Volume 1 — New York Criminal Reports

<p>Insanity.—Test of Responsibility.—Burden of Proof.— Reasonable Doubt as to Sanity.</p> <p>In this State the test of responsibility for criminal acts, where insanity is asserted, is whether at the time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry, the accused knew what he was doing, and whether at the time and with respect of that act ho had the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong.</p> <p>A criminal act cannot be excused upon the theory of irresistible impulse, where the offender knew what he was doing and had the ability to discover his legal and moral duty in respect to it.</p> <p>The burden of overthrowing the presumption of sanity is on the person who alleges the insanity.</p> <p>When evidence has been given to support the defense of insanity, then the prosecution holds the affirmative, and if a reasonable doubt of sanity exists upon the evidence, the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of that doubt.</p>

<p>Insanity.—Test of Responsibility.—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Where the defense of insanity is interposed to an indictment, the true test of criminal responsibility is, whether the accused had sufficient reason to know right from wrong.</p> <p>If he had sufficient intelligence to know it, whether he had sufficient power to control or'govern his actions is a matter of no moment whatever.</p> <p>The burden of proving sanity does not fall upon the prosecution. The presumption is that everyone is sane, and the prisoner must overcome this presumption by satisfactory evidence.</p> <p>If, however, there is reasonable doubt - as to the prisoner’s sanity arising upon the evidence in the case, and upon nothing else, the jury should» give the accused the benefit of that doubt and acquit him.</p> <p>Where "the recorder’s charge accompanied the foregoing propositions, with the instruction that the insanity must be clearly proven,—Held, that the charge was correct.</p> <p>Where a judge has given the jury the true rule applicable to a case when it comes to be considered on all the evidence, it is no error to refuse to submit to the jury a proposition which, even if correct in itself, is only calculated to confuse them, by diverting their attention from the real question, which, upon the whole evidence, has been already correctly submitted to them. (Per Davis, P. J.)</p>

The defendant, George Melius, was tried upon an indictment charging him with manslaughter in the fourth degree in causing by his culpable negligence the death of Webster Wagner. The defendant was rear brakeman of a tráin of cars on the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, in which the deceased Senator Wagner was a passenger.

<p>Disorderly House.—Theater.—Indictment.—Evidence.</p> <p>Where the evidence shows that an opera house, so called, owned by the prisoner, and licensed as a place of amusement, was so conducted by him that it became disreputable ; that the conduct of the inmates was grossly indecent and calculated to corrupt the morals of all who visited the house; and that, by the noises and tumult created therein, the peace and quiet of the community was disturbed; an indictment for keeping a disorderly house is sufficiently supported.</p> <p>To support an indictment for keeping a disorderly house, it is not necessary to show that it is a nuisance, by reason of noise, etc., to the whole neighborhood; it is enough if it be shown that it is so kept as to be injurious to public morals.</p> <p>Barnesciotta v. People, 10 Hun, 187, and Jacobowslcy v. People, 6 Id. 524, followed.</p> <p>It is not an abuse of discretion to admit testimony showing that the frequenters of such house, while going to and from the same, habitually disturbed the peace by noises, etc., upon the highway, though the prisoner be not directly connected therewith ; nor is it an abuse o.f discretion to admit the testimony of a witness as to the effect of the noise, etc., in the said house on himself and on the neighborhood1, and to characterize it as an annoyance. '</p> <p>Where a witness for the defense has testified to all he saw while at said place of amusement, and that he saw nothing wrong, it is not such error as calls for a reversal, to refuse to allow him testate whether '’' he saw anything immoral or indecent ; nor is it error calling for re- ’ versal to permit a witness for the prosecution to characterize the noises as “infernal” and “unearthly,” where he subsequently describes the disturbances and states that they consisted of “shrieks, yells and howls.”</p> <p>The printed rules and regulations as to conduct of inmates, etc., posted in such house, are not admissible in evidence on behalf of the defense.</p> <p>Testimony to show that certain plays produced in such house, which were charged to be immoral and indecent, were produced at other theatres, is inadmissible, the witness having testified to all he saw at such house when the plays were produced.</p> <p>That such a house has been duly licensed as a place of amusement, and no complaint against it, or objection to its continuance, has been made at the office where the license was granted, is of no materiality.</p> <p>Inquiry as to whether a witness has acted as an informer, being collateral to the main question involved, its extent rests in the discretion of the court. Its only legitimate purpose is to fairly exhibit the character of the witness to the jury.</p> <p>It is not error to refuse a request to charge that certain witnesses, viz.: detectives in the employment of the “ Society for the Prevention of Crime,” through whom certain of the evidence showing that the accused had been guilty of keeping a disorderly house was obtained, are accomplices, or a request which assumes that they are such. Where the court, upon the failure of a jury to agree, addresses to them remarks claimed to be improper, a general exception presents no question for review, unless it appears that no portion of such remarks was proper.</p> <p>Where an indictment charging a common law offense, and concluding “against the statute,” etc., is attacked for the first time on the trial, the conclusion is to be treated as surplusage.</p>

