Case: 23-10725 Document: 43-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 23-10725
FILED
April 30, 2024
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
In re Levi Rudder, Clerk
Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:23-MC-4
______________________________
Before Jones, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Pro se Appellant Levi Rudder challenges the district court’s imposition of sanctions on him for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in a
criminal proceeding. Rudder argues that the district court lacked the authority to impose these sanctions. We AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
On the Government’s motion, the district court held a hearing to allow Levi Rudder to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for the unauthorized practice of law. The court found that Rudder, who is not admitted
to any bar or licensed to practice law, contacted a represented detainee facing
federal firearm charges in the district court and attempted to interject himself
into the case. Despite defense counsel’s instruction to Rudder that he should
not contact the detainee again, Rudder, among other things, engaged in an
unprivileged, monitored video meeting with the detainee, offered the
Case: 23-10725 Document: 43-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/30/2024
No. 23-10725
detainee legal advice, and encouraged the detainee to sign a form appointing
Rudder as his additional counsel. As such, the court determined that Rudder
had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Having made these findings, the court exercised its inherent powers
and ordered Rudder to pay a monetary sanction of $500 and barred him from
filing documents in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas without first obtaining the court’s permission.1 The court also:
(1) admonished Rudder that it is illegal to practice law without a law license
and that doing so could subject him to additional sanctions; (2) ordered Rudder to cease his unauthorized practice of law; and (3) informed the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the State of Texas of the sanctions imposed against Rudder in this case. Rudder appeals from that order.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Rudder argues that the Constitution does not afford federal courts inherent powers to sanction individuals for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and, therefore, the district court erred in sanctioning
him. But federal courts have the inherent power to police the conduct of litigants and attorneys who appear before them. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 43-46,
111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132–33 (1991) (“[A] federal court has the
power to control admission to its bar[.]”); see also In re Stone,
986 F.2d 898,
902 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Generally, a party “cannot be represented
by a nonlawyer[.]” Raskin ex rel. JD v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
69 F.4th 280,
283 (5th Cir. 2023) (discussing
28 U.S.C. § 1654) (citation and quotations
omitted). Indeed, requiring “a minimum level of competence protects not
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1
This filing bar does not encompass a separate case in the Northern District of
Texas which was pending at the time the district court sanctioned Rudder and in which
Rudder was a party.
2
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No. 23-10725
only the [client] but also his or her adversaries and the court from poorly
drafted, inarticulate, or vexatious claims.” Id. at 286 (alteration in original)
(quotations and citation omitted). “It follows logically,” then, “that a federal court’s power to regulate and discipline attorneys appearing before it extends to conduct by nonlawyers amounting to practicing law without a license.” United States v. Johnson,
327 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
United States v. Jones, No. 21-3252,
2023 WL 1861317, at *10 (6th Cir. Feb.
9, 2023); cf. Priestley v. Astrue,
651 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The district court . . . has the authority to regulate [the unauthorized practice of law]
through local rules and an array of appropriate sanctions.”). Thus, a court
may resort to its inherent powers to sanction a person engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Johnson,
327 F.3d at 560.
Having carefully reviewed Rudder’s brief and the record, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions.2
See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 55,
111 S. Ct. at 2138; Ben E. Keith Co. v. Dining
All., Inc.,
80 F.4th 695, 701–02 (5th Cir. 2023).
AFFIRMED.
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2
Rudder’s only argument is that the district court lacked authority to sanction him.
To the extent he challenges the propriety of the sanctions for some other reason, he
inadequately briefed this additional reason and therefore forfeited it. See Rollins v. Home
Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument . . . by failing
to adequately brief the argument on appeal.”); see also FED. R. APP. P. 28(a).
3
