Volume 10 — Appeals, District of Columbia

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant on a bill of exceptions in an action on a promissory note. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the complainants from a decree fixing the rights of the respective parties in a suit in equity to quiet title to certain land. The facts are sufficiently stated in the-opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from an order in an action of replevin by the defendant overruling a motion after a jury of inquest and judgment for damages or return of goods replevied.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>On February 21, 1891, one James H. Gulick, as executor of the last will and testament of Emmeline M. Guliek, instituted a suit in replevin at common law against the appellant, Edward Corbett, as defendant, to recover from him certain specific chattels or personal property alleged to be of the value of $500. As required by the statute, the plaintiff in the suit filed with his declaration an undertaking with the appellee, William G. Pond, as surety, in which the two undertook, “for themselves and each of them, their and each of their heirs, executors and administrators, to abide by and perform the judgment of the court in the premises, which judgment may be rendered against all the parties whose names are hereto affixed.” And both Guliek and Pond affixed their names to the undertaking. Upon the filing of this declaration and undertaking, the writ of replevin was issued and served by the marshal; and the property was seized and delivered by the marshal to the plaintiff in accordance with a schedule filed in the cause.</p> <p>Subsequently, the defendant pleaded the usual plea of “not guilty,” and there was joinder of issue by the plaintiff upon his plea. But before the issue thus made up was tried the plaintiff died, and the attorney for the defendant, on December 31,1892,suggested his death upon the record. No further action seems to have been had in the cause until October 12, 1895, when the attorney who had filed the suit for the plaintiff came into court, without notice, it is said, to the defendant or-his attorney, and moved that the suit should stand abated, as the same had not been revived; and thereupon an order was entered to the effect that, inasmuch as it appeared to the court that the death of the plaintiff had been suggested on December 31,1892, and there had been no appearance or proceeding ■ by either party since that time, the suit should stand abated and the defendant should go thereof without day.</p> <p>Subsequently, on April 3, 1896, the defendant came into court and moved for a jury of inquest to assess the damages sustained- by him, and for judgment in his favor that the goods taken from his possession under the writ be returned to him with damages, or, upon failure of such return, the defendant should recover against Pond, the surviving surety, the damages sustained to be assessed by the jury of inquest. Upon argument of this motion before the court, it was overruled and denied. And from the order overruling it the present appeal has been prosecuted.</p> <p>It should be added, as was admitted in open court in the argument before us, that the plaintiff in the cause had received his letters testamentary from the courts of the State of Pennsylvania, and not from those of the District of Columbia; that he sued as a foreign executor or administrator by virtue of the statute allowing such suits; that, upon his death, letters of administration, de bonis non, cum testamento annezo, were issued by the same courts of Pennsylvania; that the administrator thus appointed declined to appear in this cause; and that it was considered by the defendant or his attorney that there was no way provided by law whereby his appearance could be enforced. And it was suggested by counsel for the appellee that the only course open to the defendant, the appellant here, was to institute proceedings of some kind in the courts of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment on verdict in an action of ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on appeals by several defendants from a decree construing a will and codicil.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on a verdict directed by the trial court in an action to recover damages. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment on verdict in an action to recover damages for death by alleged wrongful act.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is a suit brought under the act of Congress of February 17, 1885, for the recovery of damages for death alleged to have resulted from the wrongful act or negligence of the appellant, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, or its agents.</p> <p>On March 1, 1893, which was only a few days previous to the last presidential inauguration, there were horse races in progress at Ivy City, so-called, a short distance to the northeast, of the northern boundary line of the city of Washington, and adjoining the track of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company extending from the city of Washington to the city of Baltimore. Edwin H. Blackman, the intestate of the appellee, a young man a little over twenty-one years of age at the time, and a companion, another young man of about the same age, one McDonald, attended the races on the afternoon of the day mentioned. About five o’clock in the afternoon they left the race ground, entered a cab driven by one George Dent, and directed him toi drive them to Willard’s Hotel, in Washington. At the same time one Johnson got on the box outside with the driver, for the purpose of being brought into the city. The cab at the time seems to have been standing on the northwest side of the railroad track, on a road known as the Mount Olivet road, which crosses the track almost at right angles. The railroad, it may be remarked, skirts the race ground on the southeast-side; and it seems to have been deemed convenient to cross the tracks from the northwest to the southeast in order to reach a convenient road leading into the city of Washington.</p> <p>The driver Dent proceeded towards the railroad track ; but when he had come quite close to it, he descended again from his box, and proceeded to adjust the door of his carriage, or in some way to close his carriage so as to exclude the cold, of which he says the occupants complained. Mounting again to his place on the box, he proceeded to drive across the track, without stopping to see or hear whether any train was coming, without taking any precautions whatever such as the most ordinary prudence would have dictated under the circumstances, and so far disregarding the warning of a boy who was standing near and who tried in vain to stop his carriage as to make a vicious stroke at him with his whip. His carriage w'as right on the track when an express train, one of the usual express trains moving on schedule time, came from the direction of Baltimore, and struck and wrecked the carriage. The driver Dent seems to have escaped without serious injury, as did also his companion on the box, Johnson, who leaped in time to save himself. Of the two occupants of the inside, McDonald escaped with comparatively slight bruises, but the injury to Blackman was serious, and, as it is testified, resulted in his death in the following month of April. The train was stopped; he was taken into one of the cars, and upon the arrival of the train in the city was removed to one of the hospitals, whence, after the lapse of five days, he was taken to the house of his mother, the appellee in this cause.</p> <p>Thus far there seems to be no controversy in regard to the facts of this case. But there is controversy as to the course and conduct of the two occupants of the carriage, the deceased and his companion. There is testimony tending strongly to show that it was at their instance and in pursuance of their commands that the , driver of the carriage so recklessly drove upon the railroad track; but this is controverted by witnesses for the plaintiff. There would seem to be little doubt, at all events, notwithstanding the denial of McDonald, that the young men had been drinking immoderately during the day, and that immediately preceding the accident, and at the time thereof, they were so far under the influence of liquor as to have become reckless.</p> <p>There is also controversy in the testimony in regard to the alleged negligence of the officers or agents of the railroad company in failing to give due notice of the coming of the train by the ringing of the bells or the sounding of the whistle of the engine in proper time before the train reached the crossing. But this contention was settled on behalf of the appellant, the defendant below, by a special verdict by the jury upon that point; and therefore, it requires no consideration by us, even if it were not otherwise a matter to be relegated to the jury. But the jury, it seemsj specially based its verdict on the failure of the railroad company to keep a flagman or to maintain gates at the crossing in question, neither of which it is conceded that the company did.</p> <p>At the conclusion of the testimony, the counsel for the defendant requested a peremptory instruction to the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. Upon the refusal of the court so to do, is based the appellant’s first assignment of error. A second assignment is based upon the alleged error of the trial court in submitting to the jury to determine, as a question of fact, whether it was not negligence on the part of the railroad company not to maintain gates or a flagman at the crossing in question.</p>

