Volume 1 — Teissier's Louisiana Reports

<p>1. The recission of the sale of a horse will not be decreed where the conjectural and conflicting opinions of experts (veterinary surgeons) leave doubtful the fact of the existence of the vice before, at the time and within the three days following the sale, R. C. C. 2530. 5 A. 592. 708. 16 A. 107. 16 Ea. 340.</p> <p>2. Especially so where the purchaser has had for several days full possession and control of the animal, has, during that time, made a test of him without detecting any vice .and has, at the end of the time, made of him excessive use.</p> <p>3. A plaintiff should make his case certain; to make it only probable is not enough to recover.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>Appeal From Civil District Court,'Division C.</p>

<p>1. An exception of no cause of action will not prevail'where, under a sufficiency of allegations,' damages are claimed for violation of a contract, strictly commercial in character, signed by seller's agent alone, partly executed and in the hands of the buyer.</p> <p>2. The law does not require the acceptance of such a contract, to be expressed on its face; nor is it essential that the act be signed by the party in whose favor it is made. The acceptance may ’result from his acts in availing himself of its stipulations or in doing some act which indicates his acceptance. 23 A. 272 Batch vs. Ann Young and authorities there cited. Greenlf Evd. 14. 3 Ed., 268 p. 343.</p> <p>■Judgment reversed and case remanded.</p> <p>Dufour, J., dissents and files a separate opinion.</p>

<p>1. The burden of proof is on him who pleads want of consideration to a note.</p> <p>2. The issues of fact are determined adversely to the defendant.</p>

<p>Issues of fact only are involved in this cause.</p>

<p>The.judgment appealed from, as to parties, amended and affirmed. ;</p> <p>Appeal from Civil' District Court, Division —</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division B.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Civil District Coürt, Divisíoú At</p>

<p>When a building contract stipulates for delay, the owner may assert his claim for demurrage against any sum that may be due by him to the builder under the contract, and his right to be paid out of any balance due the builder primes that of the furnishers of materials.</p>

<p>1. In an action to annul a contract of promise of sale, on the ground that an unreasonable delay has expired within which one of; the parties has taken no steps to consummate the transaction, a putting in default is necessary to recovery.</p> <p>2. In the instant case neither was there a putting in default, nor was any act done ón the part of defendants which can be construed as an act receding from the agreement.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E.</p>

<p>1. The evidence offered to rebut the recitals of the tax deed inreality confirms them.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tefferson.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division A.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E and C.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>I. Where the owner of an Immovable property has held beyond his title for less than thirty years and has prior to expiration of that time conveyed his property in accord with- and within the limits of his title deed, this constitutes an interruption of possession or abandonment of his material detention of the excess beyond his title.</p> <p>2. So, his transferee who acquired by such title and a subsequent ' transferee cannot to their possession of this excess for less than thirty years, tack on the possession of the first holder to successfully urge a thirty years plea of prescription against the rightful claimant of that excess. 52 A. 192 and No. 2921 of Docket Court of Appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal1 from Civil District Court, Division B.</p>

<p>Questions of fact only are involved in this case.</p>

<p>1. To annul a judgment predicated on a confession of judgment subscribed to by a feme sole as having been obtained from her through fraud and ill-practices, the evidence must, in that respect, be clear and conclusive, n Lá. 139.</p> <p>2. Scrutiny and appreciation of the evidence of record do not conclusively show the characteristics of fraud notwithstanding’ prior to this suit the immoral relations of the parties litigant, and do not warrant the upholding of the decree annulling the judgment based on such a confession of judgment.</p>

<p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>r. The right to adjudicate to itself property sold for taxes which is granted to the State by the revenue laws makes it a tax purchaser within the meaning of the constitution and the legislation of 1898</p> <p>2. The rights and defences the State has are transmitted to its vendee who may avail himself of the time which elapsed when the title was in the State, and, if the tax sale be more than three years old, may proceed for confirmation of title under section 3 of act 101 of 1898.</p> <p>3. ■ The doctrine in Howcott vs Simeon, No' 3326 of our docket is approved.</p>

<p>1. A claim for menial services to a deceased during his lifetime by his lessee, who regularly paid her monthly rent for years and up to her lessor’s death, must be established clearly and with certainty.</p> <p>2. Evidence of admissions by the deceased, or in his loose conversations, implying his intention to provide in his will, which was either never written or found — for his lessee is of the weakest character and scarcely worthy of belief. 1 Hen. pg. 518, Nos. 3, 4 and 7.</p> <p>3. Those menial services truly rendered to deceased in his lifetime by the lesse’s son, who fixed their value at $5 per month, and embracing a number of years, are prescribed, except as to the last year of those services. R. C. C. 3534-</p>