<p>Disorderly Conduct.—Code oe Criminal Procedure, § 99.</p>

Appeal by defendant from a conviction, at the General Sessions of New York, under the second count of the indictment, for uttering a forged bank check, of which check the following is a copy: “ $3310t5-0 “ Marine National Bank, Pay to the order of H. S. Horton, thirty-three hundred and ten -£5°T dollars. “ H. J. Jewett, President. B. W. Spencer, Treasurer.

<p>The facts appear in the opinion.</p>

Writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Sessions of the County of New York to review the conviction of the relator of larceny. Henry Henderson, the relator and appellant, was tried and convicted in the Court of Special Sessions, upon a charge of larceny under the circumstances set forth in the head-note (see the facts more fully in the following opinion of Davis, P. J.), and the conviction came to this court for review upon a writ of certiorari.

Appeal by defendant from the judgment of the Court of General Sessions of the County of New York, by which the defendant was convieted of the crime of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to punishment of death, and also from an order denying a motion made upon the minutes for a new trial.

The defendant and appellant was indicted jointly with David B. Martín and George Wilson for the crime of grand larceny. He was tried separately in the Court of General Sessions of Hew York, and convicted, from which judgment, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial upon the minutes, this appeal is taken.

The defendant was indicted in General Sessions for larceny from the person, and tried August 16, 1882, Gildebsleeye, J., presiding, and convicted. An exception to the admission of certain evidence was taken by defendant at the trial, which is fully set forth in the opinion.

McGloin, of murder in the first degree. The indictment contained two counts: the first charging the killing of Louis Hanier while the prisoner and others were engaged in the perpetration of a felony, and the second charging that the prisoner with others made an assault upon the said Hanier witli a pistol with the deliberate and premeditated intent to kill him, and in pursuance of such intent did so kill him.

Appeal by the defendant from judgment of General Sessions. The defendant was jointly indicted with her husband and another, and was convicted in the Court of General Sessions of New York, oh May 18, 1882, before Hon. Frederick Smyth, Recorder, and a jury, of the crime of forgery in the third degree, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of two years and six months.

Appeal by defendant from judgment of General Sessions. The defendant was indicted for a violation of the election and registry law of the city and county of New York, passed Hay 14,1872, and its amendments, in having willfully excluded the vote of John F. Gerdes at the election of November, 1881, knowing that he was legally entitled to vote at such election.

, presiding, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial. A demurrer interposed by appellant on grounds fully stated in the opinion, was overruled and exception taken. A motion for a new trial made by appellant on grounds also set forth in the opinion was denied, and exception taken.

<p>Demurrer.—Two Counts charging different Crimes.— Code of Criminal Procedure, §§ 278, 279.</p> <p>An indictment containing two counts, the first-, charging the defendant with grand larceny, and the second charging him with having received the property alleged in the first count, to have, been stolen, knowing at the time it was so received, that it was stolen, is not 'demurrable on the ground that more than one crime is charged therein, in violation of sections 378 and 379 of the. Code of Criminal Procedure. Said sections are to.be construed together, and permit.such an indictment. .</p>

Demurrer to an indictment for libel, in the General Sessions of New York, Hon. Rufus B. Cowing, City Judge, presiding. The defendant by the indictment herein, was accused of publishing a libel against one Chas. W. Fuller. The defendant ,, filed a demurrer to the indictment upon the ground that the facts set out in the same do not constitute a crime, in that it lacks words of innuendo stating the meaning of the words referring to the prosecution claimed to be libelous.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Court of General Sessions of Hew York, convicting him of the crime of robbery in the first degree. The cause was tried before Recorder Smyth and a jury, on November 20, 1882, and resulted in the conviction of the accused, who was thereupon duly sentenced to imprisonment in the State prison for the term of fifteen years.

