1 Ill. Ct. Cl.
Volume 1 — Illinois Court of Claims Reports
126 opinions
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1Fairbanks v. State (1889)
<p>1. Statute of Limitations—act of 181¡7 not repealed by act creating Commission of Claims1. The act of 1877 creating the Commission of Claims does not repeal Section 4 of the act of 1847 which provides that “Hereafter all unliquidated claims against the State shall be proved up and filed as above within two years from the time such claims may have arisen.”</p> <p>2. Same—act of 1847 not annulled by legislative appropriation for barred claims. The provisions of the statute of limitations cannot be annulled by the legislature making appropriations for claims barred by it.</p> <p>3. Same—act of 1847 in force. The statute of limitations of 1847 is in full force and effect.</p> <p>4. Damages—caused by construction of dam; can be only one satisfaction. Where a dam is constructed by lawful authority of the State there can be but one satisfaction for the injury sustained by landowners and that will be for permanent injury to the land caused by obstruction of the river.</p> <p>5. Same—erection of dam by State; action does not survive, A right of action for injury to land caused by the erection of a dam by the State does' not survive.</p> <p>6. Actions—damage by construction of dam—when it accrues. Cause of action for damages caused by dam constructed by authority of the State accrues at the time the dam is completed and closed and the water runs over the dam.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 8Baker v. State (1889)
<p>Waters—particular facts not showing damage by construction of darn. Court reviews evidence and holds that construction of dam in the Illinois river by the State of Illinois has not affected claimant’s lands and claim is rejected.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 10Hammett v. State (1889)
<p>1. Waters—damages caused by erection of dam by State. Erection of dam by State resulting in overflow of river and consequent injury to claimant’s lands will entitle claimant to an award for the actual damage received.</p> <p>2. Practice—claim not barred by statute of limitations. Above claim being filed within two years after the closing of the dam in question is not barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 13Neuhalfen v. State (1889)
<p>1. Statute of Limitations—unliquidated claims must be filed within two years. Unless an unliquidated claim for damages is filed within two years after the cause of action accrues, it is'barred by the statute of limitations.</p> <p>2. Actions—damages through construction of dam; when action accrues. Cause of action for overflow of lands caused by erection of dam across river accrues at the time of completion of the dam.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 15Shafer v. State (1889)
<p>Waters—damages to land by construction of dam by State. In order to entitle a claimant to an award against the State for damages to land caused by the construction of a dam by the State, the proof should be clear and unequivocal as to the damage sustained and what appears to be merely speculative should be rejected.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 17Merdian v. State (1889)
<p>Statute of Limitations—When claim is barred by. When damage is alleged to have been caused by the construction of a dam which was completed Oct. 21, 1877, and claim is not filed within two years from that date, it is barred.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 18Fisher v. State (1889)
<p>Waters—damages caused by construction of State Dam. The Commission reviews the evidence and finds that the claimant is entitled to an award for damages caused to his land by reason of the construction by the State of a dam in the Illinois river.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 19Schultz v. State (1889)
<p>1. Practice—change of claimant’s name. Change of given name of claimant after claim filed does not change cause of action.</p> <p>2. Statute of Limitations—when claim is not barred by. Claim filed April 20, 1880, for injuries to land caused by dam erected by State October 21, 1877, is barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 21Taemmes v. State (1889)
<p>Waters—damage caused Toy construction of dam. Commission, reviews evidence and holds that in consequence of the building of a dam by the State of Illinois across the Illinois river, claimant’s lands were damaged by said dam causing the water to overflow claimant’s land.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 22Weir v. State (1889)
<p>Waters—damage to lands by construction of State dam. Where State constructs a dam in a stream like the Illinois river and lands adjoining are permanently injured for future use, the State ought in equity to make such compensation as would pay the owner for the actual damage shown to have been sustained.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 24Wier v. State (1889)
<p>Damages—overflow of lands through construction of dam. Court reviews evidence and holds claimant is entitled to recover.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 25Stilt v. State (1890)
<p>1. Statute of Limitations—act of 1847 still in force. The statute of limitations act of 1847 is still in force.</p> <p>2. Same—Unliquidated claims must he filed within two years after cause of action accrues. Unliquidated claims must he filed within two years after the' cause of action accrues or they are barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 27Barton v. State (1890)
<p>1. Commission of Claims—power conferred upon by statute creating. The statute creating the Commission of Claims provides that the Commission shall have power to hear and determine all claims against the State for taking or damaging private property by the State for public purposes in the construction or for the use of any State institution, river, canal, or other public improvements which have not been already barred by any statute or laws of limitations.</p> <p>2. Statute of Limitations—provision of act of 1847. An act of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to limit the time for persons to bring claims against the State of Illinois, approved March 1, 1847, provides that all unliquidated claims against the State shall be proved up and filed with the Auditor of Public Accounts within two years from the time such claim may have arisen, and any claim not presented and proved up as above and filed shall be forever barred from payment by the State.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 29Birket v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—Damages to property caused by erection of dam by authority of State and consequent overflow of Illinois river. Held that claim filed two years from date of opening of dam is barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 30Oviatt v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim, must he filed within two years from time cause of action accrues. Claim for injuries to land by-reason of construction of dam by the State and consequent overflow of river is barred by statute of limitations, if not filed within two years after the closing of dam.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 31Morgenstein v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim not filed within two years is barred. A claim filed October 30, 1879, for damages caused by a dam erected by the State October 21, 1877, is barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 32Cody v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim barred by. Claim filed April 16, 1880, for damages to land arising from construction of dam on the Illinois river by authority of the State which dam was completed and closed in October, 1877, is barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 33Teufel v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim must be filed within two years. A claim for injuries caused by the overflow of a river upon claimant’s land, said overflow being caused by the construction of a dam by the State, must be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 34Shepherd v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—petition must Be filed within two years. A .petition not having been filed within two years after cause of action accrued, is barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 35Budd v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—statute of limitations; when cause of action accrues for damages arising from the construction of a dam. A cause of action for damages to land by flooding, arising from the construction of a dam accrues and is perfect at the completion of such dam, and claimant’s petition must be filed within two years from that time or it is barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 37Carey v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim must he filed within two years. Where a dam is constructed by authority of the State and closed in October, 1877, claim for damages resulting from construction of such dam filed April 28, 1880, is barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 38Darst v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim must he filed within two years. A claim filed April 28, 1880, when the cause of action accrued October 21, 1877, is barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 39Cary v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim, barred because not filed within two years. Claim for Injuries to land by reason of construction of dam by the State and consequent overflow of river is barred by statute of limitations if not filed within two years after closing of dam.