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101 Mass. 426

Burns v. Thayer

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1869-03-15

Writ of entry to recover real estate in Chelsea. Plea, nul disseisin. The case was submitted to the superior court on an agreed statement of facts, of which the following is all that is material: The demandant was the widow of John Burns, who bought the demanded premises of Nathan Matthews on September 15, 1854, and at the same time gave a mortgage back to Matthews to secure payment of a part of the purchase money.

Relies on Holbrook v. Finney · Clark v. Munroe

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1869-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently February 1992

12 state decisions

5018691870188018901900191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Chapman, C. J.

¶1The demandant claims a homestead estate in the demanded premises. They were conveyed by Nathan Matthews to her husband September 15, 1854, and at the same time mortgaged back to secure a part of the purchase money. The mortgage was assigned to Potter, who took possession to foreclose the mortgage April 26,1855, and a certificate of his mtry was duly made and recorded. The homestead act of 1855 was passed April 27, and took effect thirty days afterwards. It gave no homestead right to Burns or the demandant as against the mortgage. On June 29,1855, in pursuance of an agreement between Potter and Burns, the mortgage was discharged, and a *428new mortgage was taken for the amount due. The release of the old mortgage and the making of the new one appear to be parts of one transaction only, and the seisin thereby acquired by Burns between the release and the new mortgage was but momentary. Such a seisin would not give his wife a right of dower. Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 566. Clark v. Munroe, 14 Mass. 351. It would not vest in Burns an attachable interest. Haynes v. Jones, 5 Met. 292. No circumstances are stated, such as existed in Webster v. Campbell, 1 Allen, 313, to raise a doubt whether the seisin was merely instantaneous. Such a seisin is not an occupation of the premises as a residence, and therefore it is not sufficient to create a homestead estate within the terms of St. 1855, c. 238. Indeed, the actual occupation of Burns was under the second mortgage; and his homestead estate must be regarded as subject to it.

¶2Under a power of sale contained in the mortgage, Potter sold the premises to Dow by a deed which purports to convey all his title to the land, and the tenant is in possession under a conveyance from Dow. The tenant’s title constitutes a valid defence to this action, upon the principles stated above, and we have no occasion to consider the other questions that have been argued.

¶3Judgment for the tenant affirmed,.

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