100 F. Supp. 2d 647 - Jamison v. Collins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Principles of comity necessary to a federal system narrow a federal court’s review of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a state prisoner. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The Supreme Court explains that “[u]nder our federal system, the federal and the state ‘courts [are] equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the [Constitution.’ ” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 , 102 S.Ct. 1198 , 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 , 6 S.Ct. 734 , 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886)); see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting same). Thus, to ensure the states an opportunity to protect these rights, the doctrine of procedural default requires that the state courts retain “the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner’s [sic] rights.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 . The doctrine of procedural default provides that, if a state court previously dismisses a state prisoner’s federal claim on the grounds that the prisoner failed to comply with a state procedural rule, then a federal court ordinarily cannot consider the merits of that federal claim. Id. at 729-730 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 . This procedural default doctrine bars federal habeas review of a state court ruling only if the following requirements have been satisfied: (1) the petitioner actually violated an applicable state procedural rule; (2) the procedural violation provides an “adequa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 604 F. Supp. 2d 1003 - Sheppard v. Bagley

2. “The United States Constitution guarantees a state criminal defendant a right to a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 , 81 S.Ct. 1639 , 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (noting that every state guarantees a criminal defendant a right to a jury trial and that this right encompasses the right to an impartial jury); see also Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.1990). Therefore, when a petitioner asks a federal court on habeas corpus review to examine his voir dire, the focus is on whether the decisions reached by the trial court during the voir dire prevented the empaneling of an impartial jury. See Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 844 (1999); see also Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 423 , 105 S.Ct. 844 . The voir dire requires a trial judge to determine juror bias based on a prospective juror’s demeanor, inflection, and responses to a particular flow of questioning. Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.1990); see also McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1321 (6th Cir.1996). Because the trial court’s credibility decisions become “historical factfs]”, these decisions are subject to the presumption of correctness found in Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 429-30 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , and “may ‘be overturned only for manifest error.’ ” Hill, 199 F.3d at 843 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 , 104 S.Ct. 2885 , 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (citing Irvin, 36”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 141 F. Supp. 2d 811 - Jackson v. Anderson

3. “Mitigating factors are factors that, while they do not justify or excuse the crime of aggravated murder, nevertheless may be considered by you as extenuating, lessening, weakening, excusing to some extent or reducing the degree of the defendant’s culpability. The Ohio Revised Code enumerates the mitigating factors, some of which may not apply in this matter. These factors include but are not limited to the following: one, the nature and circumstances of the offense; two, the history, character and background of the offender; three, whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it; four, whether it is unlikely the offense would have been committed but for the fact the defendant was under duress, coercion or strong provocation; five, whether at the time of committing the offense the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law; six, the youth of the offender; seven, the offender’s lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications; eight, if the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender, the degree of the offender’s participation in the offense and the degree of the offender’s participation in the acts that led to the death of the victim; nine, any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 141 F. Supp. 2d 811 - Jackson v. Anderson