<p>1. The facts of this case do not warrant the application of the doctrine of estoppel in pais.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division A.</p>

<p>1. Act 36 of 1888 provides certain conditions precedent which must be complied with before the association can acquire corporate existence.</p> <p>2. In the absence of such compliance, the organizers incur responsibility for the acts of the concern.</p>

<p>1. An exception of no.cause, of action, although admitting the truth of the allegations of plaintiff’s petition will be'sustained, where, in a suit to rescind for nullities and illegalites, a sale of succession property, the record of the proceedings offered and admitted in evidence without objection reveal that the plaintiff in suit was without a cause of action. '30:A. 310.</p> <p>2, The misinterpretation in the carrying out* of some of the mandatory provisions of the terms of Act'i 53 of 1900 enacted for the speedy and economical' settlement of successions not worth over $500 are-cdrédj where the succession property was',” under the order of a competent court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, sold to pay debts, and the purchaser has complied with the adjudication, 30 A. 52, 36 A. 444. Louque’s Digést p. 688, D. No. 4.</p> <p>3. Where one of the heirs enumerated in the succession proceedings and a resident of the Parish (where the succession is opened) although under coverture remain silent and inactive, and permits the succession property to pass by public sale into the hands of strangers, purchasers and third persons accepting title from her and her co-heirs, she is estopped from setting up the illegalities and nullities of said proceedings. 39 A. 972, IS A. 273, 18 A. 280.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division B.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division B.</p>

<p>I.To recover damages from the surety on an injunction bond, the defendant in injunction must resort to an.action on the bond.</p> <p>2. Whether a defendant in an injunction suit in which the injunction has been dissolved should recover frcm the plaintiff in injunction his attorney’s fees as damages, must be determined by the facts of each special cause and not by any inflexible rule.</p> <p>3. Where the intent of the parties to agreement is doubtful,' the construction placed upon it by them furnishes a rule of interpretation.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>Issues of fact only are involved jaerein.</p> <p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E,</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division B.</p>

<p>When the defence to a suit on a policy of insurance is self destruction, the burden of proof is on the insurer to establish the suicide, and, when circumstantial evidence only is relied" on, the defence fails, unless circumstances exclude with reasonaole certainty any hypotheses of death by accident or by the act of another.</p>

<p>1. A surviving- widow, although she may dispose of her interest in the community property, is powerless to dispose of the interest therein of her minor children.</p> <p>2. Where such alienation by her is superinduced by fraud, such sale will be annulled and rescinded; for the law will not hold a party bound when his consent is the result of error bearing on the substance of the contract. 46 A. 509.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C. .</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>1. Any person whose rights are invaded may invoke the aid of the Courts to prevent any act which if done would entitled him to damages.</p> <p>2. On the merits the case is entirely with the plaintiff and the Judgment is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division A.</p>

<p>Under Article 85 Constitution of 1898, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in all cases in which the constitutionality or legality of a tax is in contestation.</p>

<p>1. A protest against the paving of a street is effective only in cases arising under Act 113 of 1886 providing for paving initiated by the petition of one-fourth of the owners, which must, under the law be denied by the Council, if opposed by the majority of the owners affected.</p> <p>2. Such a protest is without effect when the work is ordered by the Council of its own volition, in accordance with the discretion vested in that body by Act 119 of 1886.</p> <p>3. Courts will take judicial notice of the signatures of public officers and will receive their certificates as prima facie proof. The reason for this rule rests on sound principles of public convenience. ,</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil-District Court, Division E.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E.</p>

<p>(Original opinion printed pp. 17-22.)</p> <p>t. Where plaintiff in injunction and appellee claims that the identy of the property he avers to own, is established by a government official map which is assailed, the exclusive official character of such map must be satisfactorily proven.</p> <p>2. Exclusion by the Court a qua of parole evidence to prove or destroy title to real estate; or to prove that the purchaser at a tax collector’s sale is a person interposed and not the real ven-dee is in accord with the following authorities: 40 A. 157; 42 A. 449; Taylor D. pg. 344; Breaux D, pg. 370-1.</p> <p>3. A 10-years plea of prescription acquirendi causa-filed in the appellate Court and which is so vague and indefinite as may be referred to no specific date is a proper ground for ascertainment by the trial Court. 30 A. 246.</p>

