Volume 1 — Vermont Reports

Assumpsit, in which the “plaintiff declared that on the 14th day of October, 1815, being Sheriff of the county of Chittenden, and having in his hands a writ of attachment in favor of one Fitch against Elisha Sears of Williston, he duly attached on that writ, a certain horse, the property of Sears ; that on the day following he delivered said horse to the defendant, who promised to re-deliver the same to the plaintiff on request, or pay all damages, &c. The declaration then…

This was a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the County Court. SilasRichards and David Selden, the present defendant,, as surviving partners of the late firm of Andrew Ogden & Co. of New York, commenced their action in Chittenden County Court, against Thomas, Herring, the plaintiff.in error,.upon several proim-isory notes executed by him to the firm aforesaid.

<p>, íf A enters upon land and makes permanent improvements under a written contract with B for the purchase of the land, and before completing the payment of the purchase money executes a deed to C, neither C nor his grantees, though ignorant of the agreement with B, can, in general, dispute the title of B.</p>

<p>If by tha terms of a contract successive acts-are required to be performed within limited periods, the several days on'which the performance is alleged, if within the respective periods limited by the contract are not material. And though the order of performance in point of tinrvg should seem to be inverted, yet if the time is laid under a videlicet and with .express reference to the periods limited by the contract, there is no repugnancy.</p> <p>In declaring upon a contract payable in such goods on demand as the plaintiff should want, it is not sufficient to aver a general demand of goods; but it should appear that the plaintiff designated the goods which ho wanted, or else that he expressly waived his right to select and gave the defendant notice of the waiver.</p> <p>Where part of an entire sum due upon a sealed agreement is payable by instal-ments at fixed periods, and the residue in specific articles on demand, cove-, nant will lie for the instalments before a demand Is made of the specific articles.</p>

In Chancery. The former -of these causes was a bill to foreclose a mortgage which Barney had executed to Chittenden on the first day of January , 1817, to .secure the payment of a promisory note of that date for eleven hundred and sixteen dollars and sixty six cents; it being stated 'that Howe had subsequently purchased the estate of Barney in a part of the mortgaged premises.

Tms was a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the county court rendered at April Term, 1826. The original action was debt on jail bond in common form .The writwas directed to die proper officers of Chittenden county,where the defendants resided, and there served and made returnable to the county court of Franklin county. It was signed by the Mon.

ErkoR -brought to reverse) the .judgment of Addison Comity Court recovered by Doty against Bishop, Jun'e Term 1825. — • The original action was tresspass for taking and Carrying away seventy eight shocks of -wheat in the straw, brought by Doty against Bishop and alleging the tresspass to have been committed at Addison, Aug. 20,1824.

This was a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the County Court in an action of assumpsit in favor oí Philips against Chilson, declaring for work and labor performed by a minor son of the plaintiff. The general issue was pleaded and tried by the court by consent of parties.

<p>The acceptance of performance of a condition precedent, after the time for its performance has expired by the terms ’of the contract, furnishes grima facie evidence only that the parties intended to continue the contract in force in its ■ original terms; and evidence íb admissible to show the intent to-be different.</p>

This was. a: motion for-a new trial, and'came up upon exceptions, taken before Skinner, Ch. Justice, and his brethren of the County- Court,, at the. last September Term.

<p>Presumptive rights, acquired by long use and enjoymént, are inalagous to those - arising under the statute of limitations ; and the use and enjoyment must be adverse and uninteirupted for'the period limited by the statute.</p> <p>If, therefore, the enjoyment of such a right has been interrupted or suspended, though not by the act of the party whose private interest was affected, such right will not become perfected ; especially if, during the seasons of interruption, the owner of the property affected, resumes the use and enjoyment of it.</p> <p>The doctrine of presumptive rights, is applicable to cases for which the statute has not provided.</p>

Euroe. to reverse a judgment of the county court rendered December Term, 1824. The action below was assumpsit and came into the county court by appeal from a justice. The declaration alleged, that Wright, the defendant, was executor of the will of one Thomas Brownell, and represented the estate to be insolvent, upon which commissioners were appointed to receive and adjust the claims of creditors.

