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← 101 Md. App. 191 - Manders v. Brown

101 Md. App. 191 - Manders v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis

1994

Citation profile

29
cited by 29 later decisions
1
states following
June 2019
most recently cited

6 district · 21 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently June 2019 · most notably 140 Md. App. 282 - Baltimore Police Department v. Cherkes (2001), 125 Md. App. 349 - Green v. Brooks (1999)

6 district · 21 state decisions

120199420002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha · Tenney v. Brandhove · Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. · Gravel v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““[T]he mere assertion that an act ‘was done maliciously, or without just cause, or illegally, or with wanton disregard, or recklessly, or improper motive’ is not sufficient. To [overcome] a motion raising governmental immunity, the plaintiff must allege with some clarity and precision those facts which make the act malicious.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “federal and local privileges are essentially co-extensive”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “... the privilege, if it applies to appellees in this case, cannot turn on Manders’s assertions that the appellees “scuttled” the redevelopment plan to accommodate the influential crab house owners and Dana Tawes, the owner of the adjacent Tawes Lumberyard, or to benefit their individual careers and social status. If it is determined that appellees acted in their legislative capacity in modifying the urban renewal plan, the privilege may very well protect them even if they modified it to accommodate a particular group. On remand, a determination must be made as to whether the appellees were acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.