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 41Neal v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim must be filed within two years. Unless claim for damages for overflow of land alleged to have been caused by erection of dam by the State, is filed within two years after cause of action accrues, same is barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 42RobinsoN v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim for damages caused by construction of dam must be presented within two years. A claimant for damages to land caused by the construction of a dam by the State must file his petition within two years after the date of the closing of the dam or his claim will be barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 44Barton v. State (1890)
<p>1. Commission of Claims—what powers are conferred upon it by statute. The statute creating this Commission of Claims provides that the Commission shall have power to hear and determine all claims against the State for taking or damaging private property by the State for public purposes in the construction or for the use of any State institution, river, canal or other public improvement, which have not been already barred by any statute or law of limitation.</p> <p>2. Statute of Limitations—provisions of act of 1847. An act of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to limit the time for persons to bring claims against the State of Illinois, approved March 1, 1847, provides that all unliquidated claims against the State shall be proved up and filed with the Auditor of Public Accounts within two years from the time such claims may have arisen and any claim not proved up as above and filed shall be forever barred from any payment by the State.</p> <p>3. Same—damages arising from the construction of dam. A cause of action for damages arising from the construction of a dam accrues at the date when the dam is closed and claimant’s petition must be filed within two years from that time.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 46Hunter v. State (1890)
<p>1. Pleadings—must show what part of lands are injured. Where damages are claimed for injuries to land caused by overflow of river consequent upon building of dam. by the State, claimant in his petition must describe what parts, if not the whole of his lands, are thus injured.</p> <p>2. Statute of Limitations—when claim is not harred. If claim is filed for damages caused by overflow of river caused by construction of dam by the State within two years after opening of such dam such claim will not be barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 51Myers v. State (1890)
<p>1. Waters—claim not barred when filed within two years after cause of action accrues. Claim for damages to lands by overflow of river caused by construction of dam by the State of Illinois is not barred by statute of limitations if filed within two years after cause of action accrues.</p> <p>2. Damages—to land by construction of State dam. Court reviews evidence and finds construction of Copperas Creek dam in the Illinois river has damaged claimant’s land by overflow of river and determines amount of award.</p> <p>3. Same—no damages allowed on lands purchased after cause of action accrued. The Commission in its award does not consider damages accruing to that part of the land purchased after cause of action originally accrued.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 55Rickey v. State (1890)
<p>1. Waters—damage to lands by backing of water caused by construction of dam. Where lands are damaged by reason of the backing of water onto the claimant’s property, caused by the raising of the river level by the construction of a dam, the direct cause of the injury is the construction of the dam and the petition must be filed within two years from the date of the closing of the dam or it will be barred by the statute of limitations.</p> <p>2. Statute of Limitations—how two years time is to be computed. In computing the two years time within which claims shall be filed, the first day is to be excluded and the last day included unless the last day be Sunday, and then it also shall be excluded.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 57Hosher v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—claimant entitled to damages for land flooded by construction of State dam. Where a dam constructed by authority of the State results in raising a river and thus damaging lands of claimant and rendering them less valuable for purposes of cultivation claimant is entitled to damages actually received.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 59Heirs of Klein v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—damage caused by construction of a dam by the State. The court reviews the evidence and finds that the claimant’s lands have been damaged by the overflowing of the Illinois river caused by the construction of a dam across the said river by the State of Illinois.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 59Rickey v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—claim barred because not filed within two years. The Commission after a hearing on a motion for a rehearing in this case affirms its former opinion.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 62Heirs of Fort v. State (1890)
<p>Practice—where testimony is conflicting; when statement of reasons for court’s decision is unnecessary. Where testimony introduced by claimant and the State is conflicting and where the Court finds much of it that does not produce in the mind of the Court a conviction that it is reasonable or true, the law under which the Court acts, which requires the Court to file with the record of each claim- determined, a brief written statement of the reasons of the Court’s determination, may be dispensed with and the conclusions only of the Court may be given in an opinion rendered.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 67Hicks v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—damage to mill by removal of dams. A mill-owner who has a mill site near a State dam but has no contract with the State giving the right to use the water power has no claim against the State because of its removal of the dam.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 71Biedleman v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—State may abandon locks and dams without liability to those using the water privileges. Under Sec. 8, Chap. 19, R. S. entitled, “Canals and Improvement of Illinois and Little Wabash Rivers,” which provides that the Canal Commissioners may wholly abandon or destroy the work by the construction of which the water privilege shall have been created whenever, in the opinion of the legislature, such work shall cease to be advantageous to the State, the State may at any time abandon locks and dams without being liable to those who have been availing themselves of the water privilege afforded by them.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 74Zeigler v. State (1890)
<p>Waters —parties damaged by the removal of a State.dam in river not entitled to damages from State. Where the law authorizing public improvements provides that the State may abandon them at any time when it may seem expedient, parties who have availed themselves of the water privileges to erect and operate a mill must take notice from the law of the State, that said improvement Is liable to be abandoned at any time by the State, and are not entitled to damages in case it is discontinued.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 76Schmidt v. State (1890)
