101 Md. App. 579 - Himple v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1994
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently January 2014
2 federal appellate · 12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Lansdowne v. State · Wills v. State · 90 Md. App. 254 - Austin v. State · Williams v. State · 101 Md. App. 429 - Joyner-Pitts v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““We agree. Those of us who have served on the trial courts are well aware of the temptation to embellish upon the instruction. Many trial judges, including some who are now on this Court, and many members of the Bar, have considered the concept of reasonable doubt to be a vague, almost wraith-like, concept that needs to be further explained (beyond the pattern instruction). Nevertheless, the appellate cases of this State are replete with reversals of convictions because of the attempts of those of us who have tried. Rare indeed is the veteran embellishing trial judge who has not been reversed by reason of the embellishment. “None of our many trial court embellishments, if objectively analyzed, better explain the concept than the pattern instruction whose stark simplicity was created by the bench and the bar in order to avoid the problems of embellishment. While we cannot go further than the Court of Appeals decision in Wills , we note for the benefit of the trial courts that it is our view that the risk of reversal arises when an instruction departs from the pattern instruction and the risk of reversal increases with the degree of departure from that pattern instruction.””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Ruffin v. State“[T]he defendant is presumed innocent of the crimes charged until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to a moral certainty. . . . [He] comes into Court clothed with this presumption of innocence, which remains with him from the beginning to the end of trial, as to each element of the crimes charged. The burden of proving the defendant guilty is upon the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. The defendant has no burden to sustain, does not have to prove his innocence. * * * The test of reasonable doubt is the evidence that the State has produced must be so convincing that it would enable you to act on an important piece of business in your everyday life. The words, to a moral certainty, do not mean absolute or mathematical certainty, but a certainty based upon a convincing ground of probability. The phrase beyond a reasonable doubt, does not mean beyond any doubt or all possible doubt, but, as the words indicate, beyond a doubt that is reasonable. You are further instructed that the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the offenses were committed, but that the defendant is the person who committed them.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Savoy v. State“Even if the "probability" factor had not been included, the balance of the instruction given [in Himple's case] appear[ed] to equate the degree with which people make important decisions in their everyday life with the reasonable doubt standard. That is not an accurate comparison. The important language in that portion of the pattern instruction that makes it a proper comparison is the language "willing to act. . . without reservation. " The legal reasonable doubt standard and the decision making progress in respect to important personal matters in a layman's life are not the same. It is the language "without reservation" that tends to impart to the jury the degree of certainty that elevates the comparison in the direction of the reasonable doubt standard.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Savoy v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.