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101 F.3d 1323

Docket No. 96-80418.

In re Turner

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Dec. 3, 1996.

As Amended Jan. 21, 1997.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1996-12-03

Cited by 29 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2003 · most notably Slack v. McDaniel (2000), Kulvir Singh Barapind v. Janet Reno, Attorney General (2000)

26 federal appellate ·

1 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“that a petition filed after a prior petition is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies is not a 'second or successive' petition within the meaning of § 2244.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Davidson v. P Keane

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Camarano v. Irvin

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1996-12-03

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Terry M. Turner, Aiea, HA, Pro Se.

¶2Before: PREGERSON, REINHARDT and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

¶3Petitioner has filed a motion for permission to file a successive habeas corpus petition in the district court pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). Petitioner’s motion was lodged in this court on October 28, 1996 pursuant to the pre-filing review order entered in docket no. 93-80158. We hold that section 2244 does not apply to second or subsequent habeas petitions where the first petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, and we deny petitioner’s motion as unnecessary.

¶4The petition which petitioner seeks to file in the district court raises the same claims raised in his prior petition, which was dismissed by the district court without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.

¶5This court has not decided whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), as amended by the 1996 Act, applies to second or subsequent petitions where the same claims have previously been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust. See Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44 (2d Cir.1996) (permission to file successive petition under Anti-Terrorism Act not required where first petition dismissed for failure to exhaust). We hold that it does not.

¶6Consequently, petitioner may file his petition in the district court without prior per*1324mission from this court, and the motion is denied as unnecessary.

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