Volume 10 — Michigan Reports

Berry brought replevin before a justice to recover of Lowe a trunk, certain articles of wearing apparel, and other goods. On trial, the justice found for the plaintiff as to a part of the articles replevied, and gave judgment in his favor for six cents damages and five dollars costs; and he awarded a return of the remaining articles to Lowe.

The action was by Kinyon against Fowler, in replevin. Defendant justified as a constable, under an execution issued by Alexander McArthur, a justice of the peace of said county, issued on a judgment rendered in favor of S. Ostrander against the plaintiff and one James Cummin. To prove the judgment the docket of said justice was offered in evidence, containing the following entries: “In Justice Court. S. Ostrander v. S. Z. Kinyon and James Cummin.

<p>■Whore a rocognizauce of special "bail is lost from the files of the Court, and the. plaintiff moves to substitute a copy to stand in lieu of the original, he must give the sureties notice of the motion,; and the Court has no jurisdiction ’ order the substitution to be made without such notice.</p>

Appeal in Chancery from Shiawassee Circuit. The bill was filed to quiet the title to lands, and the case, so far as passed upon, is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Cross was brought before a Justice of the Peace on a warrant based upon the following complaint: “County of Washtenaw ss.: To Charles H. Wallace, a justice of the peace for said county: Harriet Donaldson, a minor of the age of fifteen years, of Saline in said county, having been delivered of a female bastard child, the undersigned being the father and guardian of the said Harriet Donaldson, hereby applies to you to make inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the case.

Dennis and Patrick Daily filed their bill of complaint against Liba L. and Sarah Litchfield, setting forth, that ■on August 29, 2856, said Liba L. Litchfield was possessed of thirty-eight 'acres of land in Cass county, which on that day he agreed to exchange with complainants for the same-quantity of land owned by them in fee simple-, and for that purpose they entered into a contract with said Liba L. Litchfield, of which the following is a copy: “This contract, entered into…

<p>Appeal in Chancery from Shiawassee Circuit. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Actiou of ejectment by Parsons against Davenport. On tbe trial, plaintiff traced title to the premises in controversy to Thomas Emerson, Frederick Pettis and Richard H. Morris, by deed dated Jauuary 30, 1837, and which granted them “ to the said party of the second part and to the survivors or survivor of them (not as tenants in common, but as joint tenants, with right of survivorship), his heirs and assigns forever;” habendun “to the said party of the second part, and to…

On exceptions from Ingham Circuit, The defendant was proceeded against in the Court below by information, of which the following is a copy: “ State of Michigan: Ingham Gounty, ss.: The Circuit Court for the County of Ingham: of the term of May, a. d. 1861.

Elliott sued Green & Hinkley, on a recognizance of special bail, alleged to have been entered into by them before a Notary Public, as sureties for one Dudley, in an action brought in the Circuit Court for Ingham, county. Defendants interposed a plea of the general issue, with notice that if any such recognizance existed, it was not genuine, and was never executed and acknowledged by them. No affidavit was made of the fact alleged in the notice.

<p>Where the parties in interest to a decree in Chancery remain unchanged, and. no new rights have arisen, a defendant interested in having the decree executed* should proceed by petition for that purpose. But when a third person has acquired an interest in the decree, a bill is necessary to bring him before the Court, that his rights may be passed upon by the Court as in other cases.</p> <p>The only effect of non-resident defendants appearing and answering after decree, under the statute, is to vacate the decree as to them, leaving it to stand as against other defendants.</p> <p>Where non-resident defendants appeared and answered after decree, and after a bill had been filed to execute the same, and no subsequent steps were taken in the original suit, it was held, that if these defendants wished to avail themselves of the right they had acquired by so appearing and answering, they should make their defense by answer to the supplemental bill.</p> <p>An appellant in Chancery can not complain of errors not affecting his interests.</p> <p>One of the defendants in a foreclosure decree who had a residuary interest in the mortgage foreclosed after complainant’s demand should be satisfied, filed a bill the object of wlrch was to have the benefit of that decree, and also to foreclose the mortgage against the defendants who were not, but should have been* parties to the first suit. Held not objectionable. Such a bill is an original bill as to those who were not parties to the first bill, and a supplemental bill as to those who were.</p> <p>It is no objection to tbe decroo in such a case that it is intbe ordinary form of foreclosure decrees — it appearing that payments have become due on the mortgage since the decree in the original suit, as well as on complainant’s debt which the mortgage was assigned to secure.</p> <p>One who receives a conveyance of lands with covenant against incumbrances, and gives back a mortgage for the purchase price, can not, in a suit to foreclose his mortgage, set off the amount of prior incumbrances whioh hechas neither paid nor shows that he has been or is in danger of being damnified by.</p> <p>He does not show that he is damnified by setting up the foreclosure in Chancery of an incumbrance, and the sale of the mortgaged premises, but without alleging that he was a party to the suit or in any way bound thereby.</p> <p>Where a mortgage was given by a railway .company to trustees for the bond holders, and these trustees purchased on the foreclosure of a prior mortgage a parcel of land which had been conveyed to the company, and the purchase was made by them in their own right, and not as trustees, it was held, that the purchase could not bo treated as a payment of the mortgage by them as trustee mortgagees, so as to entitle the amount to be set off against a mortgage given by the railway company for the purchase price of the land.</p>

