. 17 Fed. 653; The J. W. Tucker, 20 Fed. 131: The F. H. Stanwood, 1 C. C. A. 385, 49 Fed. 5S0.]</p> <p>5. Seamen’s wages for the same voyage, and perhaps for the same season of navigation upon the great lakes, are, however, generally to be preferred to claims of material-men, &c.</p> <p>6. Maritime liens arising out of contracts of affreightment, and other maritime liens not resting upon the necessities of the ship, or the hazards of navigation, should be assigned to a class different from- that which embraces the claims of material-men, bottomry-bond holders, salvors, and collision claimants; and such liens should be postponed until all the liens belonging to superior classes, and arising at the same time, are paid.</p>

<p>Case No. 289.</p> <p>Admiralty — J iirisdiction — Rules —Pilot’s Lien Given by State Statute — Enforcement.</p> <p>1. The admiralty has jurisdiction to enforce a lien against a vessel given by a state statute in certain cases to a pilot whose services have been tendered and refused.</p> <p>[Cited in Flanders v. Tripp, Case No. 4.854; The California, Id. 2,312; The Williams, Id. 17,710; The George T. Kemp, Id. 5.o41; The Kalmar, Id. 7.601; Joslyn v. Nicker-son, 1 Fed. 134; The Alzena, 14 Fed. 175; The Edith Godden, 25 Fed. 511.]</p> <p>2. The twelfth admiralty rule prescribed by the supreme court, which, as amended, prohibits the district courts from enforcing certain liens created by state statutes, has no application to pilots; for they come under the fourteenth rule.</p> <p>[Cited in Flanders v. Tripp. Case No. 4.854; The George T. Kemp, Id. 5,341; The Edith Godden, 25 Fed. 511.]</p>

[At law. Action, of assumpsit by the American Basket Company against the Farmville Insurance Company, pursuant to the Code of Virginia, on a policy of fire insurance, claiming $1,750 damages. Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs.] Plaintiffs are a corporation • of the state of Connecticut. The defendants are a corporation of Virginia. The property insured and burnt was in the state of Delaware, at a place called Milford.

In equity. These suits were brought to enforce the provisions of a will executed by Seth Holman, of Mass., November 16, I860, by which he made the following bequest: “Eighthly. I bequeath and devise to the American Bible Society * * * one half of the proceeds of a mortgage given by Carlos Wilcox, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, to be disposed of by my executors to their best judgment. Ninthly.

<p>At law. The facts sufficiently appear in the charge of the judge.</p>

[In equity. Bill by the American Cotton-Tie Company, Limited, James J. MeComb. administrator of Mary T. McComb, deceased, and others, against Simeon W. Simmons and others, to enjoin the infringement of patents Nos. 23,291 and 31,252, and for an accounting. Bill dismissed. Decree reversed on complainants’ appeal. American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U. S. 89, 1 Sup. Ct. 52.]

<p>Case No. 294.</p> <p>Patents tor Inventions — Infringement—License “to Use Once Only."</p> <p>The plaintiff was the owner of patents covering improvements in metallic cotton ties, consisting of buckles and hoops, for compressing bales of cotton. Neither the plaintiff nor any prior owner of the 'patents had granted any licenses to make buckles or ties, but they had made and sold the ties. The buckles were stamped, “Licensed to use once only,” and were sold with invoices declaring that the ties were licensed to.be used once only, as baling ties. The defendant bought the buckles so once used, from cotton mills and junk dealers, and put up some with new hoops, and some with pieces of the original hoops pieced together, and sold them as cotton ties: Held, that the defendant had infringed the patents, and ought to be enjoined from further infringement.</p> <p>[See American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U. S. S9, 1 Sup. Ct. 52; Id., Case No. 293.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Patent No. 23.291 was granted March 22, 1859, to G. Brodie, and reissued March 25, 1873. It has been the subject of judicial construction in the following eases: American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 IT. S. 89, 1 Sup. Ct. 52; Id., Case No. 293: Same v. McCready, Id. 295. Patent No. 31,252 was granted January 29, 1S61. to J. J. McComb. and was also involved in each of the above cases.]</p>

[In equity. Bill by the American Cotton-Tie Supply Company against McCready, as president, and Stanford, as secretary and general freight agent, of the Old Dominion Steamship Company, for an injunction restraining defendants from transporting certain infringements of plaintiff’s patents Nos. 23,291, and 31,252, for other parties. Injunction granted.]2

[In equity. Suit by the American Diiimond Rock Boring Company against Charles Shel-d'on and others to enjoin infringement of letters patent No. 39,235, reissue No. 3,690, and for an accounting. Decree for complainants. [In course of litigation, complainants subsequently moved for an injunction, and defendants objected, on the ground that the patent had expired. Objection overruled. American Diamond Rock Boring Co. v. Sheldon, Case No. 297.

[In equity. Suit by the American Diamond Rock Boring Company against Charles Sheldon and others to enjoin infringement of letters patent, No. 39.235, reissue No. 3.690, and for an accounting. Decree for complainant. American Diamond Rock Boring Co. v. Sheldon, Case No. 296. Complainant moves for an injunction, and defendants object on the ground that the patent has expired. Objection overruled.

<p>Case No. 298.</p> <p>Patexts por Ixvextioxs — Ixfrixgemext— Pre-LIMIXARY IXJUXCTIOX.— NECESSITY OP AFFIDAVITS.</p> <p>1. The invention set forth in reissued letters ■latent No. 3.G90, granted to Asahel J. Severance, assignee of Rudolph Lesehot. October 26th, 1S09, for an ‘‘improved rock drill,” the •original letters patent having been issued to ■said Lesehot July 14th, 1SG3, defined, [and held valid.]</p> <p>[Cited in American Diamond Rock Boring Co. v. Sheldon, Case No. 296, 1 Fed. 871, and 24 Fed. 374.]</p> <p>2. It is not limited to an annular boring head, but covers a convex boring head.</p> <p>3. A constructor of a machine infringes, if he makes his machine with express reference to a i result which he knows will happen when the I machine is put to its use, and which result, if j ■originally introduced in the machine, is an in- I fringement.</p> <p>4. It is not proper to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction on a patent, on a theory which, although it may be true, is not supported •by affidavits.</p> <p>[NOTE. Theoriginal bill was subsequently dismissed. For opinion, see American Diamond Drill Co. v. Sullivan 'Mach. Co., 21 Fed, 74. For other cases involving this patent, see note to American Diamond Bock Boring Co. v. Sheldon, Case No. 296.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel in rem for collision, by the American Dredging Company, owners of the steam dredge Baltic, against the steamship Bedowin, her engines, etc. On libellant’s motion for an interlocutory decree. Granted.]

In admiralty. Collision. The libel first in date was brought by the owners of the steamer Forest City, a large coasting vessel which plies between Portland and Boston, against the steam-tug American Eagle, for a collision in the harbor of Boston, at a quarter before six o’clock on Christmas morning, 1869. In the other case the parties were reversed.

At law. This was an action on the case, tried by Judge Shepley and a jury, and brought [by the American Hide & Leather Splitting & Dressing Machine Company against the American Tool & Machine Company and George H. Fox] to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent for an “improvement in leather-splitting machines,” granted to Joseph F. Flanders and his as-signee, Enos G. Allen, August 14, 1860, [No. 29,649.] The patented invention was an improvement upon and…

[Appeal from the district court for the district of South Carolina. [In admiralty. Libel by the American Insurance Company and the Ocean Insurance Company to set aside a judicial sale of 356 bales of cotton, (David Canter, claimant.) From a decree setting aside the sale, and directing the restitution to libelants of a part of the cotton, both libelants and claimant appeal. Beversed. Decree of reversal subsequently affirmed on appeal to the supreme court. 1 Pet.

[In admiralty. The original libel in this, case was by the American Insurance Com-party against Three Hundred Fifty-Six Bales j of Cotton, (David Canter, claimant.) From ; a decree for libelants (nowhere reported) j both parties appealed, and this court re- j versed the decision, and decreed restitution. | American Ins. Co. v. Canter, Case No. 302a. I On libelants’ appeal, this decree was affirmed i by the supreme court. 1 Bet.

In admiralty. This was a libel in perso-nam, in behalf of ten Marine Insurance Companies of the city of New-York [against Otarles Johnson.] The libellants were underwriters upon the cargo of the brig Hercules, by twenty-eight several policies, to the amount of $151,875, for a voyage from New-York to Mobile. The brig sailed with a cargo valued at $180,000, and, in September, 1825, grounded on Carysfort reef on the coast -of Florida.

<p>Case No. 304.</p> <p>Patexts for Ixvextioxs — What Coxstitutes IXFHIXGEMEXT— SIMILARITY —IMPROVEMEXT IX Tempering TJmbrella Ribs.</p> <p>1. The invention set forth in letters patent granted to A. Stewart Black, July 14th, 1863, for an “improvement in tempering umbrella ribs,” defined.</p> <p>2. The first claim , of said patent, namely, “constructing the tempering die with a square hole, corresponding in size to the wire to be tempered, in order that the wire may be straightened in all directions, and the flattened portions of the wire be brought in line with each other, ns and for the purposes specified,” is infringed by the use, for the tempering of umbrella ribs of U-shaped wire, with wider flattened parts in them, of a die formed of two plates, one above and one below, with the groove in one plate shallow and semi-elliptical, to accommodate one ■edge of the flattened parts of the rib, and with the groove in the other plate broader and deeper, and, in its _ cross-section, the shape of the body of the wire, with a channel opposite to and like the groove in the other plate, to accommodate the other edge of the flattened part of the rib.</p> <p>3. The prior existence of a square hole or groove for the purpose of drawing through it square bars or strips of metal, to compress them -and straighten them, does not anticipate the invention claimed in said first claim.</p> <p>[NOTE. So far as known, this patent, No. 39,210. has not been involved in any other cases reported prior to January 1, 1880.]</p>

[In equity. Bill by the American Middlings Purifier Company against the Atlantic Mill- . ing Company for infringing patents Nos. 37,-317, 37,318, and 37,321. Heard on motion for provisional injunction. Injunction refused. On final hearing, plaintiff’s bill was dismissed.

[In equity. ' Bill by the American Middlings Purifier Company against the Atlantic Milling Company, and another bill against John A Christian & Co. for infringing plaintiff’s patents Nos. 37,317, 37,318, and 37,321. On application a preliminary injunction was refused in the Atlantic Milling Case, (Case No. 305,) and also in the Christian Case, provided the defendants would give bonds, etc. (Id. 307.) The cases came on for final hearing, and were argued together.

[In equity. Bill by the American Mid-dlings Purifier Company against John A. Christian & Co. for infringing plaintiff’s patents Nos. 37,317, 37,318, and 37,321. Heard on motion for preliminary injunction. Motion allowed unless the defendants give security in the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. On final hearing plaintiff’s bill was dismissed.

[In equity. Suit by the American Mid-dlings Purifier Company against Daniel S. Vail and others, for infringement of letters patent Nos. 37,317 and 37,318. Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction. Granted.]

[In equity. Bill by the American Nicholson Pavement Company against the city of Elizabeth, N. J., George W. Tubbs, and the New Jersey Wood Paving Company, for an injunction and an account for the alleged infringement of patent No. 11,491. Motion for provisional injunction was denied, provided defendants give bond for a stated sum. American Nicholson Pavement Co. v. City of Elizabeth, Case No. 312.

[In equity. Bill by the American Nicholson Pavement Company against the City of Elizabeth, George W. Tubbs, and the New Jersey Wood Paving Company, for an injunction restraining the infringement of patent No. 11,491, and its several reissues. Decree for complainant American Nicholson Pavement Co. v. City of Elizabeth, Case No. 311; Id. 309.

[In equity. Bill by the American Nicholson Pavement Company against the city of Elizabeth, N. J., George W. Tubbs, and the New Jersey Wood Paving Company, for an injunction and an account for the alleged infringement of reissues of patent No. 11,491. Motion for provisional injunction was denied, provided defendants give bond for a -stated sum. American Nicholson Pavement Co. v. City of Elizabeth, Case No. 312. Heard upon the merits. Decree for complainant.

[In equity. Bill by the American Nicholson Pavement Company against the city of Elizabeth, N. J., George W. Tubbs, and the New Jersey Wood Pavement Company, for an injunction and an account for the alleged infringement of patent No. 11,491. Heard on motion for a provisional injunction. Motion denied.

In equity. This was a bill in equity, founded upon letters patent [Nos. 2,275 and 2,970.] The facts are fully set forth in the opinion of the court:

<p>Case No. 314.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Contingent Liabilities — Fire Insurance Policy.</p> <p>[A fire insurance policy is a “contingent liability,” within the meaning of section 19, cl. 4, of the bankruptcy act of 1867; and on the bankruptcy of the insurance company the assured is entitled to share in the dividends to the extent of any loss occurring before the order for the final dividend.]</p>

<p>Case No. 315.</p> <p>Patents for Inventions — Patentability—An-ticipation — Pad por Harness Saddles — Action for Infringement — Evidence.</p> <p>1. An invention of a pad for harness-saddles, having, as its distinguishing feature, an impervious bearing surface of vulcanized rubber or gutta-percha, is not anticipated by previous use of harness-saddle pads having bearing surfaces of other materials than vulcanized rubber, or rubber-cloth, or gutta-percha.</p> <p>2. In a suit in equity to restrain infringement of a patent, a prior patent not mentioned in the defendant’s answer is admissible only as evidence of the state of the art at the date of the invention claimed in the complainant’s patent. If seasonable objection is taken, it is not admissible to show want of novelty in that invention.</p>

<p>Case £Jo. 316.</p> <p>Patents fob Inventions — Action fob Infringement— Evidence — Disagreement of Counsel —Waiver of Objections.</p> <p>1. The court will not so far take notice of an alleged parol agreement of counsel made out of court, as to undertake, where there is a conflict of opinion between the respective counsel as to the terms of the agreement, or a difference of recollection as to its existence or meaning, to decide the question of accuracy of recollection or construction.</p> <p>2. A waiver of an objection entered on the record of a suit in equity, should also be entered on the record.</p>

[In equity. Bill by the American Shoe-Tip Company against the National Shoe-Toe Protector Company for infringement of patent No. 26,329. Heard on motion for preliminary injunction. Motion granted.]

In bankruptcy. In this case, the creditors had adopted a resolution, under section forty-three of the bankrupt act, appointing trustees, and the matter of confirming the resolution came up before the court. Some of the parties interested contested the confirmation of the resolution, and the question of the practice in such a case was discussed.