<p>Hearing- on appeals from decrees dismissing bills in equity to enjoin the enforcement.of certain police regulations; and from judgments dismissing writs of habeas corpus and remanding the petitioners therefor to custody.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>The same question, though presented in different ways, is involved in all the foregoing appeals, and they have, by agreement, been heard and considered together.</p> <p>The question raised on behalf of the railway companies in each case is the validity of the following sections of the regulations adopted and ordered to be enforced by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia:</p> <p>“Section 17. No locomotive, or train, with or without a locomotive attached, shall pass over any street railroad crossing, where the cars of a street railroad are propelled by cable or electric power, without coming to a full stop at a point not nearer than forty feet of the nearest rail of such crossing, and shall not pass over such crossing except in obedience to signal given by the gateman employed by the corporation owning the tracks over which such locomotive or train is to pass, and such signal shall not be given until the crossing gates are closed in such a manner as to effectually prevent access to said tracks from the highway.</p> <p>“Section 18. The safety gates at every railroad crossing shall be closed during the passing of any trains, locomotives or cars, and shall be opened immediately after the passage of the same.</p> <p>“ Section 19. No train, locomotive or car shall be allowed to stop or stand on any street crossing for a longer period than two minutes at any one time.”</p> <p>Another section provides a fine for the violation of each of the foregoing sections, by any agent, employee, and so forth, of any railway company.</p> <p>Francis T. Bowler, appellant in No. 597, and George R. Kindle, appellant in No. 600, were engineers of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, respectively, and were arrested for, and tried and convicted in the Police Court, of violations of section 17 aforesaid. Refusing to pay the fines of five dollars each, they were duly committed to the District workhouse, of which the appellee, Walter H. Stoutenburgh, is intendant, for the period of fifteen days. Writs of habeas corpus were at once sued out in the Supreme Court of the District; but in each case the writ was dismissed and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the intendant aforesaid.</p> <p>Each of the railroad companies had previously filed a separate bill in equity against the Commissioners to restrain the enforcement of said regulations. Restraining orders were granted, and the Commissioners were ordered to show cause why an injunction should not be granted. The Commissioners answered under oath, and the cases were, by stipulation, “ set down for hearing upon the bills, answers, exhibits and accompanying affidavits.” The bills were, upon this hearing, dismissed, and the appeals taken thereon are those numbered 596 and 598 above.</p> <p>The habeas corpus records contain no statements of facts; but it has been agreed on all sides that for their determination also we shall look to the records of the other cases.</p> <p>It appears from the allegations of the bills that an immense number of passenger and freight trains traverse the streets of Washington daily on each railroad, carrying many passengers, and much mail, express and freight to and fro, in course of transportation from State to State.</p> <p>Each railroad is operated under charters from the State of Maryland, and in accordance with acts of Congress. These acts, respecting each company, contain a clause, upon which the appellants rely in part, reserving to Congress the right “to enact such rules and regulations prescribing the speed of cars or carriages passing over said road and other matters relating thereto necessary for the security of the persons and property of the inhabitants of the District of •Columbia in such manner as the present or any future Congress shall deem expedient.”</p> <p>The Baltimore and Ohio tracks are crossed by one cable railway and the Baltimore and Potomac tracks by. one cable and one electric railway, within the limits of Washington and near their respective stations. The said cable and electric railways were constructed since the said steam railways occupied the streets under the power granted them by Congress.</p> <p>The bills allege that each railway crossing is supplied with safety gates, electric alarm bells and gate keepers, and that every reasonable precaution has been taken to insure safety.</p> <p>Appellants first charge that the District Commissioners have no power to enact any such regulations at all. They further say that the said regulations are unreasonable and oppressive, because they will cause ruinous delays in the transportation of passengers, mails and interstate commerce;, that by reason of heavy grades, curves, and so forth, at and near crossings, the ordinary trains cannot be stopped and started in the time required, and hence by reason of the trains lying across more than one street at a time, they will be subjected to penalties for obstructing crossings as provided in section 19 aforesaid. They say that all the dangers that are supposed to be avoided by the regulations are fully guarded against by the gates, watchmen, and alarm bells already provided and maintained. They also charge defendants with the intent to use physical force to stop said trains, as well as to institute constant criminal prosecutions against the employees of complainants, all of which, they say, will lead to much unnecessary, vexatious and expensive litigation.</p> <p>Affidavits accompany the bills showing the condition of the tracks, crossings, and so forth.</p> <p>The following affidavit on behalf of the Baltimore and Potomac Company fairly presents the' condition attending its operation in the city:</p> <p>“ Francis P. Holmes, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says as follows: That he is in the employ of the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, in the capacity of train dispatcher, and has been in such employ for about five years; that he has personal knowledge of the extent and character of the freight and passenger traffic of said railroad, and is familiar with the movement and management of its trains in the District.of Columbia; that about thirty trains daily now leave the passenger depot of said railroad company at the corner of Sixth and B streets northwest, and pass up Sixth street to Virginia avenue, and along said avenue and various streets to the east on their way north; and about an equal number of passenger trains leave said depot going south on Maryland avenue, to and over the Long Bridge, into Virginia; that about the same number of trains daily enter said station from the north and south over the same route as depart therefrom; and in addition to the regular-passenger trains daily entering and departing from said station there are a large number of through trains for points in the west and south which are made up in Jersey City, New Jersey, which pass through the city of Washington by way of and over Virginia and Maryland-avenues and said crossings at Four-and-a-half and Seventh street, and thence over the Long Bridge'into Virginia; that in addition to the passenger trains aforesaid from ten to fourteen regular freight trains (exclusive of passenger and freight shifting engines), containing from twenty-five to -thirty loaded cars, daily pass along the streets between the Long Bridge and Eastern branch of the Potomac; that said freight trains coming from the south, on their way to various points in the north, pass from the Long Bridge down Maryland avenue to its junction with Virginia avenue, thence along Virginia avenue to Canal street, and to and over the trestle bridge crossing the Eastern branch of the Potomac; that heavy freight trains of loaded cars also daily pass over the said route on their way south; that in addition to the freight and passenger trains of the plaintiff the trains of the Southern Railroad Company, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, the Washington and Southern Railroad Company, for various points in the south and west, daily pass over the plaintiff’s lines of railroad between its passenger station aforesaid and the Long Bridge; that if these various trains are compelled to stop before crossing Four-and-a-half and Seventh streets it will seriously interfere with and interrupt the business of the plaintiff and obstruct travel upon the streets east and west of said Four-and-a-half and Seventh streets from three to five minutes at a time, according to the condition of the weather and the length and character of the train; that if trains going south are compelled to stop on Maryland avenue before crossing Seventh street they will ‘ stall,’ owing to the heavy grade at that point, and cause an additional delay of from five to eight minutes in order to get them started.”</p> <p>An affidavit substantially similar in respect of the number . and length of trains and difficulties of stopping, and so forth, was filed on behalf of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and in addition a curve in the tracks near their intersection with the Columbia cable railway was described as greatly increasing the difficulties of stopping and starting ordinary trains.