Rice was prosecuted by Ruddiman, under chapter 150 of the Compiled Laws, for the forcible entry and detainer of a building, described as situated on the Muskegon Lake,, in Muskegon township, near the north shore of said lake, opposite fractional section sixteen, town ten north of range-ten east.

<p>Appeal in Chancery from Wayne Circuit.</p>

<p>Suit against the maker and endorser of a promissory note. Defendants pleaded separately, and the issue as to one was tried, and judgment rendered against Mm. On error, the record not showing that any objection was taken in the Court below to tho trial of the separate issue, 'it was held that it must be presumed either that the action was severed by consent, or by the putting off of the-trial as to himself by the other defendant.</p> <p>Error will not be presumed: it must be made to appear affirmatively.</p>

Alexander C. Bailey presented to the Probate Court for Kent county, for probate and allowance, an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of LutherMudge. On the hearing in that Court, Temperance White and Mary Blood, daughters of said Mudge, appeared and' opposed, and the. will was disallowed. Bailey appealed to the Circuit Court, where an issue was directed by the Court to be made up and submitted to a jury.

On exceptions from Washtenaw Circuit. Defendant was indicted for perjury in testifying, in an ’action in which George Cook was plaintiff, and Henry B, Wier was defendant, that the note of two hundred and forty dollars upon which the action was brought was the property of said George Cook, and not of himself.

The plaintiff in error was convicted on an information for assaulting one John Gore, with intent to murder. On the trial, John Gore testified as follows: “I am a constable of the First Ward; I know defendant; on the 9th of February, 1861, at about one o’clock in the morning, I arrested defendant at a house kept by one TTilT on Gratiot street.

The action below was brought by Freeman, who in the first count of the declaration set out a contract made November 15, 1859, by which defendants (below) were to draw within the winter next following, all the pine timber on a certain lot of land, at one dollar and fifty cents per thousand feet, to be paid for as follows: “ Whatever supplies are necessary to carry on said job, up to one dollar per thousand feet, as fast as said logs are barked, inspected and scaled; it being…

<p>II. contracted with tho Railroad Company to draw, saw and pile for them certain wood at one of their stations, and the plaintiff was employed by him by the day in piling tho wood as it came from the saw. While thus employed he was injured by the cars being thrown from the track, and running against the woodshed, and in some way causing his hand to be crushed. For this injury he brought action against the Company. The Company, on the theory (which there was some evidence to establish) that the cars were thrown from the track hy means of a plank which EL had placed’ between the rails to aid in his work under the contract, asked the Court to charge the jury;</p> <p>1. That the plaintiff and El. while working on the premises were bound to use the same ordinary care against accidents to themselves as was incumbent on the Company, and that if the neglect of plaintiff or of H. in the course of their work under the contract contributed proximately to the accident, the plaintiff could not recover, unless the conduct of the company’s servants was wanton or willful.</p> <p>2. That if H. in the course of his work under the contract placed the plank on tho track, and thereby tho cars were thrown off and ran against the woodshed, this was neglect on the part of EL which contributed proximately to the accident, and that plaintiff could not recover unless the conduct of the Company’s servants was wanton or willful.</p> <p>There was no evidence that plaintiff knew of the plank being placed on the track, but it was proved to have been seen there by the station agent.</p> <p>Whether the Company were entitled to this charge, or not, quere; the Court being equally divided on the question.</p>

Habeas Corpus. The petition showed that, on a complaint being made before a justice of the peace under section 9 of the Prohibitory Liquor Law, petitioner was subpoenaed as a witness to lay the foundation for 2R-’ocess against the person complained of; that a question was put to him which he refused to answer; whereupon the justice issued his warrant, committing him to the common jail until he should submit to answer the question, and he discharged by due course of law.

