¶1I respectfully dissent. In my view, Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress defendant’s post-Miranda statements, which were part of a single custodial police interrogation that began before warnings were administered and continued without a pronounced break. Defendant was intoxicated at the time of his arrest and was interrogated following a 19 hour detention.
¶2The New York Constitution grants broader protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in cases involving successive interrogations where a Mirandized statement is preceded by an improper, un-Mirandized admission (see People v Bethea, 67 NY2d 364, 368 [1986]). The view of the U.S. Supreme Court, as expressed in Oregon v Elstad (470 US 298 [1985]), is that, once Miranda warnings are given, the “taint” of a prior, unwarned statement is dissipated, rendering the subsequent statement admissible at trial. The Supreme Court concluded that:
“[A] careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible. The warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the suspect’s choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an ‘act of free will’ ” (id. at 310-311).
¶3In contrast, this Court has stated that, “where an improper, unwarned statement gives rise to a subsequent Mirandized statement as part of a ‘single continuous chain of events,’ there is inadequate assurance that the Miranda warnings were effective in protecting a defendant’s rights, and the warned statement must also be suppressed” (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130 [2005]). The factors to be considered in determining whether there is a “single continuous chain of events” include
“the time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent admission; whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper ques*294tioning; and whether, prior to the Miranda violation, defendant had indicated a willingness to speak to police” {id. at 130-131).
¶4While “[n]o one factor is determinative and each case must be viewed on its unique facts” (id. at 131), this Court has stated that the purpose of the inquiry is to assess whether “there was a sufficiently ‘definite, pronounced break in the interrogation’ to dissipate the taint from the Miranda violation” (id., quoting People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]).
¶5As the majority notes, the Appellate Division’s determination that defendant was subjected to a brief period of custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent prior to receiving Miranda warnings is a mixed question of law and fact that must be affirmed unless no record basis exists for this conclusion (see Paulson, 5 NY3d at 129; People v Cruz, 90 NY2d 961, 962 [1997]). In my view, record support exists for the Appellate Division’s conclusion that defendant was interrogated because, prior to advising defendant of his Miranda rights the detectives asked defendant if he wanted to “tell his side of the story” after showing him a picture of the victim and telling him that he was murdered “in cold blood, or there was a reason for it.” As the Appellate Division noted, such questioning was likely to elicit an incriminating response from defendant.
¶6Furthermore, the fact that defendant’s pr e-Miranda statement was not incriminating does not eliminate the need to determine whether the sessions were part of a “single continuous chain of events.” Adopting such a principle would significantly alter this Court’s Chapple-Bethea rule by rendering it inapplicable in all cases except where the defendant confesses or implicates himself in a crime prior to receiving Miranda warnings. If the pre- and post-Miranda interrogations are part of a “single continuous chain of events,” there still exists “inadequate assurance that the Miranda warnings were effective in protecting a defendant’s rights” (Paulman, 5 NY3d at 130), even if defendant does not make an incriminating statement prior to receiving Miranda warnings. Concluding that only inculpatory statements trigger the “single continuous chain of events” rule would not, in my opinion, adequately deter prolonged, un-Mirandized police interrogation.
¶7Applying the Paulmanfactors to determine whether the questioning of defendant was part of a “single continuous chain of events,” it seems clear that there was no pronounced break between the pre-Miranda statement by defendant (in which he *295agreed to tell the detectives “everything” if they brought him cigarettes and Pepsi) and his post -Miranda confession. The same detectives performed the interrogation before and after administration of the Miranda warnings (in fact, one detective remained with defendant while the cigarettes and soft drink were being retrieved) and there was no change in the location or nature of the interrogation (see Paulman, 5 NY3d at 130-131). Further, unlike the case in Paulman, where the Court noted that the defendant had previously expressed a willingness to speak with the police prior to the Miranda violation, there is no indication here that defendant wished to speak with the police before the Miranda violation occurred. Accordingly, in my view, defendant’s post -Miranda statements should have been suppressed.
¶8Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur with Judge Ciparick; Judge Pigott dissents in a separate opinion.
¶9Order affirmed.