<p>1. Respondeat Supebioe—State not liable for negligence of employes. A state or other involuntary municipal corporation cannot be held liable for the tort or negligence of any of its employes unless such liability is created by statute.</p> <p>2. Commission of Claims—purpose of statute creating. The law creating this commission does not undertake to create a new liability against the State but provides a method, by which claims against the State may be heard before this commission, and the claim rejected or an award made in favor of the claimant.</p> <p>3. Same—claimant must present a legal or equitable claim against State. The .Commission of Claims has no power to make an award in any case unless the facts show a legal or equitable claim against the State. It was not the intention of the Legislature to leave it discretionary with the commission to make an award in favor of the claimant regardless of the question as to whether or not he had a legal claim against the State.</p> <p>4. Practice—as to conclusiveness of decision. Section 10 of the act creating this commission provides as follows: “In case said commission shall reject any claim so filed as aforesaid upon the hearing thereof, such rejection shall conclude all parties thereto, unless said commission shall in their award thereon otherwise direct.”</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 81Hickox v. State (1890)
<p>Respondeat Superior—State is liable for damages caused by bullets used by militia in target practice. The damaging of property by bullets during target practice by the State Militia is not merely the act of a servant in which the servant could exercise a choice or make use of his judgment; it is the military acting in strict subordination to the civil power, and the State is liable.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 85Guibert v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—claim for injury to lands caused by construction of dam by the State of Illinois. Court reviews evidence and holds that petitioner’s claim is not supported by the evidence and. claim is rejected.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 87Guibert v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—damages caused by construction of dam. The court reviews evidence and finds that claimant’s lands are not damaged by construction of dam in Illinois river by the State of Illinois.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 88Craine v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—damages caused by construction of State dam. Court reviews evidence and finds that claimant’s lands have been damaged by overflowing of the Illinois river caused by construction of a dam across said river by the State of Illinois.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 89Combs v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—damage caused by construction of State dam. The Commission reviews the evidence and finds claimant is entitled to an award for damages caused to his land by the construction by the State of Copperas Creek dam on the Illinois river.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 91Crawford v. State (1890)
<p>Militia—member entitled to relief when injured by discharge of rifle; under what circumstances. Where a section of the statute provides for target practice at the annual parades and encampments of the National Guard and a person is injured by the discharge of a rifle in the hands of a member of the National Guard under orders in camp, at target practice, under such statute and a statute providing for annual encampments, the injury received is the direct result of an act authorized by the State. It is something more than the mere negligence of a servant or agent and claimant is entitled to recover damages.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 95Bickerman v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—claim for damages arising from the construction of a dam by the State; statute of limitations. A claim for damages arising from the construction of a dam by the State must be presented within two years of the date of the closing of the dam or it will be barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 96Babb v. State (1890)
<p>Statute of Limitations—petition filed within two years; claim not barred. Where petition is filed within two years after closing of dam alleged to have caused damage to property of claimant, claim is not hatred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 98Jones v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—damages caused by construction of dam by State. The Commission reviews the evidence and finds that the claimant is entitled to an award of $100 for damages to his land caused by the construction of Copperas Creek dam by the State.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 100Heirs of Seward v. State (1890)
<p>Waters—damage caused by construction of dam; when cause of action accrues. A cause of action for damages sustained by reason of the construction of a dam whereby land is innundated, accrues at the completion of the dam.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 103Trickle v. State (1891)
<p>1. Commision of Claims—not restricted to consideration of claims which can only be prosecuted in court of law. The statute does not restrict the Commission to the consideration of claims which can only be prosecuted in a court of law, and under the rules there prevailing in regard to proper parties.</p> <p>2. Same—claims to be determined according to equity and justice. The Commission of Claims is enjoined by the act creating it to determine all claims according to the principles of equity and justice, except when otherwise provided by the laws of the State.</p> <p>3. Limitations—theory upon which laws proceed. All limitation laws proceed on the theory that the party by lapse of time and omissions on his part has forfeited his right to assert his title in the law. All statutes of limitations also must proceed on the idea that the party has full opportunity to try his right in the courts.</p> <p>4. Same—statutes rest upon sound public policy. Statutes of limitations rest upon principles of sound public policy, and are not to be evaded except by the methods provided therein. If claimants stand by inactive and permit their claims to be barred, it is not the law, but the party, who is responsible for the hardships entailed.</p> <p>5. Same—statute runs against all claims except those sought to be enforced by government. The statute of limitations runs against all claims except those which are sought to be enforced by the government in its name and in its behalf.</p> <p>6. Same—government may avail itself of provisions of statute. The government, although not precluded by the statute, may nevertheless avail itself thereof in suits against it, where there is a statute authorizing individuals to bring suits against it.</p> <p>7. State Indebtedness—policy of State toward creditors. It has been the settled policy of the State for more than forty years to induce all persons having claims against it whether adjusted or not to present them that they may be satisfied in some manner.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 112Heirs of Jones v. State (1892)
<p>Waters—damage to land caused by construction of dam. Court reviews evidence and finds claimant not entitled to damages.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 113Turkington v. State (1892)
<p>Statute car Limitations—is a bar to all unadjusted claims not filed with Auditor of State within two years from the time they accrue. Claim growing out of service said to have been rendered by claimant and moneys by him expended in recruiting soldiers for service in war of the rebellion, is barred by statute of limitation if not filed with Auditor of State within two years from time same accrues.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 114McLaughlin v. State (1892)
<p>1. Waters—claim for. damages to land through construction of dam—rwhen not barred. A claim for damages to land caused by overflow of river as a consequence of the construction of a dam by the State of Illinois is not barred by statute of limitations if filed within two years after the same accrues.</p> <p>2. Same—evidence entitling to award. The Court reviews the evidence and holds that claimant’s lands were damaged by the overflow or inundation occasioned by the construction of a dam by the State of Illinois.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 118Hoge v. State (1892)
<p>1. Statute of Limitations—unadjusted claims must be filed within two years. Claims must be filed with the Auditor within two years after cause of action accrues.</p> <p>2. Same—what acts will not take claim out of statute of limitations. The fact that claimant’s attorney presented his claim to the Secretary of State, and to other officers not authorized to receive it, within two years from the time the cause of action accrued, does not take the claim out of the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 119Johnson v. State (1894)