<p>Error to Houghton District Court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of Christiancy J.</p>

Bryan commenced proceedings before the Circuit Court Commissioner to recover possession of certain lands.

Clair Circuit. The action was brought by Ripley against Daniels, on an award signed by H. Chamberlin, John E. Kitton and Alexander Gilchrist, purporting to be made under a submission executed by said Ripley and Daniels, by which all matters in dispute between them were referred to “the decision and arbitration of Harmon Chamberlin, John E. Kitton and Alexander Gilchrist, or to any two of them.” The questions arising on the trial sufficiently appear by the opinion.

“In' the name of the People of the State of Michigan, I, David E. Ilarbaugh, Prosecuting Attorney in and for said county of Wayne, who prosecutes for and on behalf of the People of said State, in said Court, come now here in said Court, and give the said Court here to understand and be informed, that Thomas Delany, late of said city of Detroit, on the first day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and from that day to the twentieth day of…

<p>Appeal in Chancery from Wayne Circuit.</p>

<p>A county may be created and have existence as such, notwithstanding it has no county officers. Per Martin Oh. J.</p> <p>And where anew county is created by setting off for that purpose organized townships from existing counties, the supervisors of these townships are thenceforth supervisors of the new county, their powers being conferred and duties imposed by the general laws of the State, instead of by the act creating the new county. Per Martin On. J. and Manning J. '</p> <p>It is not absolutely necessary to the existence of a County Board of Supervisors that there be a person authorized to perform the duties of County Clerk. The Board is a constitutional body, and if there be no County Clerk, it may appoint a person to act as its clerk, so as to enable it to proceed to the discharge of its duties. Per Martin Ch. J.</p> <p>A county was organized by setting off certain townships from existing counties. The act for that purpose was passed February 4th, 1859, and provided for an election of county officers “ at the annual township election to he held in April next” which officers were to enter upon the discharge of the’ir duties “ on the first day of June next.” But the act not having been ordered to take immediate effect, did not take effect under the Constitution until May 16th, 1859. An election was nevertheless held for county officers in April, 1859, and the persons who were chosen qualified and entered upon the discharge of the duties of county officers at the time specified.</p> <p>Held per Martin Cir. J. and Manning J. that whether this election was lawful or not, these persons were officers de facto, and the legality of their tenure of office could only be questioned in a direct proceeding for that purpose, to which they were parties. Where there is an office, all that is required to make an officer defacto is that the individual claiming the office be in possession of it, performing its duties, and claiming to bo such officer under color of an election or appointment, as the case may be.</p> <p>But per Campbell J., Christiancy J. concurring, there can be no officer de facto where no officer de jure is provided for. To give the law any force it must be held to apply to the annual election next after it took effect, and prior to that time the law would negative the idea that there could be lawful incumbents of the county offices.</p>

<p>Error to Shiawassee Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal in Chancery from Washtenaw Circuit.</p>

Parsons took judgment against Trombly in the Court below, by confession, upon a note dated July 9th, 1861. Below the note upon the same sheet of paper was the warrant of attorney, which was dated July 16th, 1861, and authorized judgment to be entered up, “on the promissory note hereto attached,” on any day after September 3d, 1861.

Gougb was the bolder of several orders, drawn in 1854, by tbe highway commissioners of ZilwauMe, on tbe treasurer of that township, directing him to pay to one Russell or bearer certain moneys mentioned therein, out of any moneys in tbe treasury belonging to road district number one. At tbe bottom of each order was a certificate, signed by tbe commissioners, that tbe sum was given for labor performed or materials furnished for ¿said road district.

