Volume 1 — Louisiana Reports

<p>The ordinance of the mayor, aldermen and city council of New-Orleans, of September’, 1827, imposing a tax on the front proprietors of ground within the city and incorporated faubourgs for the exclusive purpose of paving the streets and making the banquets, violates neither the constitution of the United States nor that of Louisiana.</p> <p>Taxation need not be uniform.</p> <p>A tax laying a certain sum on the owners of all property of a particular description, is a tax on property.</p> <p>The corporation Of New-Orleans, have a right to lay a tax to provide for a prospective deficiency.</p> <p>The ordinance of the mayor, aldermen and city council of Now-Oceans of Sept’r 1827, imposing a tax °" *he fr°nt proprietors of g^mmi within the city andmcorpo-faubourgs, ior the exclusive PurPos««fp&v®g the streets & making the ban-quetts, violate neither the constitution of the United States or that of Louisiana.</p> <p>Taxation need not be uniform.</p> <p>certain sum on the owners of ail property of a par-tieuiar description is a tax on property, A tax laying a</p> <p>The corporation ofN. Orleans have a right to levy a tax to supply a prospective deficency.</p>

<p>The acts of an administrator, appointed by the court of probates, can only be annulled by declaring void and illegal the authority, in virtue of which he acted.</p> <p>The court of competent jurisdiction for this pur pose, is that which conferred on him the authority.</p> <p>administrator ap-probatel “Laby dedarl “*[ th<fauthority he actea.</p> <p>The court of competent authority for this purpose is that which conferred on him1' the authority,</p>

The petition stated that in the month of January, 1820, the defendant and William Wa-terhouse formed a commercial partnership, the object of which was to establish in the country an apothecary’s shop, and to practice together as physicians.

On the 24th of April, 1812, William Donaldson, by authentic act, sold to the defendant Maurin, two lots of ground for the price of 55600, to be paid at the will of the purchaser. and subject to an annual and perpetual interest . , , , , of six per cent, per annum, to be calculated from the first of January, 1812, and payable Half yearly on the first of July and first of January, in each year, until the whole principal should be paid.

, . i „ , ... . tnct, the judge of the eighth presiding. Relf and others were appointed syndics to 1 1 the insolvent Bougard, and the present action was brought by Relf alone,- who styled himself acting syndic. The defendants excepted to the petition, on the ground that all the syndics should have been made parties.

<p>Appeal from the court of the third district, the judge of the eighth presiding.</p> <p>This action was brought to recover a tract of land in possession of the defendants, of which the plaintiff alledged himself to be the legal owner.</p> <p>The plaintiff claimed under a sheriff’s deed, and it appeared from the evidence, that the land therein conveyed was of a different description from that described in the petition.</p> <p>There was judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>1st. No property passes at sheriff’s sale, except what is ascertained and declared at the time of sale. — Jackson v's. Striker, 1 Johnson’s cases, 284.</p> <p>2d. Sheriffs cannot sell under a general description — Jackson vs. Newton, 18 T. R. 355.</p> <p>3d. In a sheriff’s deed, the land must be described with reasonable certainty. — Jackson vs. Delaney, 13 T. R. 537.</p> <p>4. Sheriff’s return of seizure must contain a definite description of the land levied on, or nothing passes by the sale. — 9 Mass. 92, 11 Mass. 163.</p> <p>The sheriff, in his return, shall specify the object seized and sold, and the property sold by the sheriff must have been actually seized. Code of Practice 701, 2; 2 Hayioood 66.</p> <p>The sheriff’s sale to the plaintiff was made under the laws in the Code of Practice, art. 690, 695 ; therefore any defects in the deed cannot affect the validity of the adjudication. — Hughes vs. Harrison,! th M. n. s. 227. If the deed is not essential to the sheriff’s sale, and the adjudication is good without it., defects m what is immaterial can*. not invalidate what would otherwise be good.</p> <p>The variance between the deed and the seizure was an accidental error in the sheriff.</p>

A copartnership, which had existed between the plaintiff and defendant, was dissolved in 1817, by mutual consent, and the plaintiff put in possession of the books, for the purpose of collecting the debts and settling the affairs of the partnership. Ficklin afterwards died, leaving a vacant estate.