</p> <p>The answers of the Commissioners under oath alleged, among other things justifying the regulations, that the very great number of the steam railway trains crossing streets at grade at all times of the day and night greatly increased the dangers to life and property of citizens who cross the said track in great numbers at all hours of the day; that the electric and cable lines cross the complainants’ tracks at intervals of about three minutes, carrying great numbers of passengers; that “ in the last few years by the use of cable and electric power instead of horse cars in the transportation of passengers in the city of Washington difficulties and dangers have arisen, growing out of the intersection of such lines with each other and with the lines of steam railways, which, in the opinion of these defendants, were not sufficiently guarded against by previous regulations. So far as these difficulties and dangers growing out of the intersection of such cable and electric lines with each other these defendants have undertaken to provide against them by a regulation adopted on the twenty-sixth day of October, 1895, a copy of which is hereto appended, marked ‘ Exhibit B,’ and made part hereof.</p> <p>“Afterward, in various ways, the dangers to life and property arising from the intersection of such cable and electric lines with the lines of steam railways within the city of Washington were brought to the attention of the defendants. They investigated the matter with great care and reached the conclusion that the safety gates and gatemen referred to in the bill of complaint in this case are not sufficient safeguard for such crossings. These defendants, upon information and belief, aver that both upon such cable lines and upon such electric lines there are a variety of circumstances under which a car propelled by cable or electric power, as the case may be, may at any point in its course be brought to a stop suddenly, unexpectedly, and under such circumstances that if such stoppage should occur while the car is crossing the line of a steam railway it would be impossible for those in charge of such car in any way to get it out of the way of an approaching train.</p> <p>“ That no freight or other train should be drawn which stretches from one square to another square; that it is a nuisance for trains to be made up of thirty to forty cars, extending from a quarter to a third of a mile in length, and that said plaintiff ought of its own motion and a due regard for the rights of the public to break up said trains to short and reasonable limits while passing through Washington City.”</p> <p>That after careful consideration of the difficulties and dangers of the situation, they became satisfied that the existing regulations in respect of speed of trains, safety gates, alarm bells, watchmen, <fcc., were not sufficient for the proper protection of lives and property, and therefore, in the discharge of the duty committed to them, the aforesaid regulations were made and ordered enforced.</p> <p>The Commissioners further expressly deny the unreasonableness of the regulations, and say that they can be easily and readily complied with without serious injury or embarrassment to complainants in the performance of their public duties as common carriers. They aver that similar regulations are in force in many of the States of the Union.</p> <p>The allegations of the Commissioners are supported in some particulars by affidavits; and in respect of the Baltimore and Ohio crossing of the Columbia cable railway, some instances of dangers actually encountered are given, tending to show the necessity for additional regulations for safety in the line of those here complained of.</p> <p>They also deny any intention to use physical force to compel the complainants’ trains to stop; but submit they do intend to enforce the regulations by criminal prosecution whenever violated, in the Police Court of the District. They further say that said court has complete jurisdiction in the premises, and that every question raised by the bills of complaint can be decided therein in due course of law; wherefore complainants have a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, without appealing to the jurisdiction of a court of equity.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from an order of the Orphans' Oourt refusing to direct a partial distribution of the estate of a decedent under a stipulation among the next of kin. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by an applicant for a patent from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting certain claims in the application. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding between the patentee of a design and an applicant. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents refusing an application for a patent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on verdict in an action of covenant. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the petitioner from an order refusing a writ of mandamus to compel a justice of the peace to pass upon an appeal bond on an hppeal from his judgment in a case tried by a jury before him. Affirmed.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from an order setting aside an order of publication against an absent defendant in an action of ejectment. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Appellate Practice.</p> <p>A motion for rehearing, made after a former motion for the same purpose had been denied, and the case appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, in which court the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, dismissed as not having been made in time, under the rules, and also because the matter had been settled by the decision on the first motion.</p>

Petition for a writ of mandamus to a justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, directing him to vacate an order granting a new trial in a case appealed to that court from a justice of the peace and to enter a judgment upon a verdict rendered. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment on verdict in an action on a certificate of insurance. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows : This is an appeal from a judgment on a life insurance certificate.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the relator from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by one of several defendants from a decree passed on the hearing of four suits in equity, consolidated by the court below, to reach assets of an insolvent corporation.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>Four shits in equity, the general purpose of all of which was to reach certain assets of the Washington Beneficial Endowment Association which had gone into the hands of the Commercial Life Insurance Company, for the purpose of subjecting such assets to the payment of the claims of various parties to the suits, were consolidated, or are assumed to have been consolidated, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, where they had been instituted; and the present appeal has been taken from one decree rendered in each and all of them.</p> <p>The Washington Beneficial Endowment Association is, or was, a body corporate, organized under the general incorporation act of Congress enacted for the District of Columbia, for the purpose, as stated in its certificate of incorporation, “ of providing an endowment fund to be paid to the persons entitled thereto upon the death of the party named in the certificate of endowment.” It was also stated in the certificate that the capital stock of-the association should be $10,000, divided into 200 shares of $50 each. This was afterwards increased to $20,000, divided into 400 shares of $5Q each. But notwithstanding that it was apparently a joint stock organization, the association was intended to be conducted mainly on the principle of mutual life insurance associations, and its funds were to be mainly raised by assessments upon those who united themselves to the association by receiving certificates of insurance therefrom, the equivalent of the ordinary policies of insurance in other companies, which assessments were to be made from time to time on the death of any member by a call upon all the other members of the class to which the deceased member belonged — an alluring but insecure and defective scheme of life insurance.</p> <p>. The association was organized in 1877, and soon after-wards adopted by-laws, one of which has been greatly relied upon in this case, and which is as follows:</p> <p>“Art. 17, Section 1. The capital stock, together with the reserve fund and surplus fund, shall be held at °all times liable for the security of the certificate holders.”</p> <p>The affairs of the association seem to have been sufficiently successful for sixteen or seventeen years; but in August, 1894, the holders of certificates of insurance issued by it were startled by the announcement of its virtual insolvency, and the transfer of all its assets.to an organization in the city of New York, incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, and known as the Commercial Alliance Life Insurance Company, itself also a moribund concern, which soon afterwards went into the hands of a receiver, and was dissolved by a decree of the courts of the State of New York.</p> <p>Certificate holders and creditors of the Washington association, deeming that their rights had been violated, instituted proceedings in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and the four suits here consolidated were filed in the course of a few months.