, Circuit Court Commissioner for the'county of Wayne. Robbins presented to the Circuit Court Commissioner an application in the following words: “ To E. Palmer, Esq., Circuit Court Commissioner, Wayne county, Michigan. “The application of William W. Robbins shows, that on the 22d June, 1857, one Edward Osborne sued out of the Circuit Court for the county of Wayne, a writ of attachment against the goods, &c., of this applicant, and annexed thereto an affidavit that this…

<p>Error to Genesee Circuit. The case, so far as passed upon, will be found stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiffs in error as the acceptors of a bill. of exchange, drawn by C. A. Trowbridge, upon them, for §1,304,22, dated Cincinnati, April 12th, 1858, and payable at the office of E. G. Burkam &¡ Co., at six months, with ten per cent interest.

Appeal in Chancery from. Ionia Circuit. The bill was filed by Richard Dye, John O. Dexter and Stephen F. Page, against Loomis Mann and James Pattee, and set forth: That prior to September 5, 1854, Looomis Mann and David Morse had been partners as hardware merchants at Ionia; that on that day they dissolved their copartnership, and Mann, by an instrument under his hand and seal, agreed with Morse to pay all of the indebtedness of the firm, and to save Morse harmless from the…

Appeal in Chancery from Ionia Circuit. The bill was filed in aid of an execution against Orson S. Kendrick. It set forth, that said Orson became indebted to complainants in May, 1857; that in September, 1857, they recovered judgment against him on this indebtedness, in the Circuit Court for Ionia county, and caused execution on their judgment to be levied upon certain lands in said county.

Appeal in Chancery from Ionia Circuit. The bill was filed to foreclose a mortgage, which was given by Martin A. Nash and Hiram T. Barstow, as collateral to the following bond executed by them to complainants. “Know all men by these presents, that we, Martin A. Nash and Hiram T. Barstow, of Ionia county, Michigan, are held and firmly bound unto Frederick Hall and Stephen F. Page, of the same place, in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, to which payment well and truly to…

Petition for a Mandamus. The petition showed that the relator was a justice of the peace of the city of Detroit; that he presented his bill for services as such Justice in criminal cases to the Board of Auditors of Wayne county, including therein certain charges for taking down testimony; Ms oath to the correctness of the whole being attached.

On Exceptions from the Recorder’s Court of Detroit, where defendant was convicted on an information of which the following is a copy: “State of Michigan, County of Wayne: January Term, A. D. 1862; Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit.

The action was brought hy Dow & Fowler against Chamberlain & Thomas to recover the price of a threshing machine.

On the trial in that Court, the plaintiff called the defendant as a witness, who 'testified as follows: “Sometime in the month of August, 1860, the plaintiff was in the warehouse of GL O. Williams & Co. in the city of Detroit. Plaintiff offered to bet me one hundred dollars that Stephen A. Douglas would be elected President of the United States at the next ensuing presidential election.

Rachel J. Zane, the wife of defendant, died in December, 1860, and plaintiff ivas appointed administrator on her estate by the Probate Court of Cass county, where the parties resided at the time of her decease. As such administrator he brought trover against defendant, for the conversion of a promissory note and certain articles of household goods and wearing apparel alleged to have belonged to Mrs. Zane in her lifetime.

<p>Appeal by respondents from the Genesee Circuit in Chancery.</p>

Case made after judgment from Lapeer Circuit. Action upon the guaranty of a note. To maintain his action, Barman gave in ^evidence the note in the following words: “Six months after date, for value received I promise to pay to James Carhartt or bearer, two hundred dollars, with use: to secure the above payment I have this day executed a mortgage to said Carhartt.

<p>The' last clause of §25 of the Act concerning Churches and .Religious Societies, &o. (Oom/p. L. § 2033), which makes void certain bequests to the amount of one hundred dollars or more, made by last will to religious societies, unless the will is proved in open oourt by three subscribing witnesses, does not apply to wills executed before the act took effect; and consequently bequests to religious societies to the amount of one hundred dollars or more, made by a will executed before that time, and having two subscribing witnesses only, may be valid notwithstanding the death of the testator occurred after the act took effect.</p>

<p>The interest of a mortgagee in lands is not subject to attachment.</p> <p>Where lands are conveyed by deed absolute on its face, for the purpose of securing a debt, and a written defeasance is given back by the grantee, and the deed is recorded but the defeasance is not, such defeasance is not made void by the statute (Comp. L. §2751), except as to purchasers for a valuable consideration, without actual notice of its existence.</p> <p>An attaching creditor is not a purchaser within the meaning of the recording laws, until the property attached has been sold in pursuance of law, and purchased in.’ by him.</p> <p>The provision in the attachment law, that “ Real estate shall be bound, and the attachment shall be a lien thereon, from the time when it was attached, if a certified copy of the attachment, with a description of such real estate, shall be deposited in the office of- the Register of Deeds” “within three days after such real estate was attached,” only gives the creditor a lien on the debtor’s attachable interest in the lands, and in no way interferes with the previously acquired rights of third persons. ♦</p>

