Volume 1 — New Jersey Equity Reports

The bill in this case was filed by the complainants, execution creditors, against the defendant in execution, the sheriff, and the purchasers at a sheriff’s sale, made under a prior execution; to set aside the sale on the ground of inadequacy of price, and alleged fraud and irregularity in the sale ; by which the rights of the complainants, as subsequent execution creditors, were defeated.

Jacob Quick, in and by his last will and testament, dated 8th August, IS08, after devising one part of his farm to his soo Ezekiel, devised the other part as follows: “ T devise to my son Abraham Quick all the remainder of my lands, situate in the township of Amwell, (describing it by metes and bounds,) containing one hundred and twenty acres, more or less; to him the said Abraham Quick during his life time; and if he should die before his wife, she is to have the use and…

This was a bill filed to foreclose. Before the suit the mortgagor had conveyed to George Hancock in fee, in trust for certain purposes; and the mortgagor and Hancock were made parties, and also certain other persons, claiming to have a lien on the property.

<p>Upon a bill for specific performance of an agreement, that at the expiration oi a building lease the buildings and machinery should be valued by three indifferent persons, one to be chosen by each party and the third to be mutually chosen by them, or in case of their disagreement, then by the two who shall have been chosen by the said parties. If one party has made choice of an appraiser and the other refused to choose one, this court cannot compel him to choose one.</p> <p>If the appraiser chosen by one party, without the concurrence of the other, made an appraisement, it is an exparte proceeding, irregular and void.</p> <p>But in such cases, where a specific performance of the agreement has become impossible, or from the nature of the contract cannot be decreed, the party aggrieved is entitled to compensation in damages for the non-performance of the agreement.</p> <p>There is a distinction between damages arising from the non-performance of a contract, which damages may be partly imaginary, and partly the result of actual or supposed loss or inconvenience; and the damages to which a party is justly entitled for repairs or beneficial and lasting improvements, under the faith of an engagement which is afterwards discovered to be defective, or impossible to be executed by default of the opposite party. In the first case, the damages can be properly assessed only by a jury upon an issue of quantum damnificatus; in the last, the compensation may be safely ascertained by an inquiry before a master, or commissioner, or at the dfscretion of the court an issue may be awarded.</p> <p>In cases of the latter description the jurisdiction of this court is complete : the party has a clear equity to be restored to the money paid for improvements, which are rendered valueless to him, but are greatly beneficial to the owner of the land.</p> <p>Executors of a mortgagee, standing in the place of the testator, have an interest in the controversy; the mortgage is in their hands, and they have <t right to come into this court, to be satisfied the amount of it, out of tho property bound by it, or its proceeds.</p> <p>If probate was granted without the state, query ?</p>

<p>On an inquisition returned finding a person lunatic and of unsound mind at that time, and for five years last past, a third person representing himself to be the attorney in fact of the alleged lunatic, under a letter of attorney executed within that period, and stating that he had transacted business of the alleged lunatic to a considerable amount, and advertised and sold part of his real estate, the alleged lunatic himself having executed and delivered the deeds therefor ; and that, by the finding of the inquisition, he, the attorney, is endangered in the contracts entered into by virtue of said letter of attorney— cannot be heard upon petition by him praying that the inquisition may be quashed, or a new commission issued, or a traverse ordered ; he is not interested as a purchaser whose title might be affected by the inquisition, neither is he liable as vendor, the lunatic himself having executed the deeds ; he has no interest which entitles him to be heard.</p> <p>A stranger cannot sue out a commission in the nature of a writ de lunático inquircndo, nor can he make himself party to it by application to this court; he has no right to interfere in a proceeding of this nature. The party who seeks to quash the inquisition or traverse the finding of the jury, should have an actual interest, legal or equitable, which would be endangered by the finding of the jury, and that should be manifested to the court; in such cases the application will be granted.</p> <p>A person found lunatic may appear and traverse the inquisition by attorney, but an idiot must appear before the court in person.</p> <p>The petition for a commission of lunacy should be accompanied by affidavits, evincing the lunacy of the •party ; this may be, by setting forth the unsound state of the mind of the person against whom the commission is prayed, and mentioning such instances of incoherent conduct or expression, as prove him unfit to continue in the management of his own affairs : so an affidavit setting forth no particular act or expression of the alleged lunatic, from which the court could form an opinion of the propriety of granting the commission, but stating expressly, that for the space of six or seven years last past, the deponent lias, by frequently observing the behaviour and actions of the alleged lunatic, looked upon him to be deprived of his reason and understanding, so as to be incapable of the government of himself, and incompetent to manage his own affairs ; is sufficient, after inquisition returned, to sustain it as regularly issued.</p> <p>It is not necessary that the inquest should lie held at the dwelling house of the lunatic ; if held at a suitable place in the neighbourhood, not so remote as to induce the suspicion of unfair practice, orto preclude the jury from inspecting the lunatic, it is sufficient: in this case the inquisition was held at a public house seven miles distant, and the jury and two of the commissioners went to the dwelling house of the lunatic and inspected him, and it was considered to be within the rule.</p> <p>It is not necessary that the evidence taken before the jury should be reduced to writing and returned with the inquisitiefm</p> <p>Where the lunacy at the time of the inquisition found is not questioned, but a traverse is sought to vary the time at which the lunacy commenced, to exempt from its operation a will executed by the lunatic within the period of the lunacy, with respect to which the inquisition is not conclusive, it will not be granted.</p>

The bill set forth, that Augustus F. Cammann, the complainant, and Henry Traphagan, deceased, had dealings together ; that several promissory notes were given by the complainant to the deceased : upon two of which notes, and a book account, the complainant was prosecuted at law by the defendant, David P. Traphagan, as executor of the said deceased, and a verdict and judgment obtained against the complainant, who was then absent on business.

<p>The rules of pleading in a court of equity, are not so technical and precise as in courts of law. The powers of the court, and modes of administering relief, authorize and require greater liberality. Still, when principles have by repeated adjudications become settled, it is quite as important that these principles should be preserved in this as any other court.</p> <p>The court will not permit several plaintiffs to demand by one bill, several matters perfectly distinct and unconnected, against one defendant; nor one plaintiff to demand several matters of distinct natures, against several defendants.</p> <p>A bill filed by several complainants on behalf of themselves and all others, over whose lands the Morris Canal and Banking Company have made their canal, who shall come in and contribute ; charging that the defendants had entered on the complainants’ lands without permission, or having purchased or agreed for the same, and excavated their canal and done the complainants great damage, and that the company is insolvent and unable to pay ; and praying that an account may be taken and damages awarded to the complainants for the injuries already sustained, and compensation for their lands taken by the company decreed to them, and that an injunction may issue restraining the company from using or occupying the land; is multifarious, and on that account the injunction refused.</p> <p>Where the demands of several complainants united in the same bill, are entirely distinct and independent; where there is no privity between them no general right to be established as against the defendant; no common interest in all the complainants, centering in the point in issue in the cause ; no general right claimed by the bill and covering the whole case ; no rights estsblished in favour of complainants ; and no demand made, that the funds of the defendant shall be applied to the payment of the complainants’ claims after their adjustment: and where their claims are not in rem but in per-sonam ;—the bill cannot be sustained.</p> <p>A bill by several to compel the specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate, in which the complainants hold distinct rights, cannot be sustained.</p>

Abraham Ackerman, on the 28th December, 1827, made and executed bis last will and testament, in tbe presence of three subscribing witnesses; in which, among other things, he devised to his wife $200 in money, some personal property, and a lot of land in fee; and also bequeathed her $2000, to be paid to her out of his estate as soon as conveniently might be, in lieu of her dower.

The bill states that the complainant was sheriff of Essex county. That about the 25th day of May, 1826. tbere-was placed in his hands a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, issued out of the inferior court of common pleas of said count}', against D. K. Allen, at the suit of the president, directors and company of the Paterson bank, for $979 57, besides interest; and that on the same day he arrested the defendant, by virtue of the said writ.

The bill charges, that in May, 1816, John Vandegrift mortgaged the premises in question, a lot of about six acres, to Richard Edsall, junior, for $1300. That this mortgage was given for the purchase money on a sale of the premises by Edsall to Vande-grift : and that Edsall, on the 4th of November, 1816, assigned the mortgage to Henry Simmons, of whose will the complainant is executor.

James Wilson, the complainant, in bis bill, states, that he became indebted to the Slate Bank at New-Brunswick, and other banks, to a largo amount, as endorser for one Joseph Demund. That Demund having failed to pay the notes, judgment was obtained against the complainant by the bank; and execution being issued, his property, including a farm in the county of Warren, was sold. The bank became the purchaser, and received a (lee(l h'°m the sheriff.

In July, 1827, Edward Smith, Hugh F. Hollingsbead, and William Platt, exhibited their bill in this court against David C. Wood, and others, to foreclose the equity of redemption in certain mortgaged premises in the county of Cumberland.

Elizabeth Zule, filed her bill of complaint, against William Zule; in which she states, that they were lawfully married in New-York, in 1807; that the defendant treated her with extreme cruelty ; sold tbcir property and furniture, and deserted her, and has obstinately continued to desert her, for nine years, and married one Catharine Gulick, with whom he lias since lived ; in consequence of which, he was indicted for polygamy, &c.; and prays for a divorce from bed and board,…

The bill in this case, was filed by Guy M. Hinchman, against Peter Wortman and Isaac Emans, administrators of Nicholas Emans, deceased, and the heirs of said Nicholas Emans, defendants. The object of the suit was to obtain a foreclosure, and sale of certain mortgaged premises, in the county of Morris.

