Volume 1 — Florida Reports

This case having been docketed, and being called, Appellee by his Attorney, made and filed the following motion to dismiss the same, which fully sets forth the facts: And now on this 6th January, 1846, on the calling of this case, comes Thomas H. Hagner, an Attorney of this Court, and gives the Court here to understand and be informed, that the cause now placed upon the Docket of this Court, was heretofore, on the 31st December, 1844, docketed in the Court of Appeals of the…

The motion to dismiss this case having been overruled, the Court proceeded to consider the same. The facts are these : Preston on the 2nd January, 1839, made six several promissory Notes, payable to the joint order of Edward Carey, James R. Jones, Thomas Hoxey and Hines Holt, Jr., which the said Carey and others, as the joint sureties of Preston, endorsed in blank, and of which appellant became the holder. .

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the Court. 1st. That the maker of the note having become endorser subsequent to appellant, extinguished the liability of all prior endorsers, and cited: — Bayley on Bills, page 153. Chitty on Bills;, pages 248 —265. Blake vs. Sewal, 3 Mass. 556.

The facts and pleadings are fully set forth in the opinion of. the Coprt. , 1st. There being neither a scrawl nor a seal to Cotten’s name, it was not his bond.' 2nd. Cotten having signed the instrument after its negotiation, and after the death of one of the obligees (Nuttall,) his contract must have been either with the original obligees, Nuttall, Braden and ' Craig, or with the present holder.

This was an appeal from Leon Superior Court, to the Court of Appeals of the Territory of Florida, which was transferred from that to this Court. A full statement of the pleadings and evidence, except of the causes of action, are contained in the opinion of the Court.