<p>A public inventory is a ministerial act, and may be made by a notary ; but tbe right of deciding whether an inventory should be made or not, is a judicial act, and if the judge be interested, he cannot act.</p> <p>A public inventory is a ministerial act and may be made by a notary, but the right of deciding whether° anSinventory should be made or not is a judicial act and if the judge be interested he cannot act.</p>

Apfe al from the probate court of St. Helena. It appears from the record in this case, that a judgment by default was taken in the court below at the April term, and at the May term following the defendant moved for further time to answer and craved oyer of the documents in support of the plaintiff’s demand. The court overruled the motion and made final the judgment. The defendant appealed.

The petitioners stated that they were collateral heirs of Bridget Lawrence, deceased, and as such, owners of a tract of land on Thompson’s Creek, in the parish of West Feliciana.— That the defendant caused a part'of said land to be sold by the sheriff, to satisfy a judgment which he had obtained against one John Lawrence, who they alledge never had any title to the land, and that this fact was within the knowledge of the defendant at the time of the seizure.

* This suit was brought to recover from the defendant as curator of the estate of Nicholas Wilson, deceased, the amouut of a promisory note, drawn by Wilson in his lifetime, in favor of Durnford, and by the latter, transferred to the plaintiff.

the rate of ten per cent., the plaintiff for security retaining alien upon thelot. The plaintiff prayed judgment for fifteen hundred dollars, with interest — That the lot might be seized and sold to satisfy the judgment — and that the heirs of Gravier, who presented a claim to the lot, might also be made parties to the suit.

The executor of the last will and testament of the plaintiff’s mother, conjointly with the the plaintiff’s guardian, sold to Stephen Minor, on the 19th of April, 1811, a house and lot in Bienville street, for the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars, of which sum three thousand were paid at the time of sale ; two thousand four hundred thirty-nine dollars and twenty-five cents, to be paid in one year thereafter, and the balance of two thousand sixty dollars and…

<p>Appeal from the court of the third district, the judge of the eighth presiding.</p> <p>By a written instrument, dated in 1815, L. V. Folkiel acknowledged to have received of the plaintiff, district paymaster, one thousand dollars, for which he was accountable. Folkiel died in 1816, leaving Rosalie, his wife, sole heir and legatee of his succession. She died in 1817, and the defendants, as nearest of kin, inherited her estate. This action was brought to recover the sum acknowledged to have been received of the plaintiff by Folkiel.</p> <p>The answer alleged that, subsequent to the date of the acknowledgment, a settlement took place between the parties, when a balance of eighteen hundred dollars was found to be due jjy the piaintifF to Folkiel, which the defendants claimed in reconvention. Nicholson, a witness for the defendants, deposed that in May or June, 1816, Folkiel handed to him an account against the plaintiff for 81800, which witness presented to the piaintifF for payment, who [observed that he would call on deponent for the purpose of effecting a settlement — that he never did call on deponent, but retained in his possession the account which witness presented to him. It was admitted on the trial that the estate of Rosalie Grass, widow of Folkiel, left sufficient property to pay the debt in question, which came into the possession of the defendants.</p> <p>There was judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed</p> <p>made the following points;</p> <p>1st. — The plaintiff had no right to sue,' being insolvent, at the time the action was instituted.</p> <p>2d. — The judgment should havebeen against the defendants, severally, and not as is decreed, jointly.</p>

The'petitioners stated, that in the year 1820, B. Lafon, by last will and testament, bequeathed to them a legacy of twenty-one thousand dollars. That Jean Pomerat and Jean Gravier, were appointed his executors, who, in that capacity disposed of the testator’s property, amounting to a considerable sum. That in 1823, the said Pomerat was appointed their curator ad bona.

The petition stated that the husband of the plaintiff, during his lifetime, to wit, on the 4th of April, 1823, purchased from the defendant the following named slaves: Phebe, Hannah, and Will, which he retained in peaceable possession until his death, and that the plaintiff was then wrongfully dispossessed of them by the defendant.

