KERSHAW V. TOWN OF HANOOOK.
541
the oath of office, and was under orders to hold himself in readiness to start for his post at a moment's notice; that on November 4th be received orders to report for duty, and started the same day, arriving at his destination and reporting for duty on January 11, 1873, and went to work at putting the affairs of the agency in shape to be turned over to him, until January 20,1873, when he receipted for the property to his predecessor and took charge of the agency.
The government fixed the date at which his salary should begin to run at January 20th, the day he relieved his predecessor, and disallowed Roberts' claim in his account for salary from September 28, 1873, the date of commission. Channing Richards, U. S. Atty., for plaintiff. L. H. Pummill, contra. SWING, D. J., charged the jury-I. That if they found that Roberts had no notice of the price agreed upon between the government and the telegraph company for such messages, and that he paid the price demanded by the company, in good faith, he was entitled to credit therefor in his account. 2. That if they found he paid the interpreters in good faith, under instructions previously given, at the rate of $500 a year, and without knowledge of the change in the law fixing their compensation at $400 a year, he was entitled to credit therefor in his account. 8. That the defendant was el.titled to his salary from the time they found he actually went to work for the government. Verdict for plaintiff for $53.17.
KERSHAW v. TOWN
OF
HANCOCK. November 4, 1880.)
(Circuit Uourt, N. D. New York.
1.
STATUTE OF IJIMITATIONB.
Coupons detached from bonds are substantially copies of and partake of the nature of the bonds from which they are detached, and the statute of lir:lita· tions which applies to them is the one whieh relates to sealed instruments. Hence they are not lJarred by lapse of time short of 20 years.
E. B. Thomas, for plaintiff. TVm. Gleason, for defendant. WALLACE, D. J. ,The defendant has pleaded the six years' statute of limitations, and insists upon it as a defence to the coupons upon which the action is brought. These coupons were originally attached to bonds; after being detached, were sold to the plaintiff, and
542
FEDERAL REPORTER.
more than six years elapsed after their maturity before the action was brought. By the Code of Civil Procedure of this state actions upon "a contract, obligation, 01' liability, express or implied, except a judgment or sealed instrument," must be brought within six years after the cause of action has accrued; but actions upon sealed instruments may be brought within twenty years. The question is, which of these limitations applies to the coupons? As a coupon has all the attributes of negotiable paper and may be recovered on by a bonafide holder, although the bond itself may have been paid or cancelled, it would seem anomalous, upon first impression, to hold that it is to be deemed a specialty for the purposes of the statute of limitations. But the question is not an open one in this court, in the absence of any decisions of the state court in construction of the statute of limitations, and in view of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States. The cases of City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477; City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282; Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583; and Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470, are decisive to the effect that the statute of limitations which applies is the one which relates to sealed instruments. These cases hold that coupons are substantially copies of the bond, in respect to the interest, and are given to the holder of the bond for the of enabling him to collect the interest, at the time and place mentioned, without the trouble of presenting the bond every time the interest becomes due, and to enable him to realize the interest by negotiating the coupons in business transactions; and that the coupons partake of the nature of the bonds, which are of higher security than the coupons, and are not barred by lapse of time short of 20 years. Judgment is ordered for the plaintiff.
MARION COUNTY V. M'IN'rYRB.
MARION COUNTY V. McINTYRB.
(Circuit Court, IJ. Nebraska. &. COt;NTIE8 lIIAY SUE AND BE SUED.
May, 1880.)
A county is a political subdivision of a state, and can sue and be sued.
On Motioil in Arrest of Judgment. DUNDY, D. J. In the month of October, 1876, the treasury of Marion county was robbed of about $10,000 in money, and the thieves were, for a time, successful in secreting, as they had been in securing, the money. For the purpose of securing the arrest and conviction of the robbers the county offered a. respectable reward for their apprehension. Two enterprising individuals of the state of Iowa, by name, Charles B. Thompson and James E. Hetherington, after gaining such information as seemed to be within reach, sta.rted in pursuit of the thieves and their plunder. The alleged thieves were successfully followed into the interior of this state, where they were "shadowed" by their pursuers, and where they were finally arrested by Thompson and Hetherington, who had been eDJ.ployed for the purpose; A portion of the stolen funds was recovered, the sa.me hl).ving been found in the possession a.nd on the person of one of the thieves. One of the original pa.ckages stolen contained the sum of $2,000, and wa.s ta.ken from the thief by his ca.ptors before the pa.ckage had been broken or opened. This pa.ckage was reta.ined by Thompson and Hetherington for a time, and until it was by them delivered to this defendant. Bnt, while this business was progressing, the thieves, their a.ccomplices or friends, incredible as it ma.y seem, actua.lly ha.d Thompson and Hetherington arrested for robbery, the charge being for taking the stolen funds from the thieves, who had the same in pos3ession. And, wha.t is absolutely amazing, the magistrate before whom Thompson and Hetherington were taken required them to give bail to answer in the district court to the charge of robbery. The bail required was fourteen or fifteen hundred dollars, and without the use of the money captured the accused were una.ble to give it. At this stage of the proceedings this defend. ant first appears in this serious, and what seemed to be a rather dangerous and inconvenient, farce. This, however, let it be said, Was not at all discreditable to him. Negotiations between this defend. ant and Thompson and Hetherington led to an agreemen' which