¶1On adverting to the act of Assembly in relation to this matter,
¶2According to the English course of proceeding it would seem to be a general rule, that the defendant must appear in person and swear to his answer before one of the masters in chancery. This *551was greatly inconvenient to defendants who resided at any distance from the place where the court was held. Hence at first as an indulgence and by a special order, but now and for a long time past, where a defendant resides more than twenty miles from London, or is unable to travel, it is a matter of course to issue a dedimus potestatem to take his answer.
¶3With regard to an infant defendant, however distant within the kingdom he may reside, he must be brought in; because the court must see, from inspection and observation, that he is an infant, for whom it is necessary, that a guardian should be appointed by whom he may answer. But if the infant be abroad, or unable to attend, a. commission must go to appoint a guardian and take his answer by such guardian. The dedimus or commission, in such case is similar; the four commissioners are appointed in the same way as; and it is executed in all respects like, that which goes to take the answer of an adult defendant who resides more than twenty miles from London.
¶4The practice in Maryland is different. I have met with no evidence, that it ever was at any time, either before or since our revolution, the practice of this court to have the defendant actually brought in merely to swear to his answer before the Chancellor or the register of the court. It appears to have been always the practice here for the defendant to swear to his answer before a judge or a justice of the peace, which when thus authenticated and filedj has been uniformly received and dealt with as an answer,
¶5It would seem, that, according to the course of proceeding in the English Court of Chancery, there may be a material distinction between a guardian ad litem of an infant-defendant, and a guardian having no other concern with the case than merely to answer the bill. The guardian ad litem must not only answer the bill, but is bound to inform himself of all circumstances, and to make as good, a defence for his ward as the nature of his case will admit; while on the other hand, as it would seem, the duty of a guardian to answer only, extends no further than merely to the making and filing of an answer.
¶6If it appears upon the face of the proceedings-, or upon enquiry into the fact, that the defendant is an infant, the court cannot proceed without a guardian to answer and defend for him ;
¶7In England, when an infant defendant resides out of the jurisdiction of the court, a commission may be sent abroad to appoint a guardian and take his answer, and on a supplemental bill being afterwards filed the same guardian may be authorized to answer for him.
¶8Such appears to have been the understanding of the profession as to the practice when the legislature declared, that in cases of partition, the Chancellor on the complainant’s motion may direct a commission to issue unto three persons such as he shall approve, authorizing them or any two of them to go to the infant and appoint a guardian for the purpose of answering and defending the suit, and authorizing them likewise to take the answer and return it to the court,
¶9By an English statute enacted in 1346,
¶10These precedents would seem to sanction the position, that a positive legislative enactment may be virtually repealed by a long, general, and uninterrupted course of practice. But they are precedents which I should feel a great repugnance to adopt and enlarge upon. I hold it to be my duty to treat the acts of my predecessors with respect; and to yield implicit obedience to my superiors ; yet I cannot lose sight of the sphere assigned to the judiciary, and allow myself, by any suggestion arising from the case, or by following any lightly considered precedent, to overstep the limits constitutionally prescribed to the judicial department to which I belong. No judge or court, either -of the first or last resort, can have any right to legislate; and there can be no difference between the power to declare an act of Assembly obsolete, and the power to enact a new law. The power to repeal and to enact are of the same nature. I shall therefore always consider an express provision of a constitutional act of Assembly as an authority superior to any usage or adjudged case whatever.
¶11The first enactment upon this subject
¶12The original act
¶13The case of publication against a nonresident, presents an entirely different question; because the publication is to stand in the place of actual notice only in case the party be in truth a nonresident ; and therefore, if he does not, in fact, at the time, reside out of the State, such a substitute for the actual service of process •cannot be resorted to, for the purpose of enabling the court to act upon the case; and therefore, the decree will be void: since the publication against a nonresident can, in no way, be fashioned, like a commission to take the answer of an infant defendant, to suit both alternatives of- a residence, or a non-residence; and consequently, if the publication be not valid upon the ground of the actual nonresidence of the party, it is a nullity to all intents and purposes whatever.