<p>This was an. action of trover, for the conversion of negro man Will, commenced in the Superior Court for Walton county, in 1841, and tried at its Spring Term, 1845, when there was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff; from which defendants appealed. Pleas, general issue, and statute of limitations.</p> <p>On the trial, plaintiff gave in evidence an instrument, purporting to be a deed of gift to him, from Joab Horn — the father of Eli Horn, one of the defendants — and on which his claim is founded. This instrument, or deed of gift, was, on the trial, produced by the defendants, under a notice from plaintiff, of which the following is a copy :</p> <p>Territory of Florida, > Walton County. $ Know all men by these presents, that I, Joab Horn, of the Territory and county aforesaid, being in sound mind and perfect memory, are mindful this day to make a distribution of my property to my different children, to wit: David Gartman; that for the natural love and affection which I bear towards him, and my deceased daughter, Drucilla, and the heirs of her body. In the presence of witnesses, do this day bequeath, covenant, and positively deed, a ce.rtain portion of my property, to wit; a negro man, Will and wife Milly, and seven cows and calves; to which species of property, I, the said Joab Horn, have at this time in possession, and owner of, clear of any enthrallments; and is to remain undivided, and In my possession, so long as I live — and after my death, immediately, the stipulated property in this deed composed, to be bona fide the property of David Gartman, with its increase, to have and to hold forever and forever.</p> <p>In witness whereünto I have set my hand and seal. ,</p> <p> his </p> <p>JOAB !*! HORN, [seai.] marie.</p> <p>This 29th of June, 1829, and in the presence of,</p> <p>Jeremiah Saveli,</p> <p>Reuben N. Barrow,</p> <p>Richard J. Compton.</p> <p>The following are the endorsements on the deed:</p> <p>TERRITORY OR FLORIDA, )</p> <p>Walton County. J Personally appeared, Richard J. Compton, and being duly sworn, deposeth, that the within deed was fairly assigned and delivered in his presence.</p> <p>(Signed) RICH’D J. COMPTON.</p> <p>Sworn to and subscribed before me,</p> <p>(Signed) JEREMIAH SAYELL, J. P.</p> <p>Recorded, September 14th, 1829.</p> <p>H. G. RAMSAY, Clerk.</p> <p>The plaintiff also offered in evidence the deposition of Jeremiah Saveli, one of the Executors of Joab Horn, and also one of the defendants ; which, being objected to by defendants, was ruled out by the Court.</p> <p>The defendants gave in evidence the will of Joab Horn, deceased, executed subsequently to the deed under which plaintiff claimed, and revoking that deed; of which the following is a copy of so much thereof as is material:</p> <p>“In the name of God, amen: I, Joab Horn, formerly of the State of Georgia, but at present of Walton county, in the Territory of Florida, being of sound mind, but weak and infirm of person, sensible that it is appointed for all men to die, do make, ordain and publish, this, my last will and testament: First, for the purpose of leaving no part of my wishes in doubt, and trusting that none of my descendants will hare the impiety to attempt to disturb the disposition which I am now about to make of my wordly goods, I will state, that in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine, I made a certain disposition of my effects among my children, with the intention that the same should go into effect after my decease. This disposition of my effects, it has since become my design to alter in some particulars ; and it has been supposed that some of my descendants would resist any alteration in the same. Now, it is my express will, that should any one of those, to whom I heretofore expressed my intention to give any part of my property, attempt to thwart or prevent the accomplishment of this my last will, or any part of it, then such person shall forfeit all right to any and every portion of my estate heretofore, or hereby given, and the portion thereof destined to such person, shall return to the common stock of my estate, and be sold for the benefit of such of my heirs as shall not have attempted to thwart or prevent the accomplishment of my wishes, herein expressed. [The second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth articles, relate to the disposition of his pror perty to his different children.] Ninth: I appoint my son Eli Horn, Richard J. Compton and Jeremiah Saveli, executors of this my last will and testament, hereby revoking all former wills by me made. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this sixteenth day of May, in the year of our ¡Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three.</p> <p> Ids' </p> <p>(Signed) JOAB X HORN, [seai.]</p> <p>, mark</p> <p>Signed, sealed, published and declaied, by the above named Joab Horn, to be his last will and testament, in the presence of us who have hereto subscribed our names as witnesses, in the presence of the testator. ' (Signed) •</p> <p>WM. M. MOTHERSHEAD,</p> <p>CLESTIN PHILIBUT, his</p> <p>THOS. X BAGETH.</p> <p> mark </p> <p>The will was admitted to Probate, and recorded on the 17th day of August, 1840.</p> <p>The counsel for defendants requested the Court to instruct the jury, that the instrument of writing, purporting to be a deed of gift, was invalid. '</p> <p>First: Because there was no delivery of the property therein mentioned, nor a sufficient delivery in law of the said deed ; inasmuch as, although it was presented by the plaintiff to the recording officer for registration, yet it was produced on the trial by the defendants, under a notice from plaintiff; from which fact, the counsel for defendants insisted that the jury should presume it was in the possession, custody, and control of the said Joab Horn at his death, and was found among his papers by his executors, to wit: these defendants.</p> <p>Secondly: Because said deed is invalid in its nature, in thus creating a-fee simple, after a life estate in personal property; the Court ruling, that this instrument did not convey an estate remainder in personalty, after a life estate, but a present interest.</p> <p>Third: That said deed is testamentary in its character, and is revoked by the said will. '■</p> <p>Which instructions the Court refused; -whereupon defendants excepted.</p> <p>The counsel for defendants also requested the Court to instruct the jury, that even if this instrument, purporting to be a deed, was valid as a deed, then this action is barred by the statute of limitations ; which the Court reftsed, there being no evidence of an adverse possession until 1840, and this suit having been commenced jn 1841.</p> <p>The decision of this case depends upon the question, whether the instrument of writing, (purporting to be a deed of gift,) is a deed conveying a present interest at its date, or a will to take effect upon the death of Joab Horn who executed it. This instrument was found in the possession of the Sonor at his death, and was produced on the trial by the executors, the present appellants, under notice from the appel-' lee. If if be regarded as a deed conveying a present interest on its face, it is void for want of delivery. 4 American Com. Law, 235. No. 2, ib. 237, No. 9. 1 Iredell’s Dig. 175. Sec. 17 ib. 181. Sec. 60.</p> <p>But suppose for argument sake, that it was duly delivered» and in possession of the donee, it is then void as a deed because it is a gift, and by its terms the possession of the property is not to be delivered until the death of the grantor. A gift is incomplete and void until the possession of the thing given is delivered. 2 Blackr stone’s Com. 441. 2 Kentj 438. Hovenden on frauds, 421, 422.</p> <p>1 Eq. Dig. 397. As a gift therefore it was not binding on the grantor, at any time during his life. And if not binding might at any time be revoked; and if revocable and not binding, this instrument, regarded as a deed, conveys nothing, and is therefore void.</p> <p>If this instrument conveys no interest in the property, because the possession was not delivered, nor to be delivered until the death of the grantor, it cart at the most be regarded only as a contract, or rather a •promise to give at a future time. Now viewing it either -as a contract or a promise to give, it is void for want of consideration; a nudum factum, out of which' no action can arise. Natural love and affection, is a good consideration to support a gift made and perfected by delivery of the thing given. But it is no consideration to support a.promise or contract to give. To make the present instrument therefore binding as a promise or contract to give, it should have been upon a valuable consideration. There is no pretence of any such here, and without it, this instrument is void as a contract or promise to give ; Noble vs. Smith, 2 John’s rep. 52. Pearson vs. Pearson, 7 John’s rep. 26. Cook vs. Hastard, 12 John’s rep. 188. Grangiac vs. Arden, 10 John’s rep. 293. Fink vs. Cox, 18 John’s rep. 145. Hooper vs. Good, 1 Swan, 486. Cotteen vs. Missing, 1 Maddrep. 108.</p> <p>But regarding this instrument as a deed of conveyance, and not merely as a contract or promise to give at a future time, it is void because there is neither a good nor valuable consideration to support it. The natural love and affection, which Joab Horn had for his deceased daughter and her children, is no consideration to support a gift to David Gartman, after the death of his wife, the donor’s daughter. After her death, David Gartman does not stand toward the donor in the domestic relation, which makes natural love and affection a good consideration to support a gift to him. The natural love and affection which' the donor had for his deceased daughter and her children, cannot enure to David, to support a gift to him. Metcalf & Perkin’s Dig. 99, sec. 33. Ibid 107, sec. 107. Noy’s Maxims, 27 — 28. Roberts on Fraud, 453, note B.</p> <p>It is- at least questionable, whether a remainder can be created by deed in a personal chattel, unless it be by conveyance in trust. If this deed can convey no remainder in the property attempted to be conveyed, it is void on that account. 8 Bacon’s Ab. Title Remainder, 298 — 383—299. 2 Kent. 352, note. 2 Murphy’s Rep. 137. 2 Dev. Law Rep. 185. 3 Dev. 263. 2 Hawkes, 382. 3 Hawkes, 538. 4 McCord, 200. 1st Story’s Eq. Com. 874.</p> <p>If any one of the above propositions can be sustained, it then follows that this instrument, regarded as a deed, is void;'and it is believed that all are maintainable. But if any additional authority is wanted, to show that, as a deed, it is void, this is abundantly shown from the fact, that the books show, “ that all instruments which are to operate after death,” though intended at the time they were executed to be deeds, are wills; and it is immaterial what may be the form of the instrument, or whether made upon a good or valuable consideration. 12 New Hamp. 371. 2 Ves. Rep. 1st Roberts on Wilis, 59. 1st Williams on Executors, 54 — 55. 2 N. C. Reports, 295. Hovenden on Fraud, part 1st, page 253 — 254. 1st Equity Dig. 401, sec. 3, 402 ; sec. 16, 408; sec. 39, 42. -2 Eq. Dig. 584, sec. 13, 14. 2 Iredell’s Dig. 584, sec. 3. South Carolina Dig. 351. 4 McCord, 11 — 200.</p> <p>' In the cases last cited, it is evident that the parties who executed the instrument, thought at the time they w’ere making deeds, which transferred the property, and were, irrevocable. So did not think Joab Horn, when he made this instrument, as is proved from the face of it.</p> <p>This instrument is not only more like a will than any of the deeds poll, above referred to, for they were in all things like deeds of conveyance, except in the time the gift was to take effect — in pos-| session of the .donor — viz: “ after the death of the grantor.” But. this is upon its very face, more like a will than a deed. It is like a deed in nothing, except, “he positively deeds,” arfd signs it with a-seal at the end of his name ; neither of which has much tendency to prove it to be a deed; as wills are often made with a seal, and generally are in the present tense, “ I give.” 1st William’s Executors, 55 — 95.</p> <p>The whole face of the instrument, with this exception, shows that it is a will, and was so intended.</p> <p>Bjit if it is a will, it is revocable — if revocable it has been revoked by a subsequent will.</p> <p>I. First exception — Want of delivery : — Delivery ofthe property in specie, was not necessary to the consummation of the gift or grant— because: — 1. A present delivery was not consistent with the nature of the interest conveyed, which was a remainder after a life estate. And because: 2. The delivery proved was a sufficient delivery in law.</p> <p>1. “ Delivery must be according to the nature of the thing.” 2 Kent’s Com. 439.</p> <p>2. The fag; of the delivery to Gartman was for the jury to determine ; and mthis Court it is to be presumed the delivery to him was complete — (as was the fact.)