<p>Bill to redeem from a conveyance claimed to foe a mortgage. The "bill was not filed until thirty-four years after the maturity of the mortgage, which the bill alleges to have remained unpaid, and twenty-four years after the grantee had sold and conveyed the land. A party seeking to redeem after such a lapse of time, is bound to show affirmatively in his bill such facts as will establish the instrument as continuing in force and subject to redemption.</p> <p>The bill showed that the grantee in the mortgage - conveyance, and those claiming under him, had claimed and disposed of the premises as absolute owners for more than twenty years, and that possession had been had under them. It averred that the possession had not been continuous and adverse for twenty years’ but did not sbow that it was taken within that time. No excuse was shown for „ the delay in applying to redeem, and it was AeZcZ/that the averments in the bill were too uncertain to found a right to redeem upon.</p>

Trudo replevied of Anderson a horse. The case was tried by the Circuit Judge, without a jury, and the following is the finding: “ 1st. That the plaintiff was, in the month of July, 1860, in Canada West, the owner of the horse in question; that for several years before that time the plaintiff had been a laborer in the employ of one John McAlister, in Canada West, and left the horse upon the premises of said John McAlister, in Canada West, to be sold by said McAlister; that,…

<p>Wlien a case made after judgment in the Circuit Court is settled and filed with the clerk of that court, either party desiring action upon it may cause it to he certified to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>The Supreme Court cannot dismiss a case made after judgment which has never been transmitted to and filed in that Court.</p>

Washburn, his wife, as follows: “ State of Michigan, Washtenaw Gounty, ss.: The Circuit Court for the County of Washtenaw.

<p>Error to Washtenaw Circuit.</p>

<p>Where a highway is laid out through the lands of an individual, and his damages are appraised, and an order «on the township treasurer is tendered for the amount, the order must designate the payee, so as to show on its face the person to whom it is payable.</p> <p>An order payable “to tbe owner or occupant, or to the person entitled thereto, for the land so taken,” is not a compliance with the statute, and its tender does not authorize the highway commissioners to take possession of the land</p>

Appeal in Chancery from Lenawee Circuit. The bill was filed to cancel certain tax titles, held by defendant, of lands which he occupied, but which were claimed by complainant; and also for an injunction to restrain waste upon the lands. Defendant demurred generally, for want of equity.

Information in the nature of a quo warranto, to forfeit the rights and franchises of the defendants. The plea of the defendants set up their incorporation under the General Plank Road Act of 1851, and averred a compliance with all the provisions and requirements of law to constitute them a body politic and corporate.

On case made from Clinton Circuit. Lee commenced proceedings before tbe Circuit Court Commissioner for Clinton county, to recover possession of certain premises held by Mason, and which Lee claimed under the foreclosure by Bacon, his grantor, of a mortgage given by one Vansice, from- whom Mason derived title. The mortgage was of three several parcels of land, two of which were adjoining, and the other a mile or more distant.

On the fourth day of August, 1854, Nathaniel P. Jacobs purchased of Charles Seymour certain premises in the city of Detroit, for the purchase price of which he gave to said Seymour his bond, in the penal sum of $20,000, conditioned for the payment of $10,000 as follows: $500 on the fourth day of August in each of the following years: 1856, 1857, 1858, 1859 and 1860; and $1,500 on the fourth day of August in each of the following years: 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864 and 1865;…

Clair Circuit, where the defendants in error recovered judgment in ejectment against plaintiff in error.

<p>Appeal in Chancery from Kent Circuit.</p>

On December 2d, 1859, a decree of divorce was made by said Circuit Court in Chancery, in favor of said Eliza A. Perkins, and the • sum of $1,000 ordered to be paid to her by said Sebra Perkins as alimony. The decree for alimony was soon afterwards sold by her to one Renwick.