</p> <p>On August 30, 1894, about three weeks after the transfer by the Washington association to the New York company, Robert Ball, Hannibal D. Norton, and Solomon J. Fague, who each held certificates of insurance, or certificates of endowment, as they were called, from the Washington association, filed their bill in equity, designated in the record as No. 15,809 on the docket of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting in equity, against the two organizations, and Lawrence Gardner, president of the Washington association. After reference to facts hereinbefore stated, they alleged that the association had become-insolvent and had ceased to do business; that the transfer to the New York company was fraudulent and in violation of their rights, and that out of the assets so transferred they were entitled to be paid the value of their several certificates, whatever such value should be ascertained to be, and the prayer of the bill was for an injunction, the appointment of a receiver, and the winding up of the business of the association.</p> <p>Answers to this bill, substantially identical, were filed by the Washington association and by Gardner individually. In these answers they denied the insolvency of the association, which was afterwards conclusively proved, and alleged that it had ample assets in the power of assessment to meet all its liabilities, a statement which proved to b*e utterly illusory. They averred that the Commercial Alliance Life Insurance Company had, by purchase for the sum of $13,939, become the owner of all the outstanding stock of the association, amounting to 283 shares, being at the rate of $53 a share, and that an arrangement had been made between the Washington association and the Commercial Alliance Company, whereby the latter agreed in some manner to re-insure such certificate holders of the Washington association as would enter into their scheme and accept their terms. It seems not to have been known to the complainants at the time that all the property of the association had been actually transferred to the New York company; and consequently nothing was said about that transfer either in the bill or answers.</p> <p>In the meantime there had been a second suit instituted, which was by the association itself against the New York company; and after the foregoing answers had been filed, there was an order made, on motion of counsel for the complainant, to consolidate this suit with that.</p> <p>Subsequently the appellant, William T. Gilbert, the receiver appointed in New York for the Commercial Alliance Company, was by order of court permitted to intervene in the suit, and he filed a demurrer to the bill of complaint.</p> <p>There seem to have been no further pleadings in the cause, no replication to the answers of the association and Gardner, and no action upon the demurrer of Gilbert.</p> <p>On October 6,1894, Gardner caused a bill in equity to be filed in the name of the Washington Endowment Association against the Commercial Alliance Life Insurance Company, to vacate, on the ground of fraud, the transfer which had been made on the 9th day of August, 1894, by the former to the latter, of all its assets, business, and good will; and it prayed for the cancellation of the deed of transfer, and for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. This was sworn to by Gardner, and is numbered as 15,907.</p> <p>On November 5, 1894, there was an appearance entered for the New York company, and on the next day, by consent of the respective solicitors, Andrew A. Lipscomb and Thomas M. Fields were appointed receivers to take charge of the assets mentioned in the bill, which consisted mainly of a piece of real estate in which the office of the association had been kept, and some personal property on the premises. These were afterwards sold by order of court and the consent of the parties, and the proceeds were brought into court by the receivers, and are held to await the result of the litigation.</p> <p>Then, on December 1, 1894, followed the order, which has been already mentioned, consolidating this cause with the previous one. Subsequently there was an answer to the bill filed by the receiver of the New York company, the appellant here, in substance denying that there was any fraud in the transaction that had been had between the two companies. It does not appear that there was any replication to this answer; but some months afterwards, in June and July, 1895, both parties proceeded to take testimony in the consolidated causes.</p> <p>Two parties intervened by petition in this second cause— one in the early stages of the cause, a Mrs. Henry Ann Stuart, the beneficiary mentioned in a certain certificate o endowment issued by the association, and who, on October 1, 1894, after a protracted litigation, had finally obtained judgment against the association for the sum of $5,000, with interest from September -29, 1887, the amount secured by the certificate — the second intervenor, one Carrie H. Golden, afterwards by marriage, or remarriage, Carrie H. Smith, who had, on December 19, 1894, obtained a judgment for $3,000, on a similar certificate of endowment.</p> <p>Answers were filed to the petition of Mrs. Stuart both by the association and by the receiver of the New York company. Whether there was any replication to these does not appear; but testimony was taken in support of the petition about the same time as the taking of testimony in the main cause.</p> <p>The petition of Carrie H. Golden was filed on December 10, 1895, after the testimony had been closed for several months, and the cause, or causes, stood ready for hearing. It is said that there was an order of court, making her a party; but the transcript of record before us does not show it. Nor does it appear that there was any service of process under it upon any one, or that there was any further proceeding of any kind upon the petition in the court below.</p> <p>A third suit, designated as No. 16,072, Equity, was instituted on December 24, 1894, by James S. Edwards, as administrator of Anthony Buchly, deceased, against the Washington Beneficial Endowment Association, the-Commercial Alliance Life Insurance Company, and Andrew A. Lipscomb and Thomas M. Fields, receivers, as defendants, for the same general purpose as the previous suits. It was based upon a liability which had Accrued under a certificate of endowment, but which had not been reduced to judgment. This suit, on the motion of the complainant, was almost immediately ordered tobe consolidated with No. 15,907, immediately preceding; and subsequently answers were filed to it by the receiver Gilbert, the appellant here, and by Lipscomb and Fields, also as receivers. No other proceedings so far as the record before us discloses, appear to have been had in the cause.</p> <p>Lastly, on January 17,1895, there was a fourth suit filed, designated as No. 16,165, Equity, which was a bill in equity by one Man S. Quarles, administrator of Alfred Shield, against the same defendants who are mentioned in the third suit, and upon the same or a similar basis of liability upon a certificate of endowment which had become due and payable in consequence of the death of the holder thereof. To this there was a demurrer interposed by the receivers Lipscomb and Fields, also a demurrer by the receiver Gilbert, and subsequently an answer by the Endowment Association. But it does not appear that there were any further proceedings in the case. It seems to be conceded that there was some order of court consolidating this suit also with the other suits, or with No. 15,907, although no such order appears in the record. It is recited, however, in the final decree of the court that it was so consolidated.</p> <p>It appears that the suit of the Washington Beneficial Endowment Association against the Commercial Alliance Life Insurance Company, No. 15,907, Equity, for a rescission of the contract between them, was regarded as the principal suit in this litigation, and the others only as ancillary to it; and that for this reason they were all consolidated with it, and thereafter regarded and treated as part of that suit,</p> <p>Testimony was taken in the consolidated suits, said to be for the complainants, the defendants, the respondents and intervenors, and also testimony in rebuttal; and the cause or causes ultimately came on for hearing, Thereupon there was a decree rendered on June 27, 1896, in which it was adjudged that the deed of conveyance from the Washington Beneficial Endowment Association to the Commercial Alliance Life Insurance Company should be vacated and held void, and that the proceeds of sale in the hands of the receivers appointed in cause No. 15,907, should be held for the payment of the claims of the holders of the certificates of endowment issued by the association in such proportions as might afterwards be determined by the court upon the filing of a report by the auditor of the court. And reference was ordered to the auditor to state an account and to make a report to the court upon the claims already introduced by the holders of certificates, and upon any other similar claims that might be brought before him, and to state what sums severally they were entitled to receive.</p> <p>From this decree the respondent, William T. Gilbert, receiver of the Commercial Alliance Life Insurance Company, was allowed an appeal in open court, and therein to sever from the other respondents, who all declined to join in the appeal or in its prosecution. And it is this appeal which is now before us.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from an order of the court below vacating a sale made under a writ of execution. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This is an appeal from ah order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, vacating a sale made under a writ of execution issued from said court.