</p> <p>“ A delivery to á third person, as the servant or bailee of the grantee, will be valid.” Soubervye & Wife vs. Arden, et. al. 1 J. Ch. R. 240. 9 Mass. R. 307 — 10. Verplank vs. Sterry, 12 J. R. 536. 15 Wendell, 656.</p> <p>“ Delivery to a third person, though not an agent of grantee, sufficient.” — 1 Tom. Law Dicty. 523. 8 B. & C. 67Í.</p> <p>“ A formal delivery (of a deed) is not necessary, if there be acts evincing an intent to deliver.” Goodrich vs. Walker, 1 J. C. 250.</p> <p>But the exception does not seem so much to negative the original delivery, (that fact having been established by the jury,) as to intimate that the subsequent possession of the deed by the grantor, amounted to a revocation.</p> <p>This position is opposed by numerous authorities, and is adverse to well established general principles. ' A gift, once consummated by actual or constructive delivery, cannot be recalled, without the consent of the grantee. . .* . . ’</p> <p>“ If a deed'has been once delivered, so as to take effect, a second delivery can be of no avail.” V. vs. Sterny, 12. J. R. 536.</p> <p>“ If a deed be duly delivered in the first instance, the subsequent “ custody-of it by the grantor will not destroy-the effect of the delivery.” 'Soubervye & Wife, vs. Arden et. al. Í J. C. R. ¿56.</p> <p>“ Even non-delivery, unless accompanied by other circumstances, 4 will not avoid á deed.” : , •</p> <p>Ib. 257, quoting 2 Yern. 473, and 1 Atk. 625, in which Lord Hardwicke held, that a voluntary deed, formal as to-its execution, and without a power of revocation, and kept by the grantor, uncan-celled,' was not- to be defeated by a subsequent will.</p> <p>He went even further, in the case of Johnson vs. Smith, (257,) in 1 Ves. 314.- . -</p> <p>44 A voluntary’settlement, without power of revocation, cannot be revoked” — ib. 258, referring to Villiers vs. Beaumont, 1 Yern. 100 ; and Bole Vs. Newton, 1 Y©rn. 464 — “ though retained by thé grantor in his possession, until his death.” -Ib. Bunn,- et.-ál., vs. Winthrop, et. al., 1 J. C. R. 329 — 30—31—36—37.</p> <p>The delivery of the- deed to Gartman having been shown to .be sufficient; and irrevocable, ft is scarcely necessary to adduce any authority to show, that a gift or grant- by deed, is equivalent to the actual.delivery of-the.chattel. This point was conced^ on the trial, and no longer admits of any . doubt. ' * - . ' ' •</p> <p>J refer the Court, however, to. a few authorities on this head.</p> <p>“ As, between the parties, a voluntary transfer, by deed, of a chat-14 tel interest, is valid, without any consideration appearing.” Bunn vs. Winthrop,-1- J. C. R. 329 — 330-^331—336—7.'</p> <p>Delivery, though in general necessary to the validity of a gift, may be supplied by-deed-or writing. 2 Kent’s Com. 438. . Flower’s case, Noy’s Maxims, 57. Irons vs. Smallpiece, 2 Barn. & Aid. 551.</p> <p>44 Written obligations to give, even where there is no consideration, will be enforced.” ■ 2 Bl. C. 446.</p> <p>In, this'case, there was a good consideration moving the" grantor, which makes the casé stronger than where-the deed is purely voluntary. " ,-</p> <p>II. Wp come now to the second exception, which denies that a a remainder may be limited, after a life estate, in personal property.</p> <p>This may have been law once, but it is long since exploded ; and no point is better established by authority, than the one opposed' by this exception. '</p> <p>Chattels may be limited overby way’of remainder, after a life estate. 2 Kent’s Com. 352. Smith us. Clever, 2 Vern. Rep. 59. Hyde us.-Parrot, 1 P. Wins. 1.' Tissen vs. Tissen, ibid, 500. Ban-dallas. Russell, 3 Mer. R. 190. And such a . repaainder may be created^ equally by grant or devise. Note bn 2-Kónt, C. 352. Child v's. Baylie, Cro. J. 459. ^Powell vs. Brown, S. C, .Law Journal,'^42. • .</p> <p>Prefer also, as to the general principle, to the following cases:— Moffat us. Strong, 10 J. R. 12. Westcott us. Cady, 5 J. C, -R. 334. Scott us. Price, 2 Sergt. & Rawle, 59. Royal] vs. Eppes, 2 Mun-ford, 470. Mortimer us. Moffat, 4 H. & M. 503. Madden us. Madden, Ex’rs, 2 Leigh, 377. * *</p> <p>“ The rule that a remainder may be "limited, after a life estate in “ personal property, is as we,11 settled as any other principle of our “ law, The attempt to create such limitation is no,t opposed, by,the “ policy of the law, or by any of its rules.”' Smith us. Bell, 6 Pe'ter’s Rep. 78. * ,</p> <p>Blackstóne is conclusive on this point, He says: “By the an- “ cient common láw, there could be no future property, to take “ place in, expectancy, created in personal goods and chattels — but “ yet in last wills such limitations were permitted, though originally “that indulgence was only shown, when merely the use of the goods, and not the goods themselves, was given to the first legatee. “ But now that distinction is disregarded ; and therefore, if a man, “ either by will or deed, limits his books or furniture to A, for life, “with remainder over to B, this, remainder over is good.”,, 2 Bl. Com. 398. - .1 v</p> <p>The case before the Court is precisely such a one. Jóáb Horn • conveys a remainder to Gartman, after a life estate' to himself; or it is more closely assimilated to the gift of the‘use, to a first legatee, with remainder over. • . • • •-</p> <p>:In contradiction of all these authorities, a single case was relied on at bar, from McCord’s Reports, whiqh I have not before me. I think its tenor was opposed to the creation of an estate in futuro, without an intervening’ interest. It is obvious, I think,-that this case is not one of that kind — a present intérest is -conveyed by the deed, which attached upon the’ delivery of the deed, though its enjoyment was postponed to a future time. In the case Of Lightioot’s Ex’rs, vs. Colgin & wife, this . point is cle'arly established. At the 77th page, 5 Munford’s Reports, Judge Roane, in expressing, his‘concurrence with the Court, speaking of a certain conveyance, which 'was the subject of controversy, says: “ Considered ás a grant, it is of no importance that' a remainder Only is granted,' while the life estate is retained. That remainder is a vested interest — is-a real advancement, and may. be alienated.” ■ •</p> <p>Other parts of this case are good authority, on the subject of the retention of the property by the donor, not defeating a gift, to take effect in futuro. % ' . . ..</p> <p>, III. The third exception alledges, that the deed is testamentary in its character.</p> <p>>To this objection I oppose: 1. The evident intention' of the donor. And % The terms of the instrument itself. .</p> <p>1. Joab Horn did not reg’ard it as a will, for otherwise he would not- have delivered it to Gartman,’ to have had it recorded. He would not haye made- provision in -the instrument for the property remaining in his possession', if he had regarded it as a will, which could have no effect, till'after'his death. He speaks in the instrument o'f it, as “ litis deed” — a term too familiar, even tO the unlearned, to have been applied by him .to a paper designed for á will. And above all, he makes no disposition of the.residue of his property, nor mentions his other children, ant! appoints no executors. In short, there is nothing about the whole instrument to support the exception, but the single word bequeath,^ used in connection with the binding phrase, positively deed." This is a word, (bequeath,) not so familiar tó the unlearned; and here it evidently conveys no meaning, adverse to the well understood word deed, 'used more than once. . •</p> <p>The whole structure pf the instrument — its singleness of character, (being confined-tó a conveyance of a single piece of property, to a single individual,) with all its -incidents,'intrinsic and extrinsic, negative the idea-that Joab Horn designed it for a will. /</p> <p>But I contehd that, whatever might be the intentions of Joab Horn, the terms of the instrument are'such as to control that intention. . ; ></p> <p>“ A deed is a writing, sealed and delivered by the, parties.” ’ I Tom. Law Diet. Title Deed.</p> <p>The delivery iftakes it differ from a will. “ A deed may be good without all'the formal parts.” Ibid, 523,.</p> <p>There was a' grantor — a grantee — a thing granted — :a good consideration’; (though this last was not essential)-r-and sufficient words, s.uch as deed, and positively'deed, and is to become the property of, &c., to convey an interest present, and irrevocable. ;. ■</p> <p>Again : a gift may be made without deed, and any words used to signify an intention to give, suffice. The only object of a deed is, to serve as an evidence of the gift ; and in some cases, /to answer in lieu of a present .delivery of the property. No greater formality is necessary in a gift by yriting, than in a'.verbal-gift; if the intention is manifest, that is all that is required. ■</p> <p>Besides, “an uncertainty shall be taken in favor, of the grantee;” Jackson on Dem. . Butler vs; Gardiner, 8 J. R.'394. ' ,</p> <p>Joab>Horn’s subsequent declarations in his will,.cannot nullify his antecedent gift, if it ever was such. ..' ,</p> <p>“ Declarations of the intentions, on understanding of a grantor, “ different from the intent Apparent on the face of a deed, to be effec-f‘ tual,. must be'made at the time of executing it.” Soubervye & wife vs. Arden, 1 J. C. R. 2.40. *</p> <p>Joab Horn'reserving, a-life estate in the negro, cannot be regarded as in any wise converting the grant into a will.</p> <p>“ A deed of trust, if not revocable by the graritbr, is nqt to be considered a will-in disguise, on the grounds that nearly all his personal estate is thereby, conveyed, and that he reserves to himself the possession and control of the property during his Jife.”' Lightfoot’s Ex’rs vs. Colgiii & wife, 5 Munford’s Rep. 42 — 69., -.See judgment of the Court in same casp, passim, commencing page 80.</p> <p>IT. The fourth exception relies upon the statute; of limitations, as a bar to this action. ' ' , ■</p> <p>• This statute was made to bar stale claims, and punish negligence. Joab Horn died in, Í840: — who could have sited him for the negro mentioned in .this-deed, while living? Certainly not/David Gart-man, or any claiming under him. ■ He Had no .right to the possession of the negfo till the old man’s death,-and within a year after that occurred, suit was brought. ■ "</p> <p>The cause of action accrued to David Gartman in 1840, and not sooner;.and the statute, as to him, began to run only from thattime. If he was barred by the statute, then would every remainder man be barred, when, the particular estate happened to be of longer duration than five years. * " .</p> <p>, There must be an adverse possession too, to enable a person to bring an- action surtrover; and the statute ■ commenced to run,only from the time when the adverse possession begun.-' Surely it will not be contended that the possession of Joab Horn, during his life, was adverse, o' . •</p> <p>• I do not -deem it necessary to trouble the Court with any authority on this- obvious point, beyond the familiar one;' in 1 Tidd’s Practice, at page 17.' A right of action cannot be barred till .six years after there has been a complete cause of action; as if, I promise to, pay a man £100 after he returns from Rome — the statute will not. begin to run, till after his return. , •</p> <p>(I have not Tidd before me, but this is the substance of the autho. nty-)'- ,</p> <p>Y. The last objection made, is to the'éxclusion of Jeremiah Sa-ville’s deposition. J ' ,</p> <p>Saville is one-of the'Executors, anda partydéfendant on-the -re. cord. The simple statement of the objection' conveys a sufficient answer to it.</p> <p>The respectability, of the counsel making- th'e objection, induces me to refer to an authority or two — otherwise I should consider it almost .disrespectful to the Court to argue the .point.</p> <p>“A party to the record, though merely a nominal party, is not “ allowed to testify on the trial of the case, though he be willing, if “objected to by the party in interest.” Benjamin vs. Coventry, 19 Wend. 853. Frear vs. Evertson, 20 J. R. 142. Chenango Supervisors' vs. Birdsall','4 Wend. 453. Brown.w. Howard, 14 J. R. 122.</p> <p>' Addendum,. — “ A gift of chattels, to take platee after the donor’s “ death,'passes only those which remain in specie at the timé of the “ gift.” 2 Tomlin’s Diet. 32, quoting 3 Swan R. 400..</p> <p>The appellants bill of exceptions presents objections to' the sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s title, as well upon his own evidence, as also, when that evidence is met by the proofs offered by the defendants. I shall examine these points separately.</p> <p>. And Í. As to.plaintiff’s title upon his own evidence. - The plaintiff offered in’evidence the deed or instrument of writing,, signed and sealed by Joab Horn, on 29th June, 1829; so declared on its face by the witnesses, in these words : “ In withess wheréunto I have set my hand and seal, this 29th June, .1829, and in the presents of,</p> <p>Jeremiah Savill, 1 Ms Reuben N. Barrow, . > JOAB í*¡ HORN, • [seal.] Rich’d -J.