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← 101 F.3d 20 - Farkas v. Rumore

Farkas v. Rumore’s Empirical Analysis

101 F.3d 20 · 1996

Citation profile

29
cited by 29 later decisions
5
states following
June 2018
most recently cited

12 federal appellate · 2 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently June 2018 · most notably Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens Inc. (1998), Cody, Inc. v. Town of Woodbury (1999)

12 federal appellate · 2 district · 5 state decisions

120199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co. · Federal Trade Commission v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. · MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman · Taylor v. Continental Group Change in Control Severance Pay Plan · Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “18 The trial court in this case essentially reentered the same order it had previously entered to effectuate compliance with the first Order. "Where a judgment is reentered, and the subsequent judgment does not alter the substantive rights affected by the first judgment, the time for appeal runs from the first judgment.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Only when the lower court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a judgment previously rendered should the period within which an appeal must be taken or a petition for certiorari filed begin to run anew.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[W]here an order disposes of a party's substantive claims, but does not dispose of claims relating to attorney's fees, the time for appeal of the substantive claims starts to run from the date of the first order unless the district court explicitly grants a delay.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.