The defendant’s attorney petitioned for the allowance of the appeal on the ground that it was an important case, and one .in which the law should be settled by the higher courts. The appeal was allowed by Justice Barrett oí the Supreme Court. The facts appear in the opinion.

<p>Appeal from judgment of Court of Sessions of Westchester county, affirming a judgment of Court of Special Sessions convicting defendant of being a disorderly person.</p>

Appeal by defendant from judgment of the General Sessions of Hew York. . An indictment of murder in the first degree was found against defendant, and was, on September 21, 1882, tried before Hon. Bufus B. Cowing, City Judge, and a jury, and resulted in a judgment convicting defendant of murder in the first degree. A motion for a new trial upon grounds stated in the opinion was made and denied when defendant was arraigned for sentence, and exception taken.

<p>Assault with intent to steal.—Jurisdiction of New York Special Sessions.—Laws of 1852, oh. 374, § 3.</p> <p>The statute (L. 1862, ch. 374, § 3), creating and defining the offense of an assault with intent to steal, has not been repealed by the Penal Code, and is in full force.</p> <p>The word assault is used in L. 1862, ch. 374, § 3, in a sense and as descriptive of something essentially different from the common laW definition of that word.</p> <p>The Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York has jurisdiction of the offense of an assault with intent to steal.</p>

<p>Self Defense.—Burden of Proof.—Evidence.—Character for Peacefulness.</p> <p>Upon the trial of an indictment it is competent for a defendant to call • witnesses to his general reputation and character, but this is as far as the rule in that regard permits him to go.</p> <p>Accordingly, where on the trial of an indictment for felonious assault, the following questions asked on defendant’s behalf were excluded, viz: “In your association with him (the accused), has it been your observation that he is a peaceable character, his disposition as to peacefulness?” “What is your judgment as to his disposition as to peacefulness or quarrelsomeness?” Held, not error. The questions were objectionable as being leading, and .calling for the opinion of the witnesses as to the character of the accused, based upon personal observation.</p> <p>Where, upon the trial of an indictment, it appears by uncontradicted evidence, that the accused shot complainant with a pistol, the burden is on the accused to show to the satisfaction of the jury the existence of sufficient cause to justify him in the use of the deadly weapon.</p>

Appeal by the defendants from a judgment of the Court of General Sessions of New York City and County, Smyth, Recorder, presiding, entered May 29, 1882, convicting them of a violation of the lottery laws of the State. The facts are fully set forth in the opinion.

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Court of General Sessions of. Erie county, adjudging him to be the father of a bastard child. The facts fully appear in the opinion.

Upon a writ of error to review the conviction of the prisoner of murder in the first degree in the Oneida Oyer and Terminer, the General Term affirmed the judgment entered upon such conviction and remitted the proceedings to the Oyer and Terminer of Oneida, witli instruction to proceed thereon.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the General Sessions of Hew York, convicting her of petit larceny from the person. The case was tried before Hon. Henry A. Gilder-sleeve, and a jury, March 27, 1882, and resulted in the conviction of the accused; whereupon she was sentenced to imprisonment in the Penitentiary in the city of Hew York, for the term of five years.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court, affirming a judgment of conviction of the General Sessions of New York (reported ante, page 290).

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Sessions of Onondaga county, entered on a conviction of the appellant of petit larceny.</p> <p>The facts appear in the opinion.</p>

Writ of error to reverse a conviction of the plaintiff in error, in the Court of Sessions of Jefferson county, for the crime , of assault with intent to kill, in having shot one Samuel Zoller in the town of Pamelia, on a farm formerly owned by the plaintiff in error. Defense was insanity. Verdict guilty, and prisoner sen- ■ fenced to seven years in Auburn prison. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Motion to set aside an alleged panel of grand jurors for Albany county, and also, a motion to set aside certain indictments found by' such alleged grand jury.* The facts fully appear in the opinion.