The petition set forth that the plaintiff sold to the defendant a slave, in consideration that the latter would take up and deliver to plaintiff his note of hand in favor of one Hughy, for six hundred dollars. It was proved upon the trial that the defendant failed to take up the note.

Upon a final partition of the estate of Archibald Palmer, deceased, the plaintiffs, who were forced coheirs with the defendants, received as their portion of the estate a certain moiety of a tract of land. They alleged in their petition, that their ancestor had no title to the land, that it belonged to another individual with whom they were unwilling to contend; and this suit was brought in the court of probates to recover an indemnity.

In 1827, the firm of Allyn & Babcock obtained a judgment against J;he plaintiff for two hundred twenty dollars and fifty-seven cents ; and in 1828, Andrew Skillman obtained a judgment against Babcock in his indvidual capacity. Execution issued against Babcock, and the sheriff seized d sold his undivided interest in the judgment which the firm of Allyn 8c Babcock had obtained against the plaintiff. At the sale, the plaintiff became the purchaser.

' Appeal from the court of the fourth district, the judge of the second presiding.. The defendants, acting under the police regulations of the parish, contracted with the plaintiff to make a certain portion of new levee on the lands of one Delamere, for which work, as stipulated in the contract, he was to receive the sum of five hundred dollars.

This suit was originally brought by Blair, against Wade, and at the April term of 1825, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for the amount claimed. The defendant applied for, and obtained a new trial. The death of the defendant was suggested, November term fol- . , , . lowing, and leave granted to make his representatives parties to the suit. At April term, 1826, death of the plaintiff was suggested and his heirs made parties.

<p>Where a party is ordered to produce papers, until he does so, or shows that it was not in his power to comply with the order, the cause ought not to be tried.</p> <p>is o"de»d topro-dace papera, un-tu he does so, or shows that it is not in his power theC°order, "the tobe tried!11 "ot</p>

By an authentic act dated in August, 1822, the defendant and her then husband, Harris, acknowledged themselves indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of iwelve thousand dollars, which was secured by mortgage upon a tract of land and certain slaves. After the death of Harris, his widow intermarried with Stephens, the defendant. The petition prayed judgment for twelve, thousand dollars, and that the mortgaged property be seized and sold.

<p>Aeteal from the court of the parish and City of New Orleans.</p> <p>There is one slight difference in the present ° r .case, from that referred to, arising on the contract of deposit made between William Me-Muado Duncan & Sons, who were acceptors of the bills of exchange and their creditors.</p> <p>In the case of the bank of the United States it appeared that its officers had received a dividend of the deposit, amounting to seven shillings in the pound on their claims. The same amount in relation to the claims of Hicks & Sons, seems to remain in the hands of the de-positees, for the benefit, and subject to the order of the former, according to certain conditions to be by them performed in relation to the depositors. Thiscircumstanceof difference, does not, in our opinion, materially change the essential merits of the two cases.</p>

The defendant was sued as the endorser of a note,'and the defence set up was, want of notice. It appeared from the testimony, that the defendant, at the time of protest, was clerk, on board the steamboat Washington, a regular trader between New Orleans and Louisville, Kentucky, at which last place she then was. The note was protested on Wednesday the 10th of _ , . j une, and the notice to defendant was put in the post office on Sunday the 14th.

The plaintiff purchased from the defendants at public auction, the exclusive privilege of vending oysters at certain stations on the levee, designated by the city authorities, The petitioner stated that, previous to his purchase, the corporation had prohibited the public sale of oysters, at other places than those adjudicated to him; in consequence of which, he had been induced to give for the privilege the sum of five thousand eight hundred dollars.

The petition stated that the defendant had charged the plaintiff and his wife with having stolen from him certain smoothing irons, in consequence of which slander, he had sustained damage to the amount of one thousand dollars; and further, that the defendant, assisted by one Claiborne Watkins, had wantonly and unjustifiably imprisoned the plaintiff, in the st0cks, for which last injury he claimed as damages the further sum of two thousand dollars.