This action of assumpsit was tried at the last March Term of the County Court, Chief Justice Skinner, presiding.

This was an action on the case against the defendants for negligence as attornies, and was tried upon the general issue at the ■last December term of the County Court, Chief Justice Skinner, presiding. The plaintiff and another person, since deceased, being joint creditors of Richard Merriam, retained the defendants, then attornies in partnership, to collect their debt.

This was an action of ejectment brought to recover the seizen and possession of a lot of land in Essex.

This was an action of trespass for breaking and entering the defendant’s house, taking away his goods, &c. At the trialbefore the County Court, the defendants severallypleaded the general issue with notice, and offered in evidence, by way of justification, a warrant signed by a justice of the peace, directed to the defendant Hazel-tine as the collector of the JVorth Centre District in Essex, for the collection of a certain tax specified in the rate-bill accompanying and…

This was a petition for a new trial in an action defaulted in the County Court at their March Term, 1826. Said petition was brought directly to this court pursuant to the provisions of a late Statute of this state.

<p>That an administrator cannot avoid the deed of his intestate by showing the same to have been made to defraud the creditors of the intestate, though there be no other fund from which their debts can be paid*</p>

<p>That an action on book account will not lie where there is á contract of sale but not completed by actual delivery.</p>

This was an action of ejectment for a tract of land in Swanton, described as lot No. 147. The defendants pleaded the general issue, which was joined. There was a trial by jury in the County Court at the last April Term; when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, under the direction of the court, with a view to save all the questions of law raised on trial, and let the same pass to the Supreme Court for a revision.

This action was tried in the County Court, and was decided for defendant, and a bill of exceptions allowed and a case agreed upon, on which a hearing has been had this term. The exceptions and case agreed upon were as follows: “This was an actiop brought against defendant as endorsor of a note executed by William JV. Ryan, 8s made payable to Eli JV.

The case presented to the court contained a long schedule of items of the bill of cost claimed by the plaintiff.

This was an action of book account, and came before the court On the report of auditors made to die County Court at their September term, 1827, and exceptions to that report.

The writ in tins case issued in common form, declaring upon a note of $291,19, signed by both of the defendants. The service was made by attaching the goods of the defendants, io Cambridge, where Runnels lived; Hunt then living in Fairfax, in the same county.

This was an action of ejectment for land in Grand-Isle, in said county; the only description of which, in the original declaration, Was “ thirty-six acres of the south east corner of the first division “lot drawn to the right of John Wood.11 At a former term of this court, in which a new trial was-granted in said cause, the plaintiff made the following motion to amend his declaration, to wit; “ Supreme Court, Grand-Isle County, January Term,1827. “ And now the plaintiff…

The plaintiff, Lampson, brought his action of trespass against the defendant, Fletcher, before a justice of the peace, and declared against him as follows to wit: “ In a plea of trespass, for that the “ defendant, heretofore, to wit, on the first day of September, 1823, “ with force and arms, at South Hero, aforesaid, took, seized, and “ carried away, a certain two-horse-waggon the property of the “ plaintiff, of the value of sixty dollars ; and other wrongs and injuries…

This was an appeal taken from the decree of the Court of Probate, relative to the accounts existing between the two estates. The accounts had been sent to an auditor who made a detailed report to this court, to which exceptions were taken.

■ The questions decided in this case appear in the following bilí of exceptions allowed at the County Court,, to wit: • “ This is an; “ action of ejectment to recover the seizin and possession of ten “ acres of land in the township of Addison, and described as part “ of lot No. 24 in the second division of the 8000-acre-tract, so cal- “ led.