The original bill in this case was filed by Jacob Glover against Elias Hedges, for an injunction, and for relief against a judgment obtained by said Hedges against Glover, in the common pleas of Morris county, for wrongfully cancelling a bond and mortgage given by Samuel Hedges to the said Elias for four hundred dollars, (on which about three hundred was due,) and by him deposited with Glover as collateral security for the payment of a note given by Elias Hedges and Jacob…

A bill was filed by the complainants for a foreclosure and sale of certain mortgaged premises in Paterson, in the county of Essex, consisting of a cotton mill and machinery, then in the occupation of Nicholas Smith. There were a number of incum-brances on the property, and all persons interested were made parties to the bill.

<p>B. Tuthill, by his will, after some specific bequests, ordered “that all the rest of his estate, real and personal, be sold by his executors and turned into money as soon after his decease as conveniently might be, and distributed among his children in the following proportions, viz : two shares to each of his sons, and one share to each of his daughtersand provided “that none of the legacies should lapse by the death of any of his children, but that, in case of such death, the share of the deceased child should go to his or her issue in the proportions aforesaid; and if such deceased child should leave no issue, then his or her share should go to and among his surviving children, in the like proportions.”</p> <p>Upon the death of the testator his children took vested interests in their respective shares, although payment could not be made until after the land should be sold, which in no wise affected the vesting of the estate.</p> <p>By this bequest the whole interest or estate in their respective shares, and not a life estate merely, vested in the children, notwithstanding there are no words of perpetuity or inheritance ; the intent being clear.</p> <p>The provision in case of the death of any of the children, with, or without issue, refers to their death in the life-time of the testator; and goes no farther than to prevent the lapse of their legacies. It does not amount to a limitation over, on the death of a legatee after the testator’s death, and before receiving the legacy.</p> <p>The land not being devised, but a mere power of sale given to the executors; between the death of the testator and sale of the land, the beneficial interest was in the heirs; and they were entitled to the rents and profits.</p> <p>The heirs had also a right to make a disposition or transfer of their vested interest. William, one of the sons, having previous to the sale mortgaged his proportion of the lands to the complainant, to secure a debt, and drawn an order on the executor to pay the proceeds of his share, when sold, to the mortgagee, which was accepted by the executor; the money was fixed in the hands of the executor, and the mortgagee entitled to receive the amount of his debt out of the proceeds.</p> <p>This order was not a bill of exchange, but a direction to the executor to pay such part of this money to the mortgagee, for a past valuable consideration received; which the executor by his acceptance agreed to do.</p> <p>A subsequent assignment by the same legatee to the executor of his share in the estate, is subject to the prior vested right of the mortgagee.</p>

<p>The original bill in this cause was filed for a foreclosure and sale of certain mortgaged premises, in the county of Monmouth. The mortgages were given by Garret H. Smock and wife, and belonged to the complainants. After the execution of these mortgages, Garret H. Smock confessed a judgment in favour of John W. Holmes and Gilbert Yan Mater, as trustees of Micah Clark, late Micah Polhemus. Upon this judgment an execution issued, and the mortgaged premises were sold by virtue of that execution, and purchased by the trustees for the sum of five dollars, subject to all legal incumbrances. It appears that the property formerly belonged to Hendrick Smock, the father of the mortgagor, who died in 1814, leaving a last will and testament. In this last will, he orders that his wife Sarah shall have certain chattels and also certain privileges, therein particularly designated, and gave her also six hundred dollars, to be at her disposal during life. To his daughters Elizabeth, Sarah, Jane and Ann, he gave one thousand dollars each, to be paid when they should respectively attain the age of twenty-eight years. He directed his debts and legacies to be paid by his executors, out of the first monies they received ; authorized a sale of his personal property for their payment, and that being insufficient, so much of his real estate at Freehold as might be necessary. The residue of his real and personal estate he gave to his two sons, Garret H. Smock and Hendrick Smock. In 1819 Henry conveyed his moiety to Garret. At the time of the sheriff’s sale, public notice was given by the executors of Hendrick Smock, that a part of these legacies was unpaid ; and that there uTas due to the widow on her legacy, nine hundred and twenty dollars and twenty-five cents ; and that the sum of two hundred and seventy-five dollars and thirty-five cents was due to Jane, and four hundred and sixty-nine dollars and twenty-three cents to Ann, as the balance of their respective legacies ; and also that there was a balance due to the executors, for monies paid out by them in satisfaction of debts and legacies over and above the personalty. All these were claimed to be liens on the mortgaged premises, being the estate in Freehold mentioned in the will. The complainants admit the prior lien of the legacies, and pray a sale of the property to discharge the incumbrances in their order.</p> <p>The answer of the trustees of Micah Clark, whose rights are the most seriously affected by these claims, questions the amount due to the several claimants or legatees as set forth in the bill, prays an account, and submits whether by the true construction of the will the legacies are properly liens on the land.</p> <p>The answer of the executors of Hendrick Smock admits the facts as charged in the bill.</p> <p>The trustees of Micah Clark hereupon filed their cross-bill; in which they allege that the legacy to Jane was paid off by Garret H. Smock: that Ann had agreed to take, and had actually taken, Aaron Smock for the balance of the legacy bequeathed to her : that the widow always lived with Garret and was support- , ed by him, and it was agreed that such maintenance and the ProPerty taken by her from the inventory according to the directions of the will, should be in full satisfaction of the life estate and interest in the six hundred dollars given by her husband: that the widow had lately died, leaving Aaron Smock her executor : that the legatees trusted to the personal security of Garret, but finding him embarrassed, they now colluded with him to protect his property and injure honest purchasers. They pray that the premises may be held discharged from any of the liens set up against them, save the mortgages.</p> <p>The defendants to this bill deny these allegations; and insist that the widow in her life-time lived only part of the time with Garret, and that she fully compensated him for any extra, services rendered: that for a number of years she voluntarily receipted him for the payment of the interest on the legacy of six hundred dollars, but always claimed right to the principal sum; and they further insist, that the balances due are charges on the land, and to be first paid and satisfied.</p> <p>On the hearing of the cause, it was adjudged that the lands were charged with the legacies by the legal construction of the will; and by a decretal order of the term of July, 1829, a reference to a master was ordered, with directions, among other things, to take an account of the amounts respectively due to the said legatees, including the legacy given to Sarah Smock, the widow of the testator, now deceased ; and of the personal assets of the said testator, not specifically bequeathed; and to ascertain and report whether all the debts of the testator have been paid, and what amount, if any, is coming to the executors of Hendrick Smock, deceased, or any of them, for moneys overpaid and advanced by them.</p> <p>The master reported, that at the date of his report, viz. on the 12th day of January, L830, there was due to Jane Vander-veer, late Jane Smock, one of the legatees, two hundred and forty-three dollars and eighty-three cents; and to Ann Conover, formerly Ann Smock, another legatee, four hundred and sixty-eight dollars seventy-one cents; and to the executors of Sarah Smock, ten hundred and fifty-two dollars and ninety-four cents, if the chancellor shall decree that the same is to be paid out of the estate ; and also that there was due to the executors four hundred and six dollars and one cent, for money overpaid and advanced by them.</p> <p>As to the sum reported due on the legacy to Jane Vanderveer, which was charged on the land, we set up in the cross-bill, and now insist, that it was paid ; and refer to the evidence of George Clark. The master has allowed the principal and interest of the legacy to the widow, when, in fact, there was nothing due. The principal was at her disposal during life; she had not an absolute estate in it, but only an estate for life. Upon her death it did not pass to any one, except under the residuary clause. It is only charged on the real estate in aid of the personal. The legacies were to be paid out of the personal estate if sufficient, if not then out of the real estate. This legacy to the widow was raised out of the land. The executor, while owner of the land, satisfied the interest, and stood ready to pay the principal if she had required it. But she not having required it, or made any disposition of it during her life, it must return to the same fund out of which it was raised : 2 Mad. 107)7 Ves. jr. 435. The object of turning the realty into personalty, is for the particular purpose of satisfying this legacy; without this it would not have been changed : 2 Mad. 110. It will not now be raised out of the realty, to be paid to the executors of the widow, to be distributed to the next of kin. As to the interest of this legacy, it is paid. She was supported by G. Smock, one of the executors and residuary legatees, during her life, which satisfied the interest. The master was to take the account; he should have made all just allowances, and ought to have allowed for this : he has not done so, but submitted it to the court, which is incorrect. The master has also allowed the excess, paid by the executors beyond the personal estate, to satisfy debts and legacies; which is improper. G. Smock, the executor and devisee, has no right now to charge this on the land in the hands of a purchaser.</p> <p>There is no reason why the executors should lose the excess which they have paid to satisfy debts. The account was fairly settled in the orphan’s court, and exhibits the sums paid and amount due to the executors ; and it appears by the will, that if the personal estate was exhausted the real estate was to be charged. As to the legacy to Jane Vanderveer, G. H. Smock, in the answer and cross-bill, has sworn that it was due : Geo. Clark’s evidence to the contrary, is only of loose conversations with Smock : it does not amount to any thing conclusive ; and if it did, he is interested in the matter. The will gives the legacy of six hundred dollars to the widow during life, to be at her disposition. The use is declared: it amounts to a fee. She died before it was paid. The trustees of Mrs. Clark bought the property with full notice of this claim. If it be not an absolute bequest, the legacy, unex-pended, will go to the residuary legatee. But that question does not come up here ; Mrs. Clark’s trustees have no concern with it. It appears that G. H. Smock paid up the interest to April, 1819. It is true, the old lady since lived with him; but there was no contract that this was to go for the interest she was entitled to receive. She was no burthen to the family, and her executor is now entitled to receive the principal of the legacy with the interest from 1819, reported due.</p>

