¶1(dissenting) — The majority summarily rejects what I perceive to be the real issue in this case— whether a defendant who has raised an issue in a prior personal restraint petition, considered by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, may then raise the same issue concerning the same crime during a habitual criminal proceeding. There is no reason to reach the question of nongovernmental coercion and thus I express no opinion on the majority's discussion of that issue.
¶2Additionally, I cannot fully agree with the majority's discussion in part II of its opinion.
¶3I
¶4The chronology of the various court proceedings in this case is important to the first issue. The hearing at which petitioner pleaded guilty to robbery and kidnapping in 1976 lasted some 36 minutes and encompassed 25 pages of transcript. It included not only colloquy between counsel, judge and defendant, but also sworn testimony of the arresting officer. Never have I seen a more thorough proceeding for the taking of a plea. To summarize the events testified to, Frederick and one Griffin, in Frederick's car, with Frederick's father's 357 magnum robbed a gas station, took the gas station attendant hostage, drove him from the scene and released him unharmed. Frederick and Griffin were sighted near the scene of the crime within a short time *563of the robbery. Later, after being advised of his rights, Frederick admitted the crime, recovered the gun for the officers and implicated Griffin. At the plea hearing Frederick admitted the officers' testimony to that effect was substantially correct and in his own words reiterated that he
drove into the gas station, stopped, waited a few minutes, had the other guy get out with the gun waved around, got the money, got back in the car. We took off with the guy in back and let him out and that was it.
¶5The court inquired at great length as to the voluntariness of the plea and as to any other comments Frederick had. He criticized his lawyer at that time, and expressed unhappiness with his lawyer's performance in that he made comments concerning the defendant he didn't appreciate. Frederick freely expressed his dissatisfaction to the judge concerning the judge's previous decision that his confession would be admissible against him at trial. He voiced complaints that that decision was predetermined or "fixed". Frederick did not voice any fear from any source at that time. He undoubtedly knew that conviction would be inevitable as a result of his confession being ruled admissible for trial. He was obviously making one final attempt to persuade the court to reconsider its decision regarding the admissibility of the confession. That attempt being unsuccessful, the defendant considered his alternatives and pleaded guilty.
¶6When Frederick refused to testify against him, his code-fendant, Griffin, was found not guilty. It was then that Frederick apparently felt he made a poor choice in pleading guilty. Because it was too late to file an appeal, he filed a personal restraint petition challenging the voluntariness of his plea. He alleged for the first time that his codefendant had coerced him into pleading guilty.
¶7The Court of Appeals considered Frederick's assertion that he feared for his life and thus pleaded guilty, as well as the entire record surrounding the plea, and dismissed the petition as being frivolous. RAP 16.11(b). The facts of Mr. *564Frederick's claim were in the petition and record. The majority totally ignores that in addition to this review by the Court of Appeals, our Supreme Court Commissioner reviewed the entire personal restraint petition and verbatim report of proceedings in upholding the dismissal. RAP 17.6. Furthermore, a department of this court, including the Chief Justice, reviewed the matter upholding the commissioner and the Court of Appeals in the disposition of the matter.
¶8Frederick, in his attempt to have the trial court in this habitual criminal proceeding reconsider his coercion claim, presented a letter from his former attorney. The letter in pertinent part reads:
As the case developed, the strongest evidence against my client was his own confession. I might add that he had told the investigating officers that he wanted to get caught. As it turns out, Mr. Frederick pleaded guilty to the charges, without any reductions or plea bargaining. Further, Mr. Frederick had told me right from the start that he did not want to testify against Mr. Griffin, because his life would be put in jeopardy when he was transferred to the Department of Institutions. This was brought up in front of the Judge and the Court determined that there were no direct threats being made against Mr. Frederick, and therefore allowed his plea to be accepted. As such, I do not believe that there is grounds [sic] for his plea to be withdrawn, but, I have always felt that he was intimidated by the prison system, especially since he had been there once before.
¶9(Italics mine.) The attorney is now deceased, which is precisely one reason why finality of judgments is so important in these cases.
