Attachment for rent by appellee against appellant. Erom verdict and judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals.

Appellant, Lula Stevens, and J. L. Stevens were the owners, as tenants in common, of certain lands in Olay county. J. L. Stevens was in possession, Lula Stevens not living in the county at the time of the rent contract. J. L. Stevens, in January, 1881, leased the lands, by a written contract, to G-. H. Burkett for two years, 1881 and 1882.

At the same time the lease was executed Burkett executed his two notes payable-to J. L. Stevens, one for nine bales of lint cotton, rent for the year 1881, and the other for nine bales of lint cotton, rent for the year 1882. J. L. Stevens assigned these notes to appellee Wm. E. Moore. On the trial J. L. Stevens testified that he transferred the notes to Moore about the 1st of January, 1881, and at that time it was agreed and understood that Moore was to pay one bale cotton to Lula Stevens for each of the two years of the lease as her part of the rent. Wm. E. Moore testified that he never agreed to pay Lula Stevens anything for the year 1882, the year for which the rent was claimed.

Appealed from Circuit Court, Clay county, James M. Arnold, Judge.

Brief of Tbos. E. Bugg:

* * * pirig court decided in Marye v. Dyche, 42 Miss. 347, “ the policy of the law respecting distress for rent has been changed by our statute, and a distress for that purpose is now no more than a summary method of seizing under a writ of attachment, the tenant’s property and selling the same to satisfy the rent which he owes.”

So that the attachment for rent will lie in those cases now under •our statute, where the common-law process of distress would. To determine Lula Stevens’ rights in this case, the question arises, did the relation of landlord and tenant subsist to the extent to authorize the attachment for rent ? To which there can be but one answer, that such relation did subsist.

“ The tenancy that will authorize a distress need not necessarily be in writing, nor in any particular form, for a lease may be inferred from circumstances; a parol lease will be sufficient; and very slight circumstances will constitute a tenancy for this purpose; as the admission by a party holding under an agreement of a charge of half a year’s rent, in an account between him and his landlord, or the payment of a previous quarter’s rent.” Taylor’s Landlord & Tenant, § 563.

Moore admits that he paid rent for the year 1881.

“ So a holding over after the expiration of a lease for a year, is a continuation of the former tenancy and subjects the tenant to a distress whether the first demise be by deed or parol. And the right subsists if the lease under which the tenant holds is void under the statute; for though it may be void, as a lease for the term, it yet inures as a tenancy from year to year, and must regulate the terms on which the tenancy subsists in all other respects except in durationTaylor’s Landlord & Tenant, § 564; Love v. Law, 57 Miss. 596.

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