<p>By notarial act .fixing the amount of his liabilities, to the exception of a minor item not included in said act, but afterwards added to the list of liabilities which he assumed and paid, the defendant sold out at a considerable cash price his stock,and candy business to the plaintiff, who subsequently brought stfit as defendant’s creditor on a promissory note signed by defendant’s business manager and for minor items alleged to have been furnished by plaintiff to said manager, whose only powers were to buy and sell what pertained to the business to pay running expenses out of the receipts, but not to borrow money therefor, although attempt was made to show that with defendant’s approval and ratification and to his knowledge the full amount of the loan went into the business. Held.</p> <p>1. Without express authority — either written or unequivocally given — employers cannot be bound by the notes and bills of their employees, notwithstanding that the nature of their functions would, perhaps, include that right 39 A. 815 and authorities there cited, R. C. C. C. 2997, Mechem on Agency, Sections 298 and 399.</p> <p>2. Ratification, where of a doubtful character enures to the benefit of the one to whom it is opposed 39 A. 242.</p> <p>3- A sale and payment by which one buys in bulk the retail business of another, distinctly specifying what obligations of said business will be paid by the parties respectively and which sale is full, complete and a final settlement between buyer and seller, closes out and settles all pre-existing debts owed, at the date of such sale, to the purchaser by the business of the vendor; particularly when in said act of sale no mention of or demand is made of the vendor of any pre-existing debt due to the purchaser, 109 La. 670.</p>

<p>1. Emancipation gives to the slave his Civil rights, and a contract of marriage, legal and valid by the consent of the master and moral assent of the slave, from the moment of freedom, although dormant during slavery, produces all the effects which results from such contract among fxee persons.</p> <p>2. The marriage which has been declared null nevertheless produces its Civil effects as it relates to the parties and their children; provided that it has been contracted in good faith.</p> <p>3. Purchasers in good faith need not look beyond the order of sale made by a Court having jurisdiction of the Succession. They are not affected by antecedent irregularities; the jurisprudence on this point is settled.</p>

<p>1. To recover damages for a malicious prosecution three things must concur:</p> <p>1st. The motive of the party instituting or prosecuting the suit or proceeding must have been malicious.</p> <p>2nd. The suit or proceeding complained of must have been instituted without any probable cause.</p> <p>3rd. The suit must have terminated.</p> <p>2. A railroad company has the right to use and employ its private property in such manner as it sees fit, so long as the employment is not of a nature reprobated by law, injurious to the right of others or repuguant to its charter or its obligations ás a public carrier; hence it may properly designate certain portions of its depot site for specific purposes and from which it may exclude all persons save those, whom, by the nature of their or its business, it invited thereon.</p> <p>3. A person on such excluded portion of a depot site, being there without authority, or invitation resulting from the nature of their business commits a breach of the peace when cautioned and requested to leave and refuses to depart therefrom.</p> <p>4. Any act having a tendency to produce a breach of the peace is itself a breach of the peace.</p>

<p>Since the adoption of the constitution of 1898, no judgment annulling a tax sale shall have effect until the price and all taxes and costs paid, with ten per cent per annum interest on the amount of the price and taxes paid from date of respective payments, be previously paid to the purchaser.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>Original opinion heretofore handed down remains undisturbed. (See page 13.)</p> <p>Judge Moore concurs in a separate opinion.</p> <p>Judge Dufour dissents in a separate opinion.</p>

<p>1. A suit to enforce tender of redemption is not a petitory action involving a conflict of title, but merely presents the issues of an interest to redeem and of compliance with the Statutes.</p> <p>2. When such tender is made according to law by a party in interest to the tax purchaser, the tax title is defeated, whether the tender be accepted or not.</p> <p>3. Such tax title becomes a mere illegal incumbrance which may be summarily erased by mandamus taken contradictorily with the parties in interest,</p> <p>4. The proof of interest and of tender are sufficient to entitle rela-tors to relief.</p>

<p>1. A divested owner is without interest to question the disposition . made by the State of the property forfeited to it for non-payment of taxes, or to urge the nullity of defendant’s title from the State, which must stand until set aside by a party entitled ■ to have the sale set aside.</p>