<p>Case Ho. 319.</p> <p>Patents for Intentions — Infringement—Equivalent for Combination — Machine for Shaping Whip Stocks.</p> <p>1. Patent No. 53,003, to L. Hull, for gauge-lathe, and reissue of same, No. 7,262, construed and sustained. It is now well settled that the patentee or owner of a patent for a combination is as much entitled to equivalents as the patentee or owner of any other class of inventions. By an equivalent, in such a case, it is meant that the element or ingredient substituted for the one withdrawn performs the same function as the other, and that it was well known at the date of the patent in question as a proper substitute for the one omitted in the patented combination.</p> <p>2. The invention, consisting chiefly in the combination, in a machine for shaping whip-stocks, of a holding and feeding mechanism, with revolving cutters having their axis of rotation at right angles, or nearly so, to the axis of the stocks, and of guides for directing and controlling the action of the cutters, as described in the specification and shown in the drawings, is infringed by a machine in which numerous blades are substituted for the burrs of the patentee, and where a formal change merely is made in the clamping and advancing mechanism by combining the two in one apparatus instead of performing the operation by two separate devices.</p> <p>[NOTE. So far as ascertained, there are no-other reported cases directly involving this patent prior to 18S0.]</p>

[In equity. Bill by the American Wood-Paper Company against the Fibre Disintegrating Company to restrain the infringement of patents Nos. 11,343, 17,387, 25,418, and 3S,901. Decree for complainant. An appeal was subsequently taken to the supreme court, and this decree was affirmed. American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co.. 23 Wall.

[In equity. Bill by the American Wood-Paper Company against the Glen’s Falls Paper Company for an accounting, and for an injunction restraining the infringement of patent No. 17,387, and reissues Nos. 1,448 and 1,449 of patent No. 11,343. Decree for plaintiff. A rehearing was subsequently granted, and is reported under same title.

[In equity. Bill by the American Wood-Paper Company against the Glen’s Falls Paper Company for an accounting, and for an injunction restraining the infringement of patent No. 17,387, and reissues Nos. 1,148 and 1,449 of patent No. 11,343. Decree for plaintiff. American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., Case No. 320.

In equity. This was a bill in equity Bled [by the American Wood-Paper Company against J. D. Heft and others] to restrain the defendants from infringing the following letters patent, which had been assigned to complainants: I. Letters patent for “improvements in pulping and disintegrating vegetable substances,” granted to Charles Watt and Hugh Burgess, July 18, 1854, [No. 11,343,] for fourteen years from August 10, 1853, when the same invention was patented in England,…

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

In equity. This cause came before the circuit judge on a motion by the plaintiffs for an order on the clerk of the United States circuit court for Colorado to docket the cause (the original files… Held: at which the constitution was adopted. August 1st, 1876, the proclamation of the president declaring Colorado admitted as a state, was issued. The enabling act, aforementioned, contains the following: “Sec. 1.

In equity. Bill to foreclose a mortgage. A very full history of this case is given in connection with the opinion of the circuit judge on the motion to docket under the act of June 26, 1876, which was announced at this term. 4 Dill. 251, [Ames v. Colorado Cent.

<p>Case No. 326.</p> <p>Patents eor Inventions — Construction —Surprise — Appeal — Objections Waived — New Trial.</p> <p>1. Patents and specifications annexed thereto should be construed fairly and liberally, and not subjected to any over-nice or critical refinements.</p> <p>[Cited in Davoll v. Brown, Case No. 3,662; Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. (45 U. S.) 70S; Aiken v. Bemis, Case No. Í09; Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 486; Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. (56 U. S.) 341; Goodyear Dental Yulcanite Co. v. Gardiner, Case No. 5,591; Hamilton v. Ives, Id. 5,982; Milligan Glue Co. v. Upton, Id. 9,607; Thomas v. Shoe Mach. Manuf’g Co., Id. 13,911.]</p> <p>See Ryan v. Goodwin, [Case No. 12,186:1 Blanchard v. Sprague, [Id. 1,518.]</p> <p>2. Where an invention is so loosely and inaccurately described in the specification, that the court cannot, without resorting to conjecture, gather what it is. then the patent is void; but if the court can clearly see the nature and extent of the claim, however imperfectly and inartifieially it may be expressed, the patent is good.</p> <p>3. A patent contained the following words in the description of the invention: “I do not claim the felting, vats, rollers, presses, wire-cloth, or any separate parts of the above described machinery or apparatus, as my invention; what I do claim as new, and as my invention, is the construction and use of the peculiar cylinder above described, and the several parts thereof in combination for the purpose aforesaid.” Held, that it is not the cylinder alone, or its several parts, which are claimed per se, but they are claimed in their actual combination with the other machinery, to make paper.</p> <p>[Cited in Davoll v. Brown, Case No. 3,662; Wilson v. Rousseau. 4 How. (45 U. S.) 708; Hovey v. Stevens, Case No. 6,746; Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 486; Brooks v. Fiske, 15 How. (56 U. S.) 223; Stover v. Halsted, Case No. 13,509.]</p> <p>See Prouty v. Ruggles, 16 Pet. [41 U. S.| 336: Ryan v. Goodwin, [Case No. 12,186;] Prouty v. Draper, [Id. 11,446;] Pitts v. Whitman, [Id. 11,196;] Washburn v. Gould, [Id. 17.-214.]</p> <p>4. Semble, that no previous notice or claim of a right to the exclusive use of an invention is necessary, to enable a patentee to maintain an action for an alleged violation of his patent-right.</p> <p>[Cited in Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 41.]</p> <p>5. It is the practice of this court, in all cases of surprise at the trial, by new matter proving a ground material to either party, and clearly made out by affidavit, to postpone or continue the cause. If the party interested, however, elects to go on with the cause, relying upon other matters, he is understood to waive the matter of surprise, and he cannot take his chance with the jury, and, if unsuccessful, then move the matter as a ground for a new trial.</p> <p>6. A new trial is not granted upon mere cumulative evidence.</p> <p>[Cited in Wiggin v. Coffin. Case No. 17,624; Aiken v. Bemis, Id. 109.]</p> <p>7. The defendants cannot put in new rebutting evidence to affidavits of the plaintiff, offered in reply to those first offered by the defendants.</p> <p>[8. Cited in Smith v. Downing, Case No. 13, 036, to the point that “the avoidance of patents for claiming too much is of frequent occurrence, and needs no explanation as to the reasons for it, when an applicant is so improvident or unjust to others as to claim for himself more than he invented, and the credit or profit of which belongs to others rather than to himself.”]</p> <p>[9. Cited in Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 41, to the point that it is fatal to a patent that it consists in the application of an old process to a new subject, without any exercise of the inventive faculty, and without the development of any new or original idea.]</p> <p>(10. Cited in Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 555, to the point that a combination of two or more old elements in a machine, producing a new and useful result, is patentable.]</p>

<p>[At law. Assumpsit by Ames and Ames against Le Rue. Judgment for plaintiffs.].</p>

<p>Heard on petition of Arphaxad Loomis and others.</p>

In admiralty. This was a ease of sal vnge. The Amethyst, a British vessel, sailed from Boston to St. John, in New Brunswick, May 1. On the 3d, at 5 o’clock A. M., she was struck by a heavy squall, and upset. Of twelve persons on board, including passengers, ten saved themselves by banging to the wreck until 11 o’clock A. M., when they were taken off by the schooner Compeer, of Ellsworth. Two were drowned, and their bodies subsequently found on board the wreck.

[In admiralty. Libel by Peter Joseph Mer-ault, owner of the schooner Amiable Nancy, and by the master, mate, supercargo, and one of the mariners, against the private armed brig the Scourge, for illegal detention and search. Decree for libelants.3 Defendant appeals. Amount of the decree reduced. The libelants appealed to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was modified by adding some items to the allowance. See The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. (16 U. S.) 546.]

<p>Case No. 332.</p> <p>Salvage — Removal or Cahgo to Save Vessel.</p>

<p>This was a bill in equity, originally filed in the circuit court of Fond Du Lac, and transferred thence to the circuit court of the United States, praying for an injunction to restrain the executors of the last will and testament of James Amory from setting up or using the said will to defeat the legal rights of the complainant. The judges of the circuit court were divided in opinion as to whether a demurrer to the bill should be sustained.</p>

In equity. This was a demurrer to a bill in equity, by Angelina Amory, praying that the defendants, Samuel B. Amory and John Amory, as executors of the last will and testament of James Amory, deceased, might be perpetually enjoined and restrained from pleading, setting up, interposing, or insisting upon the record proceedings or judgment of the superior court of New York city, for divorce, in any action or proceeding complainant might commence or prosecute in the courts of…

<p>Case No. 335.</p> <p>Impeaching Decree — Widow—Proof of Heir-ship — Laches.</p> <p>1. Fraud upon a party by her counsel in a state court will not invalidate a decree where it does not satisfactorily appear that it altered the result.</p> <p>2. A woman claiming an estate from a man as his widow and heir-at-law, required in this case to give satisfactory proof, independent of her own statement, that she was actually the wife of the deceased.</p> <p>3. If, soon after decree, the party has knowledge of facts calculated to throw suspicion upon the conduct of her counsel, she is bound to use due diligence in inquiring and in seeking relief, and a delay of eleven years bars any relief against the decree and the consequences of the fraud alleged.</p>

<p>Case No. 336.</p> <p>Mortgages — What Constitutes — Equity—Parol Evidence — Limitations—Pleading.</p> <p>1. It is the settled rule in the federal courts : that oral evidence is admissible to show that ¡ a deed absolute on its face was intended as a mortgage.</p> <p>[See Howland v. Blake; Case No. 6,792; Cadman v. Peter, 12 Fed. 363; Peugh v. Davis, 96 TJ. S. 332; Dow v. Chamberlin, Case No. 4,037; Bentley v. Phelps, Id. 1,-331; Andrews v. Hyde, Id. 377.]</p> <p>2. The complainant being indebted in a large sum, conveyed certain real estate to one Otis, upon an agreement with one Appleton, that he should pay the amount due the complainant’s ■creditors, and take a transfer of the property conveyed, and account to the complainant for the balance left of the property after he had paid himself the amount advanced and interest. The trustee was to hold the property as security for the money advanced. Held: The conveyance, though absolute on its face, was. under the decisions of the supreme court, a mortgage.</p> <p>3. After the trustee had been repaid, the rents and profits of the property in the trustee’s hands was a debt or liability not under seal, for which the trustee was responsible to the complainant, and as such constituted a good cause of an action of contract or suit in equity.</p> <p>4. But the claim in this case was barred by ■the statute of limitations.</p> <p>5. The construction given to state statutes of limitations, by the courts of the state in which such statutes are enacted, furnish the rule of decision in the federal courts in cases where they apply.</p> <p>6. The courts of equity in Massachusetts apply the statute of limitation in suits in equity.</p> <p>7. The statute of limitations in this case began to apply when the complainant first became aware that the trustee had been repaid for his advances out of the proceeds of the sale or the rents and profits of the real estate conveyed to him, and knew what his rights in the premises were.</p> <p>8. The claim against the executors of the deceased trustee, for the balance in the hands of the trustee of moneys collected in execution of the trust, beyond the amount advanced and interest, was held to be barred by the statute of limitations, the complainant having known, twelve years before the filing of the bill, that the trustee had been repaid for such advance and interest.</p> <p>9. Where an absolute deed is intended as a mortgage, a subsequent purchaser with notice, stands in the place of the equitable mortgagee.</p> <p>10. Six years is no bar to redeem a mortgage, nor is the plea of laches any defence to the suit, unless they are shown to have extended to the period of twenty years.</p> <p>11. ‘Courts of equity, in the case of a mortgagor coming to redeem, have fixed upon the term of twenty years after forfeiture and possession taken by the mortgagee, no interest having been paid in the meantime, and with no circumstances accounting for the neglect, as a period beyond which the right of redemption shall not be favored.</p> <p>[See Slicer v. Bank of Pittsburg, 16 How. (57 U. S.) 571; Cromwell v. Bank of Pitts-burg, Case No. 3.409; Dexter v. Arnold, Id. 3,S57.]</p> <p>12. Lapse of twenty years without any recognition of the complainant’s rights to redeem the mortgaged premises, consisting of the undivided seventh part of the dower estate of the complainant’s mother, and which the trustee in his lifetime conveyed to the last named respondent, was not shown in ‘this case.</p> <p>13. In this case, the property covered by the complainant’s claim against the trustee (which claim the complainant purchased from the assignees in bankruptcy) was property not taken possession of by the assignee, to which the title of the bankrupt is good against all the world, except the assignee or any one to whom he might convey.</p> <p>14. An assignee in bankruptcy is not bound to take property which may be onerous to the estate, or burden instead of benefit it. If he does not take it, it remains in the bankrupt.</p> <p>[Cited in Ivimberling v. Hartly, 1 Fed. 575; Garrett v. Sayles, Id. 377; American File Co. v. Garrett. 110 U. S. 289, 4 Sup. Ct. 94: Taylor v. Irwin, 20 Fed. 620; Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 29, 12 Sup. Ct. SOI.]</p> <p>15. After the lapse of years, in this case, the court held that the conclusion must be that the assignee elected not to take possession of certain property of which the complainant when a bankrupt took an assignment as set forth in the bill.</p> <p>16. Reasonable presumptions are admitted by a demurrer, as well as matters expressly alleged.</p> <p>17. The allegation in the bill was sufficient, although it did not state that the assignment of the claim against the trustee was under an order of court first made, because the presumption is that such sale was made in conformity to such an order, and because, independently of the assignment, the bankrupt’s title was good against all the world if the assignee elected not to take the property as not beneficial to the estate.</p> <p>18. Waiver by the bill of oath in the answer. amounts to nothing unless accepted by the respondents.</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Jonathan Amory and Henry H. Leeds. Heard on motion by certain creditors to vacate and revoke certificates of discharge heretofore taken out by the bankrupts. Granted.]

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Jonathan Amory and Henry H. Leeds. Certificates of discharge which had been taken out were heretofore vacated. Case No. 336a. Certain questions were referred to the circuit justice, who died without answering them, and they are now submitted by agreement to the district judge. Discharges denied.]

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Jonathan Amory and Henry H. Leeds. Certificates of discharge which had been taken out were vacated, (In re Amory and Leeds, Case No. 336a;) and discharges were thereafter refused, (Id., Case No. 336b.) The bankrupts appeal. Affirmed.]

[In admiralty. Libel by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, owners of the schooner Wind, against the propeller Amos C. Bar-stow, for damages caused by collision. Libel dismissed, with costs.]