^ Compton, ' J mark” ■</p> <p>■The witness Compton, made oath-before a Justice -of' the Peace, “ that the within deed was fairly assigned ;and delivered in. his pre-¡ sents,” and being thus-proved, the instrument was. recorded on 14th September, 1839, in the life time of the donor.</p> <p>The point made by the appellants is, that this instrument was not and is not a deed, but a mere contract tó give in future,- or at best a testamentary disposition. • ,</p> <p>The Court will be aided-in the correct. exposition .of this instrument, . by recurring- to the principal rules for the understanding of deeds laid down in Plowden, p. Í60 — they are:</p> <p>“ First, That they shall be taken most beneficially for the pkrty'to whom they were made. . ■ / , , .</p> <p>“Second, That a deed shall never be void," where the words may be applied to any intent to make it'good-on the principle, utresmagis valéat quam pereat,” • .</p> <p>“ Third, That the words shall be construed according to the intent of the. parties and not otherwise, and the intent directs gifts more than the words.” • , . ,</p> <p>The words used here are, 1st, ‘bequeath, admittedly a term implying a disposition'by will, but its inaptitude here is repeatedly admitted by the donor himself — calling the act over and over again a Seed. 2nd, Covenant, a woyd as clearly indicating a disposition by deed. ' 2 Black’s Com.' 338.. Shepard’s Touchstone 511-12. .Saunders on'Use’s, 566. 3 Comyn’s Digest, Cov.,(?. , .- ' ■</p> <p>This term too, more entirely comports with the consideration expressed ; a covenant'must notfo'e in consideration of money, for-that would be a bargain arid sale. 2 Wilson’s Reports 22.</p> <p>A person may covenant'to stand.seized to an use in futuro,, as.from Christmas next; or a deed which may take effect as a covenant; to stand, seized, is good, though the use is to arise after- the decease of the covenantor. - ’ Doe vs. Whittingham, 4 Taunton 20. And where the covenant is to stand seized to a future use’, the use, till it may vest, results to-the-covenantor.- Same case.</p> <p>•Resort must be had to the meaning of these terms, if we are to be met by the argument, that the term bequeath, is of testamentary disposition., And let us look again at the third term used in this instrument : . ■ ■ r</p> <p>3rd, Deed — “positively deed;” “ a certain portion of my property;” and again, “the stipulated, property in this deed composed;” The grantor “deedé the property.” Now as is well argued by Mr. Anderson, this word is of more general acceptation than' anj .other used — rit is significant in the fullest sense; and that the grantor understood its meaning, is clear from the subsequent recognition of the act' by himself — “in this deed composed; “ the property in this deed composed.” . ‘ '</p> <p>Now ■ “ a deed ex vi termini, means a writing sealed.and delivered.” Hammond vs. Alexander, 1 .Bibb, 333.</p> <p>It is no manner'of objection to the Courts carrying into, effect this instrument, or rather to the Courts recognition of'its legal bearing and effect, that it is not drawn with accuracy qr conformably with, precise precedent. See 5 Peters’- Sup. Co. Rep. 580..</p> <p>The intention is to be collected from the paper itself, from the understanding of the parties; and taking the whole instrument together, if the clear design of the grantor appears to be, to “ deed” the property, the. effect follows of consequence. ■ • - ; 1</p> <p>In 1st Massachusetts’ Rep. 219, is a case where the Court gave effect to an instrument having no words of grant in the premises, and held sufficient to pass a -fee to land, from the words used.in other parts of the deed. The Court recognizing the great rule of law to h'e, to effectuate the intention of the parties at the time; “ if it can be done consistently with the rules of law.” In that paper the term “ granted,” occurred — “ granted premises,” and a right “ to convey”— and from these, the .Court concluded the" intention and carried it into effect. Again, Patterson Justice, in delivering the opinion of the Circuit Court for the Pennsylvania District,'in 4 Dallas Reports 347, speaks to like effect, that to' effectuate the intention, is the great ruje of interpretation. Examining this paper then with a view to the intention of the parties, let us inquire 'what was the manifest intention of Joab Horn, when he signed and sealed it ? He .'declares1 himself “mindful this day to make a distribution of his property,” &c.; he does “ this day bequeath, covenant, and positively-deed” property, He then has “inpqssession.and owner of, clear of any enthralments.”</p> <p>Now did not the party intend to give a present effect to his present purpose ? Does he not declare his ability at that hour to. make the distribution, while'he is clear of debt ?, Does he not exhibit a plain purpose to vest a present interest in this specific property 1 And he couples with the active power of the clause, which positively deeds the property to Gartman, the Peoviso, that it is to remain in the possession of the donor during life, and then with its increase to be the property of the donee in good faith,</p> <p>Let us test the question of present interest; and to that end let me ask, would not this conveyance to Gartman, have protected the property against the creditors of Horn, who might have become such, subsequent to the deed 1 Suppose afterwards that Horn had become involved, all the world having notice of this transfer, would not the estate vested in David Gartman have been protected from such subsequent creditors ? .There cannot be a doubt, because when Joab Horn was “clear of any enthralments,” he had that day made distribution by deed of gift among his children ? When he had no creditors, when he was clear of the world, he had distributed his estate as he had a right to do, and there remained in him, but the use of the property during the brief remnant of his days.</p> <p>This point has been judicially determined by the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland in 1826, the case of Bohn vs. Headley. 7th Harris & Johnson, p. 257 to 272,.</p> <p>“ A deed of gift of -personal property from a father (who was not indebted at the time) to his child, executed, acknowledged and recorded, according to law; conveying the property to the child, with a PROVISION, that the donor was to remain in its possession and use , during life. Held to be valid both at common law and under the Statute of 13th Eliz. 1.</p> <p>An examination of that case will show the Court, that all the objections here taken were insisted on, before the Court of Appeals of Maryland. It was contended the gift was void by the Statutes 13 and 27 Eliz., that it was void at common law; that the gift; was re-vocable on its face, and that by the subsequent sale of the negroes to a third person, the grantor did revoke it. Each of these points was met by the Court, and decided in favor of the grantee under the deed. The Court will note further, that the decision is placed not upon the Statute of Maryland, but upon the Statutes of England and the common law. The subsequent purchaser was there the plaintiff below, suing for the negroes; and the grantee held the negroes against the subsequent purchaser from the Grantor.</p> <p>Another case from the'same Court, is yet nearer in analogy to the case at bar; and presents the distinct question, whether a donor can retain to himself the possession and use of the chattels for life, by the same deed of gift which passes the title to the property. In the case of Hope, Administrator of Hope vs. Hutchings, 9th Gill and Johnson 77; the defendants intestate executed and delivered to the plaintiff Thomas Hutchings, a bill of sale dated August 21, 1818, and for, and in consideration of the natural love and affection she bore to the grantee and his wife, (her- daughter,) and for the better maintainance, support and preferment of them, made the bill of sale of negroes, and all the household furniture of which she may be possessed at the time of her deceaseProvided, the said Hannah shall not be debarred or prevented, holding, using and enjoying the said property above as aforementioned, and all profits arising therefrom during her natural life.”</p> <p>Upon the construction of the deed, the Court by Stephen Judge declared, “ that from the terms of “ the instrument itselfj the legal '■‘title upon its execution immediately passed to the grantee, and that “ nothing more than a mere usu-fructuary interest or right of enjoy- “ ment, was intended to be reserved by the grantor in relation either “ to principal or profits.”</p> <p>So in the case from 1 Murphey’s law and equity, rep. 466, in North Carolina, it was decided in 1810; and in Caines & Wife vs. Marley, 2nd Yerger’s Tennessee Reports p. 582, the deed of gift re] served the possession, use and labor of said slaves for and during the natural life of the donor, and after his death, the said grantee was to have the actual possession with the absolute title see also, 1 Humphrey’s R. 171. Johnson us. Mitchell. And in each ofthese cases it will be seen that the principle is recognized of “ the power of the owner to dispose of the remainder of a chattel reserving to himself a life estate,” as considered in the 31st year of George III, to he good law, evinced by the judgment of the Court, in 1 Henry Blackstone, p. 535, in the case of Doe vs. Polgrean. I consider that the Court below struck the right path, when they declared, that David Gartman by the deed took “ a present interest in the property,” and the case from'Blackstone fully confirms it — that was the case of a present gift by deed vested possession in a certain event, and the case turned upon the point.</p> <p>In Grantham vs. Hawley, Hobart 132, it was held that a grant of “ such corn as should be growing on the ground at the end of a termwas a good grant, and it mattered not that it was not in possession, no! nor in existence at the time of the grant.</p> <p>It is not my purpose to enter upon the question of delivery of the deed — or the delivery of the property; nor to show the .authorities on this point. They are fully and ably presented by Mr. Walker Anderson in his brief. To a few additional cases, I will however call the attention of the Court, Comyn’s Digest, p. 278, title a. 2 Dyer’s Report, 167, B. 1 Croke 7, Shelton’s case. Shepard’s Touchstone 57. And' of modern date: 12.Pickering, 145. Banks m. Markesberry, 3 Litt, 275. Gardner vs. Collins, 3 Mason, 398. Caines & Wife vs. Marley, 2 Yerg 582. Pennington vs. Gittings, 2 Gill & Johns, 216.</p> <p>II. As to plaintiffs title upon defendants evidence.</p> <p>Upon the trial the executors offered in evidence, Joab Horn’s last will and testament insisting that he had thereby revolted this disposition of his estate.</p> <p>In order to give any effect to this will as a Revocation, the counsel insist that the paper under which we claim is a testamentary disposition — and how do they prove it ? By showing that even less formal papers than this, have been admitted to probate. I deny that this is any proof at all, and an examination of the cases cited, will show that the true principle is this, viz:</p> <p>0■ “Instruments of writing when nugatory in the character intended, are often set up as wills by the parties in interest, and are admitted to probate in order to carry into effect, the maker’s object which must other wise fail of accomplishment.”</p> <p>In 4th Eng. Eccle. rep. 108, Sir John Nickoll declares this general principle as settled law.-</p> <p>Also see Rigden vs. Vallier, 2 Yesey Senior, 255, deed void for want of livery, set up as a will. See Masterman vs. Baberly, 4 Eng. Eccle. Rep. 108.</p> <p>The case cited in the notes to 1 Williams on excutors, p. 65, note n. Bartholemy vs. Henry, 3 Philimore 318, and found in 1st English Eccle. Rep. 406, is the assertion of the-mere general expression that the Court- will give effect to dispositions of property to be consummated by death, although the deceased might not be aware that he performed a testamentary actand the text of Williams is in precise conformity with the principle coupled with this adjunct— that the Courts never give such effect to a paper on its face in different form, until it has failed to operate in that form. In 1 Jarman on Wills p. 13, note 1. “A paper which purported to be a deed and was executed as such, but which was not to take effect until after the death of the grantor was construed as a will in order to give it effect. Millege vs. Lamar, 1 Dess 617.</p> <p>• So then the Court will thus see, that the question whether this might not be construed as a will, and given effect to as such, cannot well arise here, until the Court have come to the conclusion that it is ineffectual as a deed.