<p>Live Stock Commission—act of 1887 concerning board confers power to employ necessary clerics. Section 13 of the act of 1887 concerning the Live Stock Commission which provides that the members of the Board shall receive the sum of $5 per day, and necessary traveling expenses, and other incidental expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of their duties under this act confers upon the Commissioners the power to employ a clerk or secretary if necessary to do so.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 121Bannon v. State (1895)
<p>Waters—particular facts under which claimant is entitled to recover for damages to land caused hy overflow of canal. Court reviews evidence and finds claimant entitled to damages for injury to lands caused by overflow of Illinois & Michigan and Des Plaines river, resulting from repairing and raising dam.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 128Scanlan v. State (1895)
<p>Military Service—under what circumstances a claimant who is in military service of the State and is injured, can recover. Claimant while in the military service of the State and in attendance at an armory leased by the State for drilling purposes in compliance with the orders of his superior officers, fell down an elevator shaft which was open and unprotected, he being at the time ignorant of its location and the passage way leading thereto being in darkness. Held that the circumstances are such as to entitle him to recover from the State.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 129Jenkins v. State (1895)
<p>Military Service—reasonable prudence and caution in selection of officers precludes recovery by soldiers poisoned by materials furnished. Where the State has been reasonably prudent and cautious in the selection of its officers and in the performance of its duties to claimant, a claim for damages alleged to be due for injuries sustained from blood-poisoning resulting from handling soap and meat furnished by officers of the State for the use of a company of the National Guard, of which claimant was a member, will be denied.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 131Klor v. State (1896)
<p>War Claims—State government is trustee of funds received from Federal government. Where the Federal government has paid the State certain sums of money for the payment of war claims, the State government is to he regarded as a trustee, and claimant should not be barred of his rights to recover for his loss, by any statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 133Rogers v. State (1896)
<p>Pees and Salaries—Master in Chancery’s fees. A Master in Chancery is entitled to only such, fees in taking testimony as are fixed by statute.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 135Cutting v. State (1896)
<p>Waters—damages sustained by raising height of dam. Where a break in a dam under the jurisdiction of the State is repaired by the canal authorities of the State placing a considerable quantity of riprap back of the dam and next to the break, thus raising the height of the dam and causing damage to claimant’s property by raising of the water above the dam, the claimant’s property being situated above the dam, claimant is entitled to recover actual damages sustained.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 135Greely Carson Co. v. State (1896)
<p>Contracts—with State officer for services. A claim for services performed for the State under written contract with the Attorney General, and accepted by him, with no objection or defense to the claim being interposed by the State, will be allowed.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 139Phillips v. State (1896)
<p>Penal Institutions—inmates must conform to rules. Persons convicted of crime and sentenced to penitentiary must conform to statutes governing the penitentiary and controlling the inmates thereof and although sentence failed to state that claimant is to be put to hard labor and he does perform hard labor, claimant cannot recover.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 141Rokker v. State (1897)
<p>1. Constitutional Law—General Assembly not to authorise payment of claims made without express authority of law. Under See. 19. Art. 4. of the Constitution of 1870, the General Assembly cannot grant or authorize extra compensation, fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service has been rendered or a contract made, nor authorize the payment of any claim, or part thereof, hereafter created against the State under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void.</p> <p>2. Same—contracts to be let to lowest responsible bidder. Under Sec. 25 of Art. 4 of the Constitution, “The General Assembly shall provide by law, that the fuel, stationery, and printing paper furnished for the use of the State; the copying, printing, binding and distributing the laws and journals, and all other printing ordered by the General Assembly, shall be let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder.”</p> <p>3. Same—Commissioners of State contracts. The Attorney General, Secretary of State, the State Treasurer, and the Auditor of Public Accounts are created Commissioners of State Contracts by chapter 127 R. S. The same chapter provides that the printing for the State shall be let by contract to the lowest bidder; that the Commissioners of State Contracts shall advertise for bids; that the bids shall be opened and contracts awarded; that Commissioners shall have authority to cancel contracts when, in their opinion contracts were obtained by fraud, conspiracy, or any unlawful means.</p> <p>4. State Contracts—when State will not be liable on a quantum meruit. When the provisions of the Constitution make all contracts entered into by the State without express authority of law null and void, the State having entered into such contract cannot be held liable on a quantum meruit.</p> <p>5. Statute oe Limitations—Equity follows the law. Equity follows the law in the application of the statute of limitations, and where a claim for work done is not filed within five years next after the work was performed it is barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 145Johnson v. State (1897)
<p>Practice—where evidence fails to support claim. Where evidence fails to support petitioner’s claim, Court will refuse an award.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 146Ryan v. State (1897)
<p>Clerical Services—reasonable allowance made for services rendered at request of State officers. This claim is submitted on affidavits showing services on which claim is based were performed at the request of the Attorney General and that charges made are just and reasonable and the claim is allowed.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 147Sprague v. State (1897)
<p>Clerical, Services—rendered at request of State officer. At the request of Attorney General claimant rendered services as Special Commissioner in taking depositions.</p> <p>The Court reviews the evidence and holds the charges for services reasonable and makes award.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 148Hingston v. State (1897)
<p>Clerical Services—rendered State; when claim will be allowed. When there is no dispute as to the fact of employment and the amount claimed seems to be a reasonable demand for the work done for the State, award will be made.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 149Henderson v. State (1897)
<p>Statute of Limitations—when claim is barred. Claim filed April 2, 1897, for pay and subsistence in recruiting men for service in United States Army in August, 1862, is barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 150O'Connor v. State (1897)
<p>Fees and Salaries—when statute does not fist compensation only a reasonable amount will be allowed. When a stenographer performing services for the State is not an official of any court and there is no statute which fixes the amount of compensation for the services such as were rendered, only a reasonable compensation for the services rendered will be allowed.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 155Downey v. State (1897)
<p>Statute of Limitations—Section 15 of Chapter 88, R. S. construed. A claim for injuries received in May, 1873, is barred by statute of limitations if same is filed on April 29, 1897.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 156Carr v. State (1897)
<p>Statute of Limitations—when claim is barred. When cause of action accrues on December 17, 1862, and claim is filed April 2, 1897, pleading of statute of limitations operates as complete defense and claim will be denied.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 157Carpenter v. State (1897)