<p>Evidence is admissible to show that a subscription is unfairly, or fraudulently obtained, the same as in the case of any other contract.</p> <p>A discharge, without payment, from an agent clothed with full powers to settle as he shall deem for the interest of the plaintiff, is binding upon the plaintiff.</p> <p>Fictitious subscriptions obtained for the purpose of affecting other subscribers, renders void those that come afterwards ; and owing to the particular character and object of this subscription, renders the whole uncollectable.</p>

<p>That the plaintiffs might accept a subscription paper payable to them when of* fered, and affirm the agency which was at first voluntary.</p> <p>That defendant should be admitted to prove tha.t the plaintiffs, by their own act, reduced the amount of subscriptions below twenty thousand dollars; that be» ing the minimum to attach liability.</p> <p>That such a reduction of this particular subscription, though not below twenty ty thousand dollars, absolves those subscribers, who gave not consent to such reduction.</p> <p>So does their agreeing to take their pay in land.</p> <p>That the giving of notes and receiving a discharge, affords no presumption either way, between a compromise and subscription, unless defendant knew the full groundsof his defence at the time.</p> <p>the giving of a note does not preclude defendant from defending by proving ■such facts as were supposed to exist \Yheri he settled, but of which he knew no evidence whatever.</p>

<p>That a prior demand of payment need not bo averred in a suit upon a constable’s or collector’s official bond, nor that a proceeding has been had to procure an extent against the collector himself, the suit upon the bond being a cumulative remedy.</p> <p>That, in assigning a breach of such bond, the various circumstances of the tax, the time of payment, and to whom, &c. must be aveied.</p> <p>That such abond,sofar as relates to a state-tax,is a bond of indemnity to the town; and, in their suit, they must malee an averment of the state-tax.</p>