This was a petitory action, in which both parties set up title to the land in controversy.— The plaintiff claimed as universal heir under the will of her deceased husband, Donaldson, who, it appeared, bought the lots in question, in 1806.

The plaintiff, a legitimate daughter of a deceased nephew of the late Julien Poydras, claimed to be recognized as an universal legatee under the will of her deceased grand uncle, by which his nephews and nieces were called to the inheritance of his succession. The late Julien Poydras had two nephews and eleven nieces, the children of his three brothers and one sister.

This suit was brought in the usual form of a petitory action, in which the plaintiff set forth the title of his testator, and claimed to recover a certain tract of land described in his petition from the defendants, as possessed without right.

The plaintiff sued out a writ of attachment against the property of the defendant on the groun(j that he had clandestinely left the state, never again to return.

This was a case in which Arcenaut, a creditor of the insolvent, opposed his discharge on an allegation of fraud in the surrender of his property. The cause was tried by a jury in the court below, who acquitted the defendant of the charge, and the district court upon the ¿finding of the jury, dismissed the opposition ■and .granted a discharge to the insolvent. From this judgment the opposing creditor appealed. points. urged the following 1.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant Acosta, who is their mother and tutrix, made a fraudulent inventory of the property belonging to the succession of their father. That a house and lot at the corner of Dauphine and Ursuline-streets was inserted in it as community property. That she concealed other effects, and that the property inventoried was appraised below its value.

This suit was instituted on the 13th May, 1828, to recover from the defendant the amount of his promissory note. The plaintiff introduced in evidence the note and protest; also a letter of defendant dated 10th October, 1825, proposing to plaintiff to renew the note; one half payable in the month of December, 1827, and the other half in December, 1828, bearing an interest of 8 per cent, per annum.

This was an action to recover from the de. fendants, the amount of a d ue bill in the following words and figures: “Due Mr. Lai thousand dollars, New-Orleans, Jii 1829,” signed “S. C. and R. Bell.” The plaintiff alleged that he presented the^ due bill for payment to S. C. Beil, one^dFTne defendants, who tore it to pieces, and ; fused payment.

This was an action to recover from the defendant damages for a breach of contract, and the material facts of the case are as follows: In 1827, the defendant, as agent of one Thomas, contracted with the plaintiff, who is own-ner of the schooner Catharine, to transport from Thomas’s Island to New-Orleans the crop of sugar and molasses.

The defendant, Selah Ford, obtained an order of seizure and sale, on a judgment against Freeman Ford, (the husband of the plaintiff,) in the State of Mississippi, by virtue of which certain slaves were seized as the property of Freeman Ford, by the sheriff of East Baton Rouge.

Appeae from the court of the third district, the judge of the second presiding.

<p>The court properly rejected evidence, to prove a fact which was not set forth in the petition.</p> <p>Motions to amend, after issue joined, are entirely within the discretion of the court.</p> <p>When the object is to set aside a former settlement of an estate, on the ground of simulation and fraud, the court of probates is not the proper tribunal.</p> <p>The court properly rejected evidence to prove a fact which was not set forth in the petition.</p> <p>Motions to amend after issue joined, are entirely within the discretion of the court.</p> <p>Where the object is to set asida a former settlement of an estate on the ground of simulation and fraud, the court of probates is not the proper tribu nal.</p>

This suit was brought to recover from the defendants the sum of $985, and the facts, as they appear in the record, were in substance as follows: In January, 1828, the plaintiff, being in Tampico, consigned to the defendant, Calico, a bag containg 81,000, which, after deducting charges, produced the nett sum of 8985.

C This suit was brought on a policy of insurance, to recover from the defendants one thousand six hundred and six dollars and thirty-four cents, being the adjusted loss on a quantity of cotton, damaged by the perils insured against. The policy was effected by Fisher, Burke & Watson, on account of the plaintiff, who was owner of the cotton.

The defendant, as ovérseer of the roads, obtained from the district court an order of seizure and sale against the land of the plaintiff, al- .... . : legmg in his petition, that the plaintiff had failed and neglected to make the necessary repairs to j^g jevees> That the defendant and other planters, did the work by requisition, and that the same amounted to one thousand and twenty-one dollars.