Qhables Donohue, Justice of the Supreme Court, denying a motion by defendant for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The defendant was convicted in the Hew York General Sessions of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to death. Upon appeal the conviction was affirmed by the General Term in the First Department {ante, p. 180), and by the Court of Appeals {ante, p. 283).

Appeal taken July 3, 1882, from a judgment entered in Wayne county, upon the verdict of a jury, June 7, 1882, in the Oyer and Terminer of that county, convicting the appellant, Samuel Williams, of murder in the first degree.

Certiorari issued and directed to the warden and keeper of Auburn prison requiring him to certify and return the cause of imprisonment of James Lombard, who was tried at the Court of Sessions of Oneida county, upon an indictment charging him with the crime of burglary in the first degree and larceny, and was found guilty by a jury, and sentenced by the court, October 22, 1875, to imprisonment in the state prison at Auburn at hard labor for the term of eighteen years.

Appeal by defendant from judgment of the Court of Sessions of the county of Westchester, convicting him-of bigamy, November 29, 1882, Hon. Silas D. Gifford, County Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in the state prison. The facts appear in the opinion.

Writ of error, by the prisoner Thomas Mullally, to the Court of General Sessions of the county of New York, issued to review a conviction of petit larceny. Plaintiff in error was tried at the January Term of the New York General Sessions, 1881, before .the Hon. Rufus B. Cowing, city judge, upon an indictment for grand larceny, wherein he was charged with stealing an English setter dog of the value of ninety dollars, and a dog collar of the value of ten dollars.

Appeal by defendant, Louis Schewe, from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in the Court of Sessions of Cayuga county, December 23, 1881, S. Edwin Day, County Judge, presiding. The appellant was indicted at the Cayuga county Oyer and Terminer, October, 1881, for violation of the excise law, and by order of said court the indictment was sent to the Court of Sessions for trial.

Appeal by defendant from the General Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, affirming judgment of the General Sessions of New York, convicting defendant of manslaughter in the first degree. Defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree, and on his arraignment in General Sessions, December 28, 1881, Frederick Smyth, recorder, presiding, pleaded guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, whereupon the court sentenced him to hard labor for life.

Writ of certiorari to review the conviction; of the defendant, Joseph Bork, in the court of Oyer and Terminer of Erie County, Hon. Charles Daniels presiding, June 13, 1881 (on an indictment found-November, 1877), of peculation by fraudulently converting, obtaining, and disposing of certain bonds of the city of Buffalo.

After the proceedings herein reported in the case of Pork v. People .(pages 368, 379), the defendant was sentenced by Hon. Charles Daniels to five years imprisonment at hard labor. Defendant then applied to Hon. Albert Haight for a certificate to stay execution of sentence under Code of Criminal Procedure, § 527. This motion was denied, and the following opinion written. The grounds of the application appear in the opinion.

Motion to discharge the prisoner, Joseph Bork, on writ of habeas corpus. After the denial of the application for a certificate staying execution of sentence in this case (reported ante, p. 893), this motion was made by the prisoner on the grounds appearing in following opinion, written upon the denial of the motion.

Motion by defendant for a new trial. The defendant, James S. Lyon, was convicted of peculation under L. 1875, ch. 19, by wrongfully obtaining, receiving, etc., money of the city of Buffalo. The grounds of the motion and the facts fully appear in the following opinion.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered upon verdict of jury, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made under section 465, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts and exceptions appear in the opinion.

<p>Police Justice, Appeal from-—When deemed to be sitting as Court.—Charter of G-loversville.</p> <p>Where an authority is conferred upon a particular officer or magistrate, giving to him special jurisdiction in a criminal matter, with special directions as to the mode of procedure, he must be deemed to act as an officer, and not as a court of Special Sessions.</p> <p>The right of appeal exists only when expressly conferred by statute, and there is nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure which expressly or by necessary implication authorizes an appeal to the Court of ■ Sessions from a judgment rendered by a police justice sitting as such.</p> <p>Accordingly, Held, that no appeal to the Court of Sessions lies fro^m the judgment of a police justice acting under the charter of the village of Gloversville (L. 1873, ch. 605), convicting defendant of the offense of selling intoxicating liquors in quantities less than five gallons without license, said charter containing no provision for such appeal, and there being no special statute providing for it.</p>

Error by the prisoner to the Oyer and Terminer of the City and County of Hew York. William Sindram, plaintiff in error, was tried in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, of New York county, at the December term, 1881, before Beady, J., upon an indictment charging him with murder in the first degree, for the killing of Mrs. Catharine Crave, on January 26, 1881, by discharging at her a loaded pistol. The plea was not guilty.