<p>This was an action of Assumpsit on a promissory note, dated Nov. 25, 1819. It bad been tried by the County Court on the general issue, and a verdict found by the jury for the plaintiff; and the case now came before the court upon exceptions taken by the defendant on the trial. The bill of exceptions, stated, that “To prove the execution- of the note, the counsel for the plaintiff offered evidence that the payee, by the direction of the payor, signed the payor’s name to the note; to the admission of which the counsel for the defendant objected. The objection was overruled by the court, nnd the evidence was admitted ; in-, asmuchasit appeared that when the note was given, it was fo'r the benefit of the plaintiff’s sister, and that the plaintiff, had no' interest in it, unless as trustee or agent for her; the defendant-declining to give the note directly to her. The defendant’s counsel then read in evidence a receipt in full for the amount of, said note and all other demands, executed by the plaintiff to .the defendant. The plaintiff’s counsel then offered testimony tending to shew, that, at the time the note was executed, the plaintiff, Luther Haven, had no interest in it, but that said note was made after a suit had been instituted by the plaintiff’s sister against the defendant, charging the defendant with being the father of a bastard child of her’s, then about eight months old, and was given to the plaintiff by the consent of his sister, and at the request of the defendant, who said it might be kept in her possession, and paid to her; and in consideration of a discharge,at that time given to the defendants,from his liability, as the father of said child, signed by the plaintiff and his sister; and that after the defendant had left the house, plaintiff’s sister took the note, and had remained in possession of it till the commencement of this suit: to the admission ofwhich testimony,the counselforthe defendantobjected. The objection was overruled by the court, and the evidence admitted.</p> <p>The defendant requested the court to charge the jury, that the fact that the note was made payable to the plaintiff in the suit, as aforesaid, was evidence of a sufficient authority in him to receive payment of it, at least, unless his authority wasafterwards counter'-, inanded by the person in interest; and further, that there was no ¿gal consideration for the note. Bw the court refused', and charged, the jury,, “That if they believed from the testimony the défendant was; “ the father of the child, or' that he had seduced the sister of the “.plaintiff — that thés'efacts would'be sufficient to constitute á good- “ consideration for the noté — That the náme of the defendant “ being, placed to the note by his direction, although in fact. “ done by the payee, was á sufficient execution of the note to> “ bind thé defendant — -That if they believed from the evidence “ thé défénd'ant ltnéw that' the noté was in possession of the sister “ of the plaintiff when the discharge was- received' by him from “ thé plaintiff, the discharge would be void, arid would not avail “ the defendant.”</p> <p>Thé causé now ¿amé before thé court on a motion for a new - trial founded'on the said exception^ to- thé decisions’arid charge of the County Court.</p> <p>The counsel fór Ihe defendants contended, 1. That the County Court erred on the trial in admitting the evidence offeréd as to the-execution of the nóte; a bystander, or third person, might subscribe the maker’s name ; but the payee cannot Be- made the agent of thé maker for that purpose.</p> <p>2. The court erred' also in admitting the evidence offered to Counteract the receipt. By the common law, the plaintiff on record’ was formerly taken to be in all cases, the real party in interest,, arid a discharge or release from him was- always adjudged a good bar to the suit. In módérn times, the courts of law have, in some.' instances, interfered to protect the equitable interest of third persons, not parties- of reeord. But it isbeliéved that this has been d'ohe only in cases of assignment, and when the interest in the; contract has been transferred by some event accruing after its-execution.- — 7 T. R. 663, Bauerman vs. Radtnius: — -11 JEa'st, 5S3, Rex. vs. Indi, of Hardwiclc. — 7 T. R. 670, Craib et‘ u«¡. vs. TPAetli. — 3 Conn. R. 76, Bulkleij'VS. Landon.</p> <p>In' cases of written contracts, courts of law have always considered the party named in the writing as the only person originally entitled to prosécuté'it; and if any other person is ever ,re-cognizedris' having that right, it never has: been by force of the c&iginal cóntract.. lii this; case,, no facts appear which tend: to shew any change in the relative situation of the parties; but their respective rights and duties were the same at the time of the execution of the receipt» as at the time the note itself was made. If, then, the receipt be not effectual, tire plaintiff, Haven, the payee of the note, had neve? any legal interest in it, and could never have discharged it» But Was not Haven, when the note Was executed, the person legally in interest ? and what is there in the facts in this case to show that he had then no control over it ? It is not correct to say, with respect to this point, that he was the agent of his sister; for the note was taken directly to himself, and with her knowledge and assent. But if he may be viewed in this light, his authority cer-*' tainly continued until the payment was made, as there is no evidence of its being revoked. He is to be regarded 1‘ather as a-trustee for her, and with this trust this court have no concern t-the trustee has the legal interest, and could, of course, discharge the debt. The fact stated in the case, that the defendant remarked that the note might remain in the possession of tire sister,- &e.does notvary the case. It does not amount to a contract-fo‘pay her, nor does it add any thing to the written contract.- But after all, the evidence offered by the plaintiff to counteract- die receipt was wholly inadmissible, upon the ground that it was' a: direct attempt to vary the written contract, and to show by verba! evidence that a note, payable on the face of it to Luther Haven, was' not payable to him, but to some one else. This we consider wholly unauthorized by law, and it ought to be remarked, that in this view of the case, the question is to be regarded, not so much as relating to the effect of facts duly proved, as to the mode in which the facts are to be established.</p> <p>The court erred in their charge to die jury, not only in the points before suggested, but also with respect to the consideration of the note. The consideration of the note is expressed in the case to be a discharge from the woman of the defendant’s liability as father of the child. This consideration we consider void, because, neither the woman, nor the town authority, are authorized to take any security in such case, except in the mode pointed out by the statute. The discharge of the woman was no bar to a prosecution by the town. No act of her’s would defeat the town of their remedy, short of a prosecution accompanied by an order of court. — 5 Esp. E. IAS, Wilde vs. Griffin. — 6 East.Rep. 110, Cole ei al. vs. Gower etdl. — 1 Brod. and Bing. 1, Watkins vs. Hewlett. — 1 Camp. .396, Townson vs. Wilson,</p> <p>Mr. Bates, for the plaintiff. 1. As to the discharge, the principle that the payor, knowing to whom the debt is equitably due, cannot receive a discharge from tire nominal payee or plaintiff, has been frequently and recently settled in this state. The fact of executing the note to Haven could not, as has been contended by the plaintiff’s counsel, be construed into an authority to him to receive the money, because it was understood by the parties, and observed by Hobbs, at the time, that he was not to receive it, but it was to be left with the sister and paid to her. Nor has it been deemed necessary, in any of the cases, for the equitable owner to prove that he countermanded an authority to receive the money, which might be supposed to attach itself to the nominal payee.— It has always been deemed sufficient that the payor had a knowledge that he was receiving a discharge in fraud of the real owner of the debt.</p> <p>2. As to the question whether the payee can be made the agent of the payor to execute the note, it may in this case be first remarked that Haven, though the nominal payee, had never any more interest in it than a stranger, and might therefore with as much propriety be made the agent as any other person. Secondly, though by the statute 3 and 4 Anne, notes made and signed by certain persons therein described have a certain effect as to consideration, negotiability, &c. given them by that statute, yet when we are enquiring here who may be an agent to sign a note, we must look to the common law, and there we find there is no restriction whatever. A man may constitute whom he pleases his. agent.— Chittyon Bills, 27. — And the proper manner of executing a writing is for the agent to sign the name of the principal.— Id. 31. — 2 East, 143, Wilkes vs. Buck — (Lauren’s opinion.) It would seem to be an almost self evident proposition, that what a man may do with his own hand, he may do by any other instrument. And the general rule of law being settled and admitted, that whatever a mancan'do by himself he can do by his agent, if the present case forms an exception, it is incumbent on the defendant to shew some precedent to that effect.</p>