<p>The court of Chancery is not the proper tribuna! for calling in question the rights of a corporation, as such, for the purpose of declaring its franchises forfeited and lost.</p> <p>The “ Society for establishing .useful Manufactures,” owning the lands on both sides of the Pas.saic river at Paterson, the seat of the manufactories, where the tide does not ebb and flow and the stream is not navigable, as the riparian proprietors, are entitled to the use of the stream. They have in it a property, growing out of the ownership of the soil, as sacredly regarded by the law as the right of soil itself; and a right to enjoy it without diminution or alteration.</p> <p>The right is not confined to the use of so much water as may be necessary for their present purposes. They have appropriated to themselves the use of the stream, and have a right to take out the whole of it for the purposes of their manufactories ; provided it is, after being used, again restored to the bed of the river for the benefit of those below; and provided, also, that no one having prior rights is thereby injured.</p> <p>Every man has the right to have the advantage of a flow of water on his own land, without diminution or alteration; but an adverse right may exist* founded on the prior occupation of another. The right is usufructuary; a right to the flow of water, not to the water itself.</p> <p>The Morris Canal Company, by using the bed of the Rockaway (a branch of the Passaic) as part oi their canal, introducing into it the waters brought from lake Hopatcung and other sources, mingling them with the waters of the Rockaway; and on leaving it, taking out water to supply their canal, which is not again returned into the stream before it passes Paterson ; do not •injure the rights of the Society for establishing useful Manufactures at Par terson, provided they take out no more water than they bring in, and the flow of water at Paterson is not thereby diminished.</p> <p>The rights of the Canal Company are subject to the prior rights of the Society, and must be exercised in such manner as that the Society thereby sustains no injury.</p> <p>Semble. That the legislature have not power, by a subsequent act, to authorize the taking by a corporation, of streams of water or other property, previously appropriated by charter to the use of another corporation, and essential to the object of the prior grant.</p> <p>Past injuries are in themselves no ground for an injunction: the province of the injunction is, not to afford a remedy for what is past, but to prevent future mischief. If the injuries were continued, or the right to continue them set up and persisted in by the defendants, this court would, if the facts were properly established, interfere by injunction effectually to protect the complainants.</p> <p>The power of the court to grant injunctions in ease of nuisance is tinques» tionable; but the exercise of the power must always rest in the sound discretion of the court, to be governed by the nature of the case.</p>

<p>Where A. obtains judgment against B., before a justice of the peace, without an affidavit, as required by the statute, or a state of demand filed; upon which execution issues, and the goods of B. are sold, and purchased by C., who left them with the defendant for a few days ; in which time H., another creditor who had suits depending, also obtains judgment and execution, and by his agent and a constable seizes the same goods in the possession of B.; upon which C., the former purchaser, commences several suits against II., his agent, and the constable; whereupon II. files his bill in this court, to set aside the judgment and execution of A. and sale to C. as fraudulent, and obtains an injunction to stay proceedings on the suits by C.; to which bill A., B. and C. put in their answer, admitting the want of an affidavit according to the statute, and of a state of demand, but denying any fraud or collusion, and showing a bona fide debt and full consideration for the judgment: the charge of fraud is sufficiently answered, and the injunction will be dissolved.</p> <p>The omission to file a state of demand, might authorize the reversal of the judgment in a proper tribunal, but is no ground for the equitable interference of this court.</p> <p>If the want of an affidavit is fatal to the judgment, and renders void the execution and sale, so that no title was conveyed to the purchaser as against the complainant, it must be by force of the statute ; if so, they are as inoperative in courts of law as in a court of equity, and the decree of this court is not necessary to make manifest the nullity of these proceedings.</p> <p>As to continuing the injunction on the ground of multiplicity of suits ; if the proceedings are vexatious or malicious, and the plaintiff at law fails, he will bo bound to pay costs and liable to an action for a malicious prosecution. It should be a very strong case to induce this court to interfere.</p> <p>If the right should be established in favor of the defendant at law, and the plaintiff should persist in any oppressive proceedings, this court will promptly interforo.</p> <p>Semble. That the court of chancery will not interfere to restrain proceedings at law, whore the law affords an adequate remedy.</p>

This bill is filed by the complainant as a legatee, under the last will of Elizabeth Butler, deceased, (the mother of complainant,) against the defendant as executor of said will, for an account. and payment of what, on such accounting may be found due.

The bill in this case was filed upon two mortgages, given by David Wack and wife, to other persons, by whom they were assigned to the complainants. There was a decree, pro confesso, against David Wack and wife, the mortgagors. The other defendants, Jacob Wack, Aaron Ayres, and Aaron Ayres, jun., by their answer, set up an intermediate mortgage on the same premises, given by David Wack and wife to Aaron Ayres and Jacob Wack.

Benjamin Weller, late of Paterson, in the county of Essex, died in June, 1823, leaving a last will and testament, which was duly proved by Jane Weller, his widow, and Philemon Dickerson, executors in… Held: that to bar dower express words were necessary : % Ves. jr. 580 ; 2 Dick. 835. Since that time it has been held, that express words are not necessary; but the intention must be clear and undoubted, or else the widow takes dower.

This cause came on to be heard upon the bill, the plea of a judgment recovered at law, replication and proofs taken in support of the plea, before E. Van Arsdale, the master called to advise the Chancellor, &.C., and was submitted on written briefs, by

<p>A second mortgagee, having also a judgment, execution and levy on the mortgaged premisos for the same debt; and being security for the mortgagor on two notes to a third person; receiving from the mortgagor a sum ot money equal to the amount then due on the notes ; and giving him a receipt for the money, “ to be credited on the judgment, provided the debtor should indemnify him on his surety for said debtor to the holder of these notes,” with a parole understanding “that the money received was not to be considered a payment by the debtor on the judgment until he should pay the amount due on these notes to the holder,”—is entitled to hold his mortgage, judgment, execution and levy, as security for the payment of all the money due to him thereon, and also upon the notes on which he is security; and this lien is perfect against the mortgagor, and all persons claiming under him by subsequent incumbrance or conveyance.</p> <p>By this payment, receipt and agreement, the holder of these notes acquired an interest in this second mortgage, judgment and execution, and a lien upon the mortgaged premises for the payment of the notes, prior to any other incumbrance excepting the first mortgage, which interest a court of equity will protect.</p> <p>The holder of these notes (having this security for their payment, comprised in the same lien with the debt to the mortgagee, to wit, the mortgage, judgment and execution ; and the mortgagee being also debtor to the holder, as security on these notes) is entitled to have the whole amount due on the' notes paid out of the mortgaged premises, and to have it paid next after satisfaction of the first mortgage, although the premises should fall short of paying the whole amount due on the second mortgage, judgment and execution.</p> <p>Tho mortgagor having afterwards given a third mortgage ón the same premises, and subsequently assigned all his property, including the mortgaged premises, to the third mortgagee and another person, for the benefit of his creditors, this third mortgage and the assignment are subject to the previous liens, and cannot disturb the' equitable right of the holder of these notes to have them first satisfied out of the mortgaged premises.</p> <p>The second mortgagee having afterwards assigned his mortgage, judgment and execution to the third mortgagee, an agreement was entered into between the holder of these notes, a female, and the third mortgagee, that she would release the second mortgagee from his liability on the notes, on com' dition that the second mortgage should be held by the assignee for her use, as security for what was due her on the notes, to be paid after the amount paid by him for the second mortgage, and what was due him on the third mortgage were fully satisfied ; and a release was executed by her in consequence of this agreement: this agreement and release are without any con-«Iderfction; the only ostensible one, to wit, that she should have a lien on the mortgaged premises after the third mortgage, was delusive, she «ntitled to the priority: and her being induced to give up the personal se’Curity on the notes, and take a place in the list of incumbrances on the mortgaged premises, posterior to that to which she was entitled, evinced such ignorance, mistake and misapprehension of her right, that the agreement should be set aside and held void.</p> <p>Although this be a case of mere mistake, this court should find no impediment to correcting it. Equity, in rescinding contracts, does not confine itself to cases of fraud; cases of plain mistake or misapprehension of right, though not the effect of fraud or contrivance, are likewise entitled to the interposition of the court.</p>

<p>Upon a bill filed in this court by a purchaser at sheriff’s sale, showing that the judgment under which he pui chased was entered in the minutes, but not re* corded, and the execution was erroneously described in the deed ; the sheriff’s deed maybe reformed. But whether the judgment could be supplied, or the defendant injoined from taking advantage of the want of it, in a proceeding at law, query.</p> <p>Where the purchase at the sheriff’s sale was made at the request, or with the consent of defendant in execution, and for his benefit, upon an express agreement, that he should be at liberty to redeem ; and complainant was to hold such interest under the sheriff’s deed as would indemnify him for the money advanced; and the one intended to give, and the other to receive, a valid security ; although it turns out to be insufficient in law, yet the purchaser has, in equity, a vested lien on the property for the amount of his demand, and the defendant is estopped from coining into this court and setting up any defect in the title.</p> <p>The conveyance of the sheriff under these circumstances is to be considered us the act of the defendant himself, and he shall not be permitted to impugn it; as between him and the purchaser he is precluded.</p> <p>And if the defendant fail to pay, the property may be sold for the payment of what is due the purchaser, or the equity of redemption of the defendant foreclosed.</p>

Arthur Gray, late of the county of Hunterdon, died in November, 1812,. intestate, leaving real and personal estate, and leaving also a widow and a number of children and grand-children. Administration of the personal estate was committed, in due form of law, to John Britton and Peter Fox, both of whom are now deceased. The amount of the personal estate was small, and it became necessary to sell the real property for the payment of debts.