This is an action of assumpsit brought in the court below by the appellee, William G. Le Due, against the appellant, George C. Hazelton, to recover damages for the breach of an alleged contract by which it is claimed that appellant agreed to purchase from appellee a certain house and lot in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, known as lot numbered 46, in square numbered 199.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment on a verdict directed by the trial court in an action of ejectment.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment under the 73d Rule of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in an action on a promissory note.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on a verdict directed by the court in an action of ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal and a cross-appeal from a decree of the equity court confirming a report of the auditor. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: These are cross-appeals in the same suit from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, confirming a report of the auditor of that court. The cause was formerly before us on an appeal from a decree dismissing the bill of complaint.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the respondent from a decree in admiralty on a libel for an alleged injury to a vessel.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This case is in admiralty, in personam, and the libel was filed by the appellees, Charles Burnett and others, against the appellants, Charles G. Smith and Charles G. Smith, Jr., for an alleged injury to their vessel, the schooner “Ellen Tobin,” while moored in berth at the wharf of the appellants on the bank of the Potomac River, at Georgetown, District of Columbia, for the purpose of being loaded from said wharf, by and for the appellants. The inj ury complained of is alleged to have been occasioned by the negligent allowance by the appellants of a dangerous rock on the bed of the river within the limits of the berth at the wharf to which the vessel was invited to take position, and which dangerous obstruction was unknown to the master of the vessel, and who acted upon the assurance of-the appellants, by their agent, that the depth of water in the berth in front of the wharf was sufficient, and that the berth was safe for the loading of the vessel from the wharf.</p> <p>The material facts alleged in the libel and shown in proof appear to be these: The appellants are lessees of the wharf, and water rights extending to the channel of the river, and the berth assigned to and taken by the schooner for purpose of loading was in front of the wharf and within the leased premises. The appellants were engaged in the business of crushing and shipping stone from the wharf to different points, principally to Fortress Monroe; and the schooner had been brought up the river, by pre-arrangement with a ship broker in Georgetown, for the purpose of being loaded by the appellants at their wharf with crushed stone, to be taken to Fortress Monroe, in Virginia, to be uséd in government work at that place.</p> <p>There appears to be no doubt of the fact that the vessel was staunch and in good repair, though she had been built and engaged in the coasting trade for a good many years. She was a three-masted schooner of about 600 tons capacity, and 419 tons net registry; and was 136 feet long and 32 feet wide. She was registered at the New York custom house as a coasting vessel of the United States. She .was owned by the appellees at the time of the injury complained of.</p> <p>It also appears that the vessel was sunk on the 6th of August, 1893, as she was moored in the berth at the wharf, while receiving her cargo of crushed stone from the wharf, by means of a chute extended from the wharf to the hatchway of the vessel. The vessel was about two-thirds loaded, having received about 400 tons of her cargo, before signs were discovered of her distressed condition. She was then taking water so rapidly that the pumps could not relieve her, nor could the extra assistance employed by the master avail to save her from breaking and sinking in the berth. The work of loading -was stopped on Saturday evening, with the intention of resuming the work of loading on the following Monday morning; and the captain of the vessel, at the time of stopping work on Saturday, made soundings around the vessel, and supposed that she was then lying all right. But on Sunday morning it was discovered that there was so much water in her that she could not be relieved by her pumps; and by 5 o’clock on the afternoon of that day she had filled with water, and broke in the middle, and sank in her .berth, where she remained, with her cargo under w’ater, until the 1st of November, 1893, when the stone was pumped out of her, and she was then condemned as worthless, and was afterwards sold at auction for $25 to one of the owners.</p> <p>The appellants, in their answer to the libel, deny all negligence imputed to them by the appellees, and insist that they are in no way responsible for the disaster to the vessel. They also filed a cross-libel, claiming $2,700 for damages caused by the fault of the appellees in allowing the vessel to sink in the river in front of their wharf, and to remain there for an undue time. The appellees filed a replication to the answer, and an answer to the cross-libel. It was upon this state of allegation and response that a large mass of proof was taken; the most of it being very conflicting, especially that relating to the question of negligence mutually charged, and as to the value of the vessel.</p>

<p>IT baking on an appeal by the defendants from a decree vacating a conveyance of real estate and directing its sale, in a judgment creditors’ suit.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment on verdict in an action of ejectment. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This is an action of ejectment brought by the appellants, Francis G. Posey, Serena B. Williams, Louisa Edwards and others, who claim to be heirs at law of Andrew Hanson, deceased, against his widow, Julia Hanson, to- recover the possession of a part of certain parcels of lands in the city of Washington.

Hearing on appeals by two of several defendants from a judgment on verdict in an action on a promissory note- The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This action was brought on a joint and several promissor note, dated January 1st, 1894, payable one year after date, for $2,250, with interest, and signed by the present appellants and Henrietta C. Metzerott and Frank B. Metzerott, who were all sued as makers of the note.

<p>Hearing oil an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction on a verdict of guilty in a prosecution for murder.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p>

Hearing oil an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents refusing an application for letters patent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment on verdict in an action of assumpsit.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is an action of assumpsit, and the declaration, containing a single count, declares for a certain amount of ■money due the plaintiff, which was promised to be paid her by the defendant, on a settlement and compromise made between them.</p> <p>The action was brought on the 31st day of December, 1895, and in the declaration it is alleged that the defendant, Richard Mansfield, contracted and agreed with the plaintiff, Mary Sanders Winter, an actress, in consideration of the rendition by her of her professional services as an actress to the defendant, Mansfield, for the theatrical season of 1895-6,. that is, from the 16th of September, 1895, to the 15th day of June, 1896, to pay her the sum of $75 per week, such payment to be made on Saturday of each week during the entire time aforesaid; and that, in pursuance of the contract, the plaintiff entered upon the performance of her duties as such actress under the management and for the benefit of the defendant, Mansfield, and continued to render him her services as actress until the 3d day of December, 1895, when, without cause or justification, th'e defendant . dismissed her from his service and refused and failed to perform his contract with her, and refused and failed.to pay her the weeklysum of $75 agreed by him to be paid. That,there-, after, in settlement, satisfaction and compromise of the claim of plaintiff against the defendant, under said contract, and in consideration of the waiver by her of her rights thereunder, the defendant undertook and promised to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,350, payable in weekly instalments of $50, the first instalment to be paid on the 14th day of December, 1895, and the balance in weekly instalments of $50, to be paid on the Saturday of each succeeding week until the entire sum of $1,350 was paid. That thereafter, on the 14th day of December, 1895, the defendant paid one instalment of $50 to the plaintiff, but subsequently, to wit, on the 21st day of December, 1895, he wholly refused and failed to pay to her the instalment of $50 agreed by him to be paid on that date, and wholly refused and failed to pay her any further sum whatever, and has since refused and failed, and still refuses and fails to perform and carry out his contract, and has wholly refused to pay the plaintiff any further sum whatever; wherefore she brings suit and claims the sum of $1,300, with interest thereon from the 31st day of December, 1895, besides costs.</p> <p>The pleas were, that the defendant was not indebted as alleged; that he never promised as alleged; and that he never agreed as alleged. Issue was joined, and the case was tried by jury, and on the 16th day of December, 1896, verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for $1,300, the whole amount claimed; and . on that verdict, after overruling a motion for a new trial, the court, on the 21st of December, 1896, entered judgment for the plaintiff for the $1,300 and costs.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from an order overruling a motion to quash a writ of certiorari sued out to have a judgment of a justice of the peace declared void, and quashing the proceedings before said justice.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on a verdict directed by the court in an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This is an action of damages for injury to the person. The plaintiff, Daniel McCauley, was in the service of the Southern Railway Company as fireman on engine No. 791. This engine had for some time run between Washington and Leesburg.