<p>Where the answers of a garnishee to interrogatories, are sought to be disproved, the garnishee must have notice.</p> <p>Judgment cannot be rendered, before issue joined, or an opportunity for defence.</p> <p>when the an-nishe9°t<>ainter" 1.ogatories “ proved/'th^gar-“^®®must have</p> <p>nofbfrendereá before issue join-ea,and an oPPor-fo™défence? 8</p>

The defendants were owners of the steamboat Powhatan, and by their agent at Cincinnati, received from the plaintiff a quantity of flour, to be shipped to, New-Qrfeans by the Powhatan, then at Louisville. It appeared from the evidence, that the Powhatan left Louisville before the arrival of the flour, which was sent in other boats, and did not reach New-Orleans until the price of the article had considerably fallen.

The plaintiff claimed her freedom by virtue of an act of sale from Malocher to her late owner, widow Batifol, wherein it was stipulated, that the plaintiff should be emancipated at the death of the vendee.

This suit was brought to recover from the defendants the amount of certain promissory notes executed by the wife previous to her marriage. The answer admitted the execution of the notes, and among other grounds of defence the husband set up a plea in compensation for a debt due .to himself.

<p>Appeal from the court of the third district, the judge of the fourth presiding.</p> <p>The plaintiff represented himself as the owner of a tract of land upon which the defendant had illegally entered, cut down and destroyed the timber. The petition concluded with a prayer that the defendant be condemned to pay one thousand dollars damages for the trespass and injury complained of.</p> <p>The defendant, in his answer, set up title to the land on which the trespass is alleged to have been committed; and to support this plea on the trial of the cause, he offered in evidence an act under private signature, and offered testimony at the same lime to prove the signatures to the act, and to shew that possession by actual ’ 1 * delivery accompanied the transfer.</p> <p>To the introduction of this document, the plaintiff objected on the ground, that acts under private signature, purporting to transfer land, could not be received in evidence against the rights of third persons: of this opinion was the court below, and the defendant took his bill of exceptions.</p> <p>The cause was tried by a jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages at one dollar. The defendant appealed.</p> <p>1. Upon the several bills of exceptions taken by him to the matters ruled against him in the court below.</p> <p>2. The court was without jurisdiction; the amount in dispute, as it appeared on the trial, being below the jurisdiction of the district court. C. P. arts. 126, 1061, 1063, 1064.</p>

The petition stated that Malpica embarked at Vera Cruz on board the ship Belle, Mc-Kown master, where he died, leaving money and effects to the amount of S7387.— The petition averred the liability of both master and owner, and prayed judgment against them in solido. Curell in his answer admitted the ownership of the vessel, and set up the following grounds of defence.

The plaintiff, a master workman, having contracted to build for the defendant, brought this suit to recover the balance of the price agreed upon; and a further sum, for extra and additional work done upon the premises.

This suit was brought on the 9th November, 1829, to recover fron the defendant the amount of wages due the plaintiff, as a journeyman printer, from July 1828 up to January 1829. The defendant plead the general issue, prescription and the want of an amicable demand.— There was judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.

The plaintiff shipped on board the schooner Voluntario, bound from Havana to Tampico, a quantity of goods, to be delivered there upon the arrival of the vessel. At the time of the shipment it was known tp both parties that Tampico was in possession of the Spanish troops, but upon the arrival of the schooner off the bar of Tampico, it was ascertained that the place had been retaken by the Mexicans, and that the Spanish army was prisoners.

This case and the three succeeding ones, differ from that immediately preceding in only one fact, viz. that the plaintiffs were the owners of the prohibited goods. The petition also contained an averment, that not being able to enter Tampico, the vessel proceeded to New-Orleans, agreeably to a written contract, entered into between the captain, owner, and freighters of said vessel. There was judgment for the plaintiff in the court below, and the defendants apppealed.

