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1 Johns. Ch. 101

Herrick v. Blair

New York Court of Chancery

Decided July 26, 1814

New York Court of Chancery · decided 1814-07-26

THE bill stated, that, on the 31 st of March last, the parties to the bill submitted their matters in difference, relative to a lease of five acres of land, at Greenbush, from the plaintiff to the defendants, for five years, &c. to three arbitrators, and entered into arbitration bonds accordingly; that the arbitrators met, and heard the parties and their proofs; and after the arbitrators were left alone to deliberate, they called before them a witness who had been already…

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1814-07-26

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently April 1903

7 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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The Chancellor.

¶1There was nothing done, in this case, by the arbitrators, from which misconduct canbe.infer*102red. They only called awitness before them, who had been already examined in the presence of the parties, to explain his testimony concerning which the arbitrators differed. It not alleged, nor is it to be inferred, that the witness deposed differently, as to any fact, from what he meant to have testified, and to have been understood, on the first examination. The case does not come up to that of Walker v. Frobisher, (6 Ves. 70.,) for there the arbitrator, after he had told the parties that the hearing was closed, and had dismissed them, examined three more' persons on the part of the defendant, and when no person was present on the part of the plaintiff. This was unfair, partial, and a gross misconduct, and contrary to all the principles of a just proceeding. There is no analogy between that case and this; and to interfere and set aside the award upon an irregularity, (even admitting it to be one,) so slight and immaterial as the one now set up, would be contrary to the general doctrine of the court in respect to awards. The uniform language of the cases is, that an award cannot be impeached but for corruption, partiality, or gross misbehaviour, in the arbitrators, or for some palpable mistake o/ the law or the fact. The arbitrators are judges of the parties’ own choosing; their proceedings and award are treated with great liberality, and even a mistake upon a doubtful point, often will not open an award. These principles have been declared and asserted in a series of decisions, all going to the. same point, and containing a weight of authority not to be resisted. (Earle v. Stocker, 2 Vern. 251. and Pitt v. Dawkra, cited, ibid. Cornforth v. Geer, 2 Vern. 705. Ives v. Medcalfe, 1 Atk. 63. Ridoul v. Pain, 3 Atk. 486. Tittenson v. Peal, 3 Atk. 529. Anon. 3 Atk. 644. Hawkins v. Colclough, 1 Burr. 274. Knox v. Symmonds, 1 Ves. jun. 369. Morgan v. Mather, 2 Ves. jun. 22. Chace v. Westmore, 13 East, 357.)

¶2The injunction is, accordingly, denied.

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