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← 10 SW3D 205 - Luster v. State

Luster v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2000

Citation profile

20
cited by 20 later decisions
1
states following
March 2017
most recently cited

20 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Johnson v. Zerbst · Rose v. Clark · Patton v. United States · Lewis v. Gober

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The defendant may, with assent of the court, waive a trial by jury and submit the trial of any criminal case to the court, whose findings shall have the force and effect of the verdict of a jury. In felony cases such waiver by the defendant shall be made in open court and entered of record.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “To satisfy the performance prong of the Strickland test, so as to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the [movant] was required to allege facts, not conclusions, which were not refuted by the record and demonstrated that his trial counsel, before waiving the [mov-ant’s] right to a jury trial, was required, but failed, to advise him of this right and obtain his voluntary consent to waive it. Although in advising the [movant] of his right to a jury trial, his trial counsel was not required to use any specific terminology or insure that he had the same appreciation of such right as a member of the legal profession, he did have an obligation to explain the right to reasonably insure that the [movant] had an ‘awareness of the meaning, incidents and benefits of a trial by jury and the implications and consequences of waiver of the right.’”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “the purpose of [Rule 27.01(b) ] is to ensure that the defendant’s waiver is not allowed until the trial court is satisfied that the waiver is knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. Although acquiescence, under certain circumstances, can constitute a waiver of a fundamental right, acquiescence cannot be presumed, and every reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged by the court.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.