101 F. Supp. 3d 672 - Does v. Snyder’s Empirical Analysis
2015
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 4 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (§ 802 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) · 28 U.S.C. § 1341 · 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006) · 42 U.S.C. § 16911 · 42 U.S.C. § 16925 · 42 U.S.C. § 1988 · 42 U.S.C. § 3750
Relies on Landgraf v. USI Film Products · Stanley v. Illinois · Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca · Puckett v. United States · Broadrick v. Oklahoma
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[J]ust as it would be difficult to determine if a Chicagoan were standing in a place with no apparent purpose, in many circumstances, it would be difficult— perhaps not as difficult, but difficult nonetheless—to detei’mine if a[n individual] were standing in an exclusionary zone “apparently” for the specific, primary purpose of observing or contacting minors. Conduct such as a registrant starting a conversation with a minor, videotaping a minor, or standing on a playground by himself watching minors, would likely fall within the definition of “loitering” with little room for a registrant to argue ambiguity. However, it remains ambiguous whether a registrant may attend a school movie night where he intends only to watch the screen, or a parent-teacher conference where students may be present. The Morales plurality explained that “the purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law [because] ![n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.’ ” 527 U.S. at 57 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939)). [The statute’s] present definition of “loiter” is sufficiently vague as to prevent ordinary people us ing common sense from being able to determine whether Plaintiffs are, in fact, prohibited from engaging in the conduct from which Plaintiffs have refrained.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“neither prohibits registrants from engaging in any particular speech on the Internet, nor does it unmask registrants' anonymity to the public.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Ex parte Odom“electronic mail or instant message address, or any other designations used in internet communications or postings”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Ex parte Odom
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.