Hearing on an appeal by the respondent from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia directing the issue of a writ of mandamus to the Commissioner of Patents requiring him to reinstate a certain interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the complainants from a decree dismissing a bill of complaint in a suit for discovery and account of the personal estate of an intestate.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>Cases Nos. 616 and 617 were argued together, because the evidence was all taken in the case No. 616 and introduced into the other one, No. 617, by stipulation. But the cases are entirely different in their nature and character, and as to the relief prayed, and are between different parties and depend upon facts and principles of law that are not common to both cases. The cases therefore must be considered separately, though portions of the great mass of the evidence taken apply to each case.</p> <p>The first of these cases, that of Peter McCartney and Annie O. McCartnej'', his wife, administratrix of William Fletcher, deceased, against Susan Fletcher, Charles P. Fletcher, Catharine Laughlin, Thomas Broderick, John Lynch and Timothy Daley, was filed for discovery and account of the personal estate that was supposed to have belonged to William Fletcher, at the time of his death, alleged to have been concealed and secreted from the administratrix of the deceased by his widow, Susan Fletcher, the first named defendant. There are other objects sought to be attained by the bill, though of a secondary character, and which seem to be intended to have a bearing or reflection upon the objects and purposes of the bill in No. 617.</p> <p>The bill is very elaborate in its statements of the affairs of the deceased, and presents a very remarkable case. It seeks discovery and account from a surviving wife, for and in respect of all the transactions, dealings and earnings and expenditures of the husband during his married life, covering a period of about thirty years; upon the theory that the wife was the agent of the husband, in the general control and management of his business, and therefore liable to account as agent for everything in the way of money or property that came into her hands during the long period of their married life.</p> <p>It is not charged or pretended that the wife was formally or expressly constituted agent for the management of the business and affairs of the husband, but it is insisted that she should be treated and held liable as the constructive agent of the husband, by reason of the fact that she was active and industrious and frugal in taking care of the earnings of her husband, and that the husband, not a very careful or frugal man himself, confided largely to her care and general management his earnings and affairs; and that she did manage and take care of his earnings for him.</p> <p>It appears that William Fletcher died intestate in March, 1893, then aged about sixty-six years. He had been twice married. His first wife died in 1861, and he was married to his second wife in 1863. By his first wife he had two children, who still survive — Annie C. Fletcher, who was born in 1856, and who is now the wife of Peter McCartney, and William F. Fletcher, who was born in 1859. By his second wife, Susan Fletcher, he had five children — namely, Mary J., who was born in 1864, and who is now the wife of William E. Collier, to whom she was married in 1888; Charles P. Fletcher, born in 1866; Susan E. Fletcher, born in 1874; Kate E. Fletcher, born in-, and James Fletcher, born in 1881. Mrs. McCartney, the daughter by the first wife, became administratrix of her father’s personal estate; and she and her husband, Peter McCartney, are the complainants in this suit for discovery and account of the personal estate and for other purposes.</p> <p>The deceased, William Fletcher, began life as a laborer, and wholly without education. He was a man, however? of strong native sense, and of considerable energy and enterprise. Before his second marriage he had become a contractor, and owned horses and carts, and employed hands to work in the performance of his contracts; and in this way he had acquired some property, though not a great deal. His second wife was as illiterate as himself, and neither could read nor write, except that the husband had learned barely to write his name. But the record discloses the fact that the second wife was a hard-working, careful and thrifty woman, and manifestly did much not only to encourage her husband to enterprise and success, but that she was mainly instrumental in saving and taking care of his earnings. She was without property when she married the deceased; but she was a help-mate to her husband in the full sense of the term, and this he fully appreciated by the manner in which he confided to her the full participation in the management of his affairs. Her family, consisting of her husband’s two infant children by his former wife and her own five children, from the time of their birth, were well cared for, and genteelly brought up and educated • and this was principally by means of the work and management of the defendant, Susan Fletcher. The children all remained together as one family, until such of them as married went to their own homes.</p> <p>The administratrix of the deceased, after returning to the Orphans’ Court an inventory of the personal estate of the deceased, under oath, amounting to near about $10,000, filed the present bill, in which the widow is charged with having received into her possession, and then concealed and withheld from the administratrix, personal assets of the estate of the deceased, to the amount of $162,872.84, “and which sum complainants believe and aver, represented in 07ie form, or other personal property, and was personal estate of the deceased at the time of his death, and is now in the possession and under thte control of the defendant, Susan Fletcher, and is wrongfully withheld by her from complainants, and especially from the said Annie as administratrix; and for which, with the gains and increase thereof, the said Susan should be required to account to the complainants, and, upon such accounting, be required and compelled to deliver and pay over to complainants, or the said Annie as such administratrix,” &c.</p> <p>As the foundation for this general charge of concealment and withholding of the personal assets of the estate it is alleged in the preceding paragraphs of the bill that the decedent, in his lifetime, was actively engaged in business for a period of upwards of thirty years, as the complainants are informed, and that during many years of that period he was the owner of horses and carts and the appliances for conducting the business of contracting for and performing public works in the way of street improvements, etc., in the District of Columbia; and that, of her personal knowledge, he was engaged during the last mentioned years in such business upon a large and extensive scale, and with great profit to himself, as she has understood. That while complainant knew that the decedent for a long time prior to his death had been, and at the time of his death was, reputed to be of great wealth and the owner of a large estate, both real and personal, she was without exact knowedge in the premises, and was at the time of his death dependent for information therein as to the personal estate upon the defendant, Susan Fletcher. That it had been the custom of the decedent, for many years prior to his death, to deliver and intrust for safe keeping all his moneys and securities, as received from time to time, to the defendant, Susan Fletcher, and that at the time of his death the defendant Susan was supposed to have, and the complainant avers the fact to be that she then did have, not only exact and exclusive information and knowledge of the nature, quality, and extent of the personal estate, but that she also had in her possession or under her control the entire personal estate of the deceased, including moneys, securities, evidences of debt, books of account, and memoranda in regard to his affairs and effects; and complainant avers that it therefore became and was the duty of the defendant Susan, after the death of her husband, to make disclosure of the same, fully, frankly, candidly, and without concealment, to the complainant and the other parties in interest with her, the said Susan, in the estate of the deceased, and that it became, and was especially, the duty of said Susan to make such disclosure to the complainant Annie after her appointment as administratrix of the deceased, and uúthout concealment or reserve to turn over and deliver the whole of said personal estate to the complainant as