<p>A shipper cannot demand the delivery of his goods, if the landing of them would expose the vessel to seizure.</p> <p>A shipper cannot demand the delivery of his goods, ifthe landing of them would expose the vessel to seizure,</p>

<p>Appeal from the court of the parish and city ofNew-Orleans.</p>

<p>Appeal from the court of the parish and city of New-Orleans.</p> <p>[.For the facts in this case, the reader is referred to 8th Martin’s Reports, n. s. page 36.]</p>

The plaintiff, as attorney in fact of the heirs of Nathaniel Scales, jr. brought this suit to recover from Joseph Thompson, curator of the estate of Robert Thompson, deceased, who was curator of the succession of Scales, the sum of thirteen thousand seven dollars and three cents. Erwin, the surety in the curator’s bond, was made a party to the suit, and judgment prayed against him as such.

This was an attachment sued out by the plaintiff, as endorsee, against the defendants as drawers of a bill of exchange. An attorney was appointed to defend the suit, who pleaded, first, that no property had been attatched, and that the court was without jurisdiction; second, the general issue; third, that the plaintiff took the bill after he knew it was dishonored, and with the knowledge that it was given without consideration. The facts are substantially these. Wm.

The Bank of Orleans, filed their opposition to the tableau of the irisolvent, and contended that from the sum of seven thousand six hundred and seventy-two dollars and twenty-five cents, allowed to the estate of Morgan, there ought to be deducted six thousand eight hundred dollars, being the amount which was to be paid to Astor, of New-York, by the syndics of Saul, on an accommodation note of Morgan’s endorsed by Saul, and for which no consideration had been received.

The brig Mechanic, insured by the defendants on a voyage from New-Orleans to Philadelphia, sustained an inj ury in descending the river Mississippi, and was towed back to the city to be repaired.

This was a redhibitory action to rescind the sale of a slave. It appeared from the testimony that the slave was sold to the defendant without warranty against any vice, malady or defect, and that the defendant afterwards sold him to the plaintiff, warranted free from the vices prescribed by law. It further appeared, that the slave was in the habit of running away, both prior and subsequent to the sale to the plaintiff.

This suit was brought to recover back the price of two slaves, purchased with twelve others, by the plaintiff from the defendant, and which the petition alleged were unsound at the time of the sale, to the knowledge of the defendant.

This was an action for rent, and damages done to the premises leased. After the jury had been sworn, the defendant plead res judi- ^ that part of the petition which claimed damages. To the admission of this plea, the plaintiff objected, on the ground, that being m the nature of payment for damages, it was presented too late.

On the trial of this cause, the defendant offered the testimony of witnesses examined under a commission, to the introduction of which the plaintiff objected on the ground that the witnesses had not… Held: when the remainder of the flour and corn was found to be more or less damaged, and ordered to be sold. It was sold, and produced the sum of nine hundred and eighty dollars.

The appellant, a creditor of the insolvent, not placed on bis bilan, opposed the homologation of the proceedings had before the notary. The court below set aside the opposition on the the ground that it was not filed within ten days. The opposing creditor appealed. The statute of 1817, does not apply to creditors of the insolvent, who are not placed ' on the bilan of the insolvent.

In 1823 the wife of the plaintiff obtained against him .a separation of property, and a judgment which operated a mortgage upon the whole ofhis estate. The wife afterwards died, leaving three minor children, of whom, the plaintiff was natural tutor.

This was an action to recover damages from the owners of the tow-boat Grampus, for having run the vessel of the plaintiff s ashore, while towing her to sea. The damages were laid at two thousand seven hundred and forty-six dollars and twenty-three cents, and the defendants pleaded the general issue.

A. M. Desfarge, by last will and testament, bequeathed to the defendants, his natural children, all his property in Louisiana; and to the plaintiffs, his brothers and sisters, all his estate in France; the will contained a declaration, that the property in France was much more considerable than that in Louisiana.

city of New-Orleans. The plaintiff, having obtained a judgment against her mother and guardian for her portion of her father’s estate, sought to satisfy the same, by the seizure and sale of a house and lot, which her mother had purchased after the death of her father, and subsequently sold to the defendant. It was proved, that the father of the plaintiffleft a considerable property, and that the mother administered on the estate of her children.