</p> <p>If ineffectual as a deed, we are out of Court. In another suit it may be contended that a paper may be testamentary in its character, and yet irrevocable by the Testator’s last will, as Lord Hardwicke in Peacock vs. Monk, 1 Yesey, Sen. 127, seemed to consider possible. But “ sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.”</p> <p>The case from 12 New Hampshire, cited by Judge Carmack counsel for appellants, is full to show the correctness of my position. The grantee failing to uphold the paper as a deed, sought to have it admitted to probate as' a Will. The Court say there is no intrinsic difficulty in this ; but then the party was met by the revocation of it— by his own consent and relinquishment of all rights under it, by his receipt of property under the last will and testament in lieu- of this very grant.</p> <p>In the case at bar, the party in interest does not seek to alter the face, nor to charge the name of the paper. The paper is a deed of slaves — we do not seek to set it up as a will-</p> <p>The appellants seek to set up this paper as a will, only that they may change its character — they would style it a testament, that it may become revocable — they would admit it a will, only to, render it nugatory — they seek not to give it effect but to destroy. We rely upon the deed as it is, signed, sealed and delivered by the grantor in his life time. Recorded and declared to all the world as his act and deed, over which he no longer had power and dominion — which was and is irrevocable in its very nature.</p> <p>As authorities are desired by the Court upon the question whether the paper A, is testamentary in its character, I will adduce them, with an argument to show their application.</p> <p>The counsel for appellants, declared, “ the distinctive characteristic of a will to be its reference to the futurethis is not precise nor accurate.</p> <p>The ambulatory character is its distinctive attribute — that is, the act itself is not fixed till death, nothing attaches “ in presentí.” Jar-man on Wills in his 1st vol. p. 11, well explains the distinction. He says, “ It is this ambulatory quality which forms the characteristic of wills, for though a disposition by deed may postpone the possession or enjoyment, or even the vesting until the death of the disposing party, yet the postponement is in such case produced by the express terms, and does not result from the nature of the instrument.”</p> <p>And the author then gives an example, closely analagous to the case at bar. “ Thus, if a man by deed, limits lands to the use of 1‘ himself for life, with remainder to the use of A in fee, the effect “ upon the usu-fructuary enjoyment is precisely the same as if he should, by his will, make an immediate devise of such lands to A “ in fee — for in the former instance, A, immediately on the execution “ of the deed, becomes entitled to a remainder in fee, though it is “not to take effect in possession, until the decease of the settler, “ while in the latter — (the case of the will) — he would take no inter- “ est whatever, until the decease of the testator should have called “ the instrument into operation.”</p> <p>Now apply .this reasoning to the case here.</p> <p>Immediately on the execution of the deed, David Gartman becomes entitled to a remainder in fee, though it is not to take effect in possession, until the decease of the grantor — -for the postponement is, in this case, produced by the express terms, and not from the nature of the instrument.</p> <p>Again: “ A will as to personal property is considered as having existence only from the death of the testator, not from the time of its execution.”</p> <p>Case of Elcock’s Wills, 4 McCord, 39, cited in 1 Williams on Ex. ch. 2d, note 3.</p> <p>In Audley’s case, in 4 Leon, 166, it was considered conclusive against the construing an instrument as testamentary, that by it an estate was to be taken by the maker, “ who could not take by his own will.” See 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 13, note e, Tompson vs. Browne, 2 Mylne & Keene, 32. 8 Cond. Eng. Chancery Rep. 262.</p> <p>Now, it is very true, that papers most inartificially drawn, have been admitted to probate — but for what causes, and on what grounds ? If its purpose be testamentary — if it is only to be consum. mated by death — if it is not to operate during life — if it comprises no beneficial dispositions — if no interest whatever is taken under it, but such as are ulterior to the death of the donor — in short, if death is the event which alone can infuse any life into the instrument, then it is considered as testamentary — then it is a will and testament. Love-lass on Wills, p. 317 — 8. 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 11. Thorold vs. Thorold, 1 Phillim 1. Roberts on Wills, p. 59. 1 Williams on Executors, p. 53 — 55. Shepard’s Touchstone, 399.</p> <p>And it is settled law, that the will could not be valid, unless there is present the “ animus testandi. ” If there were no intention of making an operative will, the paper is no will. Shepard’s Touchstone, 404. Nicholls vs. Nicholls, 2 Phil. 180. Taylor vs. D’Egville, 3 Hagg, 206.</p> <p>Oír He must do some act, declaring the instrument to be his will. Powell on Devises, 54. And it is clear that where the party intends to make, and does make a deed, he does not design a will.</p> <p>This paper writing, then while it is perfectly sufficient as a deed, would be entirely inoperative, were it propounded as will — for it never could be admitted to probate.</p> <p>I. It is no answer to the argument that this instrument is testamentary, to prove, from an elaborate examination of the books, that it is, in some respects, like a deed. Like a deed, it is under seal; but so occasionally are wills. The terms “ positively deeds,” are used, which'is by no means very common in deeds, and can, therefore, have but little, if any tendency, to prove that it was even designed to be a deed. Indeed this extraordinary expression is, I mil venture to assert, as unusual in deeds as it is in wills. But it proves nothing in regard to the legal effect of the instrument, which is the question to be discussed — and but little in regard to the design— especially when it is connected with the word “ covenant,” which is now used as a term of conveyance, and with the words'“bequeath,” st distribution of my property,” which are very common in wills, and wore probably never used in a deed, unless this should be decided to be a deed.</p> <p>II. The certificate of Probate proves only what the witness and Justice of the Peace thought of this instrument. It had a seal, and they thought it a deed. But their opinions are not authority to prove any thing to the present purpose.</p> <p>III. It is mistaking the question again, to apply the doctrine, that in construing an instrument of writing, the intention of the parties, if that can be ascertained, must govern; and when it cannot be ascertained, the writing shall be construed more strongly against the party making it. These are rules to ascertain the meaning of the instrument — to ascertain what the parties have said, by the instrument, that they would do, or had done. But what the parties designed the instrument to be, is another and very different question, which it is not at all useful to decide, nor need it be investigated, except as a matter of curiosity. For once the meaning of the instrument is ascertained, the law affixes its character, which the design of the party making it can no more control, than it can control any other stubborn rule of law.</p> <p>It is not that the party thought he was making a deed, that makes it a deed. In every case, and we have shown them to be numerous, both in this country and in England, where a deed-pole or indenture, has been declared to be a will, the party who made it thought that he was making a deed; and if the rule contended for on the other side, could control the character of the instrument, they would have been deeds.</p> <p>IV. A disposition of property, “ to take effect after death,” unless it be a present conveyance to a trustee, to save such limitation, has generally been held revocable, and therefore a will.</p> <p>The only cases cited, which form exceptions to this rule, are those from Maryland and Tennessee. In one case in Maryland, the administrator was sued, and if the instrument was good, either as a will or a deed, it in either character conveyed title, and the question might not have been deemed material. In the othei', the question whether it was a will or deed, was not made, and it probably escaped the attention of the Court. In the first case decided in Tennessee, although the Court relies partly upon the common law, to sustain the instrument as a deed, yet that decision mainly rested upon the authority of one case in North Carolina, decided shortly after the revolutionary war, and a dictum of Judge Haywood, that that decision had become a rule of property, in both North Carolina and Tennessee. These decisions, standing alone, against the other American authorities and all the English, can be no authority here.</p> <p>Numerous cases from North Carolina have been cited, almost in point, showing that this writing is a will, and void as a deed. The case in New Hampshire is in point. The party there did not offer it as a deed — perhaps he was too modest — and it was decided not to be a will, only because it had been revoked. The case in Mississippi is in point also.</p> <p>V. It is not necessary that this instrument, or any other, should first be decided by the Court not to be a deed, as is contended on the other side, before it could be offered for probate as a will. This did not happen in any of the numerous cases already cited, and no objection appears to have been taken to their probate as wills, on that account.</p> <p>VI. It may be true, as a general rule, that instruments of this kind have been regarded as wills, because they could not operate as deeds, from a benevolent desire to give effect to them in some form or other; but I am not aware that it has ever before been argued, that such an instrument must, and ought to be a deed, lest, perchance, it might be ineffectual as a will. I cannot, therefore, see the supposed inconsistency of our argument, by which we prove this to be a will, because it happens to be our intention to have it destroyed by the subsequent will. This inconsistency which is contended for, can only be proved, by. first showing that this little instrument is a more worthy object of the benevolent attention of the Court, than the last will and testament of Joab Horn.</p> <p>VII. This deed had no present operation, at .the time it was made. Its declaration that the property mentioned in it was Joab Horn’s, and that it was to remain his, and undivided, until his death, was the mere statement of a truism, which was just as true before it was stated in the deed, as it was afterwards. This cannot be called a present operation of the deed. If it may, every will has the same present operation. “ And then,” (after the death of Joab,) “ to be bona fide the property of David Gartman!” — the only part of the whole instrument which conveys the property to David. It was to remain Joab’s property during ,his life, and to be David’s at his death — precisely such an interest as a will would have created — with only this difference, that perhaps no paper, which was a will in form, ever so explicitly described just such an interest as the law allows to be given by will.</p> <p>VIII. It has not been shown that a delivery of the thing given, is not as necessary when the gift is by deed, as when by parol. A parol gift is as good as a gift by deed, if it can be as effectually proved. The deed may, in cases of a present gift, prove a delivery of the property, by way of estoppel — the donor being estopped, by his deed, from denying that every thing has been done necessary to make a present effectual gift. By this means the deed proves a delivery of the property. But there is nothing on the face of this instrument to estop the donor from denying the delivery; on the contrary, the deed itself proves that there was none, and that there was to be none until the death of the donor. It is then only a promise to give at a future time, and on that account void.</p> <p>IX. All the cases read, to prove that a remainder may be,created in personal property, are cases of wills or deeds of trust, except the cases from Maryland and Tennessee, if they may be regarded as exceptions. This we never denied. We merely deny that a remainder can be created in personal property, by deed, unless it be a deed of trust, and we have Story & Kent, to sustain us in this denial, besides the reason of the thing. By a conveyance in trust, the trustee becomes presently the legal owner; he can sue for, and recover the property, even from the cestui que trust. The relation of trustee and cestui que trust, is not known in a Court of law; it is only in a Court of Equity where it is recognized, and where contingent and future interests in personal property can be maintained and enforced.</p>