administratrix. Yet so it is, as complainant believes and avers, that at no time since the death of the intestate, and neither before or since the appointment of the complainant Annie as administratrix, has the said Susan made such disclosure truly of the entire personal estate of the decedent, or delivered the same tothecomplainant, although frequently called upon so to do; but, to the contraiy, and in violation of her duty in the premises, the defendant Susan has, when called upon for information in the premises, made statements and representations in regard to the personal estate of the deceased which have been contradictory, inconsistent, false, evasive, and misleading. The complainant then proceeds to aver certain statements made by the defendant Susan immediately after the death of the intestate in regard to the extent and amount of the personal estate of the deceased; but which .were prior to the time of making and filing the sworn inventory of the personal estate of the deceased, by the complainant, as administratrix, in the first instance; and that, by reason of the subsequent misrepresentations and inconsistent statements of the defendant Susan as to the extent of the personal estate of the deceased, the complainant was induced to amend and change the inventory of the personal estate returned to the court by her, as such administratrix. That, upon the appointment of the complainant Annie as administratrix of the personal estate of the deceased, the defendant, Susan Fletcher, turned over to her as such administratrix the articles of property and evidence of debt mentioned and described in the amended inventory as being all of the personal estate of the decedent in the possession or under the control of her, the said Susan, and that the complainant then being without other or better information, the same were returned as the whole of the personal estate of the deceased ; and complainant avers that no part of the $4,000, consisting of debts due the decedent, mentioned in the original petition to the Orphans’ Court, -was included in the $10,000, which was stated to be the amount of the personal estate of the deceased in the ‘ amended petition.</p> <p>It is next alleged that certain notes returned as constituting part of the personal assets of the estate are not properly any part of the personal estate of the deceased, and should therefore be stricken from the list of debts due the estate; that such notes were fictitious evidences of debt given by Catharine Laughlin upon a mere pretended sale to her of ■certain real estate by the decedent, but which sale was merely sham and colorable, and the notes given for the nominal purchase money were never intended to be collectable debts; and that the farm called “ Sharon,” for which the notes were given, was conveyed by the deceased without consideration, and was intended to be in the nature of a conveyance in trust for the benefit of the grantor. It is also alleged that a certain investment in the stock of the Washington Asphalt Block and Tile Company, appraised at $2,500, does not in fact constitute assets of the estate of the deceased, and is not available as such; and the shares of the stock of the company, subscribed for by the deceased, stand in the name of Charles P. Fletcher, a son of the deceased, with a balance of $2,500 still due thereon. The subjects of these allegations have no necessary or apparent connection with the main objects of the bill, so far as the defendant Susan is concerned.</p> <p>It is alleged that the complainant had made efforts to ascertain the true extent, nature and value of the personal estate of the deceased, but without success ; but, from information received, the ^complainant believes that in none of the statements made by the defendant Susan has she made true, frank and full disclosures of ’the personal assets and estate of the deceased in her hands or under her control; but that the said Susan has wilfully and knowingly misrepresented the same; and that, at the time of the death of the intestate, as complainant is informed and believes, and so charges, the defendant Susan had in her hands and control, and still has in her hands and control, large sums of money, and securities, and obligations of various kinds for the payment of money, being of the personal estate of the. «deceased, the amount of which moneys, and the character, nature and value of which securities and obligations are unknown to the complainant because the defendant Susan had refused to make full and true disclosure in regard .to the same, and to deliver them over to the complainant. That by reason of the fraudulent secretion and concealment of such moneys and securities, the amounts, and the nature and value of such securities, cannot be ascertained by the complainant as administratrix.</p> <p>It is then alleged that the deceased was possessed, in 1871, of securities and obligations of the corporation of the city of Washington to the amount of $50,000; and that during the period of his married life with the defendant Susan, he had entered into and performed various contracts for public works, some in his own name and others in the name of himself and other persons as partners, and that the profits realized and received by the deceased therefrom amounted to a great many thousands of dollars; which, in addition to some smaller amount of receipts, made a total in moneys and securities of $183,441.39, received by him and which came into his possession during the period of his married life with the defendant Susan. The complainant avers that she believes such estimate to be reasonable, and that the gains and increases of said sum, derived therefrom by the deceased by way of interest and dividends, exclusive of sums received for rents from real estate, in whicjr a portion of said sum was invested, was in excess of $30,000.</p> <p>By paragraph 8 of the bill, it is alleged that the deceased, during the period of his married life with the defendant Susan, purchased and paid for out of the moneys which came into his hands, as in the preceding paragraph of the bill stated, and became the owner of numerous and valuable parcels of real estate in the District of Columbia, as shown in the following statement of dates, and references to the land records of the District. Then follows a long descriptive list of the real estate purchased by the intestate, and the supposed values thereof; and in the ninth paragraph of the bill is stated an account of the supposed rents and profits received by the deceased from such real estate during his married life with the defendant Susan, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $137,245, and of which sum, after deducting all expenses and outlays of every kind and description, there remained to the intestate at least the sum of $50,000, which, added to the sum of $112,872.84, makes the sum of $162,872.84, which, it is alleged, constituted the personal estate, in one form or other, of the deceased at the time of his death.</p> <p>It is alleged' in the bill that the deceased wished to make it appear that he was without means or property, in order to avoid being importuned to become surety for others, or to engage in speculations and ventures, and for that reason he allowed his wife Susan to collect all the rents from his real estate, caused his real estate to be assessed in her name, and made and recorded fictitious deeds of trust, and conveyed various parcels of his real estate to third persons, for apparent valuable considerations, and such persons would thereupon convey the same to his wife Susan for the like apparent valuable consideration. Of this character of conveyances there are four specified in the bill— conveying property of the alleged aggregate valueof $37,694. Two of these conveyances were made by the deceased and his wife Susan to the defendant, Kate Laughlin, the sister of the wife Susan, who conveyed the same property to said Susan Fletcher, for the same recited consideration'as that mentioned in the deeds to her, the said Kate Laughlin. Two other deeds made by Fletcher and wife, one to Samuel Cross, who conveyed the same property to the w7ife Susan, and the other to Patrick Daley, who thereupon conveyed the same property to the wife Susan. There 'are certain other parcels of real estate alleged to have been purchased and paid for by William Fletcher, the husband, and the deeds for which were taken directly to and in the name of the wife Susan. All these various deeds of conveyance made to the wife are alleged to have been made to the wife Susan in trust for the husband and his heirs, though the deeds contain no declaration of trusts, but are all absolute, unqualified conveyances of the property described therein. The bill demands- of the defendant, Susan Fletcher, the most varied and comprehensive discovery in relation to all transactions between herself and her late husband, during her married life, that in any manner had reference to the acquisition, the possession, and disposition of property, of every sort and description; and this, too, without regard to-the fact, that the investigation aiid accounting proposed would extend over a period of thirty years, and that, for want of education, neither husband nor wife could write or keep an account of their numerous transactions.