This was an action of ejectment, brought to recover the seizen and possession of apiece of land lymgmPittsford, in said county. It was fried in the County Court, at April Term, 1827, on the general issue, Skinned,, Ch. Justice, presiding.

This was an action of assumpsit, and was tried in the County Court at the April term, 1827, on the general issue.

This was an action of debt brought upon a prison bond, given by the defendant to procure the liberties oí the prison for Dimiclc, when confined on are execution in favor of the plaintiff.

This was an action of assumpsit, for the recovery of ascertain sum specified in the plaintiffs’ declaration, to which the defendant pleaded the general issue. The cause was tried in' the County Court at the August Term, 1827, Ch. Justice SkxNNeb,, presiding.

The defendants in error brought their action before the County Court upon a bond of indemnity,in the penal surii of four hundred dollars, spreading the whole bond and condition upon the record,- and assigned two breaches, and special pleadings were presented which closed in demurrers •, and the plaintiffs recovered; and the defendants brought this writ, of error to reverse that judgment. In millo cst en-atum,pleaded.

This was n:i nofion-oí scire facias against the defendant who had become bail for one Leonard Brown, by|endorsing his name onjthe back of an original writ in favor of the plaintiff against the said ' Brown, agreeably to the 28 th and 29th sections of the Judiciary act (page 66 of Rev. Laws.) The declaration stated, that the writ of attachment against Brown was sued out oh the 15th day of October, 1825, and made returnable to a justice of the peace, on the 25th of the same…

<p>That the statute must be strictly complied with in the service of a warning-out process ¡ all being a statute regulation.</p>

In -this action -the plaintiffs obtained a verdict in the County Court, and the exceptions taken by the defendant and allowed by the judges who tried the cause, present the questions raised before the Supreme Court. Those exceptions a-re as follow : “Holbrook and Fessenden vs. Ryssel Hyde, tried at Windham County Court, ■September Term, 1827.