¶10The trial court in the habitual criminal proceedings, in my opinion, did not emphasize the complete lack of any State involvement in the threats against Frederick in making his ruling. Majority opinion, at 553. The sentence quoted by the majority, at page 553, was taken out of an entire page of explanation given by the trial judge. He specifically included a detailed recital of the chronology of Frederick's prior personal restraint petition and concluded *565that the present challenge to this 1976 conviction raises precisely the same issue previously considered and rejected by both the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court. The court went on to say, "not only is the same legal issue presented, but the record on this motion is also the same in all respects as the record considered by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, and this court.” Thereupon the court denied the motion to suppress the 1976 conviction. The prior decisions by the Court of Appeals and this court in Frederick's case appear to me to be the reason the trial judge refused to go into the matter further.
¶11While we have recently relaxed our rules as to when and what issues may be raised when a defendant attacks a plea or conviction in a proceeding other than a direct appeal (compare In re Myers, 91 Wn.2d 120, 587 P.2d 532 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979) with In re Hews, 99 Wn.2d 80, 660 P.2d 263 (1983)), this case goes one step beyond. This petitioner had his coercion claim fully considered and should not have another opportunity to make the same claim. The majority now makes a rule that because the appellate courts do not set a personal restraint petition for hearing but dismiss it as frivolous, a petitioner may in perpetuity resubmit the same claim. I would apply the principle of judicial finality in the instant case.
¶12I am additionally concerned with the majority's lack of clear direction on a rehearing. While stating the defendant will bear a "heavy burden" (majority opinion, at 558), it fails to set out the standard. What is the standard? Beyond a reasonable doubt? Preponderance of evidence? The holding could be read in the manner urged by the petitioner that if a defendant produces some evidence, the burden shifts to the State again to prove voluntariness, thus requiring the State to produce extrinsic evidence contrary to the holding of Wood v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 501, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976).
¶13II
¶14The majority holds that "changes in the grand larceny *566statute should be ignored" in habitual offender proceedings. Majority opinion, at 561. I agree with this narrow holding. The majority, however, goes beyond this holding in two ways. First, it only allows courts to ignore those "[a]djust-ments in the value element of an offense which simply reflect inflation”. (Italics ours.) Majority opinion, at 561. The majority now apparently requires the prosecutor to prove that the Legislature made changes in applicable statutes due only to inflation with no direction as to how this is to be accomplished. The second way in which the court transgresses from its holding is to imply by torturing dictum in State v. Jackovick, 56 Wn.2d 915, 355 P.2d 976 (1960) that the general rule is different. That is, it implies that as to other crimes, it is only the present classification which is relevant. In Jackovickwe were concerned with when an out-of-state conviction could be used as a basis for habitual criminal proceedings in Washington. We merely approved a conclusion made by the trial court in instructing the jury that the out-of-state conviction '"is now and was, at the time of the claimed conviction and at all times since, a felony in the State of Washington.'" Jackovick, at 918. The Jackovickcourt did not state the rule of law espoused by the majority. Additionally, courts of all jurisdictions (not most courts, as the majority relates) as well as all three divisions of our Court of Appeals have held that reclassification of a felony as a misdemeanor or even complete decriminalization is not pertinent. Annot., Determination of Character of Former Crime as a Felony, so as To Warrant Punishment of an Accused as a Second Offender, 19 A.L.R.2d 227 (1951); State v. Ross, 30 Wn. App. 324, 634 P.2d 887 (1981); State v. Castillo, 23 Wn. App. 519, 596 P.2d 312 (1979); State v. Braxton, 20 Wn. App. 489, 580 P.2d 1116 (1978). Thus, I cannot agree with any implication that this court will hold as a general rule that the present classification of a crime is relevant in habitual criminal proceedings.
¶15The Legislature completely revised the criminal code in 1975. Requiring the prosecutor to go behind every felony *567conviction to prove its present classification would be a burdensome and totally unnecessary task. I would hold that the only reasonable conclusion is that the classification of any offense, larceny or otherwise, at the time it was committed is controlling.
¶16Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court.
¶17Rosellini, Brachtenbach, and Dore, JJ., concur with Dimmick, J.
¶18Reconsideration denied February 29, 1984.