¶14Whereupon it is ordered, that a commission issue as prayed by the said petition of the plaintiffs filed on the 15th instant.
¶15A commission was issued and an answer returned accordingly; after which, on the 8th May 1829, it was decreed that the real estate be sold, &c.
¶16 1797, ch. 114, s. 5.
¶171 Harr. Pra. Chan. 283; 1 Newl. Chan. 124.
¶181 Harr. Pra. Chan. 288.
¶19 Marlborough v. Marlborough, 1 Dick. 74; Jongsma v. Pfiel, 9 Ves. 357; Tappen v. Norman, 11 Ves. 563.
¶20 Brice v. Alexander, MS. Chan. Proc. lib. W. K. No. 1, fol. 43; Mackall v. Morsell, MS. Chan. Prom lib. W. K. No. 1, fol. 223.
¶21 Cooper v. Cooper, 1788, MS. Chan. Proc. lib. S. H. H. let. B. fol. 351.
¶22Bowie v. Mockbee. — December 1780. — Rogers, Chancellor. — On motion of the complainant’s solicitor, ordered, that the defendant stand committed to close custody of the sheriff of Prince George’s county, to remain in custody of the said sheriff until the said defendant shall put in and file a good and sufficient answer in this case, and pay the costs of the said attachment of contempt issued against him in the cause aforesaid.— Chan. Proc. Lib. No. 1, fol. 295.
¶23 Hornby v. Pemberton, Mosely, 57; Prout v. Slater, MS. 3d April, 1799, Chan. Proc. lib. S. H. H. No. 7, fol. 25; Chan. Proc. 1761, lib. D. D. No. J. fol. 59.
¶24 1 Newl. Chan. 105, 138; 2 Newl. Chan. 152; 1 Harr. Pra. Chan. 708.
¶25 Chapman v. Barnes. — This was a creditor’s bill filed against the heir and administrator of the late Richard Barnes to have his land sold for the payment of his debts. The bill stated, that Mary E. Barnes, the heir of Richard her father, was an infant, and prayed a subpoena against her as well as against the administrator; a subpoena was issued accordingly, and after-wards a commission was issued in the usual way to take the answer of the infant, under which her answer was returned and filed on the 24th of February 1814.
¶2619th March, 1814. — Kilty, Chancellor. — A motion was made by counsel for the appointment of a guardian to defend for the infant Mary Elizabeth Barnes, according to the practice in England. The Chancellor is not apprised of its having been done in this State ; but such a practice appearing to be equitable and probably necessary, it is hereby ordered, that John Barnes, of Charles county, be and he is hereby appointed guardian for the said Mary Elizabeth Barnes, to defend on her behalf the said suit.
¶27 1785, ch. 72, s. 1; 1797, ch. 114, s. 5.
¶28 Eyles v. Le Gros, 9 Ves. 12; Hill v. Smith, 1 Mad. Rep. 290.
¶29 Gist v. Gist, 3d November 1798, Chan. Proc. lib. S. H. H. No. 7, fol. 48, 52; Merriweather v. Hood, MS. June 1800; McCoy v. Springer, MS. October 1800.
¶30 Roberts v. Stanton, 2 Mun. 133.
¶31 Dulany v. Frazer, MS. per Hanson, Chancellor, 19th November, 1792.
¶32Griffith v. Davis. — 1789.—Rogers, Chancellor. — On motion of complainant’s counsel, ordered, that the messenger bring into court the body of Henrietta Davis, the infant, on the fourth day of next court, she being heretofore returned by the sheriff of Montgomery county, summoned to appear in this cause, and attachment having been, awarded on her failure to appear on the said summons. — Chan. Proc. lib. S. H. H. let. C. fol. 61.