The bill in this case is filed for a specific performance of a contract entered into on the 10th day of January. 1822, between Jarrct Morford of the one part, and Joseph King of the other part, for the purchase and sale of a house and lot of land at Red Bank, in the county of Monmouth, and also one equal fourth part of the landing at the said Red Bank, for the consideration of six hundred dollars, to be paid “on the receipt of a good title.” King complains, that after making…

<p>The act of 13th November, 1823, which provides “that it shall and may be lawful for the Board of Chosen Freeholders in and for the county of Burlington, at their discretion, to build and maintain a good and sufficient bridge over Bass river, about one quarter of a mile above the dwelling-house of Benjamin Mather, and one hundred yards below William Butler’s, ■where the new road crosses the same loading from Tuckerton to Bridgeport, with a suitable draw therein of sufficient width for the convenient passage of vessels navigating the same,”—vested in the corporation the right to build the bridge at the place specified, whenever, in the judgment and sound discretion of the Freeholders, the right might be advantageously exercised.</p> <p>The authority was not temporary, but a continuing power; it did not cease although it was not exercised by the then existing Board of Freeholders, or although the Board in 1826 might have decided that it was inexpedient to build the bridge.</p> <p>This act clothed the Board of Freeholders with tho same power to erect a bridge over the river at the place designated, that they have, of common right, to build bridges over other streams in the county not navigable.</p> <p>Semble. That the Board of Freeholders have no authority to erect a bridge over a navigable stream, without an act of the Legislature expressly for that purpose. The authority vested by such an act, is independent of the general law respecting bridges; and it is not necessary that the overseer of the highways should give notice to the director of the board of freeholders, of the necessity of a bridge at the place specified.</p> <p>The Board of Freeholders having jurisdiction over the subject matter, this court cannot interfere upon the ground that their conduct has been arbitrary, or that the complainants have been denied a fair hearing. The right of supervision and correction is in the supreme court: it appertains to their general supervising jurisdiction.</p> <p>The principle is universal, that where the rights of an individual are invaded, by the acts of persons clothed with authority, and who exercise that authority illegally, the persons aggrieved must seek redress by certiorari.</p>

<p>This was a creditors’ suit. There was an interlocutory decree, which states, “ that it appearing to the Chancellor that the real and personal estate which belonged to James Smith, and which was purchased by the said Joseph Marsh and William Edgar, at the respective sales thereof made by Alexander Dunn, esquire, as sheriff of the county of Middlesex, and afterwards by Abraham Vanarsdalen, esquire, as sheriff of said county; and mentioned in the pleadings and proofs in this cause; was purchased by them, the said Marsh and Edgar, in the first place, in trust for the creditors of the said James Smith, and ultimately for the benefit of the family of the said Smith; and that the said Marsh and Edgar are to be considered as trustees accordingly. And that all and singular the real and personal estate purchased as above mentioned, after reimbursing and indemnifying the said Marsh and Edgar thereout, for the monies duly and lawfully paid in respect thereto, ought to be liable and chargeable to and with the payment of the debts which were, at the time of said sales respectively, due and owirig from the said James Smith to his creditors, accordingly: subject, nevertheless, to the liens and incumbrances then lawfully existing and being on said property. And thereupon it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the said real and personal estate be deemed and held liable and chargeable accordingly. And it was referred to N. Saxton, qne of the masters of this court, (among other things,) to ascertain and compute the amount of the money paid by the said Marsh and Edgar, either before or after said sales, for and on account of said purchases by them : and of the amount of money by them laid out and expended, in the management and taking care of said property, and in repairs or other beneficial improvements on the said real estate. And to take an account of the liens and incumbrances which were on the said real and personal estate at the times of the said sheriffs’ sales, respectively : to ascertain the nature thereof, the amount due thereon, their legal priority, and to whom payable. Also, to ascertain and report what part of the said real and personal estate so purchased, still remained in the hands of the said Marsh and Edgar; and what part they had sold, or otherwise disposed of or wasted; and to ascertain the amount with which they ought to be charged, for the part so sold, disposed of or wasted ; distinguishing w'here the widow of the said James Smith had united in any such sales ; and that he report udiat sum was justly due, and ought to be allowed her, for her right thus conveyed. And to take an account of the rents, issues and profits which the said Marsh and Edgar had received, or without their neglect or default might have received, from the said real estate. And also to take an account of the payments made by the said Marsh and Edgar, for and on account of the said debts due from the said James Smith, and of the dates and amounts of the said payments respectively. And in taking the said accounts, to allow to the said Marsh and Edgar a just compensation for their trouble, charges and expenses in taking care of said property, making sale thereof, or otherwise in and about the same,” &c.</p> <p>In obedience to this order, the master proceeded to make the inquiries, and take the accounts directed, and made a report upon the several matters contained in the said order of reference. Among other things, the master reported, that the widow' of the said James Smith had united with the trustees in the sale and conveyance of a farm, called the Point-neck farm ; and upon the principle that, as dowress, she was entitled to the interest of one third of the purchase money during life, and that, being a healthy person under forty years of age, she might reasonably be expected to survive her husband twenty years; the master allowed her a gross sum of seven hundred and ninety-six dollars and eighty cents for her right thus conveyed ; calculating that sum to be the present value of an annuity, equal to the interest of one third of the purchase money, for that period of time.</p> <p>Upon the coming in of this report, the complainants took the following exceptions:—</p> <p>“First. For that the said master, in taking the said accounts, has allowed as liens upon the said estate of the said James Smith, deceased, judgments which were not liens on the said property ; viz. the judgments of the Trenton banking company, of Andrew Bell, of Aaron Drake, and —— Birdsall; and has reported other judgments, as liens on the whole property, which were liens only on a part.</p> <p>“ Second. For that the master has allowed a mortgage of Je-dediah Swan, deceased, as a lien on the estate, without sufficient evidence of the existence of the said mortgage, &c.</p> <p>“ Third. For that the master has allowed the widow of the said James Smith, deceased, seven hundred and ninety-six dollars and eighty cents, for her right in the Point-neck farm, sold to Samuel Dunn ; whereas nothing ought to have been allowed her, or if any thing, the allowance is much too great.</p> <p>“ Fourth. For that the master has not charged the defendants with the rents and profits received, or which might have been received out of the lands in which the said James Smith had a life estate.</p> <p>“ Fifth. For that the master has not charged the defendants with all the rents and profits received, or which with proper diligence might have been received, from the other real estate late of the said James Smith deceased, in their hands.</p> <p>“ Sixth. For that the master has allowed and deducted, for the widow of the said Smith, one third of the rents and profits, without charging her share with the one third of the taxes and expenses of carrying on the said farm.</p> <p>“ Seventh. For that the said master has allowed the said defendants, as trustees, large commissions on the sales made by them: whereas, the trust springing out of wrongful acts, no commissions ought to have been allowed, or if any, the commissions allowed are much too large.</p> <p>“ Eighth. For that the said master has allowed the defendants, for payments on recognizance to Abigail Blanchard, which have not been paid, or if paid ought not to have been allowed.</p> <p>“ Ninth. For that the said master, in his report, has made statements of the items of the defendants’ account, without deciding, and reporting his decision upon them, and whether the same are or are not allowed.”</p> <p>The exceptions were argued by</p>

J. Outcalt contracted with J. R. Hardenburgh and J. II. Bostwick for the purchase of a lot of land; he took possession of it, and erected mills and made other improvements thereon, and has since continued to occupy and use it as his own.

On the 23d of January, 1823, Thomas Taylor, late of Burlington county, made and published his last will and testament, ia writing, executed in due form to pass real estate.

<p>On a bill by the vendor, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land at auction; where it appears that the vendee was induced to make the purchase by the fraudulent contrivance and management of the vendor, he can have no remedy to enforce the contract in a court of equity: but where the charge of fraud or collusion is not established against the complainant, the relief he seeks cannot be rightfully withheld on that ground.</p> <p>So the vendee being intoxicated at the time, and not in a situation to judge correctly, or act with prudence, will not avail him to avoid the contract, unless he can show that it was procured by the contrivance of the vendor, or that an unfair or improper advantage was taken of his situation.</p> <p>Courts of equity seldom interfere to set aside contracts of sale, on the ground of inadequacy of price ; they leave the parlies to their legal remadies. But when called on to enforce a contract, they examine into the consideration to be given, its fairness and equality, and all the circumstances connected with it; and if any thing* manifestly inequitable appear in that part of the transaction, they will never lend their power to carry the contract into execution.</p> <p>There can be no objection to a contract made with a man in the habit of buying and selling, and transacting his own business, because he was illiterate, unless he has been grossly deceived or fraudulently imposed on.</p> <p>The rule of this court is, that time may be dispensed with, if not of the essence of the contract. In this case, the time of the delivery of the deed was not held to be of the essence of the contract.</p> <p>A party may waive his technical right in this respect, and the waiver need not be direct, or in writing, but may be inferred from circumstances.</p> <p>So a prior incumbrance existing on the property, and known to the purchaser, is not a bar to a specific performance : but it may be referred to a master to enquire as to the amount of the incumbrance and state of the title, that the court may judge and take such order as may be expedient. waiver of a contract for the sale of real estate may be by parol, but it should be express, and of such a character as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the intentions of the parties.</p> <p>Under conditions of a vendue “ for the sale of the property of S. R.” it is no objection to the execution of the contract, that a part instead of the whole of a lot of land was sold; provided it was made known what part was to be sold at the time it was set up.</p>