<p>A conviction alter the passage of the Code of Criminal Procedure, upon an indictment theretofore found, cannot be reviewed by writ of error, writs of error and of certiorari, as theretofore existing, being abolished by section 515 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.</p> <p>The suing out of such a writ is the commencement of a new action or proceeding, and not the continuance of the old one, and is therefore not within the saving clause of section 962 of said Code.</p> <p>Where the people give evidence tending to prove that defendant failed to appear for trial at the term to which he had given bail, though able to do so, it is proper for defendant, in order to rebut the inference of guilt or fear thereby raised in the minds of the jury, to show the reasons for his non-attendance, and, if requested to appear at the adjourned term, his good faith in preparing for trial at such time.</p>

Trial at the General Sessions of Genesee County of an indictment for violation of L. 1882, c. 295-, entitled An act to> regulate the standard of illuminating oils and fluids, for the better protection of life, health, and property.” Hon. Myron H. Peck, County Judge, presiding.

<p>Arson.—Evidence.—Silence as an Admission.— Proof of Conspiracy.</p> <p>The rule that silence is an admission only applies against a person who is . so far concerned in what is said, that, unless he speaks, his silence . may be fairly so construed.</p> <p>An anonymous letter, no connection with, or knowledge of which by prisoner is shown, received by one C., the owner of the premises for the burning of which prisoner was indicted, is not rendered admissible in evidence against defendant by the fact that at an inteview between R., an alleged co-conspirator with defendant and 0., R., making certain statements about the letter, prisoner being present, remained silent.</p> <p>A witness cannot he asked, on cross-examination, for the purpose of impeaching him, whether he has been arrested.</p> <p>Evidence of the burning at almost the same time of another salt-block belonging to the owner of the one for the burning of which prisoner was indicted, to show that these two fires were parts of a scheme concocted and carried out by defendant and his associates, is admissible.</p>

<p>Where admissions of a co-defendant made in the absence of the prisoner are used against him, the proper practice is to move that the jury be instructed to disregard the evidence as against the prisoner.</p> <p>A motion to strike out such evidence is improper.</p> <p>That the stolen property had some intrinsic value justifies a .conviction of petit larceny.</p>

<p>New Trial.—Motion for on ground of Newly Discovered Evidence.—Code Criminal Procedure, §§ 465, 466.</p> <p>The amendment to section 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in 1883, was not intended to enlarge or qualify the grounds of a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, but only to provide that in case of a sentence of death the motion may be made after judgment.</p> <p>To sustain a motion for a new trial under subdivision 7 of section 465 of said Code, it must appear that the newly discovered evidence is not . cumulative, i. e., is not of the same nature as that previously produced | to establish the same fact or facts; and a case where the evidence i given upon the trial has been elicited from the party accused, as a witness on his own behalf, forms no exception to the rule.</p> <p>The newly discovered evidence in this case considered by the court, and held to be cumulative, and also such as would not, probably,, have changed the verdict.</p>

Charles Donohue, and entered July 19, 1883, denying a motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered, evidence. Defendant was tried and convicted of homicide in the Court of General Sessions of Hew York County; an appeal was taken to the General Term and the judgment affirmed {ante, p. 180), after which an appeal was taken to this court, and the judgment finally affirmed {ante, p. 282).

Application by habeas corpus for the discharge of Andrew Hoffman from imprisonment in the Albany Penitentiary, who was there detained under a commitment issued by a police magistrate of the city of Troy. The commitment recited a formal conviction of Hoffman on September 28, 1883, of the crime of an assault and battery upon the person of Harriet Lawrence.