The plaintiff alleged that he purchased of McHugh, a tavern establishment with its furniture, fixtures and stock. That he remained in possession thereof about five months, when during a temporary absence from the state, and while the establishment was in charge of his agent, McHugh topk forcible possession, and sold it to Sears, the other defendant. He prayed that the defendants be decreed to deliver up the establishment together with damages.

This was an action to recover from the estate of William Kenner, deceased, twenty-nine thousand seven hundred and sixty-six dollars and twenty-six cents, being the amount of three promissory notes, drawn by the commercial firm of William Kenner & Co. to the order of Morgan, Dorsey & Co. and by them endorsed to the plaintiffs. .

The commercial firm of Beale After a judgment had been recovered against Beale alone, for the amount, one of the Eliots applied to the defendant, Baldwin, for payment of their debt, and was answered that he would accept a draft from Beale for the amount. Beale accordingly drew a bill of exchange on t}ie defendant, in favor of George Eliot, which was endorsed over to Andrew, who presented it to the drawer, and upon his refusing to accept, the bill was protested.

<p>Appeal from the court of the parish and city o f New- Orleans.</p>

The plaintiffs who were ship-carpenters, brought this suit to recover from the defendants, a balance which they alleged to be due them for work and labour, and materials furnished in repairing the steam-boat Columbia. The defendants denied that the work had been faithfully done. That the boat was unnecessarily delayed in the ship-yard of plaintiffs, by which heavy damages were incurred which they claimed in reconvention.

The sheriff having refused to discharge the defendant after the order of bail had been set aside, the latter' applied for a habeas corpus and was brought up. The sheriff showing no other cause for his detention, than the order of bail, (which had been set aside) the court ordered him to be enlarged, from which order an appeal was prayed for and refused.

Suit, by attachment, was brought against the defendant, a merchant at Nashville, as drawer of a bill of exchange on a merchant of the latter place, and returned under protest for non acceptance.

<p>Appeal from the court of probates of the parish and city of New-Orleans.</p>

The plaintiff claimed to be placed on the bilan of the insolvents as a privileged creditor, by virtue of an act, wherein the wife, one of the insolvents to secure the payment of six thousand dollars, represented herself as a public 1 , . / merchant, and pledged to him a slave and all her stock in trade. In the act it was stipulated that the goods pledged were put and should remain in the possession of the husband as a third person agreed upon by the parties.

The suit was brought as well against Tuthill as against the defendant, (the owner of the building) for the price of the work. The petition stated, that the defendant was indebted to Tuthill in an amount , sufficient to pay the plaintiffs demand which was claimed by privilege. The defendant plead the general issue.

<p>Appeal from the court of the parish and city of New-Orleans.</p> <p>The plaintiff in several instances applied to the defendant recorder of mortgages, for a certificate of mortgage or no mortgage on his property/ The latter always included in the certificate a donation made by a third person to the plaintiff’s children. The petition stated that this form of certificate had operated to the injury of the plaintiff in the sale of his property, and concluded with a prayer for damages, and that the defendant be compelled to alter the form of his certificates. It was admitted that the defendant was recorder of mortgages at the institution of the suit, but had since resigned.</p> <p>There was judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>1. The record of mortgages, and the book of donations, are altogether different, and kept in the same office only for the sake of convenience.</p> <p>2. The recorder of mortgages must in his certificate relate only what is on the registry of mortgages.</p> <p>3. The registry of donations is ordered and made for purposes totally different, and to operate only between the donor and the donee.</p> <p>41 The deed of donation in this case can have no effect as a mortgage, because it is a donation of no determinate thing, moveable or immoveable; that no description of the thing given or the amount of its value appears, and that according to the code, nothing can be said ° ° to have been given.</p> <p>5_ That this pretended donation is to be tested according to the spirit of the ancient code, being made in 1820.</p> <p>6. That the thing given not being within the jurisdiction of our courts, the plaintiff has no means of ascertaining its value, and offering a special mortgage.</p> <p>1. The recorder of mortgages is bound, in his certificates, to mention the- mortgages and the donations. Old Code P. 465, art. 56. P. 466, art. 58, 59. New Code, 3355, 3356, 3357.</p> <p>2. The plaintiff being tutor to his minor children, the donation in their favour, operates as a lien upon his estate, and must be recorded against him; if he wishes it raised, he should have brought suit against the under tutor of the minors, and not against; the recorder of mortgages.</p>

