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1 McCanless 383

273 S.W.2d 475

Reece v. State

Tennessee Supreme Court

Decided November 16, 1954

Tennessee Supreme Court · decided 1954-11-16

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““In civil cases, in the application of this statute it has been held that the presumption created by this statute is not a true presumption but is one created for procedural purposes to supply the place of proof and that when credible evidence of unimpeached and un-contradicted witnesses is adduced, the so-called presumption disappears; hut in the absence of such proof the presumption remains in the case, so that a jury may either accept or reject the evidence offered by the opposite party, and if it rejects the same, the jury may then fall back upon the presumption.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including 59 Tenn. App. 741 - Mercado v. Travelers Insurance Company

Relies on Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Land

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1954-11-16

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently January 2003

7 state decisions

70195419601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1ON Petition to Rehear.

¶2Counsel for the plaintiff in error has diligently filed a petition to rehear in which exception is taken to our reference in the original opinion to Code Sec. 2702, insisting that with respect to proof of ownership in this case the caption to the original Act, Pub. Acts 1921, c. 162 on which this Code Section is based limits the application of same to actions for personal injury and property damage and being in derogation of the common law, is limited in its application to civil actions for personal *388injuries and property damage, and is not applicable to connect tbe defendant in a criminal case as bere applied.

¶3Counsel is correct with reference to tbe caption and purpose of tbe Act but in our opinion, it is nevertheless true that it is consonant with tbe ordinary rules of evidence and methods of proof to bold that a prima facie case of ownership appears when it has been shown that the vehicle is registered in tbe name of tbe accused. In tbe interests of brevity we did not in tbe original opinion develop tbe point.

¶4In civil cases, in tbe application of this statute it has been held that tbe presumption created by this statute is not a true presumption but is one created for procedural purposes to supply tbe place of proof and that when credible evidence of unimpeached and uncontradicted witnesses is adduced, tbe so-called presumption disappears; but in the absence of such proof tbe presumption remains in tbe case, so that a jury may either accept or reject tbe evidence offered by tbe opposite party, and if it rejects tbe same, tbe jury may then fall back upon tbe presumption.

¶5However, whether it be a civil or a criminal case, a person does not in tbe ordinary course of events in complying with this law or one to be mentioned later herein, register a motor vehicle in bis name unless be is tbe owner of same and entitled to do so. Independent of the statute, therefore, proof of such act is evidence from which it can reasonably be found that tbe person in whose name' tbe motor vehicle was registered was tbe owner thereof on tbe date of tbe registration.

¶6That is a conclusion based upon facts in evidence and not a mere presumption, so that, although tbe alleged crime was committed a few months after tbe date of registration of tbe vehicle, a presumption may be indulged *389that the accused continued to be the owner, in the absence of any countervailing- proof. Such is not to base an inference upon an inference. The distinction is well made in Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Land, 187 Tenn. 533, 541-542, 216 S. W. (2d) 27.

¶7There is also another statute which more strongly compels the conclusions above stated. That is Chapter 70, Acts of 1951, known as the Automobile Title and Registration Act, codified in Williams’ Code as Section 5538.101 et seq. This Act took the place of the 1949 similar Act. Under the present Act also, Section 5538.127 et seq., it is required that every motor vehicle, with certain specified exceptions not here relevant, must be registered before being driven on the highways, and before the same may be registered, a certificate of title must be shown or applied for; before a transfer of interest the registration plate must be removed from the motor vehicle by the owner and there must be a transfer of the title papers. Section 5538.111, Subsection (b) provides that the word £iowner” shall mean “a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle, … V’ The Act makes it a misdemeanor to violate its provisions except where otherwise the violation is made a felony.

¶8That is a general statute designed-among other things, but particularly to prevent the theft of motor vehicles, to prevent fraud and to facilitate the transfer of title to same.

¶9Since the Act provides by express terms that the owner is the one who holds the legal title and only the one having a certificate of title may register the motor vehicle, proof of registration is practically conclusive of ownership except in some cases of fraud or under some equitable considerations. The writer had occasion while a member of the Court of Appeals, to g-o into this question and re*390search, developed that with the exception of about three cases involving equitable considerations, the Courts in every state having a similar statute holds that the certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership, and since only the one having title or applying for title may register the vehicle, the registration in the name of that person is practically conclusive evidence of ownership.

¶10With deference to counsel we accordingly overrule the petition to rehear.

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