The defendant was indicted at the Spring Term, 1844, of the late Superior Court of the Territory of Florida for Wakulla county, for unlawfully erecting in the river St. Marks, a navigable water, course, a certain pier and obstruction, composed of wood and rock, and permitting the same to continue there ; whereby the navigation and free passage of the said river, it was alledged, was greatly obstructed and straightened.

Eeror to Leon Circuit Court. The facts are contained in the opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Hawkins. > 1. The Court below erred, in determining upon .the 2d plea, affidavit, and notice of special matter, that it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove a consideration from Reese, the payee, to- defendant, the maker.

This case came up by Writ of Error to Leon Circuit Court. This is an action of debt commenced April 10, 1843, against Martha Ann Parkhill Administratrix, &c.; and which was tried and determined, March 1845, in the late Superior Court of the Territory of Florida. The following is the cause of action on which the suit was instituted: Tallahassee, December 9th, 1840. Dolls. 94,182 22.100.

This case was brought up, by. writ of error, sued out by William Forbes, to Gadsden Circuit Court; defendants in error moved to dismiss the case upon the ground-that plaintiffs in error, have not authorized the institution of the suit, and that the writ of error Was prayed for and is now prosecuted without their privity or consent. The opinion of the Court contains the facts as agreed 'to by counsel. '

This was an action of trespass vi et armis, tried February 1845, in the late Superior Court for Leon County, when there was a ver-diet for appellant. On motion of appellee judgment was arrested; whereupon, appellant prayed an appeal. The opinion of the Court contains the reasons assigned for arrest of the judgment and the other facts of the case. Corporations, in all their privileges and liabilities, are assimilated as nearly as possible, to individuals.

The following tabular statement will show the different executions, which came to the hands of the Marshal, against the executors of A. M. Gatlin, and the endorsements on each of them: On 28th April, -1845, Willis, plaintiff in execution, No. 2981, took a rule on the Marshal, to show cause why he should not pay over to him the moneys arising from sale of the mules, corn and fodder, sold on 1st Monday in January, under and by virtue of executions in his hand, as the property…

<p>A person who has been appointed an Administrator de bonis non, after the institution of a suit, cannot be made a party to it by mere suggestion, although a copy of the record of such suggestion, and of his having been so made a party, be served upon.him.</p> <p>The,“ act to regulate the foreclosure of mortgages by the Courts of Common Law, and for other purposes,” is in derogation of the Common Law; and mortgagees, when they resort to it, should be held to a strict compliance with its provisions ;• but the mortgagor or defendant should be allowed more latitude in making his objections,' which it will he sufficient for him to set forth substantially and as specifically, as the defence in an answer in Chancery; or in a notice of special matter, under.the general issue ina suit at law.</p> <p>Neither the ordinary rules of special pleading, nor the technical rules o'f practice at law', are applicable to proceedings under this statute.</p> <p>When the mortgagee has elected to proceed at law, and has obtained a judgment there upon his debt, he cannot proceed under this statute; but he should go into Chancery to obtain a foreclosure of his mortgage.</p> <p>After judgment at law, a former recovery is a good plea in bar of proceedings under this statute.</p> <p>After demurrer to a plea, it is too late to object that it was not filed in time.</p>

<p>Where the record shows that a judgment by default, for want of a plea was entered, when in fact a plea had been filed and appeared upon the record, the Court will conclude that the plea was overlooked, and that judgment was .entered through inadvertence.</p> <p>When two distinct cases between the same parties, áre by consent, submitted at the same time to the same jury, the jury should return a separate verdict in each case.</p> <p>And in such case the jury should assess the damages, not pro rata, but according to the evidence in each case, independent of the other.</p> <p>Upon failure to rejoin to the replication to a plea of non damnificatus, there is no issue which can be submitted to a jury, and the defect is not cured by a verdict.</p> <p>A jury, after having rendered their verdict on Saturday and been discharged, cannot be recalled on the ensuing Wednesday for the purpose of putting their verdict in form, and apportioning the damages in each of the tw.o cases which had been by consent submitted to them.</p>

This cause was argued and decided at the last Term of this Court, but was again brought before the Court at its present Term by a petition for a re-hearing, filed on the 18th Feb.. 1846, after the adjournment of the Court, but within fifteen days after the decision of the case was pronounced;

<p>After entering.his appearance and a judgment by default for want of a plea hafc been entered against hiin, it is too late for an alien defendant to avail himself of the privilege, allowed .by act of Congress, of removing his cause from a State Court to the Courts of the United States.</p> <p>The Judges of the Superior Courts of the late Territory of Florida, under the clause of the Constitution of the State “ continuing all officers until su-perceded Under the Constitution,” took possession, after our admission as a State, of the records and papers, and exercised jurisdiction over suits pending and instituted in those Courts as State Judges. The State Judges elected afterwards under the Constitution, succeeded them and became possessed of the records and suits; and being so possessed, it was not only competent fór them, but it was their duty.to adjudicate them.</p> <p>In all cases ot concurrent jurisdiction, the Court which first has possession of the subject must decide it. .</p> <p>There being no provision, in the act of Congress for the transfer of cases from the Superior Courts of the Territory to the Courts of the United States, no such transfer could be made.</p> <p>The Superior Courts of the late Territory were not United States Courts as defined in the constitution of the United States; and the Districts Courts of the United States were not their successor.</p> <p>That clauso of the act of the Legislature which provides that causes pending in the Superior Courts of the Territory, shall be transferred to the Circuit Courts of the proper county, except cases cognizable by the Federal Court9 which may be organized in this State, which cases shall be transferred to such courts, is ambiguous, and the design of the Legislature was probably directed to cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States Courts.</p>