<p>Statute of Limitations—when claim is barred. When, cause of action accrued in December, 1862, and claim is filed April 2, 1897, claim is barred by statute of limitations.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 158State Bank of Chicago v. State (1898)
<p>1. Municipal Corporations—The West Chicago Parle Commissioners are a municipal corporation with, the power to assess and collect taxes with the Park District so created for the special corporated purposes of its creation.</p> <p>2. Same—not liable for negligent acts of servants. Municipal corporations created merely for purposes of civil administration are not liable for the tortious acts or negligence of its officers.</p> <p>3. Same—officers are personally responsible for their negligence. Officers of public corporations are personally responsible for their own negligence or misconduct in the performance or attempted performance of their official duties.</p> <p>4. Respondeat Superior—public and State officers do not come within doctrine of. Public or State officers with only certain powers and duties enjoined upon them by the statutes do not come within the doctrine of respondeat superior.</p> <p>5. Survival of Actions—for death from negligent act no—survival at common law. Cause of action for injuries resulting in death, did not survive to the executor or administrator at common law.</p> <p>6. Personal Injuries—survival of action given by statute. The statute provides, “that whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, negligence or default, and the neglect or default is such as would, if death had ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who, or company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, nothwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstance as amount in law to felony.”</p> <p>7. Same—upon what right to maintain actions after death of person injured depends. The right to maintain an action after the death of a party injured, depends entirely upon whether if death had not ensued the decedent could have maintained an action and recovered damages against the party sued.</p> <p>8. State Liability—when State is bound by act of legislature. The State is not bound by or included in any act of the legislature unless expressly named or necessarily implied, to give effect to the act.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 168Sherman v. State (1898)
<p>Contracts—with State officer for services; reasonable compensation allowed. A Master in Chancery being requested by the Attorney General to take evidence and make report thereof will he allowed a reasonable and customary compensation therefor.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 169Arms Palace & Stock Car Co. v. State (1898)
<p>Contracts—with State to transport horses to encampment I. N. G. Claimant made contract with Adjutant General for furnishing cars for transportation of horses from Bloomington and Chicago to Springfield and return. Court reviews evidence and finds such cars were necessary and were used for transportation of horses for the I. N. G. encampment at Springfield, Illinois, and makes award.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 170Munroe v. State (1898)
<p>Bent of Armory—when claims will not be allowed. When, a claimant for additional rent on a building let by him as an armory has signed vouchers or receipts for the amount of the rent regularly, which vouchers were sent to the Auditor as a basis for the warrants which he was to draw money upon, his claim for additional rent will not be allowed.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 172Smith v. State (1898)
<p>Waters—land damaged by water from feeder to canal. The Commission reviews the evidence and awards the claimant damages in accordance with an agreement with the Attorney General.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 173Green v. State (1898)
<p>Military Service—injury to soldier through defective fire arm. Where claimant is injured in the performance of his duty, as a member of the National Guard, acting under command of his superior officer in camp, is guilty of no carelessness or negligence whatever on his part contributing to said injury and said injury is caused by an old defective rifle, unfit for use and furnished him by the State, said rifle exploding accidentally, causing laceration of his thumb and left hand and rendering claimant permanently injured, claimant can recover.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 175Ross v. State (1898)
<p>Respondeat Superior—State not liable for torts of its officers. The State is not liable for the torts arid negligent acts of its officers.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 177Claucy v. State (1898)
<p>Practice—rules of procedure of Commission must be followed. Failure to comply with the rules of Commission providing for filing of claim will support motion to dismiss.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 178Hamline v. State (1898)
<p>Services—rendered by appointment with Attorney General. When, an appointment has been made by the Attorney General and the claim for services is reasonable, claim will be allowed.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 179Martin v. State (1898)
<p>Contracts—when receipts showing settlement of account are conclusive. When claimant has given receipts showing an adjustment of his account they are conclusive in the absence of proof of fraud or mistake.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 181Grajewski v. State (1898)
<p>Practice—procedure prescribed must be followed. Law governing prosecution of claims before the Commission must be followed, otherwise claim will be rejected.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 182Hitt v. State (1898)
<p>1. Statute of Limitations—all unliquidated claims must be filed within two years. The statute of limitations of 1847 provides, “that all claims for unliquidated damages against the State must be filed within two years after the right of action accrues or be forever barred.”</p> <p>2. Same—act of 1847 still in force. The statute of limitations of 1847 was not repealed by implication upon the passage of the act creating a Commission of Claims.</p> <p>3. Fees and Salaries—manner in which State agents may be appointed and paid. The only case in which the State could be held liable for the payment of agents such as are considered in this case, is when the party making the appointment of such agents is duly empowered by an act of the General Assembly authorizing such appointment.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 187Hitt v. State (1898)
<p>Pees and Saiabies—no extra compensation to be granted public officer after service rendered on contract. Under Section 19 of Article 4 of the Constitution of 1870, which provides, “That the General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor after service has been rendered or a contract made; nor authorize the payment of any claim or part thereof hereafter created against the State under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void; provided the General Assembly shall make appropriations for expenditures incurred in suppressing insurrection or repelling invasion,” an agreement made with a party whereby he is to attempt to obtain a settlement of war claims owing the State by the United States Government and look to the legislature for his pay, is void.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 196Hitt v. State (1898)
<p>1. Statute of Limitations—act of 1847 still in force. The limitation act of 1847 has not been repealed directly or by implication, but is still in force.</p> <p>2. Pees and Salaries—contracts with State agents must be made by express authority of law. In order that a State agent such as is under consideration in this case, may receive compensation for his services, his contract must have been made under express authority of law.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 203Schultz v. State (1898)
<p>Practice—rules of procedure must be followed. Claim must be Sled in accordance with provision of law governing presentation and prosecution of claims before Commission. Failure to comply with law governing practice before Commission is ground for dismissal of claim.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 204Mulford v. State (1899)
<p>Practice—rules of procedure must be strictly adhered to. This Commission is a Court governed by the statute and the rules of procedure heretofore adopted for the trial of cases before the Commission. It is necessary that claimant comply strictly with the law and rules of the Commission. For failure to comply with the law and rules of Commission as to taking and filing proofs in support of claim and filing abstracts and arguments, claim will be rejected.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 205Continental Investment & Loan Society v. State (1899)