<p>1. Where the evidence adduced fails to show an interruption, an action on a promissory note is barred by five • years reckoning from the day when it was made payable. R. C. C. 3540.</p> <p>2. A promise to buy or sell, which was never carried out, but registered in the Conveyance Office, can no longer be an encumbrance on the property which, independently of the promisee or his legal representatives was expropriated for governmental purposes.</p> <p>3. So, a rule (as to the form of which no objection was urged) to cancel from the Conveyance books the inscription of such a promise to buy or sellthe property expropriated was properly made absolute.</p> <p>4. Where no answer for an amendment of the decree appealed from is filed none will be supplied by the Court. C. P. 591, 2 and 887.</p>

<p>ON THE REHEARING.</p> <p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division B.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court; Division E.</p>

<p>1. A defendant acting in good faith and under the belief that he was authorized to sell certain property belonging to the plaintiff and to hold the proceeds pending the final adjudication of a suit between them on appeal, cannot when sued in an action to recover the value of the property defeat same the prescription of either one or five years.</p> <p>2. The action to recover under such circumstances arises from a quasi contract and is not one ex~delicto, and is prescribed only in ten years.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division A.</p>

<p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E.</p>

<p>1. Act No. 79 of 1902, known as the “Courthouse Commission Act, ” is not repugnant to Art. 31 of the Constitution of this State which ordains that “every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one object, and that shall be ex - pressed in its title.”</p> <p>2. The requirements of singularity of subject imposed by-Art. 31 of the Constitution is not intended to embarrass honest legislation, but only to prevent the vicious practice of' joining 'in one act incongruous and unrelated matters. If all the parts, of a statute have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation, the act is not open to the objection of plurality no matter how extensively or minutely it deals with the details looking to the accomplishment of the main legislative purpose.</p> <p>3. The exception of non joinder of parties must be pleaded in lim-ine, otherwise it shall not be admitted.</p> <p>.4. It has long been held in this State that the jury of freeholders authorized by our law to act in expropriation proceedings, have to some extent the character and authority of experts, supposed to have some personal knowledge of the matters submitted to them, and authorized to rely on their own opinions as well as on the testimony adduced before them.</p> <p>5- Verdicts of juries in expropriation proceedings are indeed subject to review by appeal and may be annulled when manifestly inadequate or excessive; but they are entitled to great respect and will not be interfered with except in case of gross or manifest error.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E.</p>

<p>1. When both the husband and wife are parties plaintiff to the suit, and the claim sued on belongs to one or the other, the defendant is without interest to urge that the claim belongs to one of the spouses in particular, and that the suit should have been brought distinctively in the name of the owner of the claim.</p> <p>2. On the Merits, the case, which involves issues of fact only, is entirely with the plaintiffs; the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the Court based thereon are fully sustained by the evidence.</p>

<p>1. When parties have deliberately put their_ engagements into writing in such terms as impart a legal obligation without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties, and the manner and the extent of their undertaking was reduced to writing ; and all oral testimony of previous colloquium between the parties, or of conversation, or declarations at the time when it was completed or afterwards, is inadmissible.</p> <p>2. Chandeliers placed in a dwelling house by the owner thereof, are movables, though in order to be made use of they have to be connected with pipes which are themselves considered immova-bles by destination.</p>

<p>1. Insufficiency of the transcript may furnish ground for dismissal of an appeal after hearing on the merits but not on a motion to dismiss in limine.</p> <p>2. Whether a particular, record presents sufficient data upon which an Appellate Court would be justified in avoiding or amending a judgment, can only be known after it shall have heard the contention of the parties and made an examination of the transcript filed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division B.</p>

<p>All matters of law and issues of fact involved in this appeal were present in another, and similar appeal between the same parties in the Supreme Court and received decision by that Court adversely to the petitions of the defendant and appellant. American Homestead Company vs Mrs. Marión M. Karstendiek No. 14,652, Dec. 14th, 1903, and not yet reported.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division A.</p>

<p>The seizure of a judgment purporting to have been transferred for a valuable consideration, but claimed by the seizing creditor to have been given in pledge of and to secure a pre-existing debt which the evidence adduced at the trial shows such to have been the fact, will necessitate a remanding of the case to ascertain the correct amount of the debt thus secured; but priming to that extent the claim of the seizing creditor. 34 A, 389, R. C. C. 3157 and 3158.</p>