<p>Probate of a will granted in one state, cannot be used in the courts of another.</p> <p>To enable an executor to maintain a suit in this court, it is necessary that the fact of the probate of the will should be stated in the bill.</p> <p>When that is done, and no objection raised by the pleadings, a probate taken out at any time before the hearing is sufficient.</p> <p>Alleging in the bill that the complainant “ hath taken upon himself the bur-then of executing the trusts and duties required of him by the will, and become duly qualified as executor,” is not sufficient to show his right to sue in the capacity of executor.</p> <p>Stating in the bill, that the will has been duly proved in the state of New-Jersey, might be sufficient, without specifying whether such proof was in either of the orphan’s courts or before the ordinary.</p> <p>An original bill was filed by Rachel Eden, as executrix, and also a devisee in trust, under the will of Medcef Eden, deceased, which the defendant answered. Upon the death of the complainant, a bill of revivor and supplement was filed by J. Pelletreau, stating himself to be executor and devisee in trust under the will of the said Medcef Eden, and also administrator of the said Rachel Eden, deceased: which was demurred to for multifariousness. But the bill of revivor corresponding with the original bill, and bringing before the court the persons representing the parties to that bill, and it not appearing that the complainant relied on the supplemental matter, or any claim he might have as devisee in trust, it was held well.</p>

<p>S. L. Howell executed to S.Whitall six bonds, for two thousand dollars each, payable annually, and a mortgage to secure payment thereof on a part of Hog Island, Delaware county, Pennsylvania. After receiving payment of the first bond, Whitall assigned and delivered the second bond to W. Stevenson, the third and fourth to the executors of A. D. Woodruff, and the fifth and sixth, together with the mortgage, to J. Black ; who caused a judgment to be entered up against Howell on one of the bonds, in the common pleas of Delaware county, and an execution to be issued thereon, by virtue of which the mortgaged premises were levied on and exposed to sale by the sheriff, subject, among others, to the following condition: “The above described property is sold, subject to the payment of a mortgage from S. L. Howell to S.Whitall, dated 22d March, 1-817, and recorded in Delaware county, in Mortgage book D, page 27,” &c. After Black, the plaintiff, bid one dollar for the premises, the sheriff, at the instance of Woodruff, added to the condition these words : “And the several bonds secured by the said mortgageThe premises were struck off to Black at his bid, and he sign-cd the conditions, protesting, however, against the alteration of the conditions, and declaring he would not pay the bonds. This addition to the conditions of sale created no new contract to bind the purchaser personally to pay the bonds held by Stevenson and Woodruff; and their bill, seeking to charge him personally, was dismissed.</p> <p>The sheriff is hound to sell according to law, and the exigency of his writ; he is not justified in imposing terms on the purchaser different from those imposed by the law. If he undertakes, by any conditions of sale, to vary the relative position of parties, and create liabilities which the law does not impose, he exceeds his authority, and the purchaser is not bound.</p> <p>On general principles, the purchaser of an equity of redemption is not personally liable for the amount of the mortgage debt; by the purchase and sale the liability is not changed as between the mortgagor and mortgagee ; the obligor is still liable to the obligee on his bond, and the obligee or his assignee cannot transfer the personal liability to the purchaser.</p> <p>As between the mortgagor and the purchaser of a simple equity of redemp* tion, where the mortgage money constitutes, in fact, a part of the consideration of the purchase ; the mortgagor has a right to he indemnified by the purchaser, against all personal liability on the bond.</p> <p>The uniform language of a court of equity is, that where the purchaser (of an equity of redemption) is in possession and receives the rents and profits, there is raised upon his conscience, independently of any contract, an obligation to indemnify the vendor against the personal liability to pay the mortgage money.</p> <p>By a mortgagee, or assignee holding one of the bonds secured by a mortgage, becoming the purchaser of the equity of redemption, that part of the mortgage debt due to himself on the bond he holds, is extinguished.</p> <p>It is a general rule, that where there is a bond and mortgage, the assignment of the bond operates as an assignment of the mortgage: the bond is the principal, and the mortgage is the incident.</p> <p>Where a mortgagee assigns one of the bonds secured by the mortgage, retaining the mortgage himself; the assignee becomes equitably interested in the mortgage to the amount of his debt or bond, and the holder of the mortgage a trustee for the assignee of the bond, pro tanto.</p> <p>But the assignee of the bond has not any claim against the mortgagee, personally, growing out of the transfer of the bond; his claim is upon the mortgage or the estate bound by the mortgage, and that claim remains, no matter in whose hands the estate may be.</p> <p>The assignee of the mortgage stands, quoad, in the shoes of the mortgagee ; his rights and liabilities are the same, and not different.</p>

<p>An ejectment bill, technically so termed, is one brought simply for the recovery of real property, together with an account of rents and profits, without setting out any distinct and substantive ground of equity jurisdiction, which would be demurrable where there is no proper ground of equity.</p> <p>But a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, filed by those who without the incumbrance of such conveyance are undoubtedly entitled, is altogether different from an ejectment bill, and comes within the ordinary powers of this court.</p> <p>The bill in this case, filed by the heirs at law, to set aside a conveyance fraudulently and unconscientiously obtained; without any, or if any, a totally inadequate consideration; from a person who from habitual intoxication and being almost incessantly under the influence of liquor, or from debility of body and mind arising from a long fit of intoxication from which he was then just recovering, was incapable of transacting business with discretion, and while he was legally incompetent to make any disposition of his property ; was held good, on demurrer.</p> <p>In this case, an ejectment might have been brought. The title of the heirs is strictly a legal title, and might have been asserted in a court of law. But it docs not follow, that because a party may resort to an action of ejectment, he has no remedy in this court. The principle is too broad, and the practice of the court against it. There are many cases in which the jurisdiction of courts of law and equity are concurrent, and the party is at liberty to seek relief in either.</p> <p>It is a welt settled principle, that relief is to be obtained in this court, not only against writings, deeds, and the most solemn assurances; but against judgments and decrees, if obtained by fraud and imposition.</p> <p>If there has been the suppression of a truth, or the suggestion of a falsehood, whereby a party is circumvented or deceived, equity will relieve against it.</p> <p>'Where undue advantage has been taken of the weakness or necessity of the party ; or of any situation in which he is placed, rendering him peculiarly liable to imposition ; this court will interfere. It proceeds on the safe principle, of protecting those who are not able to protect themselves.</p> <p>It has become the settled rule of this court, that it will not interfere to assist a person on the ground of intoxication merely; but if any unfair advantage has been taken of his situation, it will render all proper aid.</p> <p>Inadequacy of price can never be the ground of setting aside a deed, unless accompanied with fraud or misrepresentation ; but this is only where the party is able to contract. Where the party was intoxicated, inadequacy ot price is direct evidence of fraud.</p> <p>The fact of the price not being paid, is no ground to set aside a deed. The fraud must be in the original transaction, and not in the non-fulfilment of the contract. But though it does not change the nature of the transaction, it may, if proved, be strong testimony to show its real character.</p>

<p>In a suit in equity, upon a mortgage or other instrument tainted with usury, the defendant may set up the usury, and, if he can prove the facts, may avoid the instrument, according to the letter of the statute.</p> <p>But when a party goes into court, seeking relief from the operation of an usurious instrument, he must offer to do what equity and good conscience requires at his hands ; that is, to pay the sum actually due: and if he omit to make such offer, the defendant may demur.</p> <p>A. mortgaged five lots of land to B. to secure payment of three thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars, in seven annual instalments. After this, he conveyed the mortgaged premises, and one other lot, to C., in trust, to receive and apply the rents and profits, and in case of deficiency to raise money by mortgage, to pay off the incumbrance, and after satisfying that, to pay the net rents and profits to the grantor’s daughter M. (wife of E. M.) for her support, until her youngest child attained twenty-one years of age, and then, in trust, to convey the premises to M. and her children then living, as tenants in common; upon their paying, or securing, a legacy of one thousand dollars to J. B. F. afterwards mortgaged the trust premises to B. to secure the farther sum of three thousand six hundred and twelve dollars and ninety cents. Upon the death of B. his administrators filed an original bill against A. and F. for the foreclosure of these mortgages. Upon this bill, after a demurrer overruled, there was a decree, pro confesso, and order of reference. Pending the reference, the cestui que trusts filed the present bill, against F. and the administrators of B. This bill charges, that B. with notice of the trust, fraudulently combined with F. to take the second mortgage, for their joint and equal benefit. That all the money advanced by B. (on this mortgage) was one thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars, of which a great part was misapplied by F. That only four hundred and twenty-five dollars (retained by B. for interest) went to discharge the prior incumbrance; all which was known to B. That by connivance of B. and F., one thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars was included in the mortgage, for money that F. pretended to borrow of himself, as trustee; and that one hundred and twelve dollars and ninety cents was included in the mortgage, over the sum pretended to be loaned: in consequence of which the mortgage was usurious and void. That the present complainants were not made parties to, or acquainted with the proceedings had on the original bill. That the annual value of the premises was one thousand two hundred and seventy-five dollars, which had been received, but not paid over or accounted for by F. The prayer of the bill is, that farther proceedings on the original suit may be suspended: that the mortgage from F. to B. may be declared fraudulent and usurious, and be set aside and can-celled ; or if any part of the money was borrowed to pay the incumbrance, it may be so applied: and that an account may be taken of the rents and profits, and the same may be appropriated to the extinguishment of the first mortgage, and the balance, if any, paid over to the said M. The bill being verified by affidavit, an order was made, in the nature of an injunction, restraining the complainants from proceeding in the original suit until farther order. The defendants appeared ; and to that part of the bill which charges, that the mortgage from F. to B. is usurious, and seeks relief on that head, demurred; upon the ground, that the complainants have not paid into court the amount admitted to have been advanced upon the security of the mortgage, nor offered themselves ready to pay the same. The demurrer allowed.</p> <p>If the complainants had been brought in as parties defendants to the original bill, they might have set up the defence of usury, and have relied on the letter of the statute. But coming in as complainants, and setting up the defence of usury, the general rule (that they must offer to pay the amount actually due) applies to them.</p> <p>The complainants in this case were not obliged to tender any preciso amount. Part of the money secured by the second mortgage, was properly applied to discharge the interest on the first; thus far the second mortgage is good. If the complainants had offered to pay that amount, with so much more as might appear to be due after the question of fraud is investigated, they would have done what is equitable, and both defences would then have been open to them.</p> <p>The complainants’ offering to pay the amount supposed to be due, would not have been a waiver of the fraud.</p> <p>Where a party is not entitled to relief, he is not entitled to discovery. The bill, in this case, is for discovery and relief; the demurrer is to both ; this is not too broad: you cannot demur to the discovery unless you also demur to the relief.</p> <p>The order to stay proceedings in the former suit, is correct. This court may control the proceedings of other tribunals, for the purpose of administering more complete justice; it is one of its most valuable powers : it may control its own proceedings to attain the same object.</p> <p>Notwithstanding an answer was put in by the administrators of B., some of the most important charges of the bill remaining unanswered; they, being merely representatives, having no personal knowledge of the facts, and therefore not admitting or denying them, the order to stay proceedings was continued.</p>

