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1 Wend. 466

Aikin v. Buck

New York Supreme Court

Decided October 15, 1828

New York Supreme Court · decided 1828-10-15

This was an action of trespass, for taking and carrying away a quantity of saw logs. The plaintiffs proved, that in the fall of 1825, or winter of 1826, they purchased a quantity of saw logs, which were received by their agent, marked as their property, and left on the bank of the river Au’Sable. The logs were principally cut on the north end of lot No. 210, in Maule’s patent, to 30 acres of which, the vendor of the logs claimed a possessory right.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1828-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently May 1941

1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions — followed in 10 states

501828183018401850186018701880189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1By the Court,

Sutherland, J.

¶2The plaintiffs shewed a sufficient possession of the property, to enable them to maintain the action. The logs were actually received and marked by the agent of the plaintiffs, and left upon the bank of the river Au’Sable, upon land belonging to, or claimed by the Peru Iron Company. The plaintiffs had such a right to the logs, prima facie, as to be entitled to take them into their actual *469possession, whenever, they pleased ; and this is sufficient to maintain the action. (8 Johns. R. 432. 13 Johns. R. 141, 561.)

¶3The "defendant entirely failed in his defence. The logs were cut on the north end of lot 210, in Maule’s patent, and the defendant proved a possession of a dwelling house, and the working of an ore bed on the south end of the lot, by himself and the Peru Iron Company, and contends that that gave him or the company, constructively, the possession of the whole lot. In this he was mistaken. He showed no deed for the lot; his. possession, therefore, was confined to the land actually occupied by him, or the company, and cannot be extended by construction to a single acre beyond it. The deed from the sheriff of Clinton county, to Daniel Cady, and to the defendant, for lot No. 210, were properly excluded by the judge. The one bore date in July, 1827, and the other in April, 1826. The logs were purchased by the plaintiff’s agent in the fall of 1825, or the winter of 1826 ; and having been removed from the lot, the subsequent sale of it would not entitle the purchaser to follow and reclaim them. Besides, as to the deed to Cady, it was inadmissible, because, in trespass de bonis asportatis, the defendant cannot shew property in a stranger, though it is otherwise in trover. (11 Johns. R. 132, 529. 13 Johns. R. 284.)

¶4The deeds were also inadmissible, on the ground that the judgments and executions under which they purported to be given, were not proved or given in evidence in any manner. The sum which the judge directed the jury to find, had undoubtedly been proved to be the value of the logs taken.

¶5The motion for a new trial must therefore be denied.

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