<p>An agent cannot maintain an action against his principal to recover the amount paid by him on a judgment obtained'against him for a false warranty of a horse, without showing that he was authorised by his principal to warrant the soundness of the horse so sold.</p> <p>The record of a judgment, obtained by the purchaser of a horse in an action for false warranty against the agent who sold, is not, in an action by the agent against the principal to recover the amount paid on such judgment, evidence of authority from the principal to the agent to warrant. Evidence of such authority and of a warranty made in accordance therewith should be aliunde such record.</p> <p>Receipt by the principal of the proceeds of the sale of a horse, sold by an agent, is not evidence of authority to the agent to warrant; nor is it a ratification of a warranty, unless there be evidence to show that at the time of receiving the proceeds, he knew that a warranty had been given by the agent.</p> <p>Where an agent to sell a horse makes a false warranty, the principal is liable to the purchaser and not to the agent, unless he can show that a deception had been practiced on him by his principal, and that in pursuance of orders or instructions, he Iona fide made the false representations, and is compelled to pay damages to the purchaser on account thereof.</p>

<p>Nil debet as Well as not guilty, may be-pleaded to an action suggesting a devas-tavit against an Executor. 1 ,</p> <p>By the 8th section of the-act of Uongfess to establish, a uniform system of ' Bankruptcy throughout the United States, the-assignee in Bankruptcy, cannot maintain 'an action, unless it be brought within ,two years after the declaration and decree of Bankruptcy.</p> <p>Under the Statute of the State, a party is entitled, after his demurrer has been overruled, to withdraw.it and reply to the pleading. If he fails to do this, judgment final will be entered against him;' . . í</p>

This ease, being a claim interposed under the statute to property levied on under executions in,favor of Willis and Moseley, was tried in the Superior Court for the late territory of Florida, at its Spring Term, 1845.

<p>This case is similar to that of T. Lane Betton, Trustee, &c. vs. Willis and Moseley.</p>

<p>A judgment against a garnishee prima facie is a bar to a subsequent recovery on the same note in the hands of any one. The law in such case constitutes 'the execution creditor an assignee of the note from the time of the service of the notice of garnishment, and entitles him to judgment as if the note had been regularly assigned to him by act of the party.</p> <p>By the judgment against the garnishee, the note in legal contemplation, becomes extinguished, lose3 its identity and character, and ceases to be the subject of future action.</p> <p>If however the Plaintiff be a bona fide holder of the note before service of the notice of garnishment, it would be otherwise, and he would be entitled to recover on the note, notwithstanding the judgment against the garnishee.</p> <p>It is irregular to sue out a writ of garnishment prior to a return of “no property found” on the execution, and the court will,'in such case, upon application, set aside the writ or excuse the party from answering. If however, the Defendant in execution neglects to make such application, he will be presumed to have waived the irregularity, and neither he nor his asignee will be permitted to disturb .the judgment afterwards in another suit, by presenting the question in a collateral manner.</p>

<p>On the death of a partner, the moneys, goods, and merchandize of the firm belong to the surviving partner, and a Sheriff as administrator ex officio of the deceased partner, has no right to collect, discharge or meddle with the partnership property in any way, except to obtain the deceased partner’s share after the settlement of the debts.</p> <p>A suit cannot be maintained by a surviving partner against a Sheriff, as administrator ex officio of the deceased partner, and his securities, on his official Bond, for the moneys, goods, and merchandize belonging to the firm, collected and received by him as such administrator.</p> <p>The securities of a Sheriff who is administrator ex officio, are only liable on his administration bond after the judgment of a court fixing the liability against him as administrator.</p>

Johns and Musquito. — His honor Judge Douglas, having been counsel for the appellant in the court below, retired from the bench at the hearing in this Court.

<p>On failure of a mortgagor to comply with the condition of the mortgage, the title in personal property becomes absolute in the mortgagee, and he may reduce it to possession; and his interest may be levied upon and sold under an execution.</p> <p>The condition of the mortgage being forfeited, an execution against the mortgagee of a slave, will have the preference over a bill of sale by the mortgagee-, made subsequent to the coming of the execution to the hands of the Sheriff, although such bill of sale be accompanied by possession and an assignment to the purchaser, by the mortgagor, of his equity of redemption.</p>

<p>This Court can only reverse a judgment for error in law.</p> <p>The correct rule, in cases tried by the Court sitting as a Jury, would seem to be, that where facts alone are submitted, and the Court has only to weigh the evidence' and determine accordingly, no Writ of Erf or lies: and Where mixed questions of law and facts are presented to the Court for its decision, no Writ of Error .lies, unless the Court is called upon to decide a question of law, or such question of law necessarily arises out of the facts, and is distinctly presented to the Court upon them, po that the decision of the point of law will decide the merits of the cause, and the decision of the Court is wrong.</p> <p>To support an action for use and occupation, a demise must be shown, or some evidence given to establish the relation between the parties of landlord and tenant.</p> <p>A lessee, who covénants to pay rent and repair, with express exception of casualties by fire, is liable upon the covenant for rent, .though the premises be burned down, and not re-built by the lessor after notice; and a Court of Equity will not restrain the lessor from suing for the rent.</p> <p>Where the lessor re-builds before the expiration of the term, and leases to a third party, the lessee, who had paid his rent in advance, but had abandoned the lease after the destruction of the property, is entitled to recover back the rent so paid by him from the time of the second lease, and at the rate which the landlord had received from him.</p>

John’s and Musquito. Judge Douglas did not sit at the hearing of this case. Assumpsit on the following endorsement on a promissory note by Dorman, the defendant: “ I agree to stand security for the payment of the within amount.” For the other facts, see the opinion of the Court. ■ This was an action on a note made by A. W. Walker, payable to Robert Bigelow, Ex’r., and guaranteed by appellant.

This case was brought up from the County of Hamilton, under the act of the' Territory of Florida, approved 6th February, 1841, entitled “An Act regulating Appeals and Writs of Error in criminal cases,” — the presiding Judge, his Honor Judge Hawkins, having continued the case and granted a certificate of a doubt upon a legal question which arose at the trial in the Court below, and transmitted the same to this Court for its decision.

<p>The endorsement of a note is not a collateral undertaking of the debt of another, within the meaning of the Statute of frauds; but is a new contract between the endorser and endorsee. The contract of each endorser being thus an independent one, he stands on the same footing as any other contractor, and possesses the same rights and powers as to any alteration, revision, or waiver of his contract of endorsement,bymnd with the consent of the endorsee.</p> <p>As a general rule, a verbal agreement between the parties to a written contract, made before, or at the time of the execution of such contract, is inadmissible to vary its terms or affect its construction: but, alter the contract is reduced to writing, it is competent to the parties, at any time before the breach of it, by a new contract, not in writing, either altogether to waive, dissolve, or annul the former agreement, or in any manner to add to, subtract from, or vary or qualify the terms of it.</p> <p>In cases ot a substituted agreement, the plaintiff can always declare on the written contract; and, unless defendant can prove performance according to the terms of the cqntract, or according to the agreement for a substituted performance, the plaintiff would be entitled to judgment.</p> <p>But these cases of substituted oral agreements being Considered in the light of new contracts, it is requisite that they be made upon some new and valuable consideration.</p> <p>An agreement between an endorser and an endorsee of a 'note, by which the endorser promised to pay the note at maturity, punctually and without fail, out of his own funds, and the endorsee, in consideration thereof, agreed to receive payment in t-he bank notes or bills of the Southern Life Insurance and Trust Company, which were depreciated, is a substituted agreement, founded on a good and valuable consideration, and is binding on the parties.</p> <p>A plea of a tender and refusal of the bank notes of. the Southern Life Insurance and Trust Company, on the day the note became due,- must be pleaded with a profert in curia of the bank notes.</p> <p>The Statute of Frauds does not apply to such new and substituted agreement, inasmuch as the endorser had for his object a benefit which he did not before enjoy, accruing immediately to himself, and by which he could pay the note with a less sum than was originally to be paid by him, in case of default by the maker.</p> <p>Entries made in the usual mode of business, and duly authenticated by the oath of the party who made them, are admissible in evidence, though the party making them can remember and testify nothing as to the fácts contained in the entries. The paper must be an original one, made at the time the facts contained in it are alleged to have taken place, and confirmed by the oath of the witness, that he believes it contains a true statement of the facts.</p> <p>The original Protest of the demand and non-payment of a promissory note is admissible in evidence, and evidence of its contents, when the Notary who made it testifies that it was drawn up at the time of the demand of payment, and that he believes the facts stated therein to be true, and to have occurred; else he would not have certified to their occurrence as Notary; but that he recollects none of the facts independent oí the Protest.</p> <p>Where aNotary testified that he sent notice of non-payment to the defendant! as stated in the certificate endorsed upon the, protest of the note, which certificate, stated that due notice of the protest was given the endorser, by depositing the notice in the P. 0. at Apalachicola, addressed to R. C. S. Franklin, Alabama, the reputed place of his abode; held to be sufficient proof of notice.</p> <p>No particular form of notice of dishonor of a note being necessary, it seems the notice would be good, if it bé sufficient to put the party on enquiry, and prepare him to pay the note, or defend himself; and even if there be some uncertainty in the description of the bill or note, if it does not tend to mislead the party, it will be good.</p> <p>When a note was made payable at the Agency of the Southern Life Insurance and Trust Company Bank, Apalachicola, which had been removed from Ap-alochicola some weeks previous to the day of the alleged presentment of the note, such removal rendered the demand at the Agency impossible: and when, demand having been made at the place of payment of the note, it was found that the Agency had been removed from Apalachicola, a sufficient demand was made to fix the endorsers.</p> <p>When facts or circumstances exist, which ampunt to an excuse, or do away the necessity of a demand, the declaration may be in the usual form, and proof of the facts which dispense with a'formal demand, will, in law, be deemed proof of a demand. ’</p>

