Lindsay v. Cusimano’s Empirical Analysis
10 F. 302 · 1882
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 3 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently May 1914
2 federal appellate · 3 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Smith v. Sixty Thousand Feet of Yellow Pine Lumber · Turnbull, Martin & Co. v. Eighty-Seven Blocks of Marble
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The obligations of the owners and charterers, where the charter party is silent as to time to be occupied in discharging, are reciprocal; each shall ase ‘reasonable dispatch.’ This obligation is hero qualified by changing ‘reasonable' into •customary’ dispatch. This enlarges the source of delay, and makes it include all those usages at the port of delivery which the carrier cannot control, — such as the working hours, the order in which vessels must come it]) to the wharf, the observance of holidays, the allowance of three days to obtain a berth, provided one cannot be sootier obtained; hut here their force stops. They cannot be held to include any delay which is purely voluntary on the part of the charterers, although such delay is customary in the fruit trade. The phrase must be confined in its meaning to excuse the parties for want of opportunity by reason of the custom prevailing at the port. This is the substance of the decision in Kearon v. Pearson, 7 Hurl. & N. 386. There the question was as to the meaning of the words ‘usual dispatch’ as applied io loading. Martin, B., before whom (he case was tried, whose ruling was affirmed by all the judges, says, page 387: ‘They meant that the vessel should be loaded with the usual dispatch of persons who have a cargo ready at Divbrpool for loading.’ Here these words ‘customary dispatch’ meant the usual dispatch of persons who are ready to receive a cargo, and exclude all customs in accordance with which these charterers might cl”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.