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1 Va. 225

Cosby v. Lambert

Supreme Court of Virginia

Decided August 15, 1842

Supreme Court of Virginia · decided 1842-08-15

<p>A tract of land is purchased by a bricklayer and carpenter, who are to pay part of the price in money at stipulated times, and the rest in a house to be erected by them. The work to be done by each is agreed upon between them, and they commence its execution: but the carpenter, from misfortune in business, becomes unable to comply with his portion of the agreement. Thereupon a new agreement is made, that the carpenter shall cover in the house, and that for the work he has done, and for covering the house, he shall be allowed the value thereof, and receive that amount in land out of the tract. The carpenter nevertheless fails to cover in the house, and the bricklayer has this part of the work done. Held, 1. that by the new agreement, the carpenter’s interest in the land is such proportion thereof, as the amount of work then done, and under that agreement to be done by him, was of the original price of the land; and 2. that this proportion is charged to the bricklayer with the value of the work which under that agreement ought to have been, but was not, done by the carpenter.</p> <p>The carpenter makes a deed of trust conveying his interest in the land to secure two persons, sureties for him in a bond, one of whom is the bricklayer. Being afterwards taken in execution at the suit of other creditors, the carpenter is discharged as an insolvent debtor, and his interest in the land is sold by the sheriff, and purchased, at the price of 50 cents, for the bricklayer. The bricklayer afterwards declares that the carpenter shall have such benefit from the land as his work entitles him to, and upon applying to his cosurety in the bond to contribute to the satisfaction thereof, states that he does not mean to keep the land for what it sold for; that he wants no advantage of that kind. The cosurety makes contribution. Eleven years afterwards, upon a bill in equity being filed by the carpenter, the bricklayer insists that the sale by the sheriff is valid. Held, the carpenter is entitled to redeem the interest sold by the sheriff; and a decree should be made for partition of the land, so as to assign him his due proportion, holding the same chargeable with such amount as may be ascertained to be due the bricklayer, after crediting for the yaiUe of the work done by him that ought to have been done by the carpenter, the sum paid by him in discharge of his suretyship, and the 50 cents paid the sheriff, and debiting him with such portion of the rents and profits as the interest of the carpenter in the land entitles him to.</p>

Decided 1842-08-15

Stanakd, J.

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2The court is of opinion that under the agreement of the 12th November 1819, Lambert's original interest in the land was reduced to such proportion thereof, as the amount of the work then done and under that agreement to be done by him, was of 5600 dollars, the original price of the land ; and had he done the work to be performed by him, the proper partition of the land would have been in the proportions aforesaid.

¶3The court is further of opinion that the failure of Lambert to do the work, did not (at least for his benefit) charge the said proportion of the land on the partition thereof; but the effect of that failure, and the doing of the work by Cosby, left Lambert's proportion of the land unchanged ;—chargeable however to Cosby for the amount of the value of said work which Lambert ought to have done, but which, on his failure, was done by Cosby.

¶4The court is further of opinion that notwithstanding the surrender of Lambert's interest in the land when he took the oath of insolvency, and the sale thereof by the sheriff, and purchase by Tapp for Cosby, the subsequent transaction, especially the demand by Cosby of contribution from his cosurety for the debt to Silas II. Smith, which was an incumbrance on Lambert's share of the land by virtue of the conveyance of Lambert to Stribling for the indemnity of the sureties for that debt,—coupled with the assurance that the land, notwithstanding the sheriff’s sale, was still redeemable by Lambert, and the receipt of contribution from that surety, entitled Lambert to redeem, on paying all that was justly chargeable thereon in favour of Cosby.

¶5*240The court is further of opinion that such right of redemption was all that Lambert could justly claim, and the court below had no authority to convert this into money demand, and by subjecting Cosby to a decree for such money demand, make him a purchaser of the equity of redemption against his will, and that too at a price fixed without enquiry into its value at the time of the decree, or any evidence of such va'lue.

¶6The court is further of opinion that the alleged sale by Cosby of one hundred acres of the land was no effectual impediment to a partition, so as to assign to Lambert his due proportion of the land ; that the proper relief to him would have been a decree for such partition, holding the share allotted to him chargeable with the amount that might be ascertained by account to be due Cosby; that amount to be ascertained by crediting Cosby for the amount of the work done by him that Lambert ought to have done under the said agreement of the 12th November 1819, and the payments of Cosby in discharge of the said debt to Silas M. Smith, and the 50 cents, the amount of the purchase at the sheriff’s sale, and debiting him with the just proportion of the rents and profits that the interest aforesaid of Lambert in the land entitled him to; and subjecting the said share of Lambert to sale, to satisfy the amount so ascertained to be due Cosby, if the same should not be paid in a reasonable time.

¶7The court is further of opinion that in fixing the value of the work done by Lambert, with a view to the ascertainment of his share as aforesaid of the land, respect should be had, as far as practicable, to the standard furnished by the prices that may have governed the original contract, rather than the current prices of other work of the like kind.

¶8The court is further of opinion that as the sheriff sold to Tapp, and no conveyance appears to have been made by Tapp to Cosby, Tapp’s heirs ought to have been par*241ties. Though the record affords strong ground for the inference that Tapp purchased for Cosby, the proceedings in this case, if Tapp’s heirs be not parlies, would not bind them, or be evidence against them ; and if the case were to proceed to decree without making them parties, an ostensible title would be left outstanding, to the assertion of which the decree in this cause would be no bar.

¶9Therefore the court doth adjudge, order and decree, that the decree be reversed with costs, and that the cause be remanded for farther proceedings in conformity with the foregoing principles.

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