, Appeal from a judgment of the Herkimer County Oyer and Terminer, entered in June, 1882, upon a verdict of murder in the second degree. The indictment charged the defendant with murder in the first degree, for deliberately and premeditately having caused the death of his wife, Margaret Welch, at the town of Little Falls, February 5, 1882. The defendant was sentenced to- the Auburn state prison for life, and is now serving out his sentence.

1868, c.'734. In the year 1880 J. H. Yreeland obtained a permit or license, in pursuance of chapter 734 of the Laws of 1868, to plant oysters in Jamaica Bay. In pursuance of such permit, he occupied three acres in the channel known as Pumpkin Patch Channel. The place so occupied was a natural clam bed.

A motion for a new trial was made, upon the grounds, among others, that counsel for the prisoner were not present, and were not notified to attend, at the time the jury were brought back into court for further instructions. The motion was denied and an exception taken. Further facts appear in the opinion.

Writ of certiorari to Charles ¡Naehr, Esq., a police justice of the city of Brooklyn, to review the proceedings upon the conviction of one Edward 1ST. Douglass, as a disorderly person, under L. 1870, c. 395, and L. 1882, c. 171, in that he had abandoned his wife, and neglected to support her according to his means. The facts appear in the opinion.

Writ, of certiorari to the Wayne Sessions, to review a conviction of Cota as principal, and Carneross as accessory before the fact, of the crime of arson in the third degree, for the burning of a building, with intent to injure an insurer, and also to review an order denying a motion for a new trial. The facts and exceptions sufficiently appear in the opinion.

Burleigh, of public intoxication. ' The defendant, Julius W. Burleigh, was arrested for public intoxication, in the streets of Chittenango in Madison county, and taken before a magistrate in that village. He offered bail to appear and answer to an indictment, which the magistrate refused to accept. Then he demanded to be tried by a jury, which was refused, and the magistrate then proceeded and tried him.

The prisoner Myron Dowling was indicted with two others for murder in the first degree charged to have been committed by wrecking a train on the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad, near Schenectady on the night of June 29, 1878, by which one Platt S. Truax a brakeman was killed and sixteen oil and three box cars were wrecked and burned.

J. Forsyth, County Judge, presiding, affirming the judgment of the Police Court of the city of Troy,* wherein the defendant was convicted of the crime of assault and battery, and sentenced to pay a fine of $30, or in default thereof, to be confined at hard labor in the Rensselaer county jail, for the period of sixty days. The alleged offense was committed on June 24, 1882 ; the complaint was made, and the trial had, four months thereafter.

Motion at Oyer and Terminer, Vann, J., presiding, by a surety for remission of the forfeiture of an undertaking given on behalf of the defendant for his appearance to answer to the charge of causing the death of a woman, while procuring a miscarriage. The facts appear in the opinion.

The prisoner was indicted by six indictments for criminal contempt committed in 1874 (1 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 417). He was tried October 22,1883, on one indictment and found guilty. On December 28, 1883, he pleaded guilty to two other of the indictments, before Hon. A. M. Osbobn, Justice of the Supreme Court sitting at Over and Terminer. Whereupon counsel for the people moved sentence.

<p>Indictment.—Amendment upon trial.—Larceny.</p> <p>Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the court upon the trial a new power authorizing the amendment of indictments in certain cases where there is “ a variance between the allegation therein and the proof, in respect to time, or in the name or description of any place, person or thing; ” but under said section the court cannot strike out from an indictment for grand larceny, a clause charging the taking of certain gold and silver coin, and substitute therefor a clause charging the taking of “ bank-bills, lawful money of the United States,” etc.</p>

Upon the trial the prisoner, being sworn in his own behalf, denied any connection with or knowledge of the robbery of which he was accused, and testified that he was during the time . when the offense was committed at the house of his sister at a christening party, and his statement was confirmed by five witnesses. Three witnesses, a captain of police and two officers, swore that defendant’s reputation was bad and that they would not believe him under oath.

Hufus B. Cowing, presiding, convicting the defendant Edward J. Courtney, on an indictment found January 30, 1883, of perjury. The alleged perjury was committed June 26,1882. Defendant having been indicted for forgery and being brought to trial, gave evidence on his own behalf.