People v. Savvides’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

69 federal appellate · 3 district · 109 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 231 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore on the witness' credibility rather than directly upon defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in anyway relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and the duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth. * * * That the district attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair.'”

   19 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States v. Barham · Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie

2. “"Savvides, learning of these matters, sought a writ of error coram nobis, which was denied by the trial court, and on appeal by the Appellate Division, but was allowed by the Court of Appeals of New York. The court held: `* * * Where witness for the prosecution falsely testified that there was no agreement that he was to receive lenient treatment for testifying against defendant, Assistant District Attorney should have exposed the lie of the witness, and failure to do so constituted error so fundamental and substantial that verdict of guilty would not be permitted to stand, even though proof of defendant's guilt may have been convincing.' And in the body of the opinion the Court said: `Where a promise of leniency or other consideration is held out to a self-confessed criminal accomplice for his co-operation, there is grave danger that, if he be weak or unscrupulous, he will not hesitate to incriminate others to further his own self-interest. Long experience in granting leniency to "co-operative accomplices has undoubtedly shown the hazards in the practice to be more than offset by benefit to society in the detection and punishment of crime. It requires no extended discussion, however, to establish that the existence of such a promise might be a strong factor in the minds of the jurors in assessing the witness' credibility and in evaluating the worth of his testimony. The failure to disclose an "understanding" or a promise cannot but seriously impair the jury's ability to pass”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Shapard v. State · Hurt v. State

3. ““The conviction cannot stand. The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also be beyond the suspicion of reproach. The prosecutor should have corrected the trial testimony given by Mantzinos and the impression it created. He should have, by immediate statement of his own or by further appropriate examination of Mantzinos, forthrightly exposed the lie, so that the court and jury would have known that the witness had reason to expect lenient treatment for ‘continued * * * co-operation.’ His failure to do so constitutes ‘error so fundamental, so substantial,’ that a verdict of guilt will not be permitted to stand. * ¡It * * X * * * That the district attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair.” 154 N. Y. S. 2d at 887, 136 N. E. 2d at 854-855 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Taylor · United States of America Ex Rel. Leon Washington v. Leon J. Vincent, Warden, Greenhaven State Prison