101 Md. App. 585 - Emory v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

51 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`[T]here are [no] such requirements or qualifications that must be satisfied before the results from a canine sniff can be considered in a warrant application in the assessment of probable cause. By analogy, a confession must be shown to be voluntary before it may be introduced in court. A warrant application may make reference to a confession without any such qualification. A lineup identification must be shown to be reliable before it can be introduced in court. There is no such threshold requirement for it to be considered in a warrant application. Prior criminal records that may never be introduced in court are standard fare in a warrant application. The warrant-issuing process is ex parte and is far less formal than a courtroom proceeding.'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 968 So. 2d 543 - State v. Montgomery · 153 Md. App. 601 - Fitzgerald v. State

2. ““Wrongful acts planned and committed together may be proved in order to show a continuing plan or common scheme ... there must be evidence ... of one grand plan; the commission of each is merely a step toward the realization of that goal. The fact that the crimes are similar to each other or occurred close in time to each other is insufficient.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 133 Md. App. 311 - Reidnauer v. State · 151 Md. App. 64 - Behrel v. State

3. “When it comes to appellate review, however, the question becomes that of whether the State met its prima facie burden of production with respect to the other crimes. A reviewing court looks only at the legal question of whether there was some competent evidence which, if believed, could persuade the fact finder as to the existence of the fact in issue. Evidence which is legally sufficient to persuade one fact finder to the bare preponderance level is, ipso facto, legally sufficient to persuade a second fact finder to the clear and convincing level and yet a third fact finder to the beyond-a reasonable-doubt level. The questions of whether and of the degree to which legally sufficient evidence actually persuades is idiosyncratic with the fact finder. Because the weighing of evidence is the exclusive prerogative of the fact finder and does not impact on the purely legal question of whether some competent evidence is present to support a finding, evidence that is legally sufficient to satisfy one burden of persuasion is legally sufficient to satisfy any burden of persuasion. This is the “clearly erroneous” standard of appellate review. It was explicitly spelled out by State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. at 635 , 552 A.2d 896 :....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 117 Md. App. 133 - Wynn v. State