<p>A surety is bound to the extent of the terms of his obligation, and no further.</p> <p>A surety on an appeal bond conditioned, “‘How if the said A. shall pay said damages so recovered by said B. against him and costs, in case the judgment of the said Superior Court shall be confirmed by the said Court of Appeals, then this bond to be null and void,” is only liable for the amount of the judgment in the Court below, and costs, and not.-for the ten per cent damages awarded by the Court of Appeals, against A.,the party taking the appeal.</p> <p>A plea of payment admifs the representative character of a plaintiff, suing as administrator, and dispenses with proof thereof.</p>

Ekkok from Jefferson Circuit Court. Assumpsit by Plaintiff, as Endorsee-of a Promissory Note, against Defendants, the Administrator and-Administratrix of William B. Nuttall, the maker thereof. The case was tried at the Spring Term, 1846, ,of Jefferson Circuit Court, Judge Macrae, presiding: . Pleas: 1st. Gen. issue. •' -2d. Statute of limitations. 3d. Plene Administravit. 4th.

<p>The 1 Sc 2 sec. of the Act of 1833, “ regulating the rate of interest,” were re» pealed by the Act of 1844; but prior to the repeal, a contract was made whereby a greater rate of interest than that thereby allowed was reserved and taken ; held that the repeal of the Act of 1833, was no bar to the plea of usury under that Act; and that the rights of the parties must be governed by the law in force at the time of the making of the contract, and that they were not affected by the subsequent repeal of the said Act.</p> <p>When a contract is, by force of a Statute, illegal at the time of its inception, no action can be maintained upon it, although the Statute declaring it ille» gal be repealed.</p> <p>The law of 1833, which declared that the interest on any usurious contract shall be void, and the obligor forever exonerated from the payment of the same, vested in the obligor a right which could not be divested by posterior legislation repealing such law.</p> <p>When' illegal interest is taken or contracted for, the whole interest becomes void from the time of the taking of the usurious interest.</p> <p>To establish usury, it is not neeessary to show that the Plaintiff actually took, or received, more for interest than the law declared lawful, but it is sufficient to show that it is promised to be paid; and it is immaterial whether the usurious interest is secm-ed by a distinct instrument, or is included in the instrument which secured the principal.</p> <p>In order to render the offence complete, so as to subject the lender to the penalty under the Statute, there must be an actual receipt of the usurious interest; but the contract may be rendered void without such receipt.</p> <p>A contract to pay more than legal interest for past forbearance is illegal.</p> <p>When the original contract is lawful no subsequent taking of, or contract to take, illegal interest, will invalidate it; and if sued on, Plaintiff may recover the principal and interest of such original valid contract; but when suit is brought on a new note, tainted with usury, which had been substituted for the original valid one, Plaintiff can only recover the original valid principal with interest thereon Up to the time of the taking of illegal interest.</p>

EseoS from Franklin County. His Honor Judge Douglas, presided at the trial of’this ease, at the Fall Term, 1845, of Franklin Circuit Court. Assumpsit on a Bill of Exchange, of which the following is a copy s “ Apalachicola, 6 Feb., 1844,; ■' Exchange for $8,500.

<p>This Court will only decide such questions as are presented by the cases before it.</p> <p>The Administrator of a deceased wife is entitled to receive her distributive share of her father’s estate; and a bill filed by him for that purpose against the Executors of the last will and testament of her father, will be sustained.</p>

<p>'The Statute of Limitations begins to run from the day the cause of action accrued ; and the Endorsee of a note cannot bring himself within its saving by alleging that at the time the cause accrued to Mm, he was beyond seas, &c.</p>

It appears from the record, that on 13th November, 1846, Felix Livingston, the Solicitor of the Circuit, filed a petition before Judge' Douglas, the Judge of the Circuit, the object of which was to have an order, made on the 15th September previous, allowing Fraser to withdraw from the files of the Court a certain written paper which had been filed with an indictment, and of which he claimed to be the owner, annulled and for a rule on the said Fraser to show cause why he…

Error from Franklin County. This case was decided at the Fall Term, 1844, of the late Supe-ñor Court of the Territory of Florida for the County of Franklin, The declaration was in trespass on the case against Bennett as owner and master of a certain steamboat called the “ Louisa,” and was to recover damages for the loss and non-délivery of a quantity of tobacco shipped by Filyaw in Dec., 1842, on board the same at Mount Vernon, for the city of Apalachicola.

<p>Where a debtor indebted on several accounts mjk.es a payment, he may apply it to either account; if he does not, the creditor may do so. If neither does, the law will appropriate it according to the justice of the case,, provided there áre no other parties interested.</p> <p>Where a party has sustained no injury from the rejection of admissible testimony, he cannot avail himself of the mistake to reverse the judgment.</p> <p>The identity of the answer and party who made it being shown, an answer of a party to a Sill in Chancery, which is depending and before the Court, may be read in evidence inn Court of Law to the jury, Without the reading of the Bill; and if the name and description of the defendant in law agree with the name and description of the party answering in Equity, it is prima facie evidence of identity.</p> <p>The Bill, as a general rule, is not read; but an exception to the rule is, that where the answer is an answer to particular interrogatories in the Bill, it also must be read; so, if the answer is obscure and needs any portion of the Bill to be read to explain it, then it may be read.</p> <p>If the verdict be conformable to the law and evidence, it will not be set aside merely because the Court refused to give instructions which might have been properly given. ' " • *</p> <p>The refusal of the Court to give an instruction which would not benefit the party asking it, is not error; nor is an erroneous instruction upon an abstract question of law, which is not involved in the decision of the Court, a ground for reversing the judgment.</p> <p>After a verdict in favor of either party, he has a right to demand of a Court cf Errors that it look to the evidence for only one purpose and1 with a single eye, to ascertain whether it was competent in law to. authorize the jury to find the facts which make out the rights of the party on a part or the whole of his case. If in its judgment, the Appellate Court shall hold the evidence was competent, then they must found their judgment on all such facts as were legally inferable therefrom in- such manner and with the same legal results as if they had been found and definitely set out in a special verdict. So, on the other hand, the finding of a jury on the whole evidence in a cause, must be taken as negativing all facts which the party against whom their verdict is given has attempted to infer from or establish by evidence.</p>

<p>Two pleas being filed, the one alleging that the cause of action did not accrue within four, instead of five years, and the other being a plea in abatement, not sworn to and filed after a plea in bar, the Court below took no notice of, or action on them: held, that these pleas being nullities which, on motion of plaintiff, would have been set aside, the judgment will not be reversed, because of the omission of the Court below to dispose thereof.</p> <p>As a general rule, until judgment is signed or there is final judgment, amendments to the pleadings may be allowed to the parties upon proper and equitable terms, and the declaration may be amended at any time, so long as the proceedings remain in paper.</p> <p>The doctrine of amendments as it stands at common law, independent of the statutes of amendments and jeofail, seems based upon the discretion of the Court, and applications for amendments are in nature of appeals to the equitable side of the Court.</p> <p>Suit was instituted against four defendants, A., B„ C. and D., and service of the writ perfected on A., B. and C., who filed a joint plea of non assumpsit: afterwards, all the defendants filed a joint plea in abatement, and of the statute of limitations: plaintiff then dismissed the suit as to C., and a trial was had and a verdict rendered against A., B. and D.; but, on motion, a new trial was granted. Plaintiff, thereupon, by leave of the Court, amended his writ and declaration by striking therefrom the names of C. and D. as defendants; and upon a trial a verdict was rendered against A. and B. Held, that the Court had a right, in its discretion, to allow plaintiff to amend his writ and declaration by striking out the names of C. and D. as defendants, and that the allowing of such amendment was not error,' for which this Court will reverse the judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal from Jackson County.</p> <p>The facts are contained in the opinion of the Court.</p>

Johns County. This was an appeal from a decree rendered by his Honor Judge Hawkins, at Spring Term, 1846, of St. Johns Circuit Court. A petition was filed in the Court below for leave to file a Bill of Review for the purpose of having a certain decree for the partition of the “ Arredondo Grant,” rendered at June Term, 1845, reviewed, reversed and set aside so far as defendants, John H. Lewis and wife, who'were parties and claimants under the-said decree, were concerned.