This was an action of ejectment for a tract of land in Brat-ileboro’, tided upon the general issue in the County Court, where the following exceptions were allowed, which exhibit the questions raised before the court. “ Windham County Court, September Term, 1827. , “In this case it was admitted by the parties, that Jonathan Burt, •previous to the 9th day of August, one thousand eight hundred -and nineteen, was seized in fee simple of the land described in the…

This was an action of ejectment for lands in IlarÜancl, in which' a new trial'was granted á yé'ar'ago. Sitcb trial was had, .ancl a,, verdict returned for the plaintiff; and the cause came up to tips court upon'a new bill of exceptions,insoms degree variant from the former one which has been reported : but the allusions to the facts, and charge of the court, are sufficiently intelligible without a full copy of the case. Everett and Cushman for the defendant.

This was an action of Assumpsit, in which the plaintiff declared against the defendant, for that the defendant at --on the 1st day of… Held: &c. speaking of notes payable to order only, enacts, that all notes for the payment of any sum of money, mentioned in such .notes, to any person or his order, or unto bearer, shall be construed to be, by virtue there-, of, due, and payable to whom the same is made payable. ■ That, the person, to whom such sum of money is,or shall be…

This was an indictment against the respondent, upon which he was tried and convicted in the County Court. After which a motion in arrest was filed, and overruled in that court. And that decision was brought up for a revision in this Court.

This was an action of Ejectment for lands in Albany, which had been tried at the Supreme Court, and exceptions taken to several decisions, which fully appear in the following case allowed by the Judge who tried the cause. “ Ejectment for a parcel of land with the appurtenances, lying and being in Albany, in said county, described as follows : being lot number fifty four, drawn to the right of Isaac White, original proprietor; plea the general issue.

This was an action of Trespass on the case, brought on tbe statute to recover the amount of damages occasioned to the plaintiff by the insufficiency and want of repair of a certain public bridge in Morrisiovm. It was tried in the County Court, October term, 1827, on the general issue, Royce J. presiding.

This was an action of ejectment for lot number twenty one, in Albany, and was tried in the County Court October term, 1827¿' on the general issue, Royce J. presiding.

The following dissenting opinion of Hutchinson, J. ought to have been inserted at the end of the case in which it was pronounced. See 2 Jlihrni Rep. 349, Barnet Gailer vs. Ralph Grinnell.

This was hn action of Assumpsit on promisory note for $270, dated January 19, 1825. At the trial in the County Court, at November adjourned term, 1826, it appeared that the plaintiff, at the time the note was executed, was guardian tootie Daniel Hurlburt, under the 47th Chap. 4th sec. JV. Comp..

Each of those was an action of Trespass iyuare'clausum fregit, for cutting timber on lot No. 167, in Essex. Held: that both the landlord and tenant might have trespass quare, 8ic. against a stranger, for cutting trees, subverting the soil, or demolishing houses, is not support* ed, it is believed, by principle or authority; It expressly says, that the lessor is entitled to his action, because these acts of trespass work a permanent injury to the…

This was an action bf Assumpsit,brought to receiver the expen* 6itures of the plaintiffs in support of one Salmon Davis, under the eleventh section of the settlement act. Two questions wereprin* cipally agitated on trial, 1st. Whether Calais was the place of Davis' last legal settlement ?■ and 2dly.

This was an action of Assumpsit,decided in the County Court for the defendant,upon a statement of facts agreed to by the parties; exceptions were taken to the decisions, and the cause was brought up to this court for a revision of those decisions.

This was an action brought upon a note of $2000, dated Nov. 9th, 1826, and payable in 64 days from the date, and discounted at the Bank the 16th of the same month. There was a jury trial in the County Court, and the defence set up was usury; and the plaintiffs obtained a verdict for the sum due upon the note.

This was an action on the case for the escape of one Silas Hathaway, who had been committed to jail on an execution in favor of the plaintiff.