<p>Case No. 338.</p> <p>COLLISION' — VE8SEL AT PlISR — POO — INEVITABLE Accident — Strength or the Moored Vessel.</p> <p>1. Passengers cannot be regarded as lookouts in any sense known to the maritime law, certainly not unless specially designated by the master for such purpose.</p> <p>[Cited in Killam v. The Erie, Case No. 7,765; The Ancon, Id. 348.]</p> <p>2. When a vessel shown to have been properly moored in a proper place is run into by a steamer crossing a harbor, the burden is on the steamer to show either that she was without fauit, or that the disaster was the result of fault on the part of the moored vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in The Russia, Case No. 12.168; The Clara, Id. 2,788; The Hansa, Id. 6,037; The Free State, Id. 5,090; The Kady Franklin, Id. 7,984; The Virginia Ehrman, 97 TJ. S. 315; Guibert v. The George Beii, Case No. 5,856; The James Bowen, Id. 7,192; The City of Lynn, 11 Fed. 340; The Roek-away, 19 Fed. 451; The Echo, Id. 454; The Ogemaw, 32 Fed. 921.]</p> <p>3. Inevitable accident under such circumstances cannot be presumed, especially when the occurrence was in the daytime; but it must be clearly proved by the party setting it up, unless the fact appears from the testimony on the other side.</p> <p>[Cited in the Russia, Case No. 12,168; The Clara, Id. 2,788: The Deer, Id. 3,737; The Hansa, Id. 6,037: The Virginia Ehrman, 97 TJ. S. 315: The City of Lynn, 11 Fed. 340; The Echo, 19 Fed. 454; The Ogemaw, 32 Fed. 921.]</p> <p>4. Ferry-boats, in crossing harbors of commercial ports in a fog, or in the night, should proceed with great caution.</p> <p>[Cited in Guibert v. The George Bell. Case No. 5,856; The Rockaway, 25 Fed. 776.]</p> <p>[See The Ophelia, 44 Fed. 941.]</p> <p>5. The owners of a vessel properly moored at a wharf are not bound to keep a watch on board.</p> <p>6. Where a leak occasioned by an injury received by a vessel moored at a wharf had damaged the cargo because the leak was not discovered for some time after the accident, but where it at the same time appeared that two examinations of the injured vessel were made subsequent to the collision, and no indications of any injury below water could be discovered, held, that the damage to the cargo was not the result of negligence upon the part of those in charge of the injured vessel.</p> <p>7. In case of a collision between a moving steamer and a vessel moored at a wharf, in which the latter -was injured, it is no defence to say that the damage would have been less if the vessel had been more strongly built s 1</p> <p>[Cited in The Deer, Case No. 3,737.]</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem by a stevedore for services performed in discharging a vessel in port. The services were rendered upon an express agreement with the master for a stipulated sum.

<p>Case No. 340.</p> <p>Slaves — Suit fok Freedom — Liabilities of Owner.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel in rem against the brig Amy Warwick and cargo, as prize of war. The vessel sailed from Rio Janeiro, May 29,1861, with a cargo of coffee, destined to Hampton Roads for orders. By her charter party she was to go either to Richmond, New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. She was captured August 10, 1861, by the United States ship of war Quaker City, and brought into this district for condemnation.

[In admiralty. Libel in rem against the-brig Amy Warwick and cargo, as prize of war. The vessel sailed from Rio Janeiro May 29,- 1861, with a cargo of coffee, destined to Hampton Roads for orders. By her charter party she was to go either to Richmond, New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. She was captured August 10, 1801, by the United States ship of war Quaker City, and brought into this district for condemnation.

[In admiralty. Libel in rem against the brig Amy Warwick and cargo, as prize of war. The vessel sailed from Rio Janeiro May 29,1861, with a cargo of coffee, destined to Hampton Roads for orders. By her charter party she was to go either to Richmond, New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. She was captured August 10, 1861, by the United States ship of war Quaker City; and brought into this district for condemnation.

In admiralty. At the sale of the Amy Warwick’s cargo, which brought, $145,393.04, the auctioneer, N. A. Thompson, charged, for his services, a commission of two and; one-half per cent., amounting to $3633.26.' This charge was objected to by Mr. Dana, the United States Attorney, and by the counsel for the claimants, as excessive; and Sprague, J., ordered evidence to be taken as to the custom of auctioneers and merchants in similar cases.

<p>Appeal from taxation of clerk’s cost. The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

In admiralty. This was an action to recover salvage. The libel was filed by Walter Burke In behalf of himself and all others, and it averred that in December last the libellant, Burke, being in Bermuda, and desirous of coming to New York, was offered a passage, free of expense, in the Italian brig “Anastasia,” and he accordingly came on board for that purpose, and that there came on board at the same port a crew of six consul’s men also bound to New York; that in the…

In admiralty. In June, 1867, the Italian brig Anastasia, being in the port of Marseilles, was chartered to one Alfred Giraud, for a voyage thence to the port of New York.

<p>[In admiralty. Decree for libellants. Affirmed in The Ancon v. Thompson, 17 Fed. 742.]</p>

This was the petition of Thomas C. Anderson and others for a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, to remove into this court an information filed against them in the superior criminal court for the parish of Orleans, by the district attorney for said parish, charging them with feloniously publishing a false election return of the parish of Vernon of an election of presidential electors.

In bankruptcy. The bankrupt, in order to obtain credit from the firm of Richards, Shaw & Winslow, procured John Servis to guarantee the payment of goods purchased of them by him to an amount not exceeding two thousand dollars, whereupon credit was extended to him by said firm to the sum of about three thousand dollars and he was indebted to them to about that amount for goods sold, when he was • adjudicated bankrupt, two thousand of which was secured by tlie guaranty of…

In bankruptcy. This cause came twice before the district court. On the first of the two occasions the facts were as follows, on which the decision of 16th March, 1874, affirmed 30th November, 1874, was based: Anderson filed his petition in this court on the 29th December, 1868; on the 26th January, 1869, he was adjudicated a bankrupt by the register.

[In bankruptcy.' The bankrupt alleges that he has filed his petition, and has deposited $50, as required by law; makes affidavit as to 'his inability to pay the costs prescribed by the bankrupt act and the general orders in bankruptcy, exceeding the sum deposited; and prays that an order may be made by the court directing that the fees and costs should not exceed said sum.]

<p>Case No. 353.</p> <p>Insolvency — Discharqe—Arrest for Prior Debt.</p> <p>A debtor, discharged under the insolvent act, cannot be arrested for a debt contracted before his discharge, although not payable till after his discharge.</p>

<p>Case No. 354.</p> <p>Principal and Agent — Relation — Effect of Civil War — Liability of Agent — Taking Confederate Currency — Pleading.</p> <p>1. The late civil war did not revoke an agency in the southern states, established before the war, by a citizen of one of the northern states, but such an agent was bound to act with due care and diligence.</p> <p>[See Botts & Darnall v. Crenshaw, Case No. 1,690.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. The receipt of Confederate treasury notes in payment of a debt due to a citizen adhering to the national government was not the exercise of such diligence.</p> <p>[See Pretz v. Stover, 22 Wall. (89 U. S.) 198; Taylor v. Thomas, Id. 479.]</p> <p>3. Such receipt did not discharge the- debtor from his debt, though paid in form, and the notes delivered to him as paid by the agent, were not paid in fact.</p> <p>[See Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall. (89 U. S.) 198; Taylor v. Thomas, Id. 479.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>4. Nothing could discharge him except ratification of the acts of the agent or voluntary release by the creditor, or actual payment in lawful money.</p> <p>[See Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall. (89 U. S.) 198; Taylor v. Thomas, Id. 479.]</p> <p>5.’ The agent can not be sued along with the debtor for the amount of the debt, without an averment of the insolvency of the debtor.</p> <p>6. But this having been done, the plaintiff may either amend his bill and charge the insolvency of the principal, or he may, under the circumstances, take a decree against the agent for the value -of the Confederate currency paid i>y the debtor, and a further decree against the debtor for what would then remain due after crediting this on the debt.</p> <p>7. If the plaintiff is not content with such a decree, he may amend his bill by alleging the insolvency of Harris and loss of his. debt through the unauthorized action of the bank.</p> <p>[NOTE. The one exception to the rule that war suspends all commercial intercourse between the citizens of two belligerent states is that of allowing the payment of debts to an agent of an alien enemy, where such agent resides in the same state with the debtor. But, said Mr. Justice Bradley, in Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, “this indulgence is subject to restrictions. In the first place, it must not be done with the view of transmitting the funds to the principal during the continuance of the war, though, if so transmitted without the debtor’s connivance, he will not be responsible for it. * * * In the next place, in order to the subsistence of the agency during the war, it must have the assent of the parties thereto. * * * It is not enough that there was an agency prior to the war. It would be contrary to reason that a man without his consent should continue to be bound by the acts of one whose relations to him have undergone such a fundamental alteration as that produced by a war between the two countries, to which they respectively belong.”]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel for a marine tort by Moses Anderson against William H. Brown and Nathaniel Jarvis, owners of the steamship Pacific. A settlement was heretofore had. Heard on motion by libelant to proceed with the suit, and to add one Lowry as a party respondent. Granted.]

At law. This was a petition for the writ of certiorari filed by defendant Gerding, under section 7 of the act approved March 3, 1S75, entitled “An act to determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from state courts, and for other i purposes,” (IS Stat. 470.) The petition stated, in substance, that Anderson, Starr & Co., a firm all of whose members were citizens of the state of New York, on February 25, 1879,…

<p>Case Tío. 358.</p> <p>Equity Pleading — Parties — Original Bill-Consent Decree — Stay oe Proceedings.</p> <p>1. Persons who are not parties to a suit cannot in general file a petition therein for a stay of proceedings, or any other cause. The remedy is by original bill. The exceptions noted.</p> <p>[Cited in Chester v. Life Ass’n of America. 4 Fed. 4S9.]</p> <p>2. Persons belonging to a class represented in the suit, such as mortgage creditors, represented by the trustees of the mortgage, are regarded os quasi parties, and may be heard on petition or motion.</p> <p>3. Parties who have withdrawn their answer, and consented to a decree cannot afterwards ask to have proceedings on the decree suspended.</p> <p>4. A consent decree was entered upon the basis of a certain agreement between the 'parties, by which execution was to be suspended upon certain terms. These terms not being complied with, the execution may be enforced.</p> <p>5. Petition for a stay of proceedings on execution by persons not parties to the suit, and by other persons who consented to the decree, upon condition that proceedings upon it should be suspended upon certain terms — which were not complied with — dismissed.</p> <p>[Cited in Chester v. Life Ass’n of America, 4 Fed. 491.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 357.</p> <p>Courts — Record must Show Jurisdiction.</p> <p>To give the court jurisdiction, all the parties must be capable of suing; and the record must show affirmatively that the court has jurisdiction.</p>

Question of taxation of costs: After the trial of this action, a question arose as to the amount to be allowed in the taxation of costs for the traveling fees of a witness,— Stafford. This witness resided in another district, — New York, — and more than one-hundred miles from the place of trial. He was not subpoenaed, but attended voluntarily at the request of the plaintiffs.

<p>Case No. 361.</p> <p>Seamen — Protection by Master — Violence op Officers.</p> <p>1. It is as much the duty of the master to restrain the violence of his officers as to repress the insubordination of the men. If he fails to exert his authority with vigor and effect for the protection of the men, he will be held responsible in damages.</p> <p>[Cited in White v. McDonough, Case No. 17,552.]</p> <p>[2. Cited in The Guiding Star, 1 Fed. 349, to the point that actions for aggravated assault upon seamen should be in personam.]</p>

<p>Case lío. 360.</p> <p>Railroad Companies — Ticket over Connecting Line — Validity.</p> <p>[A railway from B. to W., which, by agreement with a connecting line, sells tickets over its ■own line with a coupon good for a passage over the connecting line from W. to N., cannot bind the connecting line by selling a similar ticket good for passage in the opposite direction,— from N. to W.j</p>

In equity. Bill charged that on the 15th day of October, 1867, the defendant issued to William 0. Anderson a policy of assurance for $10,000, the premiums being $490 per annum for life. It provided that, if two of said premiums shall be paid and default be made in payment of after premiums, the default shaE not operate as a forfeiture, but the amount insured shaE be commuted to the sum of the annual premiums paid.

In equity. This was a bill in equity filed! by the plaintiff,' [William Anderson,] as as-signee in bankruptcy of Frederick Orde-mann, [against Oscar Strassburger and George F. Pfeiffer.] The bill alleged the voluntary bankruptcy of Ordemann, on petition filed on November 1st, 1871, and the appointment of the plaintiff as his assignee on February 6th, 1872.

In equity. The complainants, merchants and partners, subjects of the king of Great Britain, filed their bill in this court, alleging, that they were creditors of John Tompkins and Adam Murray, late partners in trade, residing in the city of Richmond, and state of Virginia, under the firm of Tompkins & Murray, to the amount of £715 13s. sterling: that on or about the 28th day of April, 1819, Adam Murray, one of the partners, embarked for Europe; and on the 8th day of May…

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, against the ship An-dover, to recover the value of ten bales of cotton. After a decree in the district court in favor of the libellant, the claimants appealed to this court

<p>Case No. 367.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Action to Recover Payment —Limitations—Estoppel—Injunction. .</p> <p>1. The plaintiffs in this bill had claims to be repaid the excess of duties, paid by them under protest, to the defendant, while collector of the port of New York, upon imported goods. The statute of limitations was about to take effect, and the plaintiffs contemplated bringing suit. An officer in the custom-house- at New York stated to the attorney for the plaintiffs, that, according to the practice, the presentation of their claims to a designated officer at the custom house prevented the running of the statute of, limitations, and that, if they should be so presented, and suits should thereafter be brought, the statute could not be and w'ould not be interposed as a defence. The defendant, who, at the time, had gone out of office, disclaimed any control in the matter, but declared his confidence in the experience and knowledge of such officer, and expressed to the attorney his concurrence in such statement and opinion. The plaintiffs presented their claims, and refrained from bringing suits until after the statute had run against all of the claims, relying upon the recognition by the government of claims of the like nature, and upon what was so said by such officer and by the defendant. The plaintiffs afterwards brought suits at law against the defendant, to recover such excess of duties, and the defendant pleaded such statute. More than seven years after the pleas were interposed, the plaintiffs filed this bill in equity, praying for an injunction to restrain the defendant from insisting upon the statute as a defence. The defendant demurred to the bill, for want of equity: Held, that the bill must be dismissed.</p> <p>2. The power of a court of equity cannot be invoked to enjoin a defendant from setting up the statute of limitations, on the ground that the cause of action sued on was originally good and valid.</p> <p>3. The lapse of time before the bill was filed, after the pleas were interposed, commented on, as a ground for withholding relief, even if the plaintiffs might otherwise be entitled to it.</p> <p>4. Regarding the actions at law as suits against the government, it cannot be prejudiced by any opinion or promise made or expressed by the defendant, especially when, at the time he said what he said, he was no longer in office.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>5. Regarding such actions as suits against the defendant, he cannot be prejudiced by anything said or done by the government or its officials, without his concurrence, especially after he ceased to be collector.</p> <p>[Cited in Hennequin v. Barney, 24 Fed. 582.]</p> <p>[See Crooke v. Maxwell, Case No. 3,413.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>6. Such actions are properly to be regarded as suits against the defendant, in fact as well as in form.</p> <p>7. Such conclusion is not affected by the fact that, as a condition of obtaining an injunction herein, pendente lite, the plaintiffs stipulated that, in any event, certificates of probable cause should be granted in such actions, to the end that no execution should issue against the property of the defendant.</p> <p>8. The officer in the custom house had no authority to bind the government by an agreement not to plead the statute of limitations; and, on what is set forth in the bill, he did not profess to make any such agreement.</p> <p>9. The defendant made no such agreement, but only expressed an opinion; and, if what he said could be viewed as an agreement, it was without mutuality and without consideration.</p> <p>10. According to the statute of limitations of- New York, (Code Proc. § 110.) “no acknowledgment or promise shall be sufficient evidence of a * * * continuing contract, whereby to take the case out of the operation of” the statute, “unless- the same be contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby,” and the highest court of that state has decided, that a parol agreement not to plead the statute cannot operate as a new promise, or as a waiver of the statute, or as an estoppel in pais.</p> <p>11. The facts stated create no estoppel as against the government, or as against the defendant.</p> <p>12. Decisions of the court granting or refusing a preliminary injunction are not conclusive, either upon the court or the parties, in a subsequent disposition of the cause by a decree.</p> <p>[NOTE. In affirming this decree, Mr. Justice Clifford, speaking for the supreme court, said: “Conceding that the United States is the real party, stall the court is of opinion that there is nothing in the remarks attributed to the auditor of the customhouse, or to the refund clerk, or to the secretary of the treasury which can- he held to preclude the respondent from pleading any proper plea to the actions which he may think necessary in making his defense. * * * Congress, undoubtedly, might authorize actions of the kind to be brought directly against the United States; but all must concede that such a power haa never -been exercised and is not conferred, and, in the absence of such- legislation, the court is of the opinion that such actions may in certain aspects be treated as actions against the collector, unless it appears that he acted under the directions of the proper official authority, or that a case is made where no execution can issue against the collector. * * * Taken in the most favorable view for the complainants, it is clear that it is impossible to regard the remarks attributed to the secretary of the treasury or to the officers of the customs as a contract or promise made by either party. There was no promise to forbear instituting the suits; nor was there any promise, if forbearance was accorded, that the statute should cease to run. * * * When they separated, each party was as free to pursue his own course, as when the interview commenced. Complainants might hare brought suits the same day, and, if they had, the respondent would have been at liberty to make any defense in his power, irrespective of anything which had transpired at the interview.” Justices Miller and Field dissenting. Andreae v. Kedfield, 95 U. S. 225.]_</p>

