¶1(concurring in the result) — The rule in People v. Holford, 63 Cal. 2d 74, 403 P.2d 423, 45 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1965) is the proper rule. It does not, as the majority implies, absolve a defendant who leaves the scene of an accident without knowledge of possible injury or death. The rule imposes criminal liability if a defendant should know "that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person." Holford, at 80.
¶2To impose felony liability on a defendant should require at least knowledge that a reasonable person would anticipate the collision caused injury to a person. The more serious penalty imposed by the 1980 amendment should only be given if the defendant's mental state makes him/her more culpable. This conclusion is supported by all the courts which have considered statutes similar to RCW 46.52.020. See, e.g., State v. Minkel, 89 S.D. 144, 230 N.W.2d 233 (1975); Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978); State v. Corpuz, 49 Or. App. 811, 621 P.2d 604 (1980); State v. Porras, 125 Ariz. 490, 610 P.2d 1051 (Ct. App. 1980); State v. Miller, 308 N.W.2d 4 (Iowa 1981); State v. Fearing, 304 N.C. 471, 284 S.E.2d 487 (1981).
¶3The facts here support a conclusion that, as a matter of law, a reasonable person would anticipate injury would occur. Therefore, any failure to instruct regarding the defendant's knowledge would at most be harmless error, regardless of which harmless error standard is applied.
¶4Pearson, J., concurs with Utter, J.