This was an action .on note, dated March 2,183 9, for $114,49, oil which several payments had been made and endorsed on the note. It was tried in the County Court, April Term, 1827, on th& general issue.

<p>In an action against the sheriff for an escape, the plaintiff will not be permitted to show that the act for which the prisoner had been sued was willful and malicious, or that, before he escaped, his friends had offered to pay the plaintiff a part of the debt, on condition he would discharge the prisoner.</p>

This case came before the court on the following statement of facts, agreed to by the parties: “ This was an action of assump- • sit on a promissory note in the words and figures following, to wit, '“$600 Vergennes, August 8, 1826. “ Sixty four days from date we jointly and severally promise to ’ “ pay the President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of St. “ Albans, six hundred dollars-for válué received. “ Scott & Raymond, “ Theodore Clark & Co., ' “ Jacob MLane, ' “…

<p>That a Bank note is not void, as usurious, by reason of their taking interest for ■ 64 days at the rate of 360 days to a year,that being a general custom at Banks; but the excess must be deducted.</p>

This was an Audita Querela, in which ffleeks Aldis and Davis in support ojHhe demurerf The action of Laiorence against the Beemanss was an action on the case for an escape on two executions, both dated October 10,1825. One for $¡1101,25. Sheriff’s fees for commitment, - 14,06. The other for - 1150,14. Committing fees, - 14,60.

The object of the original bill of complaint of the orator, Jon-r aihan Ferris,-was to-enjoin certain suits pending, in favor of said Burton against the said Jonathan Ferris; and.to compel an offset .of said demands, sued by said Burton, against certain demands of these orators.

' This was an action on book account, in which the defendant gave judgment to account in the County Court, and an auditor was appointed to take the accounts of the parties. Held: that the mortgagee could recover of the mortgagor for the use and occupation of the mortgaged property.. —1 Doug. 21, Keech vs. Hall. — 15 Mass. 268. — 1 Pick. R. 87. Wilder vs. Houghton. — 2 Con. R. 600, Barkhamstead vs. Far-mington. — Doug. R. 631, Rex vs. Michael. — 11 John. R. 593.

The plaintiffs, by a regular order and warrantof removal, removed a pauper, by the name of Wheeler, from said Georgia to said Grand-Isle, as the place of his legal settlement.

This was an action of replevin for one hrindle steer, and one red steer, distrained and impounded at a place in St. Albans, called the Sumner farm-, to which the defendant avowed, justifying the taking and impounding the steers damage feasanton said farm, he being seized and possessed of the same as tenant under David Stevens, Jr. the owner in fee.

This was an action of Assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff as as-signee of a note signed by the defendants, and payable to one Samuel Foster, or bearer, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff. Said note bears date Nov. 30th, 1824, and was made payable on the first day of January following, withinterest, for the sum of one hundred and forty three dollars. The action was brought to the County Court, March term, 1825.

This was an action of trespass' brought before a. Justice of the Peace; demanding daffirigesten dollars. The'declaratión contained three counts'. The two fii*st: were for cutting and carrying away certain pine trees ; the third arid the last-count was for taking and carrying away five pine' saw-mill logs, the property of, and in the possession of, the plaintiffs.

Tgis . was an action brought before a justice of the peace, upon a note of less than one hundred dollars. The defendant appeared, and pleaded to the jurisdiction of the justice, that he was a Deputy Collector of the United States, under the authority of Congress. . This plea was overruled by the justice ; and the defendant answered over, pleading to the jury, and obtained a verdict. The plaintiff appealed to the County Court.

This was an audita querela brought to the County Court. The defendant was found guilty by the jury, and filed his motion jn arrest. The same was overruled by the .County Court: and on motion of the defendant, the cause was removed to this court for the revision of that decision. The compláint recites, that thesaid Hubbell sued the said Dodge in trespass before a justice; thatDodg-g was arrested by the officer upon the writ, and was committed to prison for want of bail.