</p> <p>In the bill it is alleged in regard to the deeds made to the wife Susan, that the said Susan, at the time of her marriage,, had no estate of her own, and that there was no consideration paid by her for said conveyances, and that said deeds were not executed or caused to be executed by her husband with the intention or for the purpose of investing her with any equitable estate in the lands conveyed; nor did the husband intend that the said deeds, or any or either of' them, should invest her with any separate estate in the lands conveyed; but the same were made and caused to be made by the husband solely with the object before stated, and that the wife Susan, at the time of making the said deeds,, knew well and understood that the lands conveyed were to be held by her simply as a trustee, and subject in all respects to the use, control and dominion of her husband;. and the complainant avers that the defendant Susan in equity now holds the lands conveyed simply as trustee for the heirs of her deceased husband, “and that she should be-compelled to disclose and account to complainant for, among other things, all rents of said lands which came into her possession prior to the death of her husband;” and if the husband intended that the deeds should, for the respective considerations mentioned, pass title to the lands conveyed, and not simply in trust for him and his heirs, inasmuch as the considerations have not been paid, the court should, upon the facts so appearing, declare a lien upon the several parcels for the said several and respective considerations mentioned in the deeds, with interest.</p> <p>In this same bill of complaint filed by. the representative of the personal estate of the deceased alone, and to which the heirs at law of the deceased are not parties, it is alleged that a certain farm in Virginia called “Sharon,” was conveyed by William Fletcher and wife to Kate Laughlin, for the recited consideration of $10,000, and that a deed of trust for the benefit of said Fletcher was made to Edmund Burke by said Kate Laughliu, to secure $6,000 of the apparent consideration, and for which sum promissory notes were given; but that the transaction was in fact fictitious, and that no consideration passed, and none was intended to be paid; and that the farm was intended to be held in trust for the grantor. Discovery in regard to this transaction is prayed, and that the farm be conveyed to the heirs at law and widow of the deceased, and that the promissory notes given by the said Kate Laughliu be surrendered to her.</p> <p>The defendants were required upon their several and respective corporeal oaths to make full, true, direct, and perfect answers to all and singular the matters and things in the bill stated and charged, and more especially that the said Susan Fletcher state and be required to set forth and disclose with particularity in her answer — 1st. What property, if any, and the value thereof, she had at the time of her marriage to William Fletcher, deceased; 2d. What property she received during her marriage with William Fletcher, otherwise than directly or indirectly from him, and the person or persons, source or sources from which such last mentioned property, if any, was received and derived, and the date or dates, if more than one, of the receipt or several receipts thereof, and the specific character and value thereof; 3d. Wliat property, if any, she received directly or indirectly, from her said husband during her marriage with him, and in and as to which she claimed or now claims by reason of such receipt, and the circumstances thereof, any individual or separate estate, legal or equitable, and the date and several dates of the'receipt and receipts thereof, and the special circumstances in each case attending the same, out of which or upon which such claim of individual or separate estate is based, with full and particular statement in detail of the hind, nature and value of such properly, and if such claim of' individual or separate estate therein be based in whole or in part upon any instrument or instruments of writing, not of record, that she attach a copy or copies of such instruments to her said answer; 4th. That she state and be required to set forth and disclose whether all the property of every description which she now holds, and all property of every description in and as to which she claims any individual right of ownership, be the same in her personal possession or in the possession of other persons, and held in any manner for her use, is not property which was originally owned by her late husband, and the gains and increase which have arisen therefrom; 5th. That she be required to state and set forth in her answer fully and completely, and without reserve or concealment, the nature, quality, character and value of all personal property of every description which she now has in her possession or under her control, and whether held personally by her or by others for her use, specifying the same in detail and whether moneys, bonds, stocks, promissory notes, open accounts, or other form whatsoever of property, and in whose possession such property is, and in whose name such bonds and stocks are listed, and to whom such promissory notes are payable, and the source and sources, person or persons, from whom said property was derived by her.</p> <p>It is also charged that certain stock of the Second Workingmen’s Building Association, amounting to about $1,400, standing in the name of the defendant, Susan Fletcher, is property that belongs to the estate of the deceased, and the complainant prays that such stock may be paid for and delivered to her as administratrix of the deceased; and it is in.respect of this stock that the defendants, Thomas Broderick, John Lynch, and Timothy Daley, the principal officers of the association, are made parties defendant to this cause.</p> <p>There is also a prayer that a receiver be appointed to collect the rents and profits of the real estate pendente lite.</p> <p>The defendant, Susan Fletcher, and the other defendants, all demurred to the bill. The grounds of the demurrer were — 1st. That there were no sufficient grounds shown by the bill to entitle the complainant to relief; 2d. That the bill, in stating the matters against the several defendants, is multifarious in its matter and subjects, and is therefore unduly oppressive and expensive to the several defendants, in making defence; 3d. And the defendant, Susan Fletcher, further insists, by way of demurrer, that the bill does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the complainant to the discovery prayed; 4th. That the complainant is not entitled to any relief as to the conveyances of the real estate mentioned in the bill, and this defendant is not compellable to make any discovery concerning the same as in the said bill prayed; 5th. That the complainant is not entitled to or interested in any of the separate or individual estate of this defendant, personal or mixed, and this defendant is not compelled to make discovery thereof or concerning the same as prayed in the bill. For these, as well as other defects, apparent on the face of the bill, this defendant demurs thereto and to the discovery sought, and prays judgment, &c. And as further ground for demurrer, assigned by the defendant, Catharine Laughlin, she says if it were true as alleged in the bill that the deed to her for the farm called “Sharon” was in trust for William Fletcher, yet the complainant, as administratrix of the deceased, has shown no right, power or authority that would entitle her to the relief prayed in respect of said farm, or any relief whatever.</p> <p>The court below overruled the demurrers, except as to the prayer of the bill requiring the defendant Catharine Laughlin to produce and deposit in the registry of the court the deed referred to in the bill, and alleged to have been made, though not delivered, to the defendant Susan as widow, and the heirs at law of William Fletcher, deceased, for the farm called “Sharon.” To that extent the demurrer Wjas sustained; but in all other respects the demurrers were overruled, and the defendants were required to answer the bill.</p>