Commonwealth v. Hasinto

¶1ORDER OF DISMISSAL

¶2The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("government") has moved to dismiss the appeals taken by Abraham Hasinto and Peno Mailo ("defendants") from Superior Court orders denying their motions to suppress breathalyzer evidence in DUI *380prosecutions.1 The government contends that the orders appealed from are not final orders and are therefore not immediately appealable.

¶3I.

¶4This Court's appellate jurisdiction over Superior Court proceedings is set forth in 1 CMC § 3102(a): "[t]he Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over judgments and orders of the Superior Court of the Commonwealth." Our construction of this language resolves the issue presented in this motion.

¶5The government contends that an interlocutory order denying a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal proceeding cannot be appealed until the Superior Court issues a final judgment or order disposing of the case. It urges us to interpret the statutory phrase "judgments and orders" to mean final judgments and orders.

¶6The defendants note that the Commonwealth statute formerly governing appeals from the Commonwealth Trial Court (now Superior Court) provided, in part:

The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands shall have jurisdiction of all appeals from final judgments, final orders, and final decrees in criminal cases and in civil cases and proceedings.

¶7P.L. 1-5, ch. 3, § 1 (emphasis added). This provision was repealed and replaced with 1 CMC § 3102(a) upon the enactment of the Commonwealth Judicial Reorganization Act of 1989, P.L. 6-25 (codified at 1 CMC §§ 3101-3404; hereafter "P.L. 6-25”), which *381transferred appellate jurisdiction from the Appellate Division of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands (hereafter "Appellate Division") to this Court.

¶8The defendants contend that the absence of the word "final" before the phrase "judgments and orders" in 1 CMC § 3102(a) indicates that the legislature intended to alter prior law and grant this Court broader appellate jurisdiction than that formerly exercised by the Appellate Division. Asserting that 1 CMC § 3102(a) is unambiguous and therefore not subject to judicial interpretation, they urge us to construe the statute to permit their appeals from the Superior Court’s interlocutóry orders.2

¶9II.

¶10"The common law allowed an appeal only after a final decision, i.e., after the last of all possible decisions in the progress of an action." Nesbitt v. Bruce Eells & Associates. 233 P.2d 183, 184 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1951). This longstanding principle, which has been codified in most jurisdictions, is based on practical considerations:

The policy behind . . . the statutes, rules of court, and decisions embodying this principle is that litigation should not proceed piecemeal, that intermediate appeals would undu?.y delay the final disposition of litigation, *382and that- a complete disposition of the matter in the trial court may make an appeal moot.

¶114 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §92 (1957). The U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated the importance of this principle in a number of decisions concerning appeals of interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings. See. e.q.. Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Ct. 654, 656, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962) (" [t]his insistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage[s] undue litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal cases") ; Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96, 88 S.Ct. 269, 274, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) ("[a]11 our jurisprudence is strongly colored by the notion that appellate review should be postponed, except in certain narrowly defined circumstances, until after final judgment has been rendered by the trial court. . . . [t]his general policy against

¶12piecemeal appeals takes on added weight in criminal cases, where the defendant is entitled to a speedy resolution of the charges against him").

¶13Clearly, the word "final" was not included in 1 CMC § 3102(a) to limit the Superior Court "judgments and orders" that this Court may review. It is also true that the former statute governing appeals to the Appellate Division included the limiting term.

¶14We are mindful that "[a] basic principle of construction is that language must be given its plain meaning." Tudela v. MPLC, No. 90-011, slip op. at 5 (N.M.I. June 7, 1990); see also Camacho v. Northern Marianas Retirement Fund, No. 90-007 (N.M.I. Sept. 24, 1990). In addition, "[w]here the words of a later statute differ

¶15*383from those of a previous one on the same or a related subject, the [legislature] must have intended them to have a different meaning." Muscogee (Creek] Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C.Cir. 1988).

¶16These principles of statutory construction do not necessarily require that we construe 1 CMC § 3102(a) to permit appeals from interlocutory orders. In this case, another rule of construction should be considered: ”[a]bsent an indication that the legislature intends a statute to supplant common law, the courts should not give it that effect." N. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Const. § 50.01 (4th Ed., 1986); see also Devine v. White. 697 F.2d 421 (D.C.Cir. 1983); Atkins v. United States. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct.Cl. 1977).3

¶17In the absence of a clear indication that the NMI legislature sought to supplant the common law concerning the appealability of interlocutory orders, we are not persuaded that it intended to do so.4

¶18*384If we construe 1 CMC § 3102(a) as the defendants urge, all interlocutory orders coüld be immediately appealed. This would seriously disrupt criminal proceedings at the trial level.5 Whenever the trial court enters such an order (concerning, e.g., motions for suppression of evidence, requests for discovery, requests for severance of charges, etc.) and it is appealed, the proceedings would have to be stayed until this Court issues a ruling. It is conceivable that after we render our decision, appeals could be taken to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court, further delaying the final disposition of the case.

¶19Given the disruptive consequences of a departure from the common law, it is not surprising that the courts generally do not permit appeals from interlocutory orders unless they are expressly permitted by statute, rule or constitutional provision. See 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 92 (1957).6 It is noteworthy that statutes somewhat similar to 1 CMC § 3102(a) have been construed to preclude such appeals. "It has been held that statutes allowing appeals . . . from 'any' judgment, determination, or decision, and other *385similar provisions refer only to final judgments, orders or decrees .. . .." 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 93 (1957) (citing Indiana, Iowa and Maryland precedent).

¶20The common law principle described above is applicable to orders granting or denying motions to suppress evidence, which are viewed as interlocutory in nature. See, e.q.. United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944), denying an appeal from such an order: "appeals from interlocutory orders are exceptional in character and are wholly dependent upon statute; therefore, the fundamental rule . . . requiring finality of decision as a basis for appeal must be followed unless an express authorization for a different procedure can be found." Id. at 1018. See also Di Bella, supra; People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1982); Schwende v. Sheriff, Washoe County, 466 P.2d 658 (Nev. 1970).

¶21[12,13,

¶22we construe 1 CMC § 3102(a) to grant this Court appellate jurisdiction over Superior Court judgments and orders which are final. Since the statute does not expressly permit appeals from interlocutory orders,7 the orders denying the defendants* motions to suppress the breathalyzer evidence are not immediately appealable. The government's motion to dismiss the appeal is hereby GRANTED. 7As

¶23*3861.5 ~ Dated at Saipan, MP, this day of" October, 1990.