1 Md. App. 481 - Scott v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 45 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The record affirmatively shows that in both instances the applicant was sworn by the judge who issued the warrant. This is sufficient, whatever the notary may have done. Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 497 , 224 A. 2d 111 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 21 Utah 2d 24 - State v. Jasso · 5 Md. App. 36 - Propst v. State

2. ““Section 264B particularly defines a slot machine as ‘one that is adapted for use in such a way that, as a result of the insertion or deposit therein, or placing with another person of any piece of money, coin, token or other object, such machine, apparatus or device is caused to operate or may be operated, and by reason of any element of chance or of other outcome of such operation unpredictable by him, the user may receive or become entitled to receive any piece of money, coin, token or other object representative of and convertible into money, irrespective of whether the said machine, apparatus or device may, apart from any element of chance or unpredictable outcome of such operation, also sell, deliver or present some merchandise or money or other tangible thing of value.’ [Italics supplied] The devices were admitted in evidence and observed by the jury. A Maryland jury reasonably could be expected to make the decision whether they fell within the statute from this observation alone. However, numerous witnesses described them as slot machines. The fact that there was no showing that they were operational is beside the point in the light of the italicized language in the statute and in the light of the fact that the owner said he ‘could tell they are not in too bad shape.’ The inference is plain that they were operational or could be made to operate.” 231 A.2d at 737 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. BPOE 576, Elks Club v. State

3. ““'Phis is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating only the affiant’s or an informer’s belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of the ‘underlying circumstances’ upon which that belief is based. See Aguilar v. Texas, supra [ 378 U. S. 114 , 12 L. Ed. 2d at 729 ]. Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential [as it is under the Maryland statute] if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. However, where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. Jones v. United States, supra at 270 [of 362 U. S.].””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 3 Md. App. 38 - Frey v. State