<p>Where a corporation has been duly organized, and thereby acquired a legal existence, a court of equity will not, upon an alleged nonuser -or misuser of its corporate privileges, declare the charter to be forfeited : such a power is of right to be exercised by a court of law and not a court of chancery.</p> <p>Where a set of men claiming to be a legally incorporated company under an act of tne legislature, have done every thing necessary to constitute them a corporation, colourably at least, if not legally, and are exercising all the powers and functions of a corporation; they are a corporation, de facto, if not de jure ; and this court will not interfere, in an incidental way, to declare all their proceedings void, and treat them as a body having no rights or powers.</p> <p>The commissioners appointed to receive subscriptions for the stock of an incorporation, are trustees ; and as such this court, if a proper case was made, might control their acts: but, to authorize it, there should be some complaint on the part of the stockholders, or persons subscribing or seeking to subscribe for stock; and the proceeding should be by bill, and not by information.</p> <p>The right to the use of a navigable stream is a right common to all the people of this state. Before the revolution, this right was in the crown: the people are now the sovereign power, and this right is vested in them. It is their property, and, as such, may be disposed of for the common benefit, in such way as they may see fit. This disposition can only be made by the legislature of the state, which is the rightful representative of the people: and where such disposition is made, “ consistently with the principles of the law of nature, and the constitution of a well-ordered society,” it must be considered valid.</p> <p>The power of the legislature is not omnipotent; it has boundaries beyond which it may not pass. It cannot authorize private property to be taken for public use, without providing for a just remuneration ; and in regard to those public rights which appertain to the citizens generally, a common property, it cannot make such disposition of them as entirely to defeat the citizens of their common rights.</p> <p>This power is not confined to cases only, where no possible injury would accrue to any individual. In every case, some inconvenience must accrue to individuals, or some privileges be measurably impaired : yet if such disposition or regulation (of the common right) be for the common benefit; if the situation of society and the wants of the public require it, individual convenience must yield, and that upon the most obvious principles of the social compact.</p> <p>The surveyors of the highways and chosen freeholders are vested with a general authority, by statute, to lay out and cause to be opened public highways: but this general power must be construed reasonably. “A navigable river is of common right a public highway; and a general authority to lay out a new highway, must not be so extended as to give a power to obstruct an open highway already in the use of the public.” Hence it has always been considered necessary, when abridge was required over a navigable stream, to procure a special act of the legislature: their right to grant such power is beyond dispute.</p> <p>There is not, in the charter of the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation company, any specific grant of power for this particular bridge, (over South river.) But there is a special authority to erect bridges and all other works necessary for the completion of this particular road. The conclusion is, that the power to construct bridges over all the streams on the route, so as best to carry into effect the object of the incorporation, is given in the act, if not in express terms, yet by necessary implication ; and the grant thus made is constitutional.</p> <p>The power must, nevertheless, bo exercised discreetly, and with a due regard to the privileges of others. If any injurious and wanton exercise of it be shown to this court, it will interfere and regulate it on proper principles. To warrant such interference, the exercise of the power must be shown to be, not only injurious, but wilfully or wantonly so : a mere mistake in judgment will not bo sufficient.</p> <p>The word survey, does not necessarily, ex vi termini, mean a map or profile : they are sometimes used as convertible terms, not always. The books filed by the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation company, in the office of the secretary of state, containing a description (in words and figures) of the commencement of the road, the different stations made at the time of the survey, the courses and distances between those stations, and the number of stations, to the termination of the road, is “ a survey” within the meaning of that provision of the charter which requires, that “ a survey of such route and location (of the road) shall be deposited in the office of the secretary of state at least so far forth as to warrant the court in refusing an injunction on the ground that no survey whatever has been made. Injunction refused.</p>

<p>Application to discharge a re exeat, not having been made until after the cause was noticed for final hearing, refused.</p> <p>All such parts of depositions, as go to prove matters in no way put in issue by the pleadings, ordered to be stricken out.</p> <p>The statute (Rev. L. 667, s. 2) directing that answers to bills of divorce “ shall not be under oaththe answer, though sworn to, cannot be considered as evidence for any purpose.</p> <p>This court, under the statute, (Rev. L. 668, s. 10,) has original jurisdiction' to allow alimony, although there is no decree for a divorce.</p> <p>Articles of separation, signed by the parties, are no bar to the claim of the wife upon the husband for alimony.</p> <p>The effects of the marriage are, that the husband and wife are one person i he hath power over her person as well as estate, and he is bound to maintain her in a suitable mannor, according to his circumstances : the wife, by marriage, has parted with her property, and placed herself under the control of her husband, and looks to him for support.</p> <p>Although the wife voluntarily left her husband’s house, but afterwards offered to return; yet he has separated himself from her, and refuses to provide for her : the court ought to order a suitable maintenance to be provided for her by her husband.</p> <p>The usual course is, to refer it to a master, to ascertain and report what ought to be paid for the wife’s support. But testimony having been taken, and the matter debated on the hearing, and neither party requesting a reference, the allowance was fixed by the court.</p> <p>Decreed, that the husband allow the wife one hundred dollars per annum, in half-yearly payments, until the farther order of the court; that he give security for the payment thereof, and pay the costs of the suit; and that either party have liberty to apply to the court for an alteration of the alimony.</p>

The facts stated in the complainants’ bill are briefly these. In 1792, after the incorporation of the Society for establishing useful Manufactures, they purchased of one Cornelius Van Winkle a tract of land, on which were a saw-mill, grist-mill and clam, situate on the main stream of the Passaic river at Paterson, together with the bed of the river and an island in the river adjacent to the mill.

William P. Conover and Theodoras Conover, of the county of Monmouth, were brothers, living together, and owning and possessing all their property, real and personal, as tenants in common. William married and had children ; Theodoras was never married. On the sixteenth day of October, 1815, each of them made a last will and testament. William gave his half of the property to his four children, in certain portions; and Theodoras gave his half to the same persons.