Nelson, suing for the use and benefit of Thomas D. Dewey and John Stewart, recovered judgment against the plaintiff in error, in an action of assumpsit. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Case made after judgment from Saginaw Circuit. The action was trover, brought by Stephenson against William L. P. Little, M'oses B. Hess and Daniel Boutell, for a quantity of saw logs. Plea, the general issue. It appeared in evidence that in the winter of 1856-7 plaintiff got out and-'haulea upon Potobaco lake and its outlet some 2,600 pine saw logs. A portion of these was cut on and owned by the plaintiff, and others upon land belonging to the Government.

<p>An appeal in chancery will not he dismissed for the failure of the Register to cause a copy of the record to be transmitted to this Court within the time provided by the statute, if'such copy is aotually filed’before the motion to dismiss is made.</p> <p>IT or will it he dismissed for the failure on the part of the appellant to serve notioe thereof on oo-defendants, as required by Supreme Court Rule 14, when such failure is sufficiently excused.</p>

The bill was filed by Wureherer to foreclose a mortgage given to him by defendant, William A. Hewitt, to sfecure tbe purchase price of the mortgaged premises. The mortgage was dated June 14, 1856, but was not recorded until August 20, 1856.

Complainant, as administratrix of Mary Eisenlord, filed her bill to foreclose a mortgage given to said Mary by her son, Spencer Eisenlord, June 28, 1845, conditioned that the said Spencer Eisenlord should support and maintain said Mary, from the date of said mortgage, during her natural life, and furnish her with all proper and necessary board, meat, food, drinks and lodgings, together with all proper nursing, medicine, and medical attendance in sickness, and to provide and…

<p>Error to Saginaw Circuit. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Allison brought suit against Chandler, and declared in trespass as follows: “For that the said defendant, on- the fourth day of August, 1860, and on divers other days and times between that day and the time of commencing this suit, with force and arms broke into and entered a certain store of the plaintiff, situated and being in the city of Detroit and county of Wayne aforesaid, and known as number one hundred and seventy-six, on the south side of Jefferson Avenue, in said…

Replevin by Derbyshire for one hundred bushels of wheat. On the trial, plaintiff, to show title to the wheat, introduced in evidence the docket entries in a suit before a justice of the peace, between himself as plaintiff, and Joseph T. Church as defendant, which suit appeared by the entries to have been commenced by summons which was returned served: and it further appeared that on the return day the parties appeared; that plaintiff declared on a promissory note, and that…

<p>Where trover is brought for the conversion of a promissory note, plaintiff is entitled to prove the existence and contents of the note, without giving defendant notice to produce it.</p> <p>Where a case has beon tried in the Circuit Court without a jury, and improper evidence has been received, and it is then removed to the Supreme Court for review upon the whole facts, that Court will not reverse the judgment for the admission of the improper evidence, if there is sufficient of an unexceptionable character to sustain it.</p> <p>Where defendant has converted a promissory note belonging to plaintiff, and the Court is satisfied the note was available at its nominal amount to the plaintiff, he may recover that amount, notwithstanding the maker is proved not to have property from which collection might be enforced by execution.</p>

<p>Trust estates are not liable to levy and sale on execution.</p> <p>Under tho Revised Statutes of 1838 a sale of lands on execution did not divest the titlo of tho judgment debtor until consummated by a deed.</p> <p>Where a complainant in Chancery has stated his case defectively, and no demurrer has been interposed, but defendant has only claimed the benefit of a demurrer, by his answer, and the case is brought to a hearing on pleadings and proofs, it may be proper to allow the defect in tho bill to be corrected at tho hearing if the proofs show complainant entitled to relief.</p> <p>The time for redemption on sales under said Revised Statutes was to be computed exclusive of the day on which the sale was made.</p> <p>A deed to consummate an execution sale, executod before the time of redemption ha6 expired, is void.</p> <p>The act of Congress of May 19th, 1828, adopting for the final prooess of the United States Courts the laws of the several States on the subject, having by the act of August 1, 1842, been mado applicable to the States afterwards admitted, is to have the same effect in the new States as if originally adopted at the last mentioned date. It is therefore to be construed as adopting such laws of Michigan on the subject as were in force August 1, 1842.</p> <p>On sales made by the. United States Marshal in Michigan on demands accruing in 1842, for moneys collected by a publio officer, or for misconduct or neglect in office, two years redemption was allowed.</p> <p>Whore suit was brought against a public officer, for balances reported against him at three several times, it was held that the action must be deemed to have accrued against him at the date of the last balance.</p>

The action was replevin, brought by Phillips for a wagon, which had belonged to one George W. Phillips, who had mortgaged it with other property to James B. Harvey, and afterwards sold it to Moses B. Hess, who sold it to the plaintiff below. Woodruff had become owner of the mortgage, and had taken the wagon upon it.

