10 Haw. App. 503 - State v. Kupau’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[w]hether [Complainant’s] injuries amounted to a "bone fracture” or a “major laceration, avulsion, or penetration of the skin” so as to constitute "substantial bodily injury” was a question of fact for the jury, which could [rationally] have concluded that [Complainant] did not sustain a "substantial bodily injuiy.” Consequently, [Defendant] could have been acquitted of the [assault in the second degree] charges [sic]. The jury could also have [rationally] concluded that [Complainant] suffered at least physical pain, illness, or harm amounting to hodily injuiy and therefore convicted [Defendant] of the [included offense] of [assault in the third degree]. Therefore, a rational basis existed in the evidence for acquitting [Defendant] of the greater offense and convicting him of the [included offense], and pursuant to HRS § 701-109(5), [Defendant] was entitled to the [included offense] instruction.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Kupau · State v. KAPAU

2. “In the instant case, there was sufficient evidence proffered at trial from which a jury could have reasonably concluded that [Kupau] was guilty of [assault in the third degree] rather than [assault in the second degree]. Accordingly, the trial court was obligated, even absent a request by either party, to so instruct the jury. The trial court's failure to do so constitutes plain error.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Kupau · State v. KAPAU

3. “Undeniably, the defendant has a constitutional right under the sixth amendment to offer a defense, and, as an adjunct to this right, to devise a proper and appropriate trial strategy to blunt or otherwise neutralize the thrust of the prosecution’s ease-in-chief. But this right and option, while relevant to the jury’s duty to properly perform its constitutional functions in arriving at a just decision, is separate and distinct from the independent duty of the court to reasonably assist and instruct the jury in the intelligent discharge of these functions so as to avoid a miscarriage of justice.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Adviento.