<p>After a mortgago is given, the ultimate payment thereof cannot be defeated by any conveyance of the mortgaged premises that may bo made by the mortgagor.</p> <p>But where new rights or interests have originated since the execution of the mortgage, although the mortgagee is no party to them, and they may delay him in the prosecution of his remedy; yet the court will protect them, and direct the mortgage to be paid out of such parts of the property as may be most equitable to all parties concerned.</p> <p>Where a mortgagor, after giving a mortgage, sells part of the mortgaged premises to a third person for a valuable consideration ; justice demands that the residue of the premises in the hands of the mortgagor should satisfy the mortgage debt; and the purchaser acquires a right, even against the mortgagee, to compel him to iiavc recourse to such residue for the satisfaction of his debt.</p> <p>If the mortgagor sells a second parcel, this second purchaser acquires rights as against the mortgagor and mortgagee ; rights also aiisc as between the first and second purchasers, as to their liability to the mortgage ; all which the court will notice and protect. If the property remaining unsold in the hands of the mortgagor is sufficient to pay the debt, both purchasers will be protected ; if insufficient, the last purchaser contributes first, and if there still be a deficiency the first purchaser may be called on : thus the last purchaser is first liable.</p> <p>It is the policy and duty of the court to settle ail claims between the parlies, ill one suit,, if possibles; and upon a question arising between two co-defendants, where the matter is distinctly before the court, upon the pleadings and proof between the complainant and defendants in the case, the court will decide the rights of the defendants as between themselves.</p> <p>The assignee of a bond and mortgage holds them subject to the same equity that existed against them in the hands of the mortgagee.</p> <p>Where a vendor conveys land by deed with covenant of warranty, which is subject to a mortgage; if the amount of the mortgage is raised out of the premises conveyed, and paid to satisfy the mortgage, the vendee can immediately recover it back, by action against the vendor, on his covenant.</p> <p>So if the vendor was prosecuting the vendee, on his bond for purchase-money, this court would enjoin him, and compel him to appropriate the money so as to discharge the incumbrance against which he had covenanted.</p> <p>Where a vendor conveys land which is subject to a prior mortgage, by deed, with covenant of warranty; and the vendee gives a mortgage to the vendor for purchase-money, which the vendor assigns to a third person, and a bill is filed upon tho prior mortgage, against the vendor, vendee and assignee of the second mortgage ; if any part of the premises so conveyed is taken to satisfy the first mortgage, the vendee has a right to have so much deducted out of his purchase-money, or tho mortgage given by him for purchase-money, in the hands of the assignee.</p> <p>Whore there is a mere allegation of an outstanding title or incumbrance, this court will not interfere, but will leave the party to his remedy on the covenant ; but where there is an eviction, or even an ejectment brought, it will interfere.</p> <p>Thus where A. and B. wore joint owners of two lots, a small lot and a larger lot, and in 1821 gave a mortgage on both lots to M., to secure three hundred and sixty-five dollars : in 1823 B. conveyed his half of both lots to G.; in the same year A. convoys his half of the largo lot to G., and G, conveys his half of the small lot to A., whereby A. became sole owner of the small lot, and G. of the large lot; G. having thus become the purchaser of the largo lot, by conveyance both from A. and B., the original owners and mortgagors, had a right to throw the payment of the mortgage to M. on the small lot; and that lot must pay it if sufficient, if not the largo lot must be resorted to to make up the deficiency.</p> <p>After this G. sold ninety feet of tho large lot to R., and fifty feet to P.; and in 1825 sold the residue to C. Upon this the same right to protection vests in those purchasers. In the event of the small lot being insufficient to pay the first mortgage, those parts of tho large lot sold to R, and P. will be protected from sale until the residue sold to C. is disposed of: that being the last sold is first liable.</p> <p>The residue of the large lot was sold and conveyed by G. to C., with covenant of warranty, and C. on tho same day mortgaged it to G. for five hundred and fifty dollars. This mortgage was assigned by G. to E., and on the death of E. passed to bis executors. If tho small lot prove insufficient to satisfy the first mortgage, and any part is to be raised out of tho residue of the large lot, C. the purchaser, by virtue of his covenant, is entitled to have that amount deducted from his mortgage, given to G. for purchase-money, in the hands of his assignee.</p> <p>In 1827 A. again mortgaged the small lot to V. for ono hundred and sixty dollars. V. assigned this mortgage to S, the complainant, who in 1829 also procured an assignment of the first mortgage given to M. in 1821 on both lots, and thereupon filed his bill to foreclose; all the mortgages being yet outstanding. This third mortgage is a lien on the small lot only, and can only come in for the surplus, in case the small lot should produce more than sufficient to satisfy the first mortgage.</p> <p>This right of the purchasers to protection is not personal, but attaches to the purchaser of the property, whoever it may bo ; it is connected with the land itself, and passes with it.</p>

The complainant is the assignee of a mortgage given by William Caskey to Joseph Chandler and David D. Chandler.

In 1818, John White and wife gave a mortgage to Catharine J. Miller, for two hundred dollars, on a lot of land in Hardwick j and in 1822, they gave another mortgage on the same property to the complainant, Jonathan Hill, for one hundred and fifty dollars.

<p>The vested right of a legatee, upon his death, is transmitted to his personal representatives.</p> <p>The next of kin are not the personal representatives, and cannot, as such, come into court representing the ancestor.</p> <p>Where a legatee died before receiving his legacy, without a will, and there had been no administration; a bill filed by his next of kin, to recover the amount due on the legacy, held bad on demurrer: such a claim could be properly made only through the medium of an administrator.</p> <p>The next of kin may come into this court seeking their rights against administrators, calling them to account, or seeking a distributive share of the intestate’s estate. They have a direct interest, which they may lawfully assert.</p> <p>After payment of debts, the administrator is a trustee for the benefit of the next of kin, alone ; and they may proceed against him directly for what is due them.</p> <p>The power of the administrator is over all the estate, not only for the purpose of paying debts, but for the purpose of distribution ; and if he come into court, on good ground of equity, seeking to recover assets, the court will aid him; without enquiring whether they are to be appropriated to pay debts, or to be distributed among the next of kin.</p>

This is a bill for an injunction and relief; and the material facts necessary to the correct understanding of the case, are the following :—In March, 1807, Jesse Baldwin and John Y. Baldwin entered into partnership in trade in Newark, under an agreement, that Jesse Baldwin was to furnish a capital of ten thousand dollars in merchandize; to let to the company, without any charge for rent, his store-house in the town ; and to let his dwelling-house, adjoining the store-house,…

<p>The practice of examining witnesses a second time, on the same matter, disapproved.</p> <p>The execution and acknowledgment of a deed of conveyance, is not sufficient; it must be delivered to the purchaser, actually or in contemplation of law, to pass the title.</p> <p>It is not necessary that there should be an actual handing over of the instrument, to constitute a delivery; a deed may be delivered by words without acts, by acts without words, or by both words and acts.</p> <p>A deed may be effectual to pass real estate, though it be left in the custody of the grantor. If both parties be present, and the contract is to all appearance consummated, without any condition or qualification annexed, it is a complete and valid deed, notwithstanding it be left in the custody of the grantor.</p> <p>It is necessary, however, that there should be some act evincing the intent: it must satisfactorily appear, if not from acts or express words, yet from circumstances at least, that thero was an intention to part with the deed, and of course to pass the title.</p> <p>Where the evidence opposes the idea that there was a delivery, and proves, that although there might have been an intention to deliver, founded on the presumption that the contract was about to be consummated; yet that such intention was abandoned, and it was distinctly stated that the deed could not or would not be delivered at that time; it cannot be considered a delivery.</p> <p>William Parker, the elder, by his will devised a farm to his son Joseph Parker; and directed, that if the property appropriated for that purpose should not be enough to pay his debts, his sons, Joseph Parker and William Parker, should pay the remainder. Joseph Parker, being in possession of the place devised to him, offered it for sale at public auction, and agreed to take in payment any lawful claims against the estate of his father. William L. Lloyd became the purchaser. He then proposed to borrow of John Crawford a sealed bill given him by the testator for one thousand eight hundred dollars, on which about two thousand dollars was due ; and pay it to Joseph Parker in part of the purchase; and in lieu of it, to give J. Crawford a mortgage on the property; to which all parties agreed; and W. Lloyd was let into possession. The parties afterwards met to complete the purchase ; when it was proposed by Lloyd, and agreed to by Parker, that beside the said sealed bill to Crawford, Parker should take two bonds given to Thomas Lloyd, and a sealed bill given to the executors of Thomas Lloyd, in part payment, and for the balance of the purchase money take the note of W. Lloyd, with J. H. Van Mater as security; and that on receiving these the deed should be delivered. Parker executed and acknowledged a deed to Lloyd for the premises, and it was laid on the table. Lloyd executed and delivered a bond and mortgage to Crawford for two thousand dollars, which was afterwards recorded. Crawford delivered his sealed bill to Lloyd, who gave it to Parker in part payment, together with the two bonds to T. Lloyd and sealed bill to the executors of T. Lloyd, as claims against the testator’s estate. The interest was cast on them, they were taken into possession by Parker ; he tore the seals from two of the instruments, and Lloyd tore the seal from a third; the seals were torn from the sealed bill of Crawford’s and two of the bonds. Lloyd then signed the note to Parker for the balance of the purchase money, which was to be signed by J. Ii. Van Mater at a future day. Lloyd then said, this (the deed) I suppose belongs to me, and the scrivener was about to hand it to him ; but Parker said, no, you cannot have it until the conditions are fully complied with. It was then agreed that the deed should be delivered the next second-day, when the note and security was to be given. Lloyd went away and left the deed, which was handed hack to Parker. Under these circumstances, the deed cannot be considered as delivered.</p> <p>Before the business at this meeting was closed, Parker began to suspect that some of the bonds he had received were not genuine ; and after Lloyd want away, mentioned his suspicions to Dr. Ten Broeck, who was present. Some •days afterwards Lloyd called on Parker; said he had Van Mater’s security to the note, and wanted the deed. Parker, then being satisfied that two of the bonds he had received were not genuine, said he would not accept the note till the bonds were made good; and refused to deliver the deed. He offered to return the bills and bonds he had received to Lloyd, who refused to take them. Parker then brought an ejectment for the land, and Lloyd filed a bill for specific performance of the contract, and obtained an injunction to stay proceedings in the ejectment. An issue was awarded to try the genuineness of the bonds, two of which were found to be spurious : whereupon the injunction was dissolved and the bill dismissed, and Parker recovered possession of the land. After the termination of this suit, the estate of William Parker, the testator, proving to be insolvent; his executors, under an order of the orphan’s court of the county of Monmouth, sold and conveyed the farm to J. G. Berlholf, for threo thousand two hundred and seventy-five dollars and eighty-six cents ; after which the interest of W. Lloyd in the premises was sold, under an execution against him, by the sheriff, to J. H. Van Mater, for fourteen dollars and twenty-seven cents. J. Crawford assigned his bond and mortgage to Richard S. Iiartshorne, (the sealed bill being still unpaid,) upon which the complainants, Crawford and Hartshornc, filed the present bill; praying that the mortgage may be decreed to be a lion on the premises, or that the complainants may be decreed to have an equitable lien on the property, for the amount of the sealed bill or mortgage; and that an account be taken, and the executors of W. Parker decreed to pay it. Held that the complainants have shown no sufficient ground of equity to entitle them to relief.</p> <p>When a contract is made for the sale of an estate, equity considers the vendor as a trustee for the purchaser, of the estate sold ; and the purchaser as trustee of the purchase money, for the vendor.</p> <p>As a consequence of this rule, the purchaser may sell or charge the estate, before the conveyance is executed. lie may come into this court, claiming a specific performance of the contract, and compel the execution of the title.</p> <p>If he has paid any part of the purchase money, he will be considered as having a lien on the property for the amount thus paid; and a court of equity will not compel him to render up possession, until he shall have been repaid.</p> <p>But all this proceeds on the principle of honesty and good faith between the parties; without this, equity will not interfere. If there be fraud in the transaction, equity will not yield its aid to the wrong doer; but will leave him to his legal remedy.</p> <p>It is a sound maxim, that “ he who commits inequity shall not have equity.”— In this case this maxim will apply. W. L. Lloyd had no equity. He had paid part of the purchase money in available securities; the other secu-" rities offered were not genuine. He attempted fraudulently to impose on the vendor, and was considered as entitled to no equitable relief. He could not obtain a decree for specific performance ; but, on the ground of fraud, his bill was dismissed.</p> <p>Under these circumstances, Lloyd, personally, had had no lien upon the property for the money ho had paid. lie was entitled to a return of the money (or securities) paid, or to recover it back of the vendor, but nothing more.</p> <p>Such being the case, Lloyd had no equitable right that he could convey to Crawford ; and Crawford, considered simply as a purchaser under Lloyd, can have no rights as against the defendants.</p> <p>This is not the case of notice. When one affected with notice conveys to one without notice, the assignee, in case he has the legal estate, shall be protected. Here the assignee has not the legal estate. His assignor was not affected with notice of any incumbrance cr claim, but was guilty of fraud ; and the assignee is seeking protection, not against the incumbrancer, but against the owner of the legal estate.</p> <p>It is a general rule in equity, that when a person having rights, and knowing those rights, secs another person take a mortgage upon property, without disclosing his title, he shall not be allowed afterwards to set up his title to defeat the mortgage. The same principle applies to other transactions.</p> <p>The cases under this head of equity, all go on the ground of misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment, whereby an innocent person is induced to do wliat he otherwise would not do.</p> <p>In this case, there was no misrepresentation on the part of Parker. As to concealment, his not communicating to Crawford, at the time, his suspicions of the genuineness of the bonds, when they were mere suspicions, and he had no personal knowledge of the fact; does not render him liable to the imputation of fraud.</p> <p>A party, to be chargod on the ground of concealment, should be aware of his rights. Fraud implies knowledge: if there was a mistake, this court will not consider it fraud.</p> <p>Nor was Parker guilty of fraud in not returning the sealed bill to Crawford ; he did not deal with him. The bill came not from Crawford, but from Lloyd to Parker. It belonged to Llo}d: he had purchased it. When he failed to comply, he was entitled to receive back what lie had paid: it was offered to him, and he refused it.</p> <p>If Crawford had taken any pains, lie might have recovered the possession of his bill, and been in as good a situation as when he passed it to Lloyd. The mutilation of the bill, by tearing off the seals, could not have affected the validity of the bill, or impaired his rights.</p> <p>That the estate to which he must look for payment, has since become wasted, in consequence of which the complainants may suffer loss, does not alter the principle ; nor can it, in this case, furnish a substantive ground of relief.</p>