<p>Practice—Court rules must be observed. Failure to file proper declaration meeting requirements of the statute and rules of the Commission; failure to take evidence in support of claim and failure to file abstracts and briefs as provided by rules 4, 7, 11 and 12, will support a motion by the State to dismiss the claim.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 208Johnson v. State (1899)
<p>1. Respondeat Superior—State not liable for wrongful acts of subordinate officers. The State is not liable for the wrongful acts or negligent conduct of its subordinate officers or agents.</p> <p>2. Commission op Claims—no new liability against State created by act. The law creating the Commission, does not create any new liabilities against the State but simply provides a method by which claims may be allowed or rejected.</p> <p>3. Practice—evidence may be filed where demurrer is sustained. Upon claim being rejected on demurrer claimant can file evidence in order that claim can be submitted to the legislature.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 211Fogarty v. State (1899)
<p>Practice—rules of Commission must be followed. Rules of Commission and provisions of statute governing practice before the Commission are not unreasonable or technical and must be followed by persons seeking relief at the hands of the Commission.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 212Rhodes v. State (1899)
<p>StatutesChap. 129, Art. 9, Sec. 1, construed. Where the order of the Commander in Chief of State militia calling it into service contains no language showing that the company was called into actual service “for the suppression of riot and the enforcement of the laws,” and does not show that they were called to perform any duty “under orders of the Commander in Chief,” its members are entitled to no more pay than is provided by law for officers of the United States army and navy of like grade.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 214Alexander v. State (1899)
<p>Respondeat Superior—State not liable for torts of officers. The :State is not liable for the torts or negligent acts of its officers.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 215Brewster v. State (1899)
<p>Respondeat Superior—State not responsible for negligence or misconduct of its officers. The State cannot be held responsible for the negligence or misconduct of its officers or subordinate agents. The State is not liable for acts of employes of Park Commissioners in operating a steam roller resulting in frightening of claimant’s horse, causing horse to run away and. injure claimant.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 217Herr v. State (1899)
<p>Practice—Court procedure must be observed. Failure to take and file proofs in support of claim and to file abstracts and briefs is sufficient cause for dismissal of same.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 218Oliver v. State (1900)
<p>Practice—where no foundation in law exists for allowance of claim. Where the record discloses no foundation in law for the allowance of claim, it is rejected.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 220Jones v. State (1900)
<p>Militia—claim for additional compensation for services rendered. The Commission sustains a demurrer to claimant’s petition upon the authority of Rhodes v. the State ante p. 212.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 221Hatfield v. State (1900)
<p>Militia—personal injury to member while doing duty at annual encampment. Claimant while on duty as member of a troop of cavalry in their annual encampment received an injury by his horse falling on him while making a charge on the parade ground, which resulted in his right arm and shoulder being broken. The captain gave the command to charge the batteries. As they went by, the cannon were fired and the balloon on the parade ground ascended and the horses were frightened and became tangled up together, resulting in the injury. Held that the claimant exercising due care and caution and being in the line of his duty at the time he received the injury, is entitled to recover.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 222Snyder v. State (1900)
<p>Militia—claim for services rendered. The Commission sustains a demurrer to claimant’s petition upon the authority of Rhodes v. the State ante p. 212.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 223Hatfield v. State (1901)
<p>1. Respondeat Superior—State not legally liable for negligence of officers. The State can not be held legally liable for either the neglect of duty or the negligent performance of duty by the officers of a troop or regiment while on their annual encampment.</p> <p>2. State Liability—founded upon its own consent. The liability of the State for any claim, must be founded on its own consent expressed through some act of the Legislature.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 228Herring v. State (1902)
<p>1. Proximate Cause—not sufficient to show one of two conjectures more probable than the other. In attempting to prove a defect to be the proximate cause of an accident it is not sufficient to show that it is more probable that the injury was caused by the defect than otherwise.</p> <p>2. Master and Servant—what necessary in order to hold master liable for defect. A servant, in order to recover for an injury, for defects in the appliances in his business, is required to establish three propositions. 1st: That the appliances were defective. 2d: That the master had notice thereof, or knowledge, or ought to have had, and 3d: That the servant did not know of the defect, and had not equal means of knowing with the master.</p> <p>3. Same—servant must report defect at once. It is the duty of a servant to report a defect at once to his superiors, and if he fails to do so it is negligence on his part that will bar recovery.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 233Gleason v. State (1902)
<p>Building Contracts—when architect’s certificate is final. Contractors under a building contract which makes the architect the judge of whether any work or material is an extra, and of the amount which should be added or deducted from the contract for such change or addition, who have a right to appeal to arbitration if they think they are not fairly treated, and fail to do so, can neither claim that certain work should have been considered an extra which the architect did not so consider, nor that a larger sum should be allowed than was allowed by the architect. When parties to a building contract agree upon an arbitrator to settle disputes, and when the contract provides that no money is payable thereon except upon the certificate of the architect, the decision of the arbitrator is final in the absence of fraud or mistake.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 249Witte v. State (1902)
<p>Militia—State liable for death of member hilled while at target practice under orders. State is liable for death of an officer of the National Guard killed at target practice while performing his duties as such officer, in pursuance of lawful orders from the Commander in Chief.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 255O'Donnell v. State (1902)
<p>1. Respondeat Superior—doctrine does not apply against State. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply as against the State; the State is not liable for the acts of its agents.</p> <p>2. Commission oe Claims—can allow claims only where legislature has created liability on part of State. The Commission of Claims can allow claims against the State only in cases where by express statutory provision the Legislature has created a liability on the part of the State for the acts of its agents, or, rather, waived the exemption of the State from such liability.</p> <p>3. Militia—in what cases there is a liability for injury to member of. In order to sustain a recovery for injury to a member of the National Guard or Naval Militia it must come within the provisions of Sec. 4, of Art. 9, of the Military Code, which provides that “In every case when an officer, soldier or seaman of the Illinois National Guard or the Naval Militia of Illinois, shall be killed or wounded while performing his duties as officer, soldier or seaman, in pursuance of orders from the Commander in Chief, said officer, soldier or seaman, or his legal heirs, shall have a claim against the State for financial help or assistance, and the State Board of Claims shall act on and adjust the same as the merits of each case may demand.”</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 258Tedens v. State (1902)