To this suit, which was brought on'a promissory note, the defendant pleaded prescription and the general issue. On the trial of the cause the plaintiff offered in evidence the note sued on, without adducing any proof of'the defendant’s signature. The latter objected to its admission, but was overruled by the court on the groud that the answer of the defendant precluded the necessity of proving the execution of the note.

The plaintiff obtained an order of seizure and sale, on certain lots of ground in the town of McDonough, upon which he had a mortgage. The sale was opposed by Mooney, who set up title in himself as having purchased the lots when sold by the state for taxes.

The plaintiff claimed the privilege of a depositor by virtue: of a letter from the ancestor of the 'defendants wherein he acknowledged to have in his hands a. sum of money belonging to the plaintiff, and which he held subject to her order. There was judgment for the defendants in the court below and the plaintiff appealed.

On the 1st of January 1820, Thomas Beale, sen. made his promissory note to the order of his natural son Thomas Beale, jun. for $5000 Thomas Beale, sen. and Thomas Beale, iun. , , , being both dead,the mother of the latter brought this suit against the widow and minor children 0f ^ forInerj recover the amount of the note. The defence set up was, that the note was a disguised donation from the father to his natural son.

The plaintiff, a creditor of William B. Bel-den & Co., brought this suit to recover the '. . amount of lus claim, and to set aside a sale which Belden Sc Co. made to their co-defendant Jones, of all their stock in trade, amounting to twenty-seven thousand dollars. It was proved on the trial, that Jones was a creditor of Leiden & Co. for a large amount, and that the latter were in insolvent circumstances at the time of the sale.

She also claimed by virtue of the will of her mother, as her universal legatee. The defendant was a third possessor of the estate claimed, and derived title from the universal legatee, under the will of Edward Pearse. There was judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant’s war-rantor appealed.

<p>The instructions from one partner to another when both are equal in interest, are to be considered in the nature of advice, subject tobe deviated from according to circumstances.</p> <p>The "instructions, from one partner to another when both are equal in interest, are to be considered in the nature of advice, subject to be deviated from according to circumstances.</p>

<p>Appeal from the court of the first district.</p> <p>Ante p. 122. A rehearing having been granted in this case, it was argued a second time at this term, and</p>

This suit was brought by the wife, to recover a lot of ground, which she claimed as her paraphernal property, and which had been sold by her husband.to the defendant. It appeared from the evidence, that the portion of the plaintiff in the succession of her father and mother, had been deposited in the hands of her aunt, who conveyed the lot in question to the husband, in discharge of the debt.

In 1819, Thomas Beale, sen. conveyed all his property, by notarial acts, to his natural son Thomas Beale, jr., for one hundred and twenty-four thousand dollars, for which he took his notes, with reservation of mortgage. Shortly after, Beale, sen. died intestate, leaving a widow and minor children, but no proceedings in the probate court where had upon his estate.

<p>Appeal from the court of the first district.</p>

The petition set forth that the plaintiff and child, with a number of other proscribed Spaniards, embarked at the port of Vera Cruz, on board the ship Belle for Havana, of which ship McKown was master and the defendant owner: that, after being out about thirty days, the ship grounded near the mouth of Rio de Lagarte, on the coast of Yucatan: that the captain told the passengers, with the exception of twenty, to go ashore for the purpose of lightening the ship and getting…

These cases commenced by attachment, and the only question was as to privilege for supplies furnished to the steam-boat Oregon.

This suit was brought to recover the value of a quantity ice, alleged to have been lost in consequence of the defendants having removed the roof of a building, which they had leased to the plaintiff for an ice house. The defendants admitted the lease and removal of the roof, but contended that the repairs were indispensable, and made at the instance and requst of the plaintiff.