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100 N.Y. 12

2 N.E 388

Zorntlein v. . Bram

New York Court of Appeals

Decided October 6, 1885

New York Court of Appeals · decided 1885-10-06

(Mem. of decision below, 17 J. & S. 476.) This was an action for partition. In 1878 the property in question was conveyed to Jacob Bram and Babeta Bram, his wife. On September 23, 1881, said Babeta Bram executed a deed purporting to convey an undivided one-half of the premises to plaintiff. On September 30, 1881, said Jacob and Babeta Bram joined in a deed of the premises to defendant, George A. Bram.

Relies on Bertles v. . Nunan

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1885-10-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently May 2009 · most notably In re the Estate of Sitkin (1934), Jones v. Williams (1920)

39 state decisions

1501885189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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*15 Rapallo, J.

¶1 This case is controlled by the decision in Bertles v. Nunan (92 N. Y. 152). The common-law rule, that when land is conveyed to husband and wife they do not take as tenants in common, or as joint tenants, but each becomes seized of the entirety, jper tout and no't per my, and that on the death of either the whole survives to the other, was held in that case to be still subsisting in this State, notwithstanding the acts in relation to married women. The act of 1880 (Chap. 472), which allows husband and wife to make division between themselves of lands thus held, was before us in that case, but was not regarded as abrogating the former rule. At all events it could not affect the title in question in this action as the conveyance to Jacob Bram and his wife was made in 1878. The seizin of the entirety by each, and the right of survivorship, could not be divested by a subsequent statute, as those rights vested by virtue of the grant and not of mere succession. The act of 1880 could not, therefore, so operate as to authorize either the husband or wife separately to convey to a third party. The deed executed by Mrs. Bram to the plaintiff conveyed no title and he could not maintain an action for partition.

¶2 The exceptions to the conclusions of the referee to the contrary are well taken and require a reversal of the judgment.

¶3 It is unnecessary to discuss the extraneous questions raised in the respondent’s points as to the circumstances attending the purchase of the property. ,

¶4 Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.

¶5 All concur.

¶6 Judgment reversed.

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