¶1dissenting:
¶2In my judgment, disbarment is the only appropriate discipline for attorneys who repeatedly engage in dishonest or deceitful behavior. This court has frequently stated that disbarment is warranted when the intentional misrepresentation which occurred here is established. (In re Schneider (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 215, 224; In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 324; In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 276.) This is especially true when, as here, the misrepresentations are directed towards the attorney’s clients and accompanied by other acts of misconduct. (In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 9-13; In re Smith (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 134, 136-42; In re Frey (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 130, 131-32.) The majority’s suggestion that respondent’s conduct was not fraudulent is clearly indefensible in light of our recent statement that fraud includes “ '… anything calculated to deceive … whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence, by word of mouth or by look or gesture.’ ” (In re Armentrout (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 242, 251.) Too, the court has always considered an attorney’s prior discipline for similar conduct a critical factor in its decisions to disbar. In re Nesselson (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 262; In re Broverman (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 302.
¶3As the majority observes, this is not a case like In re Chapman (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 484, where an attorney was guilty of a single instance of neglect, and where alcoholism and illness were important mitigating factors. We deal here with an attorney who was undeterred by his prior discipline, who admits to serious and repeated neglect in the handling of his clients’ cases, and who has irreparably prejudiced his clients’ legal rights through misrepresentations and nondisclosures. Under these circumstances I do not believe any sanction short of disbarment will adequately protect the public or maintain the integrity of the legal profession.
¶4JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.