<p>Case No. 368;</p> <p>Limitations — Action aoainst Collector roa Duties Paid — Promise not to Plead Statute.</p> <p>[1. In a replication to a plea of the statute of limitations, an allegation that the defendant resided out of the state 11 months, without an averment that the statutory period has not elapsed, exclusive of the time of his absence, is insufficient.]</p> <p>[2. In a suit against a collector of customs whose plea is the statute of limitations, a replication alleging that the United States, and not the collector, were liable for the amount claimed; that the United States had made a new promise, and had promised not to plead the statute, if it contains any substantial defense to the plea, is double, and therefore insufficient.]</p> <p>[3. The granting of leave to put in several replications merely permits the parties to put the matters in the record, and is not an adjudication of their sufficiency.]</p> <p>[4. Where leave is given in a suit against a revenue collector to set up in reply to a plea of the statute of limitations an agreement that, if the plaintiffs filed their claims with the collector, the statute should not be pleaded, with an averment that they did file such claims, a replication setting up an agreement that the statute should not be pleaded to any claims for refund accruing within six years prior to the commencement of a test suit decided in favor of the plaintiffs, and acquiesced in by the treasury department, that such test suit had been so decided and acquiesced in, and wherein such suit is not particularly described, nor the connection of the case at bar with the alleged agreement or test suit .mown, is too vague.]</p> <p>[5. The averment in such a replication of a complete promise by the secretary of the treasury 10 years before- the bringing of the suit is insufficient. The secretary’s promise, cannot be construed to operate without any limit as to time.]</p> <p>F6. Act March- 3, 1863, providing for ihe relief of collectors, of customs by discharging their liability for unlawful collections out of the treasury, did not confer on the s-*:retary of the treasury any such power that his promise not to plead the statute of limitations will avail plaintiffs in an action against a collector.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[7. Where leave is granted to file four replications in an action against a collector of customs, of which the first two rest upon promises by the collector, and the last upon promises by the secretary of the treasury, as if the collector was a merely nominal defendanr. such last replication is bad, since it is inconsistent with the others.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Rejoinders were filed to the first and second replications, and issue joined thereon. While the cases were still pending, the plaintiffs filed a bill of complaint to restrain the respondents from pleading the statute of limitations in the action at law, setting up a promise by the customs officials and the secretary of the treasury not to plead the statute of limitations, new promises by both these officers, and the fact that in other actions, on similar facts, judgment had been given for the importers, and the excessive duties refunded by the government. The bill was dismissed by the circuit court, and on appeal the supreme court affirmed that decision, on the ground that conversations wherein the government officers said that under like circumstances it was not the custom of the - treasury department to plead the statute of limitations did not amount to a promise not to plead the statute, nor to a new promise, because not in writing; that, if they did amount to such a contract, it was void for lack of consideration; and that the defendants were not estopped to plead the statute because both parties were equally well informed of all the facts» Miller and Field, JJ., dissented, on the ground that the acts and promises of the government officials amounted to an estoppel in equity to the plea of the statute of limitations. Andreae v. Redfield, 98 U. S. 225.]</p>

Habeas corpus. A father asks the discharge of his minor son from an enlistment in the army, made without the father's consent

<p>[In equity. Suit by William D. Andrews and others against Theodore A. Carman to enjoin infringement of reissued patent No. 4,372, and for damages. Decree for complainants.]</p>

<p>Case No. 372.</p> <p>Equity Practice — Decree pro Confesso — Setting Aside — Laches.</p> <p>In a suit in equity on a patent, a preliminary injunction was granted, on notice and without opposition. Afterwards a decree pro confesso was entered, and a reference ordered, which was commenced, and witnesses were examined, and the defendants produced their accounts and attended by counsel. Afterwards they moved to set aside the decree and for leave to file an answer, alleging matters which had been set up in a prior suit on the patent and overruled by the court, and sundry new matters. No mistake or misapprehension or neglect of counsel was alleged. The plaintiffs offered to limit their recovery to $500, which would be less than the expense to the defendants of trying the issues. The defendants had ceased to use the patented invention: Held, that the motion must be denied, on the plaintiffs stipulating to limit their recovery to $500.</p> <p>[NOTE. Patent No. 73,425. was granted toN. W. Green, January 14, 1868. reissued (No. 4.372) May 9, 1871. It has been the subject of litigation in the following cases: Andrews v. Oarman, Case No. 371; Same v. Wright, Id.. 382; Same v. Cross, 8 Fed. 269: Same. v. Long, 12 Fed. 871; Same v. Creegan, 7 Fed-477; Green v. Gardner, 22 O. G. 683; Andrews v. Eames, 15 Fed. 109; Green v. French, 11 Fed. 591; Andrews v. Spear, Case No. 379; Green v. Barney, 19 Fed. 42Ó; Andrews v. Hovey, 16 Fed. 387.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. Bill by Isaac 11. Andrews, assignee in bankruptcy oí Nathaniel Dole, against said Nathaniel Dole and others, to set aside, as fraudulent, transfers of his property made by said bankrupt. Delos E. Culver, made defendant as trustee, demurred to the bill. Demurrer sustained.]

<p>Case No. 374.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Marine Insurance— Reforming Policy — Equity — Misconduct of Master.</p> <p>1. A policy was underwritten, “1000 dollars on brig Union, and 4000 dollars on effects on board said brig from Salem to port or ports in the West Indies, one or more times for the purpose of selling her outward and procuring a return cargo, and at and from thence to her port of discharge in the United States.” The memorandum for insurance contained -this clause: — "The Union is bound to Kingston, Jamaica: if not allowed to sell there, will proceed to Cuba.” At the time of the insurance, both parties supposed the port of Kingston open to American vessels under a proclamation of |he governor: and neither contemplated any illicit trade. The Union went to Kingston, supposing the port was open, and was there seized and condemned for the illicit trade. Held, that the underwriters were not liable for the loss— that the omitted clause, if inserted in the policy, would not have altered the nature of the insurance. or liability of the underwriters.</p> <p>[Cited in Dean v. Equitable Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 3,705.]</p> <p>2. Held also, that a court of admiralty has jurisdiction over policies as maritime contracts: but not over contracts leading to policies: — that it cannot reform a policy by the antecedent contract; — that this part belongs to a court of equity.</p> <p>[Cited in The Perseverance. Case No. 11,017; The Tribune. Id. 14,171: Dean v. Bates, Id. 3,704: Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, Id. 5,4S7: Kynoch v. The S. C. Ives, Case No. 7,958; Deely v. The Ernest and Alice, Id. 3,735; The Star of Hope. Id. 13,313; Oakes v. Richardson, Id. 10,390; The Brothers, 7 Fed. 880; The C. C. Trowbridge. 14 Fed. 876; Wenberg v. Cargo Mineral Phosphate, 15 Fed. 288; The G. 'Reusens. 23 Fed. 405; Paterson v. Dakin, 31 Fed. 683; Rea v. The Eclipse, 135 U. S. 599, 10 Sup. Ct. 876.]</p> <p>3. Held also, that the omitted clause was not in the contemplation of both parties a part of the contract to be inserted in the policy; but was a representation of a fact.</p> <p>[Cited in Dean v. Equitable Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 3,705.]</p> <p>4. Quaere — If a loss by a peril insured against, occasioned by the misconduct of the master be a loss, for which underwriters are liable.</p> <p>[5. Cited in Joy v. Allen. Case No. 7,552. and Packard v. The Louisa, Case No. 10,652, to the point that admiralty proceeds rather on equitable than on strict legal principles.]</p> <p>[6. Cited in Leland v. The Medora, Case No. 8,237, to the point that a contract to buy or build a ship is not a maritime contract; Cunningham v. Hall, Case No. 3,481, to the point that a contract to build a ship is not enforceable in admiralty.]</p> <p>[7. Cited in Taylor v. Brigham, Case No. 13,781, to the point that the owners are -liable for the willful and malicious acts of the master, done in the course and scope of his employment.]</p>

At law. On the 25th day of March, A. D. 1867, suit was brought by the plaintiffs f ''i executors of Andrews, deeeasedj against the defendants in the court of common pleas of Ohio, to recover the sum of $10,000 deposited witli the defendants as indemnity for acceptance by them for the accommodation of the Steubenville and Indiana Railroad Company, and which the plaintiffs claim the defendants became liable to pay to them.

In bankruptcy. Writ of error, to the district court for the western district. The action was brought by the assignee of Lawrence, against the defendant, under the 35th section of the bankrupt act. The plaintiff recovered, and the defendant sued out the writ of error, which now brings the cause before this court.

<p>In equity. The complainants were the assignees in bankruptcy of the estate of Horatio Woodman, and the respondents were the heirs at law and administrators of the estate of John A. Andrews, late of Boston, deceased. Briefly stated, the cause of action, as alleged, was as follows: That Woodman on the 17th of September, 1860, borrowed of John A. Andrews the sum of $6,000, for which he gave his notes, and as for security for the debt and notes he conveyed or caused to be conveyed to him by two deeds dated respectively September 17, I860, and October 8, in the same year, certain real estate situated in the counties of Shelby and Franklin in the state of Iowa, as more fully described in the said deeds. Said deeds, as the complainants alleged, were executed as security for said indebtedness, and that the grantee agreed to hold the lands only as security as aforesaid, and that he would re-convey said real- estate to said Woodman when he should pay the amount of the loan' and interest. Based upon these allegations, the firayer of the bill was that the complainants might be permitted to redeem the said lands, and for an account. The principal deed in question was the one first described, which was acknowledged on the day of its date, and was recorded on the 26th of the same month in the proper registry of the county where the land is situated. It acknowledged the receipt of three thousand dollars,- which the grantor told one of the witnesses was the full value of the land. When conveyed, the land was wild land, neither party occupying it. Service was made, and the respondents appeared, and filed an answer in which they denied that the land was conveyed as a security, and averred that the conveyance was absolute and not as security. Testimony was taken, and the district court entered a decree for the complainants, from which decree the respondents appealed to this court. [Decree reversed, and bill dismissed, with costs.]</p> <p>Woodman testified that the deeds were never in the possession of the grantee, that' they remained in his possession until the appointment of his assignees in bankruptcy, that the deeds were made as security for present and future loans, that at the date of the first deed he was owing the grantee $3,540.91, and that at the time of his death, October, 1867, he owed him $7,000.</p>

In equity. This was a bill on tbe equity side of tbe court, filed by tbe widow and all tbe legal representatives of H. Solomon, deceased, except H. Solomon one of tbe defendants, in order to set aside tbe sales and conveyances of certain lots of ground in tbe city of Philadelphia, made by tbe sheriff under a writ of venditioni exponas issued at the suit of the defendant, E. Solomon, against tbe executors of bis father, the aforesaid H Solomon, deceased, and for other and…

Application is made to the court, and affidavits presented by the solicitors for the several defendants, who, to avoid costs and unnecessary expense, ask that th.ese suits, which involve the same issues, and depend upon the same testimony, be consolidated, or one of them be selected as a test case, and proceedings in all others be stayed until such test case is determined; or that the court order that the testimony shall be taken in one case, to be selected by the…

In equity. The bill of complaint was filed November 10th, 1876, an answer filed February 5th, 1877, and the case put at issue March 27th, 1877. The testimony of both parties is being taken before a master, with a view to an early submission of the controversy.

At law. Writ of error from the judgment of the district court, of Massachusetts district. The original suit was debt brought upon the official bond of Andrews, formerly collector of the port and district of Ipswich. The United States claimed a balance due for moneys received by the defendant; and the pleadings put the question, whether any such balance was due, directly to the jury.

<p>Case No. 383.</p> <p>Prize — Violation or Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 384.</p> <p>Towboat — Unknown' Rook in Channel — Misfortune.</p> <p>1. Where a canal boat was being towed by a steamtug at the end of a hawser, with two other boats, she being the middle one. through the Kills on the north shore of Staten island, and brought up upon a single rock lying some two hundred feet from the end of a dock, the existence of such rock beiug proved not to be known to persons familiar with those waters, the tow at the time not being in line with the steamtug, but having sagged off inshore, Held, that a steamtug is not a common carrier of the vessel she tows.</p> <p>[Cited in Powell v. The Willie, 2 Fed. 97; The Pierrepont. 42 Fed. 6S8.]</p> <p>[See The America, Case No. 282.]</p> <p>[See, also, note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. That even common carriers are not held responsible for running upon rocks not generally known, and a fortiori steamtugs would not be.</p> <p>3. That even though this tow was not in line ■with the towboat, but had sagged off towards the land, it is immaterial whether this was chargeable to the canal boat or the towboat, for there was nothing to indicate that any danger would be incurred by the sagging of the tow. So long as it was kept at a safe distance from the shore and from all other known objects, there was no negligence in any one which can be held to be the cause of the accident.</p> <p>[Distinguished in The Stranger, Case No. 13,525.]</p> <p>4. That the facts make out a case of misfortune, where the loss must be borne by the vessel on which it fell. [NOTE. “An engagement to tow does not impose either an obligation to insure or the liability of common carriers. The burden is always upon him who alleges the breach of such a contract to show either that there has been no attempt at performance, or that there has been negligence or unskillfulness to his injury in the performance. The contract requires no more than that he who undertakes to tow shall carry out his undertaking with that degree of caution and skill which prudent navigators usually employ in similar services. But there may be cases in which the result is a safe criterion by which to judge of the character of the act which caused it.” Mr. Justice Strong, in The Webb, 14 Wall. (81 U. S.) 406. If a barge is sunk by contact with ice while being towed by a tug, the owner of the ■sargo must show negligence on the part of the tug to recover for the loss. The W. E. Glad-wish,. Case No. 17,355. See, also, The Brazos, Id. 1,821; The Mary McKillop. 23 Fed. 829; The Snap, 24 Fed. 292; The B. B. Saunders, 25 Fed. 729; The Bordentown, 16 Fed. 270; Molen-brock v. St. Louis & Clarksville Packet Co., Id. 878; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. New England Transp. Co., 24 Fed. 505; The Toung America, 26 Fed. 174; The William N. Beach, 29 Fed. 303; Brawley v. The Jim Watson, Case No. 1,817; The Lyon, Id. 8,645; The ■Stranger, Id. 13,525; The Oconto, Id. 10,421; The Fannie Tuthill, 12 Fed. 446.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel for salvage by William Watson, Noyes, and others against the schooner Angeline and cargo. Decree for libellants.]