<p>Questions of facts only are involved in this case.</p>

<p>When an appeal bond is insufficient in amount to maintain the appeal as suspensive, but is for the amount fixed by the Court, the appeal will be maintained as devolutive.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division E.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>1. The provision of Art. 233 of the Constitution was intended to have the effe.ct of a statute of repose, but, to have that effect and to quiet his title by the prescription therein provided, the tax purchaser must be either 1st. one who takes actual corporeal possession of the property under and by virtue of the Tax Collector’s title; or 2nd, one who buys property not tangibly but only constructively in the possession of the tax debtor, and, himself, obtains no other possession than the civil or constructive possession which follows the tax collector’s title to him and its registry in the Conveyance office.</p> <p>2. The tax purchaser who buys property which is tangibly and corporeally in the possession of the tax debtor, but who contents himself with merely accepting and recording the tax collector’s title, making no effort to dispossess the original owner, is not afforded a sufficient foundation to support the inhibition that no sale of property for taxes shall be set aside for any cause except that of dual assessment or the antecedent payment of taxes, unless the preceding to annul is instituted within three years of the adoption of the Constitution.</p> <p>3. A party who pleads prescription is bound to prove the facts necessary to sustain the plea.</p>

<p>1. Usages and customs may be admitted to effect insurance contracts as is allowed in other contracts; the principle upon which evidence of same is received, is that the parties to the policy are supposed to have contracted with reference to them.</p> <p>2. Every usage of a particular trade which is well settled or so’generally known that all persons engaged in that trade may be fairly considered as contracting with reference to it, is considered to form part of every policy designed to protect risks in such trade, unless the express terms of the policy decisively repel the inference.</p> <p>3. The usage must be either a general usage of the whole mercantile world, or a particular usage of universal notoriety in the trade upon which, and of the place at which the insurance is effected.</p> <p>•4. The usage of a particular place or a particular class of persons cannot be binding on non-residents or on any person unless they are shown to have been cognizant of it.</p> <p>5. When the defense in a suit on a policy of fire insurance is noncompliance with the iron safe clause in that the books of the insured did not contain a record of all his purchases and that he did not have his books in his iron safe on the night when the fire occurred which destroyed the books as well as the property insured; and where the evidence is that the insured had received in his store several lots of goods at periods from three months to within a few days of the fire which he had not entered in his books, his excuse therefor being that he does not enter purchases on his books until the goods are opened and checked up and that these goods were not opened and checked up; and where the books were left exposed on his desk on the night of the fire and whilst the store was not open for business, his reason for not having put them in his iron safe being that he was working on them the evening preceding the night of the fire; that he was suddenly taken ill; that he left the store for his home to take medicine; that he intended to return; that he took an ov-dose of medicine and fell asleep and did not wake up until the alarm of fire was sounded that night or early the next morning : Held, that a breach of the express promissory warranty is shown and that there can be no recovery even under the doctrine of substantial compliance, if such doctrine obtains in this State.</p>

<p>Issue of fact only is involved herein.</p>

<p>The pleadings in this matter authorize the maintainance of the plea of estoppel, and the exclusion of the evidence sought to be introduced.</p>

<p>Issue of fact only is involved in this case.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division C.</p>

<p>V Art. 233 Const: of 1898 is not involved herein, and the real issue is, as to what passed to the purchaser by the terms of the act under which he purchased.</p> <p>2. Section 63 of the revenue Act of 1898 provides that a sale under its terms “shall operate as a cancellation of all the conventional and judicial mortgages. The inclusion of two kinds of mortgages is necessarily an exclusion of the third, the legal mortgage which the law grants to minors on the property of their tutors.</p> <p>' 3. The preservation of the minors’ mortgage is suggestive of danger and litigation and warrants defendant and adjudicatee in his refusal to accept title.</p>

<p>1. Laws in derogation of common right and detrimental to the interest of creditors, such as homestead laws, must be strictly constructed and cannot be aided b3r implications, nor extended beyond their clear and precise import.</p> <p>2. Where the statute grants to the necessitous widow or minor children of a deceased person a right to receive $1000 from the Succession of the deceased father and husband, the privilege cannot be extended to the minor children’s claim of the same nature against the insolvent estate of their deceased widowed mother.</p> <p>3. Any attempt to extend the necessitous minor’s claim beyond the Succession of the father is judicial legislation, and ignores the codal axiom that when a law is clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded, under the pre-tence of pursuing its spirit.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>Appeal from. Civil District Court, Division’ B.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division C.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division A.</p>