<p>1. Landlord and Tenant—tenant cannot dispute title of landlord. And if the real owner is threatened with suit from one who has no title whatever, and he should recognize the title of the adverse claimant, and enter into a lease, and accept possession under same and pay rent under said lease, he could not afterwards dispute the title of the other party and recover the rent paid.</p> <p>2. Same—cannot set up better title in himself or third person. A tenant cannot set up a better title in himself or in a third person.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 266Belt v. State (1902)
<p>Respondeat Superior—State not liable for negligence of its agents. The State is not liable for injuries caused by the default or neglect of its agents or employes.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268Wallace v. State (1902)
<p>Respondeat Superior—State is not liable for the default of its agents or employes. Where State Entomologist sprays fruit trees of claimant and as result the orchard is destroyed, claimant is not entitled to award.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 270Fisher v. State (1902)
<p>1. Respondeat Stiebbiob—State not bound where agents have-transcended their powers. State cannot be bound by acts or contracts of its officers or agents where such officer or agent has transcended or exceeded his lawful or legitimate powers.</p> <p>2. Ratification—of unauthorized acts by State. The State may ratify unauthorized acts of its officers or agents.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 274Arthur Frantzen Co. v. State (1902)
<p>1. State Architect—has no authority to create any liability against the State. The act under which the Supervising or State Architect was appointed, provided the amount of salary which he should receive, and defined his duties and powers, and made no provision for expenses of the office, and conferred no authority upon the State Architect, or any other person, to create any liability against the State for office rent, or expense of any kind.</p> <p>2. Responbeat Superior—State not bound where officers have transcended their powers. The State cannot be bound by the acts and contracts of its officers or agents, where such officer or agent has transcended, or exceeded his lawful and legitimate powers.</p> <p>3. Public Officers—person deals with officer at his peril. A person dealing with an officer must at his peril, ascertain the extent of his power.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 279Tierney v. State (1902)
<p>1. Commission of Claims—Law creating commission does not create new liability against State. The law creating the Commission of Claims does not undertake to create a new liability against the State, but provides a method by which claims against the State may be heard before this Commission and claims rejected or awards made in favor of the claimant. Such Commission shall hear such claims according to its rules and established practice and determine the same according to equity and justice, except as otherwise provided in the laws of this State.</p> <p>2. Statutes—Will usually not be given a retrospective operation. A statute will not be given a retrospective operation, even though such an operation will not violate the paramount law of the constitution, unless there is a clearly expressed intention that it shall have such an operation.</p> <p>3. Same—When to be construed to have a retrospective operation. A statute will be construed to have a retrospective operation only when the language is so clear as to admit of no other construction.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 284Martin v. State (1903)
<p>Contracts—for labor of convicts.. The Court on re-hearing reviews the evidence and adheres to the former opinion of the Commission rejecting the claim.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 291Chicago League Ball Club v. State (1903)
<p>Militia—liability of State for damages caused by State troops during riot. Where a tumult or riot assumes such proportions that it becomes necessary that the-soverign shall interfere and exert the supreme power of the State, to that extent the general State government is the actor and the burden of expense which its acts incur is not to be borne by the city in which the act occurs, but by the State itself.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 295Balsley v. State (1903)
<p>1. Respondeat Superior—doctrine does not apply to State. The State is not liable for the fault or neglect of its agents or employes.</p> <p>2. Statutes—usually to be given a prospective operation only. In construing a statute a prospective operation only will be given to it, unless its terms show the legislative intention that it shall have a retrospective effect.</p> <p>3. Same—presumption of intention is against words having a retroactive effect. The presumption of intention is against words having a retroactive effect, not in favor of it, and words will be presumed to be prospective only, unless there is an evident and unmistakable intention expressed in the words that the act shall be retrospective.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 299Stephens v. State (1903)
<p>Militia—Personal injuries received while in the service. Balsley t. The State of Illinois followed: The circumstances and material facts in this case are the same as in Balsley v. the State of Illinois and for the reasons therein assigned this claim is also rejected.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 300Rupert v. State (1903)
<p>Militia—injuries received by reason of the explosion of powder. Balsley v. State of Illinois followed.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 301Rokker v. State (1903)
<p>1. Commissioners of Contracts—power possessed by them, is purely statutory. The power exercised by the Commissioners of Contracts is purely statutory; and the law requires that every prerequisite to the exercise of such a power, as stated in the statute, must actually precede its exercise.</p> <p>2. SAME-power derived from, R. S. Ch. 127. The only power of the Commissioners of Contracts to bind the State in making contracts is derived from the law approved March 31, 1874, in force July 1, 1874, (Revised Statutes Ch. 127) naming certain State officials “Commissioners of Contracts” and defining their powers, said law being enacted in pursuance of Section 25, Art. 4, of the Constitution, which provides that “The General Assembly shall provide, by law, that the printing, binding the laws and journals, and all other printing ordered by the General Assembly, shall be let by contract, to the lowest responsible bidder.”</p> <p>3. Same—have power to cancel contracts obtained by fraud, conspiracy or other unlawful means. The law of 1874 (R. S. Ch. 127) provides penalties for paying any person to refrain from bidding for such contracts and gives the Commissioners authority to cancel contracts, when in their opinion said contracts were obtained ,by fraud, conspiracy, or unlawful means.</p> <p>4. Same—contracts may be made only after a public letting. An indispensable condition precedent to the powers of the Commissioners of Contracts to contract is, that there shall be a public letting in which there is entire freedom of competition.</p> <p>5. Contracts—to prevent competition in bidding. No rights accrue under. No one can derive rights under a contract made for the purpose of preventing competition in bidding.</p> <p>6. Same—power of Secretary of State to bind the State by contract. The Secretary of State cannot bind the State by contracts where there is no express authority given him by statute to do so.</p> <p>7. Same—State not liable on quantum meruit where Secretary of State lets printing contract without public bidding. The State is not liable on a quantum meruit for State printing done where the work was done at the instance of the Secretary of State without being let to the lowest bidder. The Constit ' provides that such contracts should be let to the lowest bidder v •vkes all contracts made without express authority of law null and . and prohibits the General Assembly from providing for payment of any claim arising out .of any such contract.</p> <p>8. Statute of Limitations—unliquidated claims. Unliquidated claims against the State shall be proved up and filed within two years from the time such claims may have arisen; and any claim not presented and proved up as above, and filed, shall be forever oarred from payment by the State.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 309Partello v. State (1903)
