United States v. Steffens’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

184 federal appellate · 71 district · 63 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 640 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We are therefore directly called upon to decide whether a penal statute, enacted by Congress with its limited powers, which is in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional jurisdiction, can be limited by judicial construction so as to make it operate only on that which Congress may rightfully prohibit and punish. For this purpose, we must take these sections of the statute as they are. We are not able to reject a part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, if there be any such, from that which is not. The proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or disregarding words that are in the section, but by inserting those that are not now there. Each of the sections must stand as a whole, or fall altogether. The language is plain. There is no room for construction, unless it be as to the effect of the Constitution. The question, then, to be determined, is whether we can introduce words of limitation into a penal statute, so as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is general only. It would certainly be dangerous if the Legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. * * * To limit this ”

   13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Employers' Liability Cases · Poindexter v. Greenhow

2. ““The question, therefore, whether the trade-mark bears such a relation to commerce in general terms as to bring it within congressional control, where used or applied to the classes of commerce 'which fail 'within that control, is one which, in the present case, we propose to leave undecided. We adopt this course because when this court is called on in the course of the administration of the law to consider whether an act of Congress, or of any other department of the government, is within the constitutional authority of that department, a due respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government-requires that we shall decide that it has transcended its powers only when that is so plain that we cannot avoid the duly. , “In such cases it is manifestly the dictate of wisdom and Judicial propriety to decide no more than is necessary to the case in hand. That such has been (he uniform course of this court in regard to statutes passed by Congress will readily appear to any one who will consider the vast amount of argument presented to us assailing them as unconstitutional, and he will count, as lie may do on his fingers, the instances in which this court lias declared an act of Congress void for want of constitutional power. “Governed by this view of our duty, we proceed to remark that a glance at the commerce clause of tlie Constitution discloses at once wliat has been often the subject of comment in this court and out of it, that the power of regulation there conferred on Congress ”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Employers' Liability Cases · Lottery Case

3. ““The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery. * * * It is often the result of accident rather than design, and when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way essential to the right conferred by that act. If we should endeavor to classify it under the head of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong. In this, as in regard to inventions, originality is required. And while the word ■writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of mtelleetual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.””

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Higgins v. Keuffel · Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.