¶33 2 Newl. Chan. 155; Wilson v. Bott, 1 Pric. 62; Perkins v. Hammond, Dick. 287; Smith v. Marshall, 2 Atk. 70; McMechen v. Evans, MS. 3d November 1817.
¶34Taylor v. Durben, 1787, Chan. Proc. lib. S. H. H. let. B. fol. 41.
¶35Perkins v. Gleaves. — February, 1790. — Hanson, Chancellor. — Rule that Doctor William Gleaves shew cause to this court on the first of April next, why an attachment should not issue against him for a contempt in refusing to answer on behalf of the infant to whom he was appointed guardian ad litem, by a commission issued by this court and returned. No cause having been shewn, it is ordered that attachment issue against William Gleaves to answer, &c.— Chan. Proc. lib. S. H. H. let. C. fol. 582.
¶36Brown v. Brooker, MS. October 1800, &c. &c.
¶37 Jongsma v. Pfiel, 9 Ves. 357; Lushington v. Sewell, 6 Mad. 28.
¶38 Diffendall v. Diffendall, Chan. Proc. lib. S. H. H. No. 7, fol. 148, 155.
¶39 1797, ch. 114, s. 5.
¶40 1818, ch. 193, s. 11 & 12; 1831, ch. 311, s. 8.
¶4120 Edw. 3, c. 3.
¶42 Jurisd. Court Chan. 13.
¶4315 Hen. 6, c. 4.
¶44 1 Harr. Pra. Chan. 200; 2 Com. Dig. 371.
¶45 4 & 5 Anne.
¶46 Regina v. Ballivos de Bewdley, 1 P. Will. 223; Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1755.
¶471 Hen. 5, c. 1.
¶48 2 Hall. Mid. Ages, 156.
¶49 1747, ch. 3, s. 10.
¶50 1832, ch. 302, s. 1.
¶51 1797, ch. 114, a. 5.
¶52 1818, ch. 193, s. 11 & 12
¶53Burd v. Greenleaf. — It was objected in this case, that all the parties were not before the court. Publication against the infant heirs of a defendant had been made according to the act of 1799, ch. 79, s. 1 & 4, instead of serving a subpoena upon them.
¶54February, 1808. — Kilty, Chancellor. — It appears, that the general acts of Assembly for regulating the chancery practice do not extend to infants, but that particular acts have been passed for the purpose of binding them; as in the cases of contracts by their ancestors, mortgages, debts, partition, &c. The first section of the act of 1795, ch. 88, did not, as the complainants have contended, extend to infants, hut provided for publication against persons of full age. The act of 1799, ch. 79, put infants on tile same footing with other defendants, excepting reserving at all events the liberty of appearing within eighteen months. This section is not restricted to laws within the first section of the same act, but- is applicable also to the first section of the act of 1795, or any other general act. Let us examine the intention of the two acts. The act of 1795 permits an appearance and re-examination within eighteen months, and the first decree is of course not final. The reason of which might be, that there could he no certainty of the absent defendant having seen the publication. *557The act of 1799 malees the first decree final, provided the subpoena is proved to be served. There is no doubt a considerable difficulty in making this service and proof; where the party is out of the State; but the complainant, in any case, has his choice of the two modes of proceeding. The difficulty of serving the subpoena is greater as to the infants. And the reason does not apply to them, for after such service, the eighteen months is still allowed to them. The act of 1795 allows the publication, which by the fourth section of the act of 1799 applied to the infant defendants in this case. The order may be considered as made under either act, according as the subpoena might or might not be served, and the service might have been directed with that view.
¶55 1797, ch. 114, s. 5.
¶56 Low v. Dawson, MS. 30th September, 1818; Burgess v. The Bank of Columbia, MS. 13th April 1820; Law v. Law, MS., 6th December 1824; Shaaf v. Taney, MS. 10th May 1826.
¶57 1797, ch. 114, s. 5.