Volume 1 — Liquor Tax Reporter

<p>Certiorari to compel county treasurer to issue liquor tax •certificate.</p>

<p>Proceedings instituted by certiorari to compel the County Treasurer of the County of Seneca to issue a certificate under what is termed the Raines Law to Martha E. Action.</p>

Appeal by the defendant, Henry W. Koenig, from a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions of the city and county of New Yrorb, rendered on the 18th day of June, 1896, convicting the defendant of a misdemeanor.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Recorder’s Court of the City of Binghamton convicting the defendant of having violated section 1 of article 1 of title 7 of the Ordinances of the City of Binghamton in keeping his saloon open for the transaction of business, between the hours of twelve o’clock midnight and one o’clock in the morning.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order requiring the receiver to surrender a liquor tax certificate to the brewing company.</p>

Appeal by the relator, Martin Anderson, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Westchester Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Westchester ou the 30th day of September, 1896, affirming the decision of the county treasurer denying the application of the relator for a liquor tax certificate, and quashing a writ of certiorari issued in the proceeding.

<p>Liquor Tax Law—Assignability of certificate.</p> <p>A liquor tax certificate is a chose in action capable of assignment, and an assignment thereof to one who advances the money for its purchase is paramount and prior to the claim of a judgment creditor.</p>

Appeal by Karl Scheib from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Hew York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York, on the 2d day of January, 1897, revoking a liquor tax certificate issued to Karl Scheib, a writ of certiorari to review the action of the special deputy excise commissioner in granting such liquor tax certificate to said Scheib having been granted upon the ground that he was not a citizen of the United States.

<p>Habeas Corpus.</p>

<p>1. A town meeting need not be kept open continuously from sunrise to sunset.</p> <p>The provisions of the statute (Laws of 1890, chap. 569, § 29) that "Town meetings shall be kept open for the purpose of voting in the day time only, between the rising and setting of the sun," do not require that the polls, at a town meeting, shall be open at sunrise and shall be kept open continuously until sunset; and the fact that the polls at an annual town meeting, to which was submitted, under section 16 of the Liquor Tax Law of 1896, the question whether traffic in liquors should be permitted in the town, were closed about an hour before sunset, does not invalidate the decision of the town, as shown by the votes cast at the election, that such traffic be forbidden.</p> <p>2. Election board1—Acts not reviewable by certiorari.</p> <p>The acts of an election board are not judicial in character, can not be reviewed directly by a writ of certiorari, nor can they be reviewed collaterally in such a manner by a person who was denied a liquor tax certificate and who asserts that the town election, which decided against traffic in liquors in the town, was illegal because the polls were closed an hour before sunset.</p>

<p>Liquor Tax Law—An offender against its provisions can not be sentenced to an imprisonment of one day for each dollar of the fine unpaid— Discharge under a writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>The provisions of sections 484 and 718 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, providing that a judgment which imposes a fine may also direct that the criminal be imprisoned until the fine .be paid, for a term not to exceed one day for each dollar of the fine, are not applicable to a conviction under the Liquor Tax Law (Laws of 1896, chap. 112, §34), which makes a sale of liquor by one not having a liquor tax certificate a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, but contains no specific authority to sentence the criminal to imprisonment for non-payment of the fine, the latter statute being designed to cover the whole subject, both prescribing the punishment and the manner in which the fine shall be collected.</p> <p>Where in such a case a sentence of imprisonment has been imposed for the non-payment of the fine, the prisoner may be released under a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

Appeal by the defendant, Henry H. Lyman, as State Commissioner of Excise of the State of New York, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Erie Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 9th day of February, 1898, granting a peremptory writ of mandamus, requiring the State commissioner of excise to issue orders for the payment of $416.67 on account of the surrender of a liquor tax certificate issued to the relator’s assignors.

Appeal by the petitioner, Frank Place, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Onondaga Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Onondaga on the 7th day of June, 1897, denying the petitioner’s application to have canceled a liquor tax certificate issued to Frank Matty-.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Heni-y H. Lyman, as State Commissioner of Excise of the State of New York, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Monroe Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Ontario on the 8th day of October, 1897, granting the defendants’ motion to change the place of trial from the county of Ontario to the county of New York, for the convenience of witnesses. .

Appeal by the petitioner, Henry H. Lyman, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 13th day of December, 1897, denying the petitioner’s application for the revocation and cancellation of the liquor tax certificate granted to the Young Men’s Cosmopolitan Club of New York.

Appeal by the defendant, George Hilliard, as special deputy commissioner of excise for the county of New York, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 21st day of February, 1898, granting the relator’s motion for a peremptory Avrit of mandamus requiring the defendant to forthwith approve of the bond filed by the relator with the defendant, and to issue a liquor tax…

Appeal by The Gramercy Club, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 21st day of January, 1898, revoking and canceling the liquor tax certificate issued to The Gramercy Club.

Motion tb remove excise case, violation of subdivision 1 of section 31 of Liquor Tax Law, from Special Sessions in Queens Borough, city of New York, to Grand Jury on ground that sections 35 and 35-a of Liquor Tax Law require prosecution to be by indictment save in the city and county of New York.

This is an appeal from an order denying defendant’s application for a certificate to remove the prosecution of a charge against him for violation of section 31 of the Liquor Tax Law, from a Court of Special Sessions to the Grand Jury of Queens county, pursuant to section 1406 of the charter of the city of New York. Appellant is entitled to a trial by jury and in a Court of Record having jurisdiction of crimes of the grade of felony.

Appeal by Henry Korndorfer from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 22d day of November, 1897, revoking and canceling liquor tax certificate No. 6080, granted to Henry Korndorfer.

Appeal by the relator, William H. D. Sweet, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Ulster Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 18th day of May, 1897, denying the relator’s motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the said Henry H. Lyman, State Commissioner of Excise of the State of Hew York, to reinstate the relator in the position of special agent in the excise department.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Henry H. Lyman, as State Commissioner of Excise of the State of New York, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 6th day of May, 1898, setting aside the plaintiff’s complaint and granting him leave to serve an amended complaint. The complaint is upon a bond given to secure a liquor tax certificate.

Appeal by John Fuhrmann from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 20th day of August, 1898, canceling the liquor tax certificate issued to the said John Fuhrmann.

A motion by State Commissioner Lyman to revoke and cancel a liquor tax certificate issued to the Malcolm Brewing Company was denied to-day by Justice Smith in Supreme Court, special term. The certificate authorized the defendant to traffic in liquors on the premises. inside the ball grounds known as the Washington Park Base Ball Grounds, and the bar was to be situated on the north side of Third street, 350 feet east of Third avenue.

The indictment in this case charges the defendant with misdemeanor, committed by the sale of fermented and malt liquors on Sunday, December 6, 1896, at the city of Rochester.

Appeal by the defendant, Frank Matty, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Oswego Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Oswego on the 10th day of January, 1898, denying Ms motion to change the place of trial of the action from Oswego county to Onondaga county.

The court erred in charging the jury that if they found that defendant gave away lager beer on Sunday to the. special agents on the occasion in question, or to anybody else in their presence, then he was guilty, as charged in indictment.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Fourth Municipal Court, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event. Appeal from an order of the court at Trial Term, dismissing the complaint as to one of the defendants.