<p>1. The obligation in writing of the parties to a contract of lease and sale drawn up under the provisions of Act 62 of 1877, by which one leases and buys a piano, stool and scarf at a fixed price to be paid for by installments within two years in order to acquire the ownership thereof, is an obligation to pay a specific sum on the happening of a certain event. This obligation is only prescribed by ten years. 30 A. 1276-8.</p> <p>2. A shorter period urged: three years, reckoning from the last instalment payment made: April 20, 1897, is not maintainable. The declaration in the contract admitting that on the happening of any delinquency, the whole indebtedness would be due is an acknowledgment waiving by anticipation any prescriptive period, except that arising from personal obligation. R. C. C. 3544-</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division B.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division.C.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division D.</p>

<p>This case involves the liability vel non and averred release of a suretjr on a building contractor’s Bond;under the facts of this case the release is not shown.</p>

<p>Appeal from 28th, Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division A.</p>

<p>1. The right to suspend an officer or member of the police force for the city of Newj'Orleans, “without pay, pending charges”, is vested exclusively in the Board of Police Commissioners. ■</p> <p>2. ■ Act No. 63 of 1888, creating the Board of Police Commissioners for the City of New Orleans, authorizes the Board, on conviction by it of any officer or member of the police force for any legal offence, or neglect of duty or violation of rules, etc., “to punish the offending party by reprimand, forfeiture;, or suspension of pay for a specified time, or by dismissal from the force."</p> <p>3. Whether upon a conviction by the Board of an officer or member of the force, it may punish the offender by the imposition of more than one of the different punishments stated in the Act, under one conviction for a single offence, is not necessary to a decision of this cause; nevertheless, in order to have the effect of duality of punishments the sentence must specifically, and in terms, impose them.</p> <p>4. A formal sentence, after conviction, of “dismissal from the force,” does not any more than does a sentence of “reprimand,” carry with it by its owns force, forfeiture or suspension of pay for the term preceding conviction.</p> <p>5. The right of a public officer who. has been illegally suspended from office, the assumed vacancy having been filled by the Board by the appointment of another who has received the pay, to recover the salary of- his office for the period of suspension, is to be determined by the doctrine of laches and acquiescence.</p> <p>6. As the officer’s right to a salary for the period of suspension may be defeated by his laches, so may the right of the Board to withhold payment of it be also defeated by. the same cause; for laches presupposes not only the lapse of time, but also the existence of circumstances which render negligence or recklessness imputable.</p> <p>7. It is well settled that an office which has attached to it emoluments, has a pecuniary value although primarily it is an agency for public purposes, and that the rights to the emoluments follow the title to the office.</p> <p>8. An officer who has been prevented from performing the duties of his office by an illegal suspension or removal by the governing body, is still an officer de jure, and may recover his salary for the period of suspension or removal, although the same has been paid to another officer defacto appointed to fill the assumed vacancy: provided he has not by his laches or acquiescence superinduced the filling of the assumed vacancy.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division A.</p>

<p>Questions of fact only are involved in this case.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>1. Sanity is presumed, and the burden of proving insanity rests on the party who alleges it.</p> <p>2. The real test is, whether at the moment of the making of the will, the testator was of sufficiently sound mind to fully understand the nature of the testamentary act, and to appreciate its effects.</p>

<p>Issues of fact only are involved herein.</p>

<p>Issue of fact only are involved herein.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division B.</p>

<p>1. The recognized rule is that before attempting to cross a railway track a person should stop, look and listen; and it will hardly do to substitute for it a rule to the effect that, being at a distance from a crossing, towards which plaintiff and an electric car are travelling, he may then form an opinion as to which of the two will get there first; and acting upon that opinion essay the crossing without giving himself further concern upon the' subject, i io La. 970.</p> <p>2. In this case not only was the accident for which damages are sued, at a certain moment unavoidable, but if any fault exist it is traceable to the supervening and greater fault of the plaintiff 110 La. 970.</p> <p>3. Cases cannot be tried by piece-meal; and where mover for a subpoena duces tecum has had prior to and during the trial full opportunity to obtain the books, papers and documents he requires, the ruling of the Court at the close of the trial denying mover’s motion will not be disturbed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division C.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division D.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division D.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court Division C.</p>

<p>Where one of several forced heirs institutes a suit against his co-heirs for the purpose of effecting a return to the mass of the succession of the common ancestor, of property received by them from their ancestor by donation inter vivos, in order that a judicial adjustment of the respective rights and obligations of the co-heirs may be had, and that equality, by collation, among them may take place; and where in said suit the several properties received by the respective heirs, and which it is sought to have collated, aggregate in value an amount beyond the highest jurisdictional limit of this Court, the appeal will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Division E.</p>