Beck v. Cianchetti’s Empirical Analysis
1982
Citation profile
5 federal appellate · 2 district · 62 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 73 later decisions — most recently July 2024 · most notably Oberlin v. Akron General Medical Center (2001), 101 Ill. 2d 196 - Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1984)
5 federal appellate · 2 district · 62 state decisions — followed in 16 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Padilla-Martinez v. United States · Whitt v. Hutchison · Roger Charter, Individually and as Assignee v. William J. Chleborad, M.D. · 51 Ohio App. 421 - Cushman Motor Delivery Co. v. Smith · 56 Ohio App. 427 - Kraemer v. Bates Motor Transport Lines, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[w]hen a release or a covenant not to sue ... is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury ... (1) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury ... unless its terms otherwise provide ...”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage“Apparently the General Assembly intended to change the common law; otherwise, there would have been no reason to enact the statute. The legislative mandate in R.C. 2307.32 abrogates the common law rule which provided that a release given to one tortfeasor was a release of all others and often entrapped the average person into reasonably assuming that settling a claim with one person would have no effect upon rights against others with whom he did not deal. (Citation omitted.) Instead, R.C. 2307.32 provides that a release to one tortfeasor does not discharge any other tortfeasor “unless its terms otherwise provide.” The thrust of this section is to retain the liability of tortfeasors and, thus, the phrase “unless the terms otherwise provide” should be narrowly construed and require a degree of specificity. Allowing a discharge which does not name or identify a tortfeasor perpetrates the common law rule and is contrary to statute. The statutory phrase “unless its terms provide otherwise” requires a release to expressly designate by name or to otherwise specifically describe or identify any tortfeasor to be discharged. For example, a release could meet the statutory requirement by naming an individual or specifically identifying a tortfeasor such as stating the driver of the car which struck the motorcycle.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership or control, if controverted, or bias or prejudice of a witness.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.