This was on petition for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, on the ground of adultery, and for a divorce from bed and board, on the ground of extreme cruelty.

<p>A defence which might be made at law, and which a party will omit or decline to make, cannot be the basis of a suit in equity; unless it be in case of fraud, accident or trust, peculiarly within the province of a court of equity, or when the jurisdiction of the legal tribunal cannot admit the defence.</p> <p>When the facts are such as constitute no defence at law, though properly produced ; if they are matters of which a court of law can take no cognizance, and such as are peculiarly within the province of a court of equity; there can be no objection to the bill on the ground that it was not filed pending the suit at law, and an injunction cannot be dissolved on that ground.</p> <p>If a defendant in his answer charge certain facts to exist, on which he intends to rely for his defence, and swears to the answer in the ordinary form, he swears to the truth of the facts, and not to the fact of the charge ; and if the facts as charged arc not true, perjury may be assigned upon it.</p> <p>It is not sufficient for the defendant in his answer to say he does not know it, or does not believe it; as that may all be true, and yet the fact charged be uncontradictcd.</p> <p>What is necessary, and sufficient, in an answer.</p> <p>When a charge is not fully answered, yet if the complainant do not show himself entitled to claim the equity'growing out of that transaction, it will not stand in the way of dissolving an injunction.</p> <p>When the answer is sufficient, and the complainant’s equity denied, the injunction will be dissolved.</p>

TALE LAW LIBRARY The following facts are sufficient for the proper understanding of the question raised by this demurrer. In February, 1818, John Butcher, late of Burlington county, made his last will and testament; in which he directed all his property, real and personal, to be sold by his executors, and the proceeds, after paying debts, he vests in their hands as trustees, directing them to divide it into two equal parts.

Silas Axtell, late of Morris county, died in 1823, intestate, leaving a widow and several children, viz. Samuel, Henry, Atn-zi, Phebe wife of Charles Rolf, John, Jacob, and Jonathan— the two last being minors. He also left three grand-children, the offspring of his daughter Mary, late the wife of Daniel Thompson, 3d. Letters of administration were granted to Henry Ax-tell, John Axtell and Charles Roff.

The following facts appear by the pleadings and evidence:— 1. On the 7th March, 1815, Apollo Woodward gave a mortgage to Samuel Mickle for one thousand dollars, on two lots in Gloucester county, the first being a tavern lot in Woodbury. 2. On the 5th April, 1818, Woodward gave a mortgage to Joseph Shinn, for twelve hundred dollars, on the tavern-house and lot; which mortgage was afterwards assigned to James Cook. 3.

The original bill in this cause, was filed in April, 1831. The complainant stated that he was a purchaser at sheriff’s sale, of certain property, on which the defendant bad a mortgage for one thousand dollars. This mortgage he supposed to be prior to the judgment under which he purchased, and accordingly made some arrangements with the defendant for discharging it.

Isaac Skillman, the complainant, filed bis bill in this court, setting forth, that James Van Pelt, being seized and possessed of the premises in the bill after mentioned, applied to him for the loan of seven hundred dollars, and offered to him as a security for the loan and the interest to arise on it, a mortgage on the said premises.

Daniel B. Ludlow, late of the county of Monis, died in 1823, intestate, leaving a widow and four infant children. The real estate of which he died seized, consisted of about one hundred acres of land, situate on the margin of the Hopatcong lake. His widow afterwards intermarried with Timothy Southard, who, with the wife and the infant children, are the complainants in this cause. The bill is filed for an injunction and account.

The principal object of this bill is to procure a decree of the court, declaring a certain deed of indenture, purporting to have been given by Joseph B. Stafford and the complainant, then being his wife, to the said James B. Stafford, false, forged, and of none effect.

John Youle, one of the complainants, charges, that on the 20th January, 1824, he was seized in fee of a large tract of pine land, in the county of Burlington, valuable only for the timber growing upon it.

The controversy in this case is between the receiver of the Franklin Bank of the city of New-York, and the receivers of the New-Jersey Manufacturing and Banking company, and grows out of a mortgage alleged to have been given by the last named corporation, to Samuel Leggett and James A. Burtis, in trust for the Franklin Bank. The mortgage, with the bond accompanying it, bears date on the 19th January, 1828, and is for the sum of ten thousand dollars.

The original bill was filed by Murphy against Stults, to stay waste on a tract of land, which the complainant alleged he had recently purchased of Aaron Longstreet, through his agent, John Rule, of which the defendant had taken possession, &c. The answer alleged that the defendant had entered into a prior contract with Longstreet for the purchase of the same premises, of which tJ>o complainant had notice; under which contract the defendant had taken possession, (fee.

The original bill in this cause was for an injunction, and presents the following case :— That in 1815, Samuel Hendrickson, of Monmouth county, died intestate, leaving children, viz.: Peter, Samuel, Tobias, Garret, Rebecca afterwards wife of Samuel Potter, and Alice afterwards wife of William Hendrickson. Peter sold out his interest in the real estate descended to them, to the other heirs.

ON the 17th of December, 1811, Samuel Hewlings executed an assignment of all his estate to Daniel Newbold, Samuel Haines, and Isaac Hewlings, in trust to pay and satisfy the claims of the said assignees against him, and in further trust to pay over the balance, if any, to the use of the said Samuel Hewlings, the assignor.

The controversy in this case, which arose upon a bill for the foreclosure of a mortgage, grew out of a difference of religious views and… Held: on the third second-day of tenth month, 1827, in Green street, Philadelphia; at which they formed a yearly meeting, and adjourned to meet again on the second second-day of fourth month, (April,) 1828, in Green street, Philadelphia; at which time and place a yearly meeting of this portion of the society of Friends was accordingly…

The pleadings present the following case. The complainants seek to recover upon a mortgage, given by Paul Van Buskirk, in bis life-lime, to Richard D. Wanmaker, the testator, in the penal sum of seven hundred and seventy-four dollars and seventy-two cents, conditioned for the payment of three hundred and eighty-seven dollars and thirty-six cents, in one year from the date, and dated on the 1st day of May, 1806.

This bill Is filed to procure an injunction, restraining the defendants from entering- upon the property of the complainant, for the purpose of cutting and constructing a raceway to conduct water from the river Delaware to a point below the Trenton Falls ; the right to cut and construct which raceway is claimed by the Trenton Delaware Falls company for themselves, and for the said William Perse and Elam T. Baldwin as their agents, in virtue of an act of the council and…