<p>Contracts—no recovery after all rights have been relinquished. When, a party being unable to carry out the terms of his contract, gives the other party a written relinquishment of all rights he may have thereunder, he cannot afterwards recover for money paid out by him under such contract.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 322Harper v. State (1904)
<p>1. Respondeat Superior—doctrine does not apply to counties, townships, etc. The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to municipal corporations, such as counties, townships, school districts, road districts, drainage districts, etc.</p> <p>2. Same—doctrine does not apply to State. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 324Holmes v. State (1905)
<p>1. Trespassers—not precluded from recovering for negligence of another. A trespasser is not precluded from recovering for a loss occassioned by the negligence of another, unless his act, contributed to the injury.</p> <p>2. Canal Commissioners—Rights and duties as to bridges. While it has been decided in People v. Canal Trustees, 14 Ill., 402, that the Trustees were under no legal obligation to build bridges over the canal on highways opened after the construction of the canal, the reasoning of that court does not apply to a case where the canal was opened after the highway. The canal commissioners in the latter case, at least have the legal right, if it is not their legal duty to construct and maintain such bridges; and such has been the uniform and long continued construction of the law by the State itself, through its proper officers. The canal Trustees or Commissioners also having the legal right to enter into contract with the Commissioners of Highways for the construction and maintenance of bridges, after seventy years exclusive control of the bridge in question by the canal commissioners, it will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that there was such a contract, and that such control was exercised in accordance with such contract.</p> <p>3. Same—When doctrine applies to a municipal corporation. A municipal corporation is never estopped to deny its right to make a contract, but the doctrine of estoppel is applied to it when acting in its private, as contra-distinguished from its governmental, capacity, whenever the act is within its chartered power.</p> <p>4. Court of Claims—legislative intent in creating. It was not the legislative intent, in creating the Court of Claims to create thereby, new liabilities against the State.</p> <p>5. Respondeat Superior—when doctrine applies to State. While no private action lies unless the right to bring it is expressly conferred where acts are done by the officers of towns and cities in their public capacity, in the discharge of duties imposed by the law for the public welfare, there is an implied or common law liability for the negligence of municipal officers in the performance of corporate acts which have relation to the management of the corporate or private concerns of the municipality, from which it derives special or immediate profit or advantage as a corporation.</p> <p>6. Illinois and Michigan Canal—operation of not a governmental function. The Illinois and Michigan canal is owned by the State as a business enterprise; its ownership, control and. operation, for hire and reward, is not a governmental function.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 332Phillips v. State (1905)
<p>1. Waters—degree of care required by collector of artificially collected waters. The weight of authority seems to sustain the proposition that the collector of artificially collected waters, as in the case of the owners of wild and dangerous animals, must retain them in his control at his peril, and is liable for damages done by them if they escape, whether negligent or not, except it happen by the Act of God.</p> <p>2. Respondeat Superior—when doctrine does not apply. The doctrine that the State is not liable for the negligence of its officers, does not apply to the officers in charge of the Illinois and Michigan canal.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 334Peterson v. State (1905)
<p>Damages: Caused by falling bridge over feeder of Illinois and Michigan Canal. Claimant was injured by the falling of a bridge over a “feeder” of the Illinois and Michigan canal. The court reviews the evidence and holds the claimant entitled to $2,500. Holmes v. the State followed.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 336Krueger v. State (1905)
<p>Statute of Limitations—Claim for a definite sum as compensation for military services not barred by. Claimant served in the State militia and earned $37 from the State which he has not received because of his absence in the Philippines during the life of the appropriation made to pay the claim. Held that such claim is not an unliquidated claim barred by the statute of limitations, because not presented within two years from the time the claim arose.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 338Ratto v. State (1905)
<p>Statute of Limitations—running not stopped by introduction of bill relating to claim in Legislature. The running of the statute of limitations against a claim for damages against the State is not stopped by the introduction of a bill for relief in either branch of the Legislature.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 343Palmer v. State (1905)
<p>1. Statute of Limitations—act of 1847 not repealed. Neither the act creating the Commission nor the later act creating the Court of Claims specificially repeals the limitation act of 1847; nor is it repealed by implication.</p> <p>2. Same—intention and purpose of the act of 1847. The act of 1847 was passed solely with reference to claims against the State, and with the special purpose of fixing a two years limitation within which then existing claims should be proven and filed; and a like limit as to presenting unliquidated claims against the State that might thereafter arise. The limitation was the essential intention and purpose of the act. The different officers named before which the various kinds of claims should be proven up and filed, were incident to the main purpose of the act.</p> <p>3. Statutes—rule of construction as to repeal by implication. It is a rule of construction that a law passed with reference to a specific thing is not affected by the passage of a general law unless it is definitely shown by the language of the general law that it was intended to repeal or modify the special act.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 346Reeves v. State (1905)
<p>1. Words and Phrases—construction of term, “2% of cost,” in computing architects’ fees. The term 2% of the cost of the buildings when used to designate the amount of an architect’s commission for superintending the erection of buildings, signifies 2% of the contract price and not 2% .of the actual cost price.</p> <p>2: Fees and Salaries—provision of Constitution as to payment of claims under agreements made without express authority of law. Section 19, of Article IV, Constitution of 1870, provides that “The General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation, fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service has been rendered or a contract made, nor authorize the payment of any claim, or part thereof hereafter created against the State under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall he null and void.”</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law—money not to he diverted from appropriation hy resolution. Article IV, Section 17, of the Constitution provides that, no money shall be diverted from any appropriation made for any purpose, or taken from any fund whatever, either by joint or separate resolution.</p> <p>4. Statute oe Limitations—act of 18Jf! in force. The statute of limitations of 1847 was not repealed by implication, by the act of 1877 creating a commission of claims.</p>
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 364Clausen v. State (1905)
- 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 365Crissey v. State (1905)
<p>1. Statute of Limitations—as to filing of unliquidated claims, still in force. The statute of limitations providing that all unliquidated claims "against the State shall be filed within two years from the time such claims arise, is still in force.</p> <p>2. Same—Introduction of hill in legislature within two years does not meet requirements of statute. The statute provides the manner in which a claim must be presented, against the State and the mere introduction of a bill in the general assembly does not meet the requirements of such statute.</p> <p>3. Liquidated Damages—what are. A claim for damages for a herd of cattle taken and destroyed by the State where the value of the property must be ascertained from evidence, is a claim for unliquidatd damages.</p>