<p>A. sued out of the Circuit Court an attachment, which was levied upon the property of his debtor. At the time of suing it out, only about eleven dollar# of his demand was due, but he subsequently recovered judgment for the whole amount on the debtor’s admission. B. also sued out an attachment against the debtor, which was levied on the same property after that of A., but he recovered judgment first, and caused execution to be levied on the property. B. then filed a bill in Chancery to have his lien decreed to have priority over that of A. It was held:</p> <p>1. That complainant by his attachment acquired a lien on the property, subject only to any lien which A. could lawfully hold under the statute; and that this lien of complainant could not be affected by a subsequent recovery of a judgment to which he was not a party.</p> <p>2. That he had a right to show, notwithstanding A.’s judgment, that the demand for which it was rendered was not due when the attachment was sued out.</p> <p>3. That less than a hundred dollars being due A. when his attachment was sued out, the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction; aad the whole amount of A.’s judgment was postponed to B.’s lien.</p> <p>Complainant included in his judgment a demand which he believed to be due, but which was not so. It was held that he did not, by so including it, debar himself of the right to have his priority protected in equity as to the amount included which actually was due.</p> <p>Held further, that the question of priority between A.’s judgment and that portion of B.’s which was not due when his attachment was sued out, must bo determined by the levy of execution ; and B.’s being first levied, gave him the first lien.</p> <p>A chattel mortgage was given in evidence which purported to be given to securo a certain promissory note. A note of tho description was not produced, but one of a different date was offered as the one designed to bo secured It was held that the filing of the mortgage was not notice of any other claim than the one described in it.</p>

Edmund A. -Wetmore, Treasurer of the New York State Lunatic Asylum, brought assumpsit in the Circuit Court for the county of Cass, against Henry Aldrich and Ezra B. Warner, upon the following contract, upon which he claimed to recover for the board of George F. Gardner at said asylum, from February 1st, 1860, to February 21st, 1861, at five dollars per week; for clothing furnished him between said days to the amount of $16.21, and for the expense of removing him to Cass…

On the tenth day of June 1862, William A, Nelson presented to the Commissioner a petition, duly verified, of which the following is a copy: “ Circuit Court for the County of Wayne.— William A. Nelson ads. Oliver M. JByde.

Case made after judgment, from Livingston Circuit. The action was ejectment, brought to recover the undivided one-fourth of certain lands, claimed by plaintiff as one of the heirs of Orrilla Gugins. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendant had judgment below.

<p>Where one pays a mortgage as the agent and with the funds of the mortgagor, and instead of having it discharged, causes it to be assigned as security for a debt owing by himself, the assiguoe cannot hold the mortgage as against the mortgagor or his heirs.</p> <p>$Jor can any one who takes an assignment from the assignee thereby acquire any better title than the assignee himself .had.</p> <p>Whero a mortgage has been assigned, any equities between the assignee and the mortgagor affect the mortgage in the hands of any subsequent assignee.</p> <p>A petition by the guardian of a minor to the Probate Court for license to sell lands of his ward, stating that a part only of the land was under improvement and the balance unproductive; that it is necessary a portion of the proceeds of the land should be used to pay certain (lfbts incurred in behalf of the ward, and that in the opinion of the petitioner it w> uld be for the interest of the minor to have the land sold, and the proceeds, after paying the debts, put out at interest, is a sufficient compliance with the statute.</p>

Appeal in Chancery from Oakland Circuit. The facts which may be considered as proved, or admitted, in this cause, are as follows: John N. Pettibone brought an action in the Circuit Court for Oakland county, against the Novi and White Lake Plank Road Company, upon a written contract with, said company for the building by John N. of a portion of the road of said company; and in December, 1854, recovered a verdict against the company in that action.

Case made after judgment from St. Joseph Circuit. Elizabeth .King, the wife' of Amos S. King, brought an action of trespass against Moore, before a justice of the peace, for the taking of certain corn and potatoes, and corn fodder, on an execution against said Amos — the said articles being claimed as exempt from execution.

<p>Error to Kent Circuit. The facts are fully stated in the opinion.</p>