[In bankruptcy. On motion to have the proceedings dismissed.

<p>Case No. 387.</p> <p>Attorney and Client —Compensation—Settlement by Client — Costs—Esto.ppel.</p> <p>1. The proctor of the libellant, having, given notice to the respondent that he should ask only for a decree for costs, cannot at the hearing proceed for damages.</p> <p>2. A proctor who has commenced a suit for a seaman, upon a just claim, may proceed for costs, after a settlement made by the parties, without his knowledge. And this, too, where the respondent did not know, at the moment of the settlement, that a suit had been commenced; but had previously had notice that the proctor had been employed, and might easily have learned what had been done.</p> <p>[Cited in Collins v. Nickerson, Case No. 3,016.]</p> <p>[See The Victory, Case No. 16,937; McDonald v. The Cabot, Id. 8,759.]</p>

In admiralty. This was an action brought by the owner of the tug A. G. Cattell, to recover for the damages occasioned to her by a collision- between her and the steamer Anglia, which occurred while the Anglia was backing into her place alongside of a pier in the North river.

<p>Case No. 391.</p> <p>Prize — Vessels Entitled to Share in — Practice — Presumptions.</p> <p>1. The proper practice suggested on references to ascertain what vessels are entitled to share in a prize.</p> <p>2. The right to all prize captures vests primarily in the government; and individuals derive no benefit from them, except by means of positive grant from the public authority.</p> <p>3. Every vessel of a blockading squadron is bound to do all in its power in the service to be performed, and the law presumes that that obligation is fulfilled, unless the contrary be proved.</p> <p>4. A rule is different with respect to joint associations or enterprises for war purposes by privateers or cruisers owned by individuals.</p> <p>5. The doctrine of reasonable or equitable reward has no place in an inquiry as to the distribution of prize money to national vessels under the statutes on that subject.</p> <p>6. The single fact that a vessel is one of a common force does not constitute her a participant in the prize shares obtained by the separate members of the force.</p> <p>7. It must also be shown that the vessel was “in sight” or “within signal distance” of the occurrence out of which the taking of the prize was realized.</p> <p>8. She must have been so situated as to be able, of her own accord, to contribute direct assistance to the captors by deterring the enemy from resistance, or by aiding physically in overcoming such resistance; and the vessel to be aided must have possessed the means of communicating intelligent directions to the one whose aid was needed.</p> <p>9. The acts of congress on the subject contemplate that the vessels should be in view of each other in order to correctly receive and respond to the signals given.</p> <p>10. Under those acts, a vessel, in order to be entitled to share in the proceeds of prize property, must show that she was within signal distance of the vessel making the prize, in circumstances which might have justified the capturing vessel in demanding and expecting her assistance.</p> <p>[NOTE. A note to The Vryheid. 2 C. Bob. Adm. 22, refers to the case of The Mars as follows: “Lords, 1760. This was a case of a French ship taken by one of three king’s ships, which, being apprized of the design of the enemy to escape from Port au Prince, had taken their station at different outlets to intercept them. The capture was made by one ship. A claim was given on behalf of the other two to share as joint captors, though not present at the capture, but it was rejected.”]</p>

[At law. Action by the Anglo-Californian Bank, Limited, against the Mahoney Mining Company on a promissory note. Trial to 1lie court. Judgment for plaintiff. The defendant afterwards appealed to the supreme court, and the judgment was affirmed. Ma-honey Min. Co. v. Anglo-Californian Bank, 104 U. S. 192.] The facts appear in the opinion of the court.

<p>Case No. 393.</p> <p>Carrier or Passengers — “Seen Dangers” — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>1. The carrier of passengers is bound to exact care in providing the proper means of approaching his vessel, and of ascending to or descending from it. But this duty only arises where by contract or usage he is required to be in readiness to receive his passengers.</p> <p>2. Where a passenger voluntarily encounters “a seen danger,” and receives an injury in con-sequence of his own carelessness or awkwardness: Beld, that he is guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p> <p>Specifications against discharge.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 396.</p> <p>Prize — Violation of Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for a violation of the blockade. Spoliation of papers by the master. Part of the cargo contraband of war.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] (Jn admiralty.

[In admiralty. Libel by the owners of the bark Wylie Smith to recover salvage of the brig Anna and her cargo. Decree for-libel-lant. Affirmed, under title of The Anna, Case No.-401.]

In admiralty. This was a libel by the owners of the schooner Tryall, to recover for the sinking of the schooner in the Hudson river, off Caldwell’s, on the night of December 18th, 1870. The schooner was at anchor.

[In admiralty. Libel by the owners of the bark Wiley Smith to recover salvage of the brig Anna and her cargo. Decree for libellant. Case No. 39S. Claimants appeal. Affirmed.]

<p>Case No. 400.</p> <p>Prize — Sailing under Enemy’s Flag.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, sailing under the enemy’s flag, and under passes from the enemy.</p>

<p>Case No. 402.</p> <p>Prize Court — District Attorney's Pees — Costs.</p> <p>1.The question of the allowance of costs and fees to the district attorney for services in prize cases considered.</p> <p>2. The prize court is, and always has been, in the United States a component part of ’.he admiralty court.</p> <p>3. In prosecuting in prize cases, the district attorney acts as the law officer of the government, and not in any other capacity.</p> <p>4. As the district attorney is compensated by fees and emoluments limited by law to a fixed salary, he cannot have any additional allowance for extra services within the scope of his appointment, unless such extra reward is expressly authorized by law.</p> <p>5. The act of August 6, 1861, [12 Stat. 317,] in regard to the compensation of the district attorney, discussed.</p> <p>6. The act of March 25, 1S62, § 3, [12 Stat. 375,] does not abolish the restrictions on the compensation of the district attorney, or give to him for his personal use the amounts taxed to him for services in prize cases.</p> <p>7. The acts of July 17, 1862, [12 Stat. 607,] and March 3, 1863, [12 Stat. 741,] show that the restrictions on the compensation of the district attorney are still in force.</p> <p>8. The court will not apportion to the district attorney, by a direct decree, the amount of the costs taxed for his services in each prize suit which ought to be paid to him toward his aggregate salary.</p> <p>9. The court will tax the costs of the district attorney in prize cases, under the existing laws, on the written assent of the counsel for the captors, and the deposition of the district attorney, proving the performance of the service and its reasonable value, and will leave it to the disbursing officers of the treasury to see that no more is retained by that officer than the sum given him by law.</p>

<p>Case No. 403.</p> <p>Collision — Between Steam and Sail — Foo.</p> <p>[When a master of a steamship knows that another vessel is in his front, enveiopd by a fog, and goes forward without properly heeding her fog signals, and knowing further that in all probability there would not be sufficient time to avoid a collision when she came in sight, is guilty of negligence, which will render his vessel liable for an ensuing collision.]</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel in rem by Edward Kimball, owner-of the ship Anna Kimball, against the ship’s cargo, (Alexander Duncan and others, claimants,) to enforce a lien for freight Decree for claimant. Reversed by the circuit court in Kimball v. The Anna Kimball, Case No. 7,772, and decree entered for libellant which was afterwards affirmed by the supreme court in The Kimball, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 37.]</p> <p>This was a libel to enforce an alleged lien •on the cargo of the ship Anna Kimball, for non-payment of the balance due upon the charter of the ship, amounting to about $10,-•000. The terms of the charter and the other facts appear in the statement of the pleadings, and in the opinion of the court. The ■defence was placed upon two grounds: 1st. That the terms of the charter making the balance of the charter money due at the end of the voyage, payable one-half in five days, •and one-half in ten days after the discharge of the homeward cargo, were inconsistent with the retention of the cargo as security for the payment of such balance. 2d. That the libellant had, during the voyage, received from the charterers their two notes on six months for $10,000, and that the credit thus given was inconsistent with the retention of the cargo necessary for the preservation of the lien, and that it therefore amounted to •a waiver of the lien. To this ground of de-fence the libellant replied, that shortly after taking the charterers’ notes, they became insolvent; and that he then offered to return them the notes, which they refused to receive, and that he-had always been and was now willing to give up the notes.</p>

[Libel by W. C. Annan and others against the ship Star of Hope to recover the value of goods which the ship had failed to deliver. A contribution in general average was ordered, and the case is now heard on exceptions to various charges in the commissioner's report. Overruled. This was affirmed by the ■circuit court without opinion. Reversed by supreme court in The Star of Hope v. Annan, •9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 203.

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by Giles Hawley against the canal-boat Ann Arbor for breach of a contract of carriage. Dismissed. Affirmed by the circuit court. Case No. 408.]

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem filed in the district court, against the canal-boat Ami'Arbor, ior the breach oí a contract of af-freightment in respect to certain tubs of butter, shipped by that craft, from Borne, (N. Y.,) on the Erie canal, to the city of New York. The district court dismissed the libel, [The Ann Arbor, Case No. 407,] and the claimant appealed to this court, where further proof was taken.

[In admiralty. Libel on bottomry bond by Nehemiah Carrington against the brig Ann C. Pratt, Leonard B. Pratt, claimant. Decree for libellant for his implied lieu, the bond being void for fraud. (Not reported.) Claimant appeals. Reversed, and libel dismissed, with costs. The libellant then appealed to the supreme court, where the circuit court decree was affirmed, sub nom. Carrington v. The Ann C. Pratt, 18 How.

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, by Robert Taylor against the bark Ann D. Richardson, to recover the proceeds of a sale of goods shipped on board the bark by the libellant. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Case No. 411.</p> <p>Shippixg — Delivert or Cargo — Freight.</p> <p>[Note. This case was originally published as -a note to Miston v. Lord, 1 Blatchf. 358. Nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible.]</p>

In. admiralty. This was a libel [against the Anne, George Manners, claimant,] brought to recover a compensation for piloting the British schooner Anne, from Brown’s Bank near the American coast, to Boston. The material facts proved on the trial were shortly these: — The Anne was chartered in June, 1818, at Cork, in Ireland, to proceed from thence to Quebec with pessengers.

[In admiralty. Libel by Robert Annette, owner of the steamer Thomas E. Hulse, against the steam tug Storm, for collision. Decree for libelant.]

<p>Case No. 414.</p> <p>Prize — Ship’s Papers and Crew — Evidence— War — Neutral Shipper — Domicil — Salvase —Freight.</p> <p>1. In prize causes the first hearing is to be on the ship’s papers, and the preparatory evidence of the ship’s crew. If these acquit or condemn, there is an end of the cause. If they present a case of doubt or difficulty, further proof is admissible by order, or by plea and proof. Further proof sometimes allowed to the captors.</p> <p>2. If the captured crew do not give up papers on the first examination in preparatory, the court will not admit them afterwards. If a witness suppress material facts on his examination in preparatory, he shall not be permitted to supply the defect by a supplementary affidavit. The commissioners to take the answers on the standing interrogatories should not rest satisfied with general answers, but require full and minute details of all material facts.</p> <p>3. The national character of a party depends upon his domicil. What constitutes such domi-cil. A British subject domiciled in the United States, though temporarily absent in a British island, is as to purposes of trade-held to be an American merchant.</p> <p>[Cited in Burnham v. Rangeley, Case No. 2,176.]</p> <p>4 The question of enemy or friend depends-upon the domicil of the party. A shipment made to Canada by a British subject domiciled in the United States, but temporarily at Jamaica, in his character as a British subject, does, not, if made in time of peace, affect the property with a hostile character, if war breaks out pending the voyage. But it is otherwise, if such shipment be made pending a known war. ,</p> <p>[Cited in The Amado, Case No. 12,005.]</p> <p>5. In general no claim is admitted in prize-causes. in opposition to the ship's papers; but this rule is relaxed in favor of shipments made-in peace.</p> <p>6. Where a neutral is engaged in a trade,, which is exclusively confined to the subjects of a country, and interdicted to all others, and cannot avowedly be carried on in the name of a foreigner, such a trade is so purely national, that it must follow the situation of the country, as to peace or war, and be deemed hostile- or .neutral .accordingly: and in such a trade, it is immaterial whether the shipment be made in. time of peace or war. The trade between Jamaica and Canada proved not to be of such a character. In time of war property cannot change its. character in transitu; nor can property shipped, to become the property of an enemy, be-protected by the neutrality of the shipper.</p> <p>[Cited in The Sarah Starr, Case No. 12,352; The Delta, Id. 3,777.]</p> <p>7. In order to entitle to salvage, as upon a. recapture or rescue from an enemy, the property must have been taken from the actual or constructive possession of the enemy.</p> <p>8. Captors are not in general entitled to» freight on the capture of neutral property on board of an enemy’s ship, unless the goods are carried to the port of destination, within the intent of the contracting parties. But if the property be ultimately bound to the market, where the captors carry the ship, or the proceeds are to go there indirectly, a direct communication being prohibited, freight is due to-the captors. The captors are entitled to their expenses in all cases of further proof.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 415.</p> <p>Prize — Attempted Violation op Blockade— Proceedings Suspended.</p> <p>Condemnation withheld, and proceedings suspended for sixty days, to allow the libellants to produce testimony in support of the libel, there being no testimony from witnesses present at the capture.</p> <p>[NOTE. At a subsequent hearing this vessel and cargo were duly condemned. The Annie, Case No. 418.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 417.</p> <p>Prize — Attempted Violation of Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 418.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for a violation of the blockade.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 419.</p> <p>ParzE — Violation or Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for violation of the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 420.</p> <p>Disagreement among Ship Owners — Sale of Ship on Application op Half Owners — Charter Evidence — Mortgage.</p> <p>L The admiralty has jurisdiction to order the sale of a vessel on the application of the owners of one-half of her, in case of a disagreement between them and the owners of the other half. But such disagreement must be such as pre rents the present employment of the ship, and the owners asking for a sale must either propose a different employment of the ship, or, if they merely objoct to the voyage or the master proposed by the other moiety, their objection must be based on reasonable ground.</p> <p>[Cited in The B. F. 'Wbolsey, T Fed. 116.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. The owners of half of a ship applied to the court for a decree of sale. It appeared that, at the time of filing the libel, the ship was loading in New York under a charter for San Francisco. Some of the owners of the vessel resided in New York and some in Maine, and. when she had been in New York before, some of her business had been done, by S. & Co., who, together with the father of S., owned and controlled one-half of the ship. S. had accepted this charter while the vessel was yet at sea, after a conference with his father who was in Maine, and made some effort to consult with the Maine owners. After the charter had been accepted L„ who represented the owners of the other half of the ship, came to New York and. having inquired, of S. if she was chartered and received an evasive answer, then informed S. that, as- representing the owners of the other half, he did not wish the ship chartered. S. then told him the- ship was chartered. L. did not then repudiate the charter or take any steps to prevent the signing of the charter party by the master, which was done after the arrival of the ship in New York. There was dissatisfaction on the part of L. and those owners who acted with him as to the agency of S. & Co. or the father of S., and as to some previous transactions in reference to the ship; and after the vessel was partly loaded, L. and the other owners for whom he acted filed a libel against the ship and the owners of the other half to obtain a sale; Beld, that, under the circumstances of the case, the libellants had not shown sufficient grounds to call on the court to exercise the discretionary power of sale.</p> <p>3. That evidence tending to show that as to part of the vessel, to which L. held the. legal title, the master of the vossel held an equitable interest by reason of which he had intervened in the cause and answered, opposing the sale, was admissible in order to show to the court all the circumstances in the face of which it was called to exercise its discretion.</p> <p>[NOTE. For instances in which admiralty-courts have refused to order the sale of vessels at the instance of minority owners, see The Ocean Belle, Case No. 10,402; Davis v. The-Seneca, Case No. 3,650.]</p>

In admiralty. The schooner Annie Leland, with a cargo of coal on board, and bound to Boston, went on shore on Nasha-wena rocks, in Vineyard sound, on the night of the 10th of September, 186S. The weather was thick, but not otherwise severe, and the vessel was discovered in the morning by the master of a fishing-smack, which had been anchored not far off; and he went on board, and found the master of the schooner determined to abandon her, and agreed with him to strip the…

[la admiralty. Libel by Daniel Brown, and others, owners of the schooner Sa l He Smith, against the brig Annie Lindsey, (Cornelius T. Tompkins, claimant,) for damages caused by collision. Decree for libellant. Affirmed by the circuit court, (not reported; see note at end of this case,) and also affirmed by the supreme court under title of The Annie Lind-sley, 104 TJ. S. 185.]

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by John Johnson and -eight others against the Annie M. Smull for -wages. Decree for libellants.]</p>

<p>Case No. 424.</p> <p>Prize — Attempt to Violate Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

[On appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Connecticut. [In admiralty. Libel by the United States against the ship Ann Maria, owned by El-kanah Atwater, for violation of the non-intercourse laws of 1809. Decree for libel-lant. Claimant appeals. Reversed.]

[In admiralty. Libel by Henry D. Brook-man and others against the canal-boat Ann Ryan for wharfage. Decree for libellants.]

EIrt admiralty. Libel for salvage by Richard Roberts and others against the cargo and materials of the ship Dorothea Poster, (James Tilly, claimant.) Decree for libel-lants, in part.]

[In admiralty. Libel by Thomas Eldredge and others against the brig Sea Flower and cargo for salvage, (Nathaniel Hartford, claimant.) Decree for libellant.]

<p>Case No. 431.</p> <p>Conflict of Daws — Foreign Administrator.</p>

<p>Case No. 432a.</p> <p>Costs, Fees, and Compensation in Pkize Cases.</p>

On motion for the continuance of this cause, the party made an affidavit stating the absence of Joseph Howland, Jr., a material witness, and that he hoped to procure the testimony of the witness at the next court. A counter-affidavit was filed, stating that Joseph Howland, Jr., was gone to foreign parts; that he expected to have no fixed residence, and that he did not expect to return within two or three years.

<p>Case No. 441.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — When Creditors Having Adverse Interest may Defend.</p> <p>A creditor or other person having an adverse interest to be affected by an adjudication in bankruptcy, may be admitted to defend. Practice when debtor denies that the requisite number and amount of creditors have joined. To charge suspension of commercial paper is not enough. It should be described or identified.</p>

In a cause marked for trial by special jury, nine jurors only appeared; and the question arose, whether the court (who wished to consider it with a view… Held: that the Pennsylvania act, and not the English practice, must regulate the proceedings with respect to juries; and the case of a tales in trials by special jury, though, admissible at common law, might not have been adopted by the legislature, on account of the inconveniences, which the practice tended to introduce.

<p>Case No. 446.</p> <p>Costs — Remepies—Marshal’s Fees — Attachment.</p> <p>1. The marshal may have an attachment, to enforce the payment of his fees of office, against suitors in the court.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Stover, Case No. 13,507.]</p> <p>2. So against an endorser on the writ, who by the lex loci is liable to respond the costs.</p> <p>[Cited in Goodyear v. Sawyer, 17 Fed. 5.]</p>

[The following charge to the grand jury was delivered in response to a request for instructions as follows: “Is robbery, when committed in the Indian country, indictable as such, and punishable with death?”]

<p>Case No. 449.</p> <p>Seamen — Articles op Shipment — Change op Voyage.</p> <p>[1. The term “voyage” is a technical phrase, and always imports a definite commencement and end, and therefore the addition of the term “elsewhere” in shipping articles specifying a voyage from Baltimore to Curaeoa does not authorize a voyage to St. Domingo, since such term must be construed as subordinate to the voyage specified, and only permits such a change of course as may be necessary to accomplish the voyage designated in the articles of shipment.]</p> <p>[Cited in The Brutus, Case No. 2,060.]</p> <p>[2. Cited in Magee v. The Moss, Case No. 8,944, and Brown v. Jones, Id. 2,017, to the point that the term “voyage” is a technical phrase, and always imports a definite commencement and end, and that the term “elsewhere” must be construed either as void for uncertainty, or as subordinate to the principal voyage stated in the preceding words.]</p> <p>NOTE, [from original report in Hall’s Law-Journal.] The above decision is faithfully copied from a MS. in the writing of its highly distinguished author. As it was not prepared by him for the press, this explanation is due to-his memory on the part of the editor.</p>

<p>Case No. 460.</p> <p>VOLUNTAEY BANKRUPTCY —ARREST OP APPLICANT-—Execution pob Debt.</p> <p>[A voluntary bankrupt, under the act of April 19, 1841, (5 Stat. 440, c. 9,) cannot be arrested on an execution for debt before his final examination is passed.]</p>

[In admiralty. This was a libel in rem for the purchase price of certain materials furnished for the construction of a ship1, which was at the time of filing of libel in possession by tb.e sheriff, by virtue of an attachment issued in a common law suit. Heard ■ on plea to the jurisdiction. Overruled.]

[At law. Suit by the United States against Beare, a member of the importing firm of Smith & Beare, to recover the value of smuggled goods. Beare was also arrested criminally, but by a compromise all proceedings in both suits were stopped. Sisson ■ and the agents of Col. Howe'filed claims as informers, which were referred to a commissioner. Heard on exceptions by Sisson to the commissioner’s report Sustained.]

<p>Case No. 456.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction—Conversion op Realty into Personalty — Incumbrances.</p> <p>[Under the first section of the bankrupt act of March 2, 1867, (14 Stat. 517, c. 176,) a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to order a sale of real property of the bankrupt free from incum-brances, which are thereby transferred ■ to the proceeds of the sale, but an application for such an order should be denied when it does not appear who are the incumbrancers, and whether they have had notice of the application.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Act March 2. 1867, 5 1, (14 Stat. 517, c. 176,) provides: “The jurisdiction hereby ; conferred shall extend to all cases and controversies arising between the bankrupt and any creditor or creditors who shall claim any debt or demand under the bankruptcy: to' the collection of all the assets of the bankrupt; to the ascertainment and liquidation of the liens and other specific claims thereon; to the adjustment of the various priorities and conflicting interests of all parties: and to the marshaling and disposition of the different funds and assets, so as to secure the rights of all parties and due distribution of the assets among all the creditors; and to all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement of the estate of the bankrupt, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy. The said courts shall have full authority to compel obedience to all orders and decrees passed by '■hem in bankruptcy, by process of contempt and | other remedial process, to the same extent that j the circuit courts now have in any suit pending ¡ therein in equity.”!</p>

In bankruptcy. In divers cases before J. Sayles Brown, register in bankruptcy, District of Columbia, the following questions arose, and having been certified to Judge Wylie, his opinion on each question is appended. Of Notice to Show Cause Why Discharge Should not be Granted.

<p>Case No. 458.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Warrant — Service — Election of Assignee.</p> <p>[1. The direction in a warrant in bankruptcy for service “either by mail or personally” does not confer discretionary power upon the marshal, who must serve all by mail unless the warrant directs him to serve personally certain specified persons; but the register may strike from the warrant the words “either,” “or personally.”]</p> <p>[2. If but a single creditor proves his debt, and attends the first meeting of creditors, he is entitled to name the assignee.]</p>

In bankruptcy. The following questions were put by Begister Gates: Section twenty-two, general clause one hundred and five, requires register to mail proof of claims to assignee.

In bankruptcy. This being the day to ■show cause against granting a discharge to the bankrupt, objections were filed by several creditors, charging him with having, on the 5th and 11th of January, 1841, in contemplation of bankruptcy, and for the purpose ■of giving a preference to certain of his creditors, confessed several judgments to a large amount, whereon he permitted executions to be issued forthwith, in virtue of which all his property was sold.

At the close of an argument, on a motion for a new trial by jury to determine the right of a bankrupt to a discharge, Mr.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

In bankruptcy. Breneman’s Case, [Case No. 1,830,] having decided that a general assignment with preferences is an act of bankruptcy, and void under bankrupt law, the question was raised, ■ in several subsequent cases, whether a general assignment without preferences is likewise void.

[In admiralty. Libel for seamen’s wages.] In a late case, in the district court, a question was made as to the responsibility of a mate, who, by the death of a captain, became master, by succeeding to that berth on a voyage. One, under these circumstances, was offered as a witness, on the part of the owner, in a suit, by a mariner, against the-ship and owner.

[Proceedings by United States against Amar Young, Bros. & Co. for the condemnation of certain articles of merchandise enclosed in boxes embellished with prints and pictures of an indecent and obscene character. Verdict of condemnation.]

<p>Case No. 472.</p> <p>Clekk of Cockt — Fees—How Détekmined.</p> <p>1. The third section of the act of congress of 28th February, 1799, among other things, declares that “in case a clerk of a court of the United States perform any duty for which the laws of the state make no provision, the court in which such service shall be performed,, shall ■make a reasonable compensation therefor:’’ Held, that in order to determine what is a reasonable compensation, the court must look to what the law allows in similar cases.</p> <p>[Cited in Jerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. 275.]</p> <p>2. That whatever the legislature allows to the ■officer in any case, it must be supposed, they ■considered a reasonable compensation, and meant a compensation at the same rate, when they referred it to the court to make a reasonable allowance.</p> <p>3. That acting upon this principle, the fees .allowed in the case of a seizure of goods in a river or creek, for a breach of the revenue laws, would seem to furnish the true rule of compensation to the clerk, in the case of a seizure upon land, for a similar breach of the revenue laws.</p> <p>4.That as in cases of seizure within the admiralty jurisdiction, the clerk is, by the act of 18th April, 1814, allowed one-half of one per cent, commission on the money deposited in court, the same allowance may be deemed reasonable, in cases of seizure made upon land, where the property seized has been condemned as forfeited and sold, and the proceeds brought into court.</p> <p>Quere? Whether the act of 1814 is confined to admiralty cases, or extends to others.</p>

<p>Case No. 473.</p> <p>Seamen — Imprisonment in Foreign Jail — Consular Certificate.</p> <p>[1. A master is not generally justified in imprisoning seamen in foreign jails as a mere matter of discipline, unless there is danger in keeping the offender aboard, or he has committed some great crime; and during such illegal imprisonment a seaman cannot be charged with his board nor with his wages given to another hand.]</p> <p>[2. The fact that a master, in inflicting such illegal imprisonment, acted on the advice of the consul, goes to show the absence of malice, but cannot justify the illegal act, nor deprive the injured parties of their legal remedies.]</p>

In equity. J. S. M. being the father of an illegitimate child by a former connexion, and now about to marry another woman, settled, in March 1833, of his own suggestion, $3000, personal estate, in trust for the child; himself retaining no interest in the property, which, was transferred to the trustee and the possession of it surrendered.

At law. The defendant was indicted for perjury committed before the commissioners of bankrupts, where, being asked, “at what time did you own the brig Abigail, and when did you cease to own her,” answered, on oath, “I cannot tell exactly the time; I believe it was at the latter end of 1799 that I first owned her; I ceased to own her, I rather think, in the year 1S00.” Whereas in truth and in fact, the said defendant never did own the said brig at any time during the year…

<p>Case No. 476.</p> <p>Costs — Payment before Discontinuance of Suit.</p> <p>The cause had been at issue for three terms, and the defendant asked leave to file a new plea, the effect of which would be to oblige the plaintiff to suffer a nonsuit. The defendant, before the suit was brought, refused to show his lease to the plaintiff, when, by so doing, he would have prevented the institution of the suit. The court refused to permit the defendant to enter the plea, but upon his paying the whole costs of the suit.</p>

[At law. Action of ejectment by Ano-weurth against Burlingin to recover 160 acres of land in Adams county, Ill.] The plaintiff showed good title derived from the United States, and possession by the defendant, and rested his case. The defendant relied upon seven years’ possession, the payment of taxes during that time, and a connected title from the auditor of the state on a sale in 1829 for taxes, under the act of 1827; the auditor’s deed dated in 1831. Such was his title.

In admiralty. Libel in rem, by Gurdon Waterman [against the ship Antarctic] to recover a balance of $1048 claimed to be due on account of materials furnished for th.e ship Antarctic, by virtue of the lien given by the statute .of Massachusetts of 1848, c. 290, § 1, which provides that “whenever a debt is contracted for labor performed, or materials used in the construction or repair, &c., of any vessel within this commonwealth, such debt shall be a lien,” &c. It appeared in…

In admiralty. This was a motion to set aside a decree entered in October, 1860, dismissing the libel in this case, and an order entered in January, 1861, cancelling the bond given on the discharge of the vessel, and to set the cause down for trial. The libel was filed in October, 1855, to recover for spars furnished to the vessel on the order of her owner while she was being built by him, and used in building her, of the-value of $415.

In admiralty. The ship Antelope was held under process in two cases, and both cases came before the court upon a motion made on behalf of the claimants, for the release of the vessel upon bail. It appeared that, on the 31st day of August, 1867, one George W. Curtis filed his libel against the vessel to enforce a lien, amounting to $827.22, for supplies furnished the vessel in this port between the 19th day of June and the 80th of August last.

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by David J. Taff against the brig Antelope for materials furnished during the building of the vessel. Libel dismissed, with costs.]

<p>Case No. 483.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade — False Papers.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for having false papers as to their destination, and for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 484.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Written Contract — Whaling Voyage — Salvage—Seamen as Salvors.</p> <p>1. Seamen in the whaling service have a lien on the oil for their wages.</p> <p>[Cited in The Ontario, Case No. 10,543.]</p> <p>2. Seamen can be salvors only when their connection with the ship has been entirely broken up.</p> <p>[See The Olive Branch, Case No. 10,490; Phillips v. McCall, Id. 11,104.]</p> <p>3. Daily wages which had been promised the crew for services in the nature of salvage were allowed, the owners not objecting.</p> <p>4. Where, in the original articles for a whaling voyage, the time of its continuance, though agreed on, was accidentally omitted to be written out, the defect can be supplied by oral evidence.</p> <p>[Cited in Frates v. Howland, Case No. 5,066.]</p> <p>5. Salvage paid by the master in good faith, and in the exercise of reasonable prudence, is a charge upon the oil in which the crew must share.</p>

<p>Case Ho. 485.</p> <p>Slavery — Runaway Slaves — Authority or Justice or the Peace to Commit.</p> <p>A justice of the peace in Alexandria cannot commit a person as a runaway, unless according to the form of the act of assembly of Virginia, of 26th December, 1792, p. 246.</p>

At law. Motion for a new trial. This action was brought by Francis W. Anthony against the Aetna Insurance Company, to recover upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendants upon live stock shipped on board a propeller plying upon Lake Superior. The facts out of which the controversy arose are detailed in the opinion of the court.

[In equity. Bill by R. C. Anthony and the American Wood-Paper Company against John Carroll for an accounting for the alleged infringement of patent No. 17,387. Heard on demurrer to the bilL Demurrer overruled.]

The court made the following special finding of facts, viz.: 1. This action is brought for the collection of interest coupons, originally attached to bonds of the following tenor: “United States of America, state of Missouri. No. 1. Jasper County Bond. $500. Interest, ten per cent, per annum.

<p>Case No. 489.</p> <p>Smuggling — Goons not Entered on the Manifest.</p> <p>In order to sustain a libel against a vessel for the recovery of the penalty imposed by the 24th section of the act of March 2d, 1799, (1 Stat. 640,) for the importation of goods not entered on the manifest, it must be shown that the vessel belonged in whole or in part to a citizen or inhabitant of the United States. The value of the goods omitted must also be shown.</p> <p>[See, also, U. S. v. Twenty-Six Diamond Rings, Case No. 16,572.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. Application by James S. Antisdel a bankrupt, for discharge.

<p>Case 25To. 491.</p> <p>Damage to Cargo — Peril of the Sea.</p> <p>Casks of bleaching powders were stowed In the hold of a vessel, against the skin, without dunnage. Water, which came in through the deck and water-ways, reached the casks and wet their contents, which rotted the wood of the casks. The casks were stove by reason of this, and the bleaching powders were mixed: with the water, and this water reached some bundles of bags and injured them. The bags were being carried under a bill of lading which excepted the dangers of the seas: Held, that the injury to the bags was not caused by the dangers excepted, and that the ship was liable for the damage.</p> <p>[Cited in The H. G. Johnson, 48 Fed. 697.] [See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. As to the point that a carrier is bound to observe reasonable care in loading and stowing chemicals or bleaching powders, see The St. Patrick, 7 Fed. 125: The Kate Irving, 5 Fed. 630; The Pharos, 9 Fed. 913.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 492.</p> <p>Prize — Attempt to Violate Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

In admiralty. The libellant was shipped at New Bedford in July, 1869, on board the defendant’s ship Mermaid, for a whaling voyage not exceeding four years in length. In February, 1S70, when the vessel was cruising off South Australia, the fourth mate’s boat, with six men, was separated from the ship, and, after being out for two-days with a very insufficient supply of food, they made the land at a point where there were no inhabitants.

<p>Case No. 495.</p> <p>"War — Military Duty— Exemption — Final Decision by Board — Conclusiveness — Act op March 3, 1363</p> <p>1. A statute which, in relation to summary proceedings before a military commission, enacts that its decision shall be final, does not necessarily make the decision conclusive as to-the right which was in question.</p> <p>2. The provisions of the 14th section of the act of congress of March 3, 1863, c. 75, [12 Stat. 733.] requiring the presentation, by drafted persons, of all claims of exemption to the board of enrolment, and making the hoard’s decision final, do not, in the ease of an exempt whose claim of exemption has been duly presented to the board and disallowed, preclude the subsequent consideration, under a writ of habeas corxms, of the question of his right of exemption.</p> <p>3. Quere: Whether the question will be considered under such a writ at the instance of a party, who, having had proper notice and opportunity, has not presented his claim of exemption to the board, or has failed to comply with its reasonable regulations, of which he has had proper notice, or of a party who, after a rejection of such claim, and full subsequent time and opportunity to obtain an unobstructed judicial investigation of the question of alleged right, neglects to apply for the writ until after he has been mustered into military service.</p>

<p>Case No. 496.</p> <p>Trade-Marks — Arbitrary Words — Ixfrwge-mext.</p> <p>The use, on labels and bottles, of the word ApoIIinis, in connection with the representation of a bow and arrow or anchor, was restrained, by preliminary injunction, on account of the similarity between them and the word Apollinaris and the representation of an anchor. as before used by the plaintiff, as being calculated and designed to induce the supposition, by users and dealers, that the waters of the defendant. so marked, were the waters of the nlaintiff; but the plaintiff was ordered to give a bond to pay all damages to the defendant, if it should be finally determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction.</p> <p>[Cited in Cien Cove Manuf’g Co. v. Ludel-ing, 22 Fed. 826.]</p> <p>[See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Carbolic Soap Co. v. Thompson, 25 Fed. 625; Hostetter v. Vowinkle, C.me No. 6,714.]</p>

In equity. Demurrer to bill, which prayed for an injunction against the collection of a tax. Statement of Bill. Complainants [Edward M. Apperson- and others] are citizens of Shelby county, Tennessee, and property owners and tax-payers of the city of Memphis. Defendant Brown is a citizen of Iowa, and Rawlings and Shaper are tax collectors of the city of Memphis.

Appeal [of Appleton] from the decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant letters patent to them for an improvement in paper-folding machines, and awarding priority of invention to said Cyrus Chambers, Jr. [Affirmed.]

This was an action at law commenced by attachment. A motion was made before Mr. Justice MILLER, holding the term, to vacate and dissolve an attachment levied on the goods of the defendant

In bankruptcy. On 1st May, 186S, Register Slaymaker certified the following questions, agreed to by the assignee of the bankrupt [Benjamín F. Appold] and the attorney of the bankrupt’s landlord: The room, in which the bankrupt had conducted his business of a grocer, was leased to him at $62.50 per quarter.

<p>Case Wo. 500.</p> <p>Salvage — Amount or Award.</p> <p>[Note. Nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible. 10 Adm. Rec. 26, only contains the decree.]</p>

In admiralty. The British ships Arabella and Madeira were captured, in June, 1814, by the private armed brig Rambler, Bdes commander; and thirty boxes of medicines, sixteen bales of piece goods, five boxes of opium, and seventy-five casks of Madeira wine, parcel of their cargoes, were removed on board of the Rambler, carried into the port of Canton, in China, and there landed.

In equity. This suit was brought in the district court of Arapahoe county, by the complainants, against the Kansas Pacific Railway Company, the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company, Sayre, Moffat, Carr, Perry, Meier, Edgerton, Greeley, Dodge, Gould, and Dillon.

[In bankruptcy. Archenbrown was adjudicated a bankrupt on creditor’s petition on November 6, 1872; and his estate was subsequently collected and distributed. Lawrence J. Levey, a creditor, sued the bankrupt, at law, for tbe collection of a debt; and the bankrupt petitioned, under section 21, to enjoin the prosecution of the suit until the determination of the question, then pending, of the bankrupt’s discharge.

<p>[In bankruptcy. Petition by William Archenbrown for a discharge. Refused. For prior opinions, see In re Archenbrown, Case No. 503, and In re Archenbrown, Id. 504.]</p>

<p>Case Jio. 506.</p> <p>Income Tax.</p> <p>1. It is not within the purview of sections-3172 to 3lS2 of the Revised Statutes that unpaid income-taxes are now to be assessed and' collected through the machinery provided by those sections, or that the examinations which are solely a part of such machinery should now-take place.</p> <p>2. "Where a person made sworn returns of his income each year from 1866 to 1872, and paid income-taxes accordingly, the commissioner of internal revenue could uot, in 1878, under section 3182, make a new or corrected list in respect to the income-taxes of such person for those years, because the fifteen months named in that section had elapsed.</p>

[In admiralty. For a subsequent hearing in this case on motion to take out of registry the proceeds of sale of the vessel upon giving the customary bond, see The Archer,. Case No. 508.]

[In admiralty. Heard on motion of claimants to take out of registry the proceeds of sale of the vessel upon giving the customary bond. For report of hearing on the merits, see Th.e Archer, Case No. 507.]

In admiralty. Motion for security for costs. The libel in this case was for seaman's wages. The answer denied there was anything due to libellants. The claims, as set up in the libel, were for smaR amounts, being for $5, and $11.46, respectively. The motion was founded upon the facts that the claims set up are small in amount, and the denial of any indebtedness contained in the answer.

At law. Assumpsit for use and occupation. To take the case out of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff offered in evidence the defendant’s letter to the secretary of the navy, in which he says, “I could have availed myself of the insolvent laws of the District, but preferred paying all debts as soon as possible, not omitting Mr. Archer’s claim.”

<p>[In admiralty. Action by Benjamin P. Arcularius against Oapt. Staples for pilot fees. Judgment by default for libellant. Defendant moves to set aside all proceedings as coram non judice and void. Motion denied.]</p> <p>This was an action brought by the plaintiff, a licensed Hell Gate pilot, against the master of a sailing vessel belonging to the state of Maine, to recover fees fixed by the laws of the state of New Tork. The charge was that the pilot offered his services to the master to pilot the vessel, then going through Hell Gate. The master refused to employ or receive him on board. By the laws of the state of New Tork the pilot is entitled to receive one-half legal pilot fees from the master for such refusal and that such fees amount to $5.25. The action has been prosecuted to default and reference to a commissioner, and a report made by the commissioner, finding that the sum was due to the pilot. The master applied to the court to-set aside all the proceedings as coram non judice and void. The pilot opposed the motion as irregular, and on the ground that the master has waived, by his acquiescence and laches, all claim to relief.</p> <p>The action was commenced June 7, 1857. and was by both parties put upon the calendar for hearing; and it was noticed by the libellant every term till January 29, 1859, when the default was taken, and the case was referred to a commissioner who made his report Feb. 19, 1859. On the 1st of March instant, the defendant filed his answer denying the allegations of the libel and to the jurisdiction of the court, giving written notice of this motion.</p>

In equity. Bill in equity, filed August 14, 1829, stating that the plaintiff, on the 12th of July, 1S26. purchased, for a valuable consideration, half of H. Langley’s interest in the property called the Indian Queen Hotel, in Washington, District of Columbia, which interest was one seventh. That Langley» by an instrument in writing, signed by him, assigned to plaintiff one half of that interest, and to the defendant, Jesse Brown, the other half.

In admiralty. Circuit court, April term, 1836. Appeal from the district court, in admiralty. This was an appeal from the decree of the district court, upon a libel filed by Ar-drey for wages, against Karthaus, the respondent.

In admiralty. Supplies furnished a Nova Scotian vessel in New York. — The vessel was attached in New York in a suit in a common-law court for a debt of two of the owners.

In admiralty. This was an action brought by Willett Martin, to recover wages for services on board the steamboat Argo, as pilot, from April 17th, 1872, to October 9th, 1872, and from June 21st, 1873, to October 14th, 1873. The libel was filed April 11th, 1874. It alleges the services performed, and the amount due, and that the owners had given him two notes therefor, which were unpaid, and which the libellant offered to surrender.

<p>Case No. 616.</p> <p>Prize — Condemnation — Violation oe Embargo Act — Excuses—Necessity.</p> <p>1. The 3d section of the embargo act of the 9th January, 1808, c. 8, was not repealed by the act. of the 1st March, 1809, c. 91.</p> <p>2. Of the kind of necessity which excuses from forfeiture; condemnation on the facts.</p> <p>[Disapproved in The Ella Warley, Case No. 4,373.]</p> <p>[3. Cited in Beals v. Hale, 4 How. (45 ü. S.) 53, to the point that a second law does not repeal a former one on the same subject without a repealing clause or negative words, unless so clearly repugnant as to imply a negative.]</p>

<p>Case No. 518.</p> <p>Prize — Neutral Property — Blockaded Port.</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo restored as neutral property, on a lawful voyage, but without costs against the captors,-there having been probable cause for the arrest, the vessel having attempted to enter a blockaded port to obtain the necessary supplies.</p> <p>2. An excuse of that kind is looked upon with distrust by prize court.</p>

<p>Case No. 517.</p> <p>Deposition — Notice—Attorney of Record.</p> <p>1. "When there is an attorney of record, it is improper to take depositions without notice to him, or to the party.</p> <p>2. When depositions are taken to be used against the United States, if there be an attorney of the United States within one hundred miles of. the place of caption, he must be notified.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The judiciary act of 1789, § 30, (1 Stat. 89,) required notice from the magistrate before whom the deposition is to be taken, to the adverse party or his attorney, “if either 13 within one hundred miles of the place of caption.” See Dick v. Runnels, 5 How. (46 U. S.) 8. This provision was modified by the act of 1872, c. 146, (17 Stat. 89,) which requires “reasonable notice” in writing to the adverse party or his attorney. See Rev. St. § 863.]</p>

<p>Case No. 519.</p> <p>Release of Vessel from Custody — Priority of Claim.</p> <p>AVhere a vessel was libelled, and seized under the process, then released by the marshal from custody, upon consent of the libellant, and was subsequently libelled by other parties, condemned and sold: Held, that the first libellant had no claim to be first paid out of the proceeds; that the consent to release the vessel operated as a waiver of priority of claim.</p>

At law. Replevin. Avowry for rent-plea, no rent arrear, and issue. The defendant had drawn an order on the plaintiff on account of the rent, in favor of R. Smith, for $87.50, which was accepted by the plaintiff. This was outstanding at the time of the distress, and was not credited. The amount distrained for was $175, on the 7th of August, 1823. Suit was brought by Mr. Smith against the plaintiff upon her acceptance in November, 1823.

<p>Case No. 521.</p> <p>Collision — Between Sailing- Vessels — Tacking —Customs on North River.</p> <p>1. The estimate or judgment of witnesses formed in the night time, and expressed orally, or exhibited on charts or diagrams on a vessel in motion, are of slight weight in determining the relative position and bearing of another ves. sel, also under motion.</p> <p>[See The Narragansett, Case No. 10,019.]</p> <p>2. A vessel close-hauled on the wind has a right to rely to the last moment on the ability and care of another meeting her with the wind free to avoid a collision, and is not responsible for a wrong movement on her part, caused by the negligence of the one running free; but a vessel close-hauled is bound to hold her tack, so as not to come round in the way of one free and endeavoring to avoid her.</p> <p>[Cited in The Greenpoint, 31 Fed. 232.]</p> <p>[See The Catherine v. Dickinson, 17 How. (58 U. S.) 170; The Clara II. Porter, Case No. 2,792; The Clement, Id. 2,879: The John Stuart, Id. 7,427; The M. M. Hamilton, Id. 9,685.]</p> <p>3. A vessel running free has no right to cross the bows of a beating vessel, unless she has clearly room to do it without disturbing her course; nor to come so closely upon the stern of the other as to create apprehensions of a collision, and alarm her into a change of her course to escape it.</p> <p>[Cited in The Free State, Case No. 5,090; The Maria & Elizabeth. 7 Fed. 255; The Renovator, 30 Fed. 195.]</p> <p>[See The Rebecca, Case No. 11,618; Allen v. Mackay, Id. 228; The Blossom, Id. 1,564.]</p> <p>4. A vessel on the wind has the right to run out her tack, and it is the duty of another vessel approaching her before the wind to take the necessary precautions to avoid a collision.</p> <p>5. The customs as to the navigation of the North river are in consonance with nautical usages at sea, and the rules regulating such navigation are the same as obtain in regard to sea-going vessels.</p> <p>[See Newton v. Stebbins, 10 How. (51 U. S.) 586; The Santa Claus, Case No. 12,327.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by Archibald hi. Pentz and others, owners of the brig William Edwards, against the steamer Ariadne, Charles Mallory, claimant,] for a collision, which took place about 11 o’clock P. M., on the 13th of December, 1S65, between the brig William Edwards and the steamer Ariadne. The brig was bound from Havre to New York. The steamer was a propeller, bound from New York to Appalachicola.

<p>In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court [by Archibald M. Pentz and others, owners of the brig William Edwards] against the steamer Ariadne, [Charles Mallory, claimant,] to recover for the damages sustained by the libellants, by the sinking of a brig owned by them, through a collision, which took place between her and the steamer at sea, the steamer having struck, stem on, the starboard side of the brig. The district court dismissed the libel, [The Ariadne, Case No. 524.] and the libellants appealed to this court. [Decree affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the decree was reversed in 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 475. See note to The Ariadne, Case No. 524.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem by the United States against the schooner Ariel and cargo, claiming a forfeiture of both for violation of the revenue laws. For the vessel and a part of the cargo no claim was made; but the ■balance of the cargo was claimed as goods brought from a domestic port and not subject to duty.

<p>Case KTo. 538.</p> <p>Prize — Violation or Blockade — Act or Master —Owners or Vessel and Cargo.</p> <p>1. In case of breach of blockade, the owners of the vessel, in a prize court, are conclusively bound, in all cases, by the act of the master.</p> <p>2. It is also a general rule that the owners of the cargo are bound in like manner; and the few cases in which persons interested in the cargo are permitted to show that the act of the master in violating blockade was against their wish, are carefully guarded, and are chiefly such as present a kind of physical impossibility of their knowledge or desire.</p> <p>3.Examination of facts to show a hostile-destination and ownership of cargo.</p> <p>[NOTE. For a subsequent hearing in this case concerning the distribution of the proceeds of the condemnation sale, see The. Aries, Case No. 529.]</p>

In admiralty. No special counsel appeared for any of the contesting parties, though opportunity was offered to the parties to he so represented. The whole cause was presented, by consent, by R. H. Dana, Jr., U. S. Atty.

[At law. Action of debt on administration bond by the governor of the state of Arkansas against Bennett B. Ball, John S. Blair, and Benjamin F. Howard. Defendants demur.

<p>Case No. 531.</p> <p>Patents for Inventions — Patentability— Novelty.</p> <p>A notch in one thickness of a paper bag with an evenly cut mouth, such notch facilitating the opening of the mouth, being in existence, a paper bag made with such a notch in one thickness of a mouth cut with jagged or serrated edges, with a view to facilitate the opening of the mouth, is not a patentable invention.</p> <p>[Cited in Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. y. Electrical Supply Co., 144 U. S. l8, 12 Sup. Ct. 604.]</p>

[In equity. Bill for injunction by James Arkell and Benjamin Smith against the J. M. Hurd Paper-Bag Company,] founded on letters patent granted to the plaintiffs, June Cth, 1865, [No. 48,036,] for an “improvement in paper-bags.” The specification said: This invention consists in making or preparing paper-bags in such a way as to give them, at their upper ends, a flexible character, so that, when properly filled with flour or other substances, the sides of the bags, at their…

<p>Case Mo. 534.</p> <p>Salvage — Towage—Tendee—Costs.</p> <p>1. Where a libel, claiming 81,000 as salvage, ror service rendered by a steam-tug m towing a schooner away from a slip where there was a fire, was filed by the owner of the tug, who was not personally present when the service was rendered: Held, that the case was not one of salvage, but that the libellant was entitled to reasonable compensation for the use of his vessel.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. It appearing that the service occupied but two or three hours, that another vessel was towed out at the same time, that the steam-tug was not diverted from any other occupation, that her usual compensation was from $10 to $15 an hour, and that the master of the schooner had refused to pay more than $50: Held, that that sum was sufficient, and that the libellants should recover that sum without costs. That, if the $50 had been tendered or brought into court the court would have awarded costs to the claimants.</p> <p>[NOTE. For cases in which aid or assistance in extinguishing a fire on shipboard has been held to be a salvage service, see “The Oonnemara. 108 TJ. S. 352. 2 Sup. Gt. 754; Murphy v. The Suliote, 5 Fed. 99; The Cloud, 29 Fed. 272. The owners of a steamboat are entitled to_ a reasonable compensation for tow-age in towing a burning vessel from one shore of a river to the other; but they are not, for that service alone, entitled to salvage. Emerson v. The Pandora, Case No. 4,442. So, also, was it held that a tug assisting in extricating a burning vessel was only entitled to compensation for the towage. The Cyclone, 16 Fed. 486. But a tug which had brought up to a pier, within reach of the fire department, a burning barge, was held entitled to salvage, but not as upon derelict property. Corwin v. The Jonathan Chase, 2 Fed. 268. A steamship and cargo valued at $433,-000 were towed into the stream from a pier on which a fire was spreading rapidly. The service occupied about an hour, and the steamship was entirely unharmed. There were other tugs near, which might have performed the service. Each tug was awarded $2,000 as salvage. The New York, 34 Fed. 922. A steamship and cargo valued at $600,000 'requested a tug to tow her away from a burning slip. Two others assisted, and in about two hour» the steamship was moved out of danger. The steamer could have been warped across the slip by her donkey engines, which had steam up. Salvage to the amount of $4,500 wa» awarded the three tugs, in proportion to their relative merits. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. The Holland, 44 Fed. 362.]</p>

Claim [by the heirs of Jose F. Armijo] for three leagues of land in Solano county, rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimants.

<p>Case No. 537.</p> <p>Collision in North River — Ferry-Boat and Steamboat — Followino Courses — Right op Way — Danger Signals.</p> <p>1. Where a steamboat on her regular trip across the North river, came up after a propeller also on her regular trip, which was going along close to the piers, and attempted to swing into her berth, having exchanged signals with the propeller and given a danger-signal which the pilot of the propeller heard but disregarded, and collision ensued: Held, That both vessels were in fault, the ferryboat for attempting to swing in and cross the course of the propeller when she did, being the following vessel, and the propeller, for disregarding the danger-signal and not stopping when there was sufficient time for her to do so.</p> <p>2. Under the circumstances, the ferry-boat, though compelled to enter her slip in a particular way, was not absolved from the general rule of navigation thereby, but should have held herself in the tide till she could swing in with safety.</p>

In admiralty. Appeal from the district court. Tbe schooner Fortitude, belonging to Williams and others, the libellants, citizens of the United States, with a cargo taken in at Martinico, and a part of her outward cargo carried from the United States, sailed on the 20th of August, 1809, from the said island to New-London, consigned to one of the libellants.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

In admiralty. Libel for damages occasioned by negligent towage. The libellant, the owner of the schooner Swallow, brought his action to recover damages for careless and reckless towage across’the St. Clair Flats in December, 1866.

<p>[In admiralty. Heard on demurrer to answer. Demurrer overruled.]</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill for injunction to restrain, further infringement of patent No. 2,435, granted to M. N. Armstrong, January 24, 1S42. Injunction ordered.]</p>

[At law. Action by Armstrong against Hoyt, collector, for the return of import duties illegally collected on certain importations of wool Judgment for plaintiff.]

[In equity. Bill by Edwin R. T. Armstrong against the Mechanics’ National Bank, of Chicago] to recover the sum of thirteen hundred dollars paid by the complainant under the following circumstances: Early in 1873, complainant became embarrassed, and being unable, as he claimed, to pay his debts in full, he entered into a composition arrangement with all his creditors, among whom was the defendant, by which he agreed to pay and they agreed to accept fifty cents on the dollar…

<p>[In bankruptcy. Petition by Charles Armstrong, assignee of George Garlinghouse, to declare void a levy in favor of Messrs. Rickey & Brother. Denied.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Robert Armstrong-against the brig Rydesdale for seaman’s-wages. The agent of the brig moves to dismiss the libel for want of jurisdiction. Denied.] The libel alleged that the vessel was an American vessel, and that the libellant served on board from July 25 to Dec. 6, when he was discharged, leaving $32 wages-due and unpaid, but it did not say where he-was discharged, nor that he was an American seaman.

On the 30th July, 1S32, the solicitor of the treasury, according to the provisions of the second and third sections of the act of 15th May, 1820, issued a warrant of distress against the complainant Andrew Armstrong and his surety, directed to the marshal of the eastern district of Pennsylvania, specifying the sum of twelve thousand nine hundred and forty-nine dollars and sixty-three cents, as the amount with which the said Andrew Armstrong was chargeable, for public moneys…

[In equity. Bill for injunction by Thomas Armstrong and Charles Case against the United States.] The bill stated, that in June, 1796, one Smith was appointed by the supervisor of New Jersey, to collect the internal revenue, within a particular district; and that he gave bond,- with one.Willis as his security- He was afterwards required to give additional security, and on the 1st of January, 1799, he, together with the complainants, as his sureties, executed a new bond, with…

Suit by complainant [W. W. Armsworthy] to acquire the legal title to the southeast quarter of section four, township twenty-eight, range twenty-five, in Crawford county. The facts appear in the opinion of the court.

[In bankruptcy. Certificate by register to district judge of question arising upon exception by a creditor to the rejection of his proof of debt.

[At law. Action of ejectment by Ahaz Arnold and another against Thomas Buffum.] The cause turned altogether upon the consideration of a clause in the will of Thomas Arnold, and was argued on the following statement of facts, agreed upon by the parties: “At the time of the making of Thomas Arnold’s will, and also at the time of the testator’s death, Peleg Arnold was under the age of twenty-one years, being the testator’s youngest son.

At law. This was an action on the case [by Isaac Arnold against Benjamin Clifford) for a libel, by publishing, in April, 1835, in the Providence Republican Herald, a false and injurious account of the trial of a cause, in which the plaintiff was a party. There was a special plea in justification, and issue thereon.

[In admiralty. Libel by one Arnold against Delcol and others, the owners of the. French privateer La Montague, and of the ship Industry, for the capture of the American brig Grand Sachem, commanded by Eben-ezer Baldwin, and owned by Arnold. Decree for libellant. Affirmed by the circuit court, but not reported; also affirmed by the supreme court in Del Col v. Arnold, 3 Dali.

At law. Assumpsit [by Samuel G. Arnold against Edward Dexter] on a note dated 16th February, 1815, for §666.80, payable to plaintiff or order. Plea, general issue and statute of limitations, and issue thereon. The suit was commenced on the 12th of May, 1824. At the trial the execution of the note was admitted.

<p>In a suit in equity in this court, [by Olney Arnold and Alfred H. Littlefield against Jonathan F. Frost and others,] the defendant Frost, after a final decree, took an appeal to the circuit court. On such appeal he executed a bond, with three sureties, to three obligees, who were the plaintiffs in said suit, conditioned “that if the above-named appellants shall prosecute said appeal with effect, and pay all damages and costs which shall be awarded against him as such appellant therein, if he shall fail to make said appeal good,” the bond should be void. A citation on the appeal was then issued. The circuit court affirmed the decree, with costs to the appellees. Two of the three obligees in the bond brought a suit on it, in this court, against the principal and the sureties, to recover on it. Among the defences set up were these — that this court had no jurisdiction of the suit, and that the interests of the plaintiffs were not joint but several, and they could not bring the suit jointly.</p>

<p>Case No. 559.</p> <p>New Trial — Application*—Stat op Execution— Entry op Judgment.</p> <p>Motion tor a new trial does not suspend the entering of judgment after one verdict; but execution will be stayed on application to the court.</p>

In bankruptcy. This was the case of a petition by Charles Arnold, Henry Adams, and Joseph C. Hicks, of Boston, praying, that Charles Maynard, of Lowell, might be declared a bankrupt. The petition set forth that the said Maynard, on the 5th of April, 1842, made a fraudulent mortgage to John L. Perry, his former partner, conveying all his stock in trade, the same being all his visible property, to secure a debt amounting to $2,200.00.

<p>Case No. 560.</p> <p>Right to Sue is United States’ Courts.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Lewis B. Arnold against William H. Peek to recover the value of the sloop Harmony, sunk in consequence of collision with the steamboat Isaac Newton. Dismissed.]

At chambers. On appeal [by James G. Arnold] from the decision of the commissioner of patents in the matter of an interference between claim of Jas. G. Arnold and patent of S. E. Pettee for an improved envelope for letters, &c. [Affirmed.]

At law. An action was brought, in New York, by a firm creditor, against the three members of the firm, after dissolution, on promissory notes made by the firm. Two of the defendants lived in that state, and the other, the present defendant, resided in Pennsylvania. No summons or other process was issued in the New York action; but an answer was filed by attorneys at law for all of the defendants.

<p>Case No. 563.</p> <p>Ejectment — Color of Title — Evidence — Limitations — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>L Under the limitation law of Illinois of 1S35, two things are necessary to the defense: first, possession, and second, a connected title in law or equity deducible of record, etc. Possession without title counts for nothing. The party in possession must have held under title 'for seven years next preceding the action brought.</p> <p>2. To render an auditor’s deed evidence of title to land sold for taxes under the law of 1827, it must be first shown that the requisitions of the law have been complied with.</p> <p>3. The statute of Illinois of 1838-39, “to quiet possession and conform titles to land,” is not a limitation law. It is a legislative conveyance and adjudication of one man’s land to another, and therefore unconstitutional.</p> <p>4. Color of title in good faith must be such a title as would pass the land of itself, if a better title be not shown; if it do not amount to that, but is on its face bad. the tenant can not be said to take possession in good faith.</p> <p>5. The belief' of a tenant that his title is good must be a legal and intelligent belief, and can only be arrived at by an inspection of his title. If the court, on such inspection, pronounce it a connected title in law or equity deducible of record, etc., the tenant having been seven years in possession, would be protected under the limitation law of 1835. ■ The same would arise where the occupant held under “claim and color of title made in good faith.”</p>

Appeal [by William C. Arthur] from the decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant unto him letters-patent for an improvement in oil-cans for oiling machinery.

In admiralty. Libel [by Isaac W. Arthur